Relationship between international law and Scots criminal law under reference to extradition, mutual legal assistance and proceeds of crime by Brown, Alastair Nigel
B -. 1 c
6/n?
THE UNIVERSITYofEDINBURGH
Title Relationship between international law and Scots criminal
law under reference to extradition, mutual legal assistance
and proceeds of crime
Author Brown, Alastair Nigel
Qualification PhD
Year 1999
Thesis scanned from best copy available: may
contain faint or blurred text, and/or cropped or
missing pages.
Digitisation Notes:
• Page 81 missing in original
• Page 115 skips in original
Scanned as part of the PhD Thesis Digitisation project
http://libraryblogs.is.ed.ac.uk/phddigitisation
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
SCOTS CRIMINAL LAW UNDER REFERENCE TO







Edinburgh, 2nd August 1999





International law and Scottish criminal law 11
The focus of the thesis 14
2. SOME THEORY: TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 16
Introduction 16
General Theory 16
Monism and dualism 16
The legislative transformation of treaties 20
Bennion's first option 20
Bennion's second option 21
Bennion's third option 24
Conclusion 31
3. EXTRADITION 33
the structure of this chapter 33
Introduction 33
The nature ofextradition 33
The division ofresponsibility 34
The Anglocentricity ofUK extradition law 36
The dominance ofmunicipal law 38
The extradition treaty with the United States of America 39
Introduction 39
Extradition crimes under the treaty 41
Restrictions on extradition 47
extradition and human rights 52
Introduction 52
The 1998 legislation 52
ECHR and extradition 59
Soering v United Kingdom 63
The European Convention on Extradition 70
Introduction 70
The development ofthe Convention 70
The UK attitude to the Convention between negotiation and 1990 72
Accession with reservations 79
Extradition and the Third Pillar of the EU 85
Introduction 85
The Third Pillar described 86
The Third Pillar extradition conventions 92
The Commonwealth 94
Introduction 94
The content of the Scheme 97
Ireland 100
Article 6 of the 1988 UN Drugs Convention 102
Special extradition arrangements 106
Municipal law 106
Introduction 106
The arrest phase 107
The judicial phase 112
1
The executive phase 131
Ireland. 132
The fugitive returned to the UK 135
Conclusion 142
4. MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE 145
Introduction 145
The development of the law 149
The law before the 1990 Act 149
The European Convention on Mutual Assistance in CriminalMatters 154
The Commonwealth Scheme 155
The problem recognised 156
The modernisation ofUKmutual assistance law 157
ECMA and the UK 159
Introduction 159
Article 5 167
The Harare Scheme 171
Article 7 of the 1988 UN Drugs Convention 175
Bilateral MLATs 177
The proposed EU Mutual Assistance Convention 187
Municipal law 188
Sections 4 and 8 190
Search 199




5. PROCEEDS OF CRIME 237
Introduction 237
The early development of the law 241
DTOA and the 1987 ACT 244
The Criminal Justice Act 1988 250
The Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline 251
The Basle Statement 252
The 1988 UN Drugs Convention 254
The 1990 Act 262
The Council of Europe Laundering Convention 266
The EC Directive on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of
money laundering 270
Excursis: the First Pillar and criminal law 270
The UK approach to the Directive 274
The 1993 legislation 280
The 1994 model bilateral agreement 288
The Scottish Law Commission Report and the 1995 Act 288
The 1999 (Designated Countries and Territories) Order 301










Title of Thesis.... .(UsT..,1?£.9...MT.Q^.(ttx<2.cAJ).W......QT(fl!Bk Isfrvx/.
....1.9....b.ISMtfP.II*9.rl,...tkifoAk..9f^?....99...G&m<~
No. ofwords in the main text of Thesis nf.FFO)f. II^GOO
The relationship between international law and Scots criminal law is largely
unexamined. The thesis addresses that by examination of the principal preoccupations
of UK international criminal justice policy since the mid 1980s-extradition, mutual
legal assistance and proceeds of crime.
A theoretical foundation is laid, noting that treaties require legislative
transformation before they take effect in municipal law (other than as interpretative
tools in limited circumstances). Criminal courts have, however, not always applied
that theory rigorously. Nor have they handled treaty interpretation well.
Anglocentricity pervades UK extradition law and, notwithstanding the reform
of the law in 1988 and 1989, both municipal law and the UK's international
arrangements remain in some respects a poor fit with Scots law. Issues arising from
that are explored. It is noted that further development is likely to occur in the context
of the Third Pillar of the EU. More generally, it is demonstrated that the Extradition
Act 1989 entrenches the dominance of municipal law. Furthermore, courts tend to
apply concepts drawn from more general municipal law to the determination of
extradition law questions. These (and other) factors justify the view that municipal
law has priority in the UK's approach to extradition; though obligations under ECHR
may in some circumstances take precedence. Indeed, those obligations sometimes
conflict with obligations under extradition treaties.
Mutual legal assistance has a much smaller literature than extradition and is
therefore analysed more comprehensively in the thesis. The pattern of municipal law
priority is repeated; but it becomes clear that policy makers have not always
demonstrated a firm grasp of the principles of municipal law to which they have
sought to give such priority.
The writer has previously published a detailed analysis of proceeds of crime
law and comprehensive analysis is not, therefore, required in the thesis. The
development of the law is described and it is shown that municipal law and
international law have developed in parallel. The influence which international law
has exerted on municipal law has been limited.
Ultimately, 2 conclusions are drawn. The first is that the relationship between
international law and Scots law is not merely unexplored. It is also underdeveloped.
The second is that the relationship depends substantially upon the varying policy
priorities of UK governments.
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That transnational crime is of increasing importance has not been a novel
proposition for over a century. As long ago as 1874, Clarke was able to write that
"the complexity of business transactions, the vast extension of credit, the general
use of paper money of various kinds, all make it easy for a modern criminal to
commit a fraud which may cause far more widespread misery than a similar act
could formerly have produced, and to insure at least a few hours concealment of
his guilt. And other improvements-the use of steam, the multiplication of means
of locomotion-make it easy for him in those few hours to effect his escape to a
foreign country"1. In an introduction to a German legal text-book published in
1893, von Liszt made a similar point, writing that "...the professional thief or
swindler feels equally at home in Paris, Vienna or London...counterfeit roubles
are produced in France or England and passed in Germany...gangs of criminals
operate continuously over several countries"2.
At the end of the twentieth century such words are as true as ever.
Substitute a reference to the electronic transfer of funds for that to paper money,
replace "steam" with "air travel" and either comment could have been made by a
modern commentator. In December 1989, Earl Ferrers, the Home Office Minister
of State, opened the Second Reading debate on the Bill which became the
Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 ("the 1990 Act") with the
words "the criminal fraternity has realised that the ability to hop from state to state
and to operate across national boundaries can be turned to its advantage...Today's
criminals can fly...to most places in a matter of hours"3.
In the last 150 years or so there has been a series of developments by
which states have sought to respond to and cope with the increasing
1 E Clarke, A Treatise upon The Law ofExtradition, Stevens and Haynes, 1874, 12.
2F Von Liszt, quoted without more precise reference in F Bresler, Interpol, Sinclair Stevenson,
1992, 11.
3HL Debs Vol 513, 12 December 1989, col 1214.
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internationalisation of crime. These developments have been sporadic and not
always well co-ordinated. International criminal law norms have "originated in
diverse sources and developed unsystematically over time...[They]...are neither
uniform nor consistent in application and often vary greatly as regards source of
law, form and legal status"4.
Such efforts began in earnest with the agreement of a scattering of
extradition treaties in the nineteenth century5 and continued with the development
of police co-operation (especially the creation of Interpol in 1923) and of mutual
legal assistance mechanisms such as the European Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters 1959 ("ECMA"). They have, in the last two to
three decades in particular, resulted in a wide range of instruments designed to
attack aspects of transnational crime6. Some have been multilateral, within the
framework of the United Nations or Council of Europe, reflecting to some extent
the increasing "consensus according to which respect for certain fundamental
values is not to be left to the free disposition of States individually but is
recognised and sanctioned by international law as a matter of concern to all
States"7. One might cite as examples of this the fact that in 1996, after half a
century, the International Law Commission was finally able to adopt its Draft
Code ofCrimes Against the Peace and Security ofMankind8 and the adoption, on
4Lyal S Sunga, The Emerging System ofInternational Criminal Law, Kluwer, 1997, 2.
5There are, of course, some earlier instruments, such as the Treaty between the Netherlands and
Great Britain for the Suppression of the Slave Trade 1818.
6There were in 1991, according to Bassiouni, "315 international instruments, elaborated mostly on
an ad hoc basis between 1815 and 1988, which cover 22 categories of offences" (M Cherif
Bassiouni, "Policy Considerations on Inter-State Co-operation", in A Eser, and O Lagodny,
Principles and Procedures for a New Transnational Criminal Law, Society for the Reform of
Criminal Law and Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, 1992, 807).
7Bruno Simma, "From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law", 1994 Hague
Recueil 221, 233. This does not imply uncritical acceptance of the hypothesis of a international
civitas maxima. That hypothesis faces serious objections (see Harman van der Wilt, "The Political
Offence Exception in Extradition Law: An Antidote to Prefixed Ideas about Political Integration
in Europe" (1997) 4 MJ 25,46).
8See Report of the International Law Commission on Its Forty-eighth Session, UN GAOR, 51st
Session, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/51/10 (1996). For analysis, see Timothy LH McCormack and
Gerry J Simpson, "The International Law Commission's Draft Code ofCrimes against the Peace
and Security ofMankind: An Appraisal of the Substantive Provisions" 5 Criminal Law Forum 1
(1994); and Rosemary Rayfuse, "The Draft Code ofCrimes against the Peace and Security of
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17 July 1998, of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court9. Others
have been bilateral, reflecting not only the greater ease of reaching agreement
when only two legal systems are engaged10 but also the policy preference of
certain states (including in particular the USA11) and the underlying bilateralism
of traditional international law12. Since 1992 and the Treaty on European Union
("TEU"), the so-called "Third Pillar" of the European Union has provided a
further framework for multilateral agreements at a sub-regional level13. Indeed,
Denza has suggested that TEU marked the beginning of the reversal of the process
of divergence which was going on as between European Community law and
international law14; and we shall certainly come across examples of First Pillar
initiatives bearing on our subject in this thesis.
As a result of the efforts made by international law and municipal
criminal law to address the problems of international crimes, transnational crime
and fugitive offenders, Bassiouni and Wise have gone so far as to maintain that
there now exists "a true body of international criminal law concerned...with the
repression of conduct perceived to be harmful to the interests of the international
Mankind: Eating Disorders at the International Law Commission" 8 Criminal Law Forum 43
(1997).
9 UN Doc A/CONF. 183/9.
1 "There is, however, a mathematical disadvantage inherent in bilateralism. It has been calculated
that if all of the UN member States were to base their international co-operation in criminal
matters on bilateral treaties 14356 separate treaties would be required (W Schomburg, "The
Regionalisation of International Criminal Law and the Protection ofHuman Rights in
International Co-operation in Criminal Proceedings; Section IV of the XV Congress of the
International Association of Penal Law, IAPL" 1995 European Journal ofCrime, Criminal Law
and Criminal Justice 98.
"See P Robinson, "Treaty Negotiation, Drafting, Ratification and Accession by Caricom States"
18 West Indian Law Journal 1 (1993). The US preference is said to be based partly on
geographical factors (Schomberg, op cit).
12See Bruno Simma, op cit, 230.
"These include the Convention relating to Extradition between the Member States of the
European Union (OJ 96/C 313/02), the Convention on the Protection of the European
Communities' Financial Interests (OJ 95/C 316/03) and its Protocol (OJ 96/C 313/01), the
Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (OJ 95/C 316/01) and the
Convention on simplified extradition procedure between the Member States of the European
Union (OJ 95/C 78/01). For a description of the Third Pillar arrangements, see 85 below.
14 Eileen Denza, "Two Legal Orders: Divergent or Convergent?" (1999) 48 ICLQ 257, 270.
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community as a whole" and analogous to domestic criminal law15. This, Bassiouni
says, is "...a product of the convergence of two different legal disciplines which
have emerged and developed along different paths to become complementary and
co-extensive. They are: the criminal law aspects of international law and the
international law aspects of national criminal law"16. In similar vein, Haentjens
and Swart have written (in a criminal law context) of a developing "osmosis
between international law and domestic law"17.
It is surprising, therefore, that, although the relationship between
international law and municipal law in general is well trodden ground, the
relationship between international law and criminal law in particular has until
recently received relatively little attention from scholars. Nadelmann has said that
"...US foreign policy and criminal justice...have had remarkably little to do with
one another. The vast majority of criminal justice scholars have extended their
attention no further than their nations' borders...Among students of US foreign
policy...almost no-one has paid much attention to issues of crime and law
enforcement... Whatever arguments might once have justified this disengagement
of the two disciplines can no longer be sustained. The interpenetration of foreign
policy and criminal justice institutions and concerns have simply become too
substantial to be ignored by scholars any longer"18.
International law and Scottish criminal law
What Nadelmann wrote about the USA could be written with equal force about
Scotland. The relationship between international law and Scots criminal law
15 M CherifBassiouni and Edward M Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or
Prosecute in International Law, Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1995, ix.
I6MC Bassiouni, Characteristics ofInternational Criminal Law Conventions (in MC Bassiouni,
(ed), International Criminal Law: 1 Crimes Transnational Publishers, 1986) 1.
l7Rijnhard Haentjens and Bert Swart, "Substantive Criminal Law" in Bert Swart and Andre Klip
(eds), International Criminal Law in the Netherlands, Max Planck Institut, 1997, 28.
I8EA Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization ofUS Criminal Law
Enforcement Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, xiii. A similar observation was made by
Currie, who wrote "...criminal cases having foreign aspects tend to fall between two stools, in the
academic world at least." (B Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict ofLaws, 1963, quoted in JJ
Murphy, "Revising Domestic Extradition Law" 131 University ofPennsylvania Law Review 1063,
1065 (1983)).
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remains largely unexamined. Published analysis of the UK's international
criminal law arrangements from a Scots law perspective is limited19, as is analysis
of the legislation applicable in Scotland which forms the domestic counterpart to
such international arrangements. It is the business of this thesis to begin to remedy
that state of affairs; but the endeavour confronts us with two immediate
difficulties.
The first is that there is a paucity of Scottish case-law on international
criminal law matters. For geographical reasons (Scotland is not really en route to
anywhere and London is a much more significant financial centre than any
Scottish city), Scotland is not a very obvious place for the transnational criminal
to include in his itinerary. The opportunities for Scottish courts to consider issues
of international criminal law have therefore been much more restricted than have
been those enjoyed by the English courts. Such opportunities have been further
restricted because the Extradition Act 1870 ("the 1870 Act"), which for most of
th
the 20 Century has provided the context for consideration of international
criminal law issues by UK courts, in most cases effectively denied the Scottish
courts jurisdiction even over fugitives arrested in Scotland20.
A shortage of writing and a shortage of case-law means that much of the
analysis of legislation will have to proceed from first principles; but not
exclusively so. We can draw on literature from other jurisdictions and in
particular we can make use of the literature and cases of English law, which
shares many of the relevant legislative provisions with Scotland or has very close
equivalents. Indeed, such international criminal law treaties as have been
incorporated into UK law have typically been so incorporated in legislation which
has been drafted first in English legal categories and then "translated" (not always
very well) into Scots law21, so that when one looks at the English case law on that
"The Juridical Review Centenary Index, for example, lists only 2 articles in that journal on
extradition between 1889 and 1988.
20 See 36 below.
21 One does not, of course, have to approve of this approach to legislating: the writer agrees with
much ofwhat is contained in W Finnie, "International Co-operation Against Crime and Scots
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legislation, one looks at the case law of the legal system under reference to which
the legislation was originally drafted. That is obviously likely to be helpful in
understanding the intention of the draftsman. Moreover, the relationship between
Scots law and international law is carried on by proxy. In international fora the
UK speaks with a single voice and that voice is rarely well informed about Scots
law. There was, for example, no Scottish representation on the UK delegation at
the 1988 United Nations Conference to adopt the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 ("the
1988 UN Drugs Convention") (by any measure, one of the most important
international instruments dealing with criminal law matters to have been
developed in the last 50 years22). The fact that the treaties with which we will be
concerned have been negotiated under primary reference to English law reinforces
the need to take account of English case-law in understanding their effect. It also,
incidentally, means that the relationship between international law and Scots law
tends to be unidirectional. One can identify many examples of changes made to
Scots law in order to reflect developments on the international plane. It is,
however, hard to identify any examples of Scots law influencing even UK
international policy, much less international law.
Accordingly, although this thesis is concerned with international criminal
law from a Scots law perspective, extensive use will be made of English law
material. This approach is, for a Scots lawyer, counter-intuitive. Farmer has
pointed out that "Scottish criminal law has been shaped by its determination to
remain independent from its English neighbour", that this determination is
particularly evident in criminal matters and that "much of the writing on Scots
Legislation", 1990 SLT (News) 205. See also TB Smith's characteristically pungent observation
(after noting the complaints made to the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs in 1953 about
extending English statutes to Scotland by an "application section") that this "causes an intolerable
waste of time and effort. It is not possible in the complex conditions of today to ensure that all
laws should be drafted so that he who runs may read, but they should not be made more difficult
for one sitting in Edinburgh to understand than for one sitting in London..." (TB Smith, A Short
Commentary on the Law ofScotland, W Green & Son Ltd, 1962, 27).
22See the analysis in DW Sproule, and P St-Denis, "The UN Drug Trafficking Convention: An
Ambitious Step", 1989 Canadian Yearbook ofInternational Law 263, 291.
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criminal law either assumes or celebrates this difference. It may be expressed in
the crude belief that Scottish law is better than English law, or, more usually, in
an unreflective separatism that assumes that being Scottish, and a subject of the
Scottish legal system, confers certain benefits and that this should not be tampered
with or criticised for fear of endangering a hard-won independence"23. Extensive
use of English law material should save this thesis from unreflective separatism
but it will also be important to avoid the equal and opposite danger, which is to
understate the extent to which the criminal law and criminal justice systems of
Scotland and England "still differ markedly"24 and assume that the relationship
between international law and Scots criminal law must be much the same as that
between international law and English criminal law. The criminal law of Scotland
is not merely a variation on English criminal law. Accordingly, its relationship
with international law requires to be explored in its own right.
The second difficulty is the sheer size of the field25. An adequate
examination of all aspects of international criminal law is impossible in the space
available. It is necessary to focus on a smaller area. Even within that smaller area,
analysis will require to be highly selective. The thesis will describe the law only
to the extent necessary to found analysis of the relationship between international
law and criminal law. References to more descriptive texts will be given as
appropriate.
The focus of the thesis
International co-operation is arguably the aspect of international criminal law
within which international law and national criminal law have had to engage with
each other most directly. Writing from an official UK Government perspective in
23L Farmer, Criminal law, tradition and legal order: Crime and the genius ofScots law, 1747 to
the present, Cambridge University Press, 1997, 21.
24John Hatchard, Barbara Huber and Richard Vogler, Comparative Criminal Procedure, British
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1996, 180.
25See MP Scharf, "Report of the ABA Task Force on Teaching International Criminal Law", 5
Criminal Law Forum 91 (1994); and Roger S Clark, "Countering Transnational and International
Crime: Defining the Agenda" in Peter J Cullen and William C Gilmore (eds), Crimes sans
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a paper published in 1992, Harding said that "in the UK perception there are 3
main pillars of international co-operation: extradition (perhaps the oldest of all),
general mutual assistance, and co-operation in the confiscation of criminal
assets"26. It would be possible to write exclusively about international co¬
operation and indeed that accounts for a significant part of what follows. Co¬
operation in the confiscation of criminal assets is, however, only one aspect of the
wider subject ofproceeds of crime law, which also includes domestic confiscation
law and money laundering law. By considering proceeds of crime law as a whole,
we have the opportunity to examine the relationship between international law
and criminal law as it affects an aspect of substantive law. These 3 subjects-
extradition, mutual assistance and proceeds of crime (in the wide sense)-have
been the principal (but not the exclusive) preoccupations of UK international
criminal law policy since the mid 1980s. They form the focus of our study and,
after stating some basic theory, we shall take them in the order just stated. The
law is stated according to material available at 1 May 1999.
Frontieres: International and European Legal Approaches, Hume Papers on Public Policy
(Edinburgh University Press) 1998, 20.
26Op cit, 238.
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2. SOME THEORY: TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW
Introduction
The general theory of the relationship between international law and municipal
law is well-trodden ground. That theoiy must form the starting point for




It is conventional to analyse legal systems as either dualist or monist in terms of
their relationship with international law. Reuter has summarised these two
positions by saying that: "Essentially, dualists regard international and municipal
law as completely separate, except for the head of State who is the only State
organ entitled to represent the State both in municipal and international law. On
the other hand, monists hold that municipal law is linked and subject to
international law with regard to all State organs"27. To put it another way (albeit
over-simply), in a monist system, international law is directly enforceable in
municipal courts whereas in a dualist system some act of incorporation into
municipal law is required before international rules can be invoked in those
courts.
State practice varies considerably28. Wallace and Grant have asserted,
without citation of authority, that "[i]n the United Kingdom a "mixed" approach
prevails: that is, monistic with regard to customary international law and dualistic
in respect of treaty law"29. The assumption which underlies this (and their
subsequent discussion) is that Scots law and English law are the same on this
issue.
27 P Reuter, Introduction to the Law ofTreaties, 2nd edition (translated by Jose Mico and Peter
Haggenmacher), Kegan Paul International, 1995, 17.
28 See Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim's International Law, 9th edition,
Longman, 1992, i. 54 ("Oppenheim").
29 RMM Wallace and JP Grant, "Public International Law", in Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia of
the Laws ofScotland, Vol 19, Law Society of Scotland/Butterworths, 1990, para 653.
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No-one has seriously challenged the assertion that throughout the UK the
relationship between conventional international law and municipal law is
essentially a dualist one30. Evans has speculated that differences between Scots
law and English law "might be thought to harbour problems in connection with
treaties to which the United Kingdom is a party, since at international law the
United Kingdom is required to eliminate any divergence between Scots and
English law which prevents fulfilment of treaty obligations" but to the limited
extent that he develops that thought it is to argue, in effect, that Scots law is more
dualist than English law31. And Hunt takes the view that the UK's dualism is
usually over-stated in theory but does say that the effect at the practical level is to
produce "a legal culture of resistance to the use of international law before
domestic courts"32. This is consistent with Higgins' observation that where
legislation exists bringing a treaty into effect in domestic law, "the court will
much prefer to look at the English legal instrument rather than the treaty"33.
Notwithstanding this, however, we shall see that such resistance is not universal.
Some judges seem at some times to be willing to find ways of taking more notice
of international law than strict theory might suggest they should.
The orthodox (that is, dualist) approach may be justified under reference
to constitutional theory, in which treaties are entered into, as all external relations
are conducted, under prerogative powers, by the act of the Executive, which does
30 It is difficult to identify any rule of customary international law which bears upon the subject
areas under consideration in this thesis (except as regards underlying issues such as the effect of
state sovereignty on the investigation of transnational offences). For that reason, the effect of
customary international law in Scots municipal law is not discussed in any substantial way here;
but the position is stated briefly in this note.
It is clear that customary norms opposable to the UK are per se part of English law
(Oppenheim i 56; Chung Chi Cheung v The King [1939] AC 160). Absent authority to the
contrary, the position adopted by Wallace and Grant (above, n29) and Gane and Mackarel
(Christopher Gane and Mark Mackarel, Human Rights and the Administration ofJustice,
International Bar Association/Kluwer, 1997, xvi), which makes no distinction between Scots and
English law, is probably correct. It would be unsatisfactory if the parts of a unitary state like the
UK observed different rules on the matter. It is also clear that, in Scots law, statute "trumps"
customary norms (Moretensen v Peters (1906) 5 Adam 121).
31 AC Evans, "Treaties and United Kingdom Legislation: The Scottish Dimension" 1984 JR 41.
32 Murray Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts, Hart Publishing, 1998, 11.
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not itself have the power to alter the law (that being a matter for the legislature)34.
As the ILA Committee on International Law in Municipal Courts put it, "to admit
that a treaty could have force to create rights and duties in municipal law unaided
by its incorporation in that law by statute would be to admit that the executive
could make law, thus infringing the doctrine of the separation ofpowers"35.
It is, then, clear that treaties are not self-executing in UK law36. Rather,
they require to be implemented by primary legislation37. If such primary
legislation has not been enacted, and still more if it has been enacted in terms
which run contrary to the treaty, the treaty cannot be invoked in the domestic
courts to override domestic law. Mann asserts that treaties, being non-justiciable,
cannot provide a defence38. Higgins attributes the non-justiciability of treaties to
the fact that the performance of a treaty obligation is a matter of prerogative and
that treaties, other than human rights treaties, do not bestow benefits on
individuals39.
There is a presumption that municipal law will conform to international
33 R Higgins, "United Kingdom" in FG Jacobs and S Roberts (eds), The Effect ofTreaties in
Domestic Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987, 123, 137.
34 See FA Mann, Foreign Affairs in English Courts, Clarendon Press, 1986, 84; and S de Smith
and R Brazier, Constitutional andAdministrative Law, 7th edition, Penguin Books, 1994, 151-
153. We may compare the position in the USA, where, by Article VI of the Constitution, treaties
are to form part of domestic law and judges are bound by them. US treaty practice therefore finds
it necessary to involve the legislature in the accession process. Similarly, the French Constitution
of 1958 provides by Article 55 that treaties, once ratified and published, have an authority
superior to that of legislation. This is not to say that all treaties to which the USA is Party are self
executing, but elaboration of the issues in US law is outwith the scope of this thesis. For a detailed
consideration, see Y Iwasawa, "The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A
Critical Analysis" 26 Virginia Journal ofInternational Law 627 (1986).
35 International Law Association, Committee on International Law in Municipal Courts, "First
Report: Summary of Questionnaire Responses", in Report ofthe Sixty-Sixth Conference, 1994,
326, 327.
36 Mann has suggested (op cit, 84) that a treaty relating to a matter exclusively within the scope of
the prerogative may have the force of law directly but it is thought that no matter within the
criminal law field would come into that category. Even diplomatic immunity is regulated by
statute (Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 Schedule 1).
37 See the UK's response to a Council of Europe questionnaire on the issue, reproduced at 58 B Yb
Int'l L (1987) 506.
38 FA Mann, op cit, 82. His examples relate to civil proceeding but there seems to be no reason in
principle why criminal proceedings should be subject to any different rule and there is certainly no
authority that they are.
39 Loc cit.
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law but it is only a presumption. Diplock LJ summarised the position in Salomon
v Commissioners of Customs and Excisew: "[w]here, by a treaty, Her Majesty's
Government undertakes either to introduce domestic legislation to achieve a
specified result in the United Kingdom or to secure a specified result which can
only be achieved by legislation, the treaty, since in English law it is not self
operating, remains irrelevant to any issue in the English courts until Her Majesty's
Government has taken steps by way of legislation to fulfil its treaty obligations.
Once the Government has legislated...the court must in the first instance construe
the legislation, for that is what the court has to apply. If the terms of the
legislation are clear and unambiguous, they must be given effect to, whether or
not they carry out her Majesty's treaty obligations, for the sovereign power of the
Queen in Parliament extends to breaking treaties41." Lord Diplock had said
something very similar in British Airways v Laker Airways42. In Kaur v Lord
Advocate43 Lord Ross adopted the same reasoning44 and, although Kaur has since
been overturned in T, Petitioner45, it is clear that the Inner House in that case
nevertheless accepted the accuracy of what Lord Diplock had said in Salomon. It
was what Lord Ross built on that foundation that they proceeded to demolish46.
Salomon may therefore be regarded as expressing Scots law as well as English. It
may be added that treaties which have been incorporated are in no special position
40 [1967] AC 116 at 143. Lord Diplock referred, as authority for this passage, to Ellerman Lines
Ltd vMurray; White Star Line ofRoyal and United StatesMail Steamers Oceanic Steam
Navigation Company Ltd v Comerford [1931] AC 126 in which the failure of the Merchant
Shipping (International Labour Conventions) Act 1925 to give proper effect to a draft convention
of the International Labour Organization of the League ofNations was fatal to the appellants' case.
41 The European Court ofHuman Rights has been careful, in Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v
Sweden (1976) 1 EHRR 617, to avoid holding that the Article 13 ECHR obligation to provide an
effective remedy before a national authority in respect of the violation of ECHR rights amounted
to a requirement to incorporate ECHR into national law.
42 [1985] AC 58, 85-86.
43 1 981 SLT322.
44 At 330.
45 1997 SLT 724.
46 See especially the opinion of Lord President Hope at 733 J-K.
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and in particular do not represent "higher" law than statute47.
The legislative transformation of treaties
The process of legislative transformation of a treaty can be difficult, not least
because of inherent differences between a treaty and legislation. To make the
point by over-simplifying it, treaties are negotiated by diplomats whose primary
objective is likely to be agreement and who will be prepared to achieve it through
"accommodation and compromise through vague and ambiguous language"48;
whereas the primary task of the Parliamentary draftsman is to achieve certainty.
The means of effecting legislative transformation of treaties have been
analysed in various ways49 but we take as our framework Bennion's tripartite
division50. First, he suggests, an Act may embody provisions which have the same
effect as the treaty, but which do not necessarily use the same words. Secondly,
the Act may provide that the treaty itself is to have effect as law. Finally, the
treaty may "be left simply as an international obligation, being referred to in the
construction of a relevant enactment only so far as called for by the presumption
that Parliament intends to comply with public international law"51.
Bennion's first option
Bennion regards the first option as the most satisfactory because it allows for the
tailoring of the language to the municipal legal system of the country concerned.
Lord Diplock explained the need for this in Fothergill v Monarch Airlines52:
"[t]he language of that Convention which has been adopted at the international
conference to express the common intention of the majority of states represented
there is meant to be understood in the same sense by the courts of all those states
which ratify or accede to the Convention. Their national styles of legislative
draftsmanship will vary considerably as between one another...The language of an
47 Higgins, op cit, 129. How far this proposition will require to be modified by the somewhat
special case of the Human Rights Act 1998 remains to be seen; though even in that example, the
status which the treaty has as regards legislation is itself derived from legislation.
48 See DL Mendis, "The Legislative Transformation of Treaties" 1992 Statute Law Review 216.
49 For a survey, see Mendis, op cit.
50 FAR Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code (3rd Edition), Butterworths, 1997, 523.
51 Bennion, loc cit.
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international convention...is neither couched in the conventional English
legislative idiom nor designed to be construed exclusively by English judges".
The same could be said, mutatis mutandis, about the construction of treaties by
Scottish judges.
Reasonable as this undoubtedly is, it nevertheless has the effect that what
the courts come to interpret and apply will not be the treaty but will be the statute.
On the basis of Salomon, a discrepancy between the meaning of the treaty and the
meaning of the statute will be resolved in favour of the statute. Indeed, if the
statute is clear and unambiguous, Salomon decides that the treaty will not even be
looked at, notwithstanding Mann's assertion that the "convention belongs to the
travaux preparatoires [of the statute] which an English judge is allowed to look
at"53.
Bennion's second option
Bennion's second option is one which has been much used in relation to
extradition treaties, typically by a combination of primary legislation and Order in
Council. In the case of the European Convention on Extradition 1957 ("ECE"),
the primary legislation is the Extradition Act 1989 ("the 1989 Act), which
provides all of the domestic legal framework within which the treaty
arrangements are to operate. Subordinate to that is the European Convention on
Extradition Order 199054 which gives effect to the Convention and reproduces it
in a Schedule. That reproduction opens the Convention to the scrutiny of the UK
courts as part of UK law rather than merely as an aid to interpretation; though
there is some lack of clarity about what it is that the courts think they are
interpreting where this method is used. In The Hollandia55, Sir Sebag Shaw said
that a UK legislative provision which incorporates international rules in a
schedule operates so as to "imbue them with the character of a statutory
enactment". In the same case, Ackner LJ considered that he was dealing with a
52 [1981] AC 251.
53 Op cit, 98.
54 SI 1990 No.1507.
55 [1982] 1QB 872 at 885.
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question of statutory interpretation. In Fothergill v Monarch Airlines56, however,
Lord Wilberforce considered that he was to interpret the text of a treaty
incorporated by this method "according to the principles upon which international
conventions are to be interpreted".
Both of these approaches have something to be said for them. Where the
words of a treaty are enacted in a statute, one can see why they should be imbued
with statutory quality. Alternatively, since the principles of treaty interpretation
are matters of customary international law and hence directly part of UK law57,
one can see why they should be applied to treaty wording reproduced in statute.
The Wilberforce approach has not, however, been reflected in the actual approach
of the courts.
Gardiner has pointed out that English courts have tended to assume that
"the process of bringing a treaty into English law by legislation excuses them
from considering fully the international law origins of treaties"58. His analysis
proceeds under reference to cases in the civil courts and his conclusion is that the
courts have tended to "cherry pick" from the principles set out in Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 ("the 1969 Vienna Convention"),
making occasional reference to isolated aspects of them in order to support
particular interpretations rather than treating them as the framework for
interpretation. Writing in relation to the Fothergill case itself, Bates has been
critical of the Court's understanding of the Vienna rules and of its understanding
of their relevance59. In a criminal law context, examination of the extradition cases
demonstrates that, although the courts purport to interpret treaties incorporated by
the enactment of their words according to their character as treaties, in fact the
Vienna rules are effectively ignored in favour of a flawed approach based on the
analogy between treaties and contracts and justifiable neither on the Wilberforce
56 At 281.
57 See n 30 above.
58 Richard Gardiner, "Treaty Interpretation in the English Courts since Fothergill v Monarch
Airlines" (1995) 44 ICLQ 620, 626.
59 T StJ Bates, "A Treaty and its Texts in the Courts" 1981 Statute Law Review 99.
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approach nor on the Shaw/Ackner approach.
R v Governor ofAshfordPrison, exp Postlethwaite60 is the leading case on
the interpretation of extradition treaties. The House of Lords' approach in that
case was based on what was said in two earlier cases, namely re Arton (No 2fx
and R v Governor ofAshford Remand Centre ex p Beese62. In Arton, Lord Russell
CJ said that extradition treaties "should receive a liberal interpretation, which
means no more than that they should receive their true construction according to
their language, object and intent". This was consistent with what came to be
Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. In Beese, however, Lord Widgery
CJ said that the treaty "is a contract between two sovereign states and has to be
construed as such a contract. It would be a mistake to think that it had to be
construed as though it were a domestic statute. It must be construed as a contract,
and when its true meaning has been ascertained in that way, then that meaning
must be applied to the Act of 1870 with such consequences as follow". A little
later, he said "we have two contracting parties making a bargain. The bargain
involves an obligation on each to surrender the citizens of the other under
extradition procedures". Lord Parker CJ had used similar language in Kotronis63.
But although there is an obvious analogy between treaties and contracts64, Szasz
points out that "while maintaining their contractual trappings, the instruments that
nowadays form the backbone of the law of nations...are not contractual in the
normal sense"65. Lord Widgery's approach elevates an analogy into a canon of
interpretation.
Postlethwaite turned on the question whether the evidence adduced in
support of an extradition request from Belgium had to be in a form in which it
was admissible in an English court. The bilateral extradition treaty with Belgium
60 [1988] 1 AC 924; see especially Lord Bridge ofHarwich at 945.
61 [1896] 1 QB 509.
62 [1973] 1 WLR969.
63 R v Governor ofBrixton Prison, ex p Kotronis [1971] AC 260 at 260.
64 Paul Szasz, "General Law Making Processes", in Oscar Schachter and Christopher C Joyner
(eds), UnitedNations Legal Order, Vol 1, ASIL/Grotius, 39.
65 Loc cit.
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in fact set out procedure in the English court of committal in some detail and in
particular it included the requirement that the fugitive, having been the subject of
provisional arrest, should be set free if the "evidence" in support of the request
was not presented within two months. The court had to decide what was meant by
"evidence".
In the House of Lords, Lord Bridge of Harwich said that two important
principles had to be borne in mind. The first of these he derived from Arton : "the
court should not, unless constrained by the language used, interpret any
extradition treaty in a way which would 'hinder and narrow the operation ofmost
salutory international arrangements'". The second he derived from Beese:
extradition treaties are contracts66.
Bennion's third option
Bennion's third option as regards the effect of treaties in domestic law is the
leaving of the treaty as an interpretative tool. So far as Scots law is concerned, this
third option has only relatively recently become available, as a result of T,
Petitioner61. Hitherto, Scots law was expressed in Kaur v Lord Advocate and in
Moore v Secretary ofState for Scotland, both of which concerned the use to be
made of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 1950 ("ECHR") and which in Murdoch's estimation, stood "as twin
watchdogs at the doors of the [Scottish] legal system prohibiting entry of [ECHR]
without legislative authority". Murdoch went on to point out that those decisions
not only denied to ECHR the status of a hierarchically superior norm but also
prevented use of the Convention as an aid to the construction of statutes and as a
66 In Re McAliskey unreported, Queens Bench Divisional Court, 22 January 1997, CO 156/97, the
Divisional Court followed Postlethwaite and Arton in holding that a treaty should receive a liberal
interpretation. The issue was the effect on UK obligations of the German reservation to ECE by
which that State declines to extradite its nationals. The Court referred to the 1969 Vienna
Convention for the meaning and purpose of reservations. But even though the Court referred to
that Convention for one purpose and even though the correct approach to the interpretation of





source of principle for development of the common law69. He maintained
(probably correctly) that of all the then member states of the Council of Europe it
was the legal system of Scotland which accorded ECHR the least recognition70.
In Kaur Lord Ross, sitting in the Outer House, refused to treat ECHR as
an aid to interpretation of statute, saying "[i]f a Convention does not form part of
the municipal law, I do not see why the court should have regard to it at all". In
Moore the Inner House said that Lord Ross in Kaur had been correct to hold that
ECHR plays no part in UK law unless incorporated by legislation. Bates,
however, has criticised Lord Ross's reasoning on a number of grounds, the first of
which is that Lord Ross had based his opinion on "a limited analysis of the issues
and of the English case law" and "the view of a rather limited range of English
textbook writers". He has pointed out that unincorporated treaties which evidence
rules of customary international law will certainly be required to be considered by
the court and concluded that "giving a limited interpretative effect to
unincorporated treaty provisions is not the dramatic departure from principle it is
sometimes presented"71.
Since Bates wrote, the rule that ambiguous statutory provisions fall to be
interpreted so as to be conform to the UK's international treaty obligations has
been consolidated in English law and that development has been applied to Scots
law in T, Petitioner. This case represented an opportunity which Lord President
Hope had been seeking for some time72. In it, he said that the view which Lord
Ross had expressed in Kaur was looking increasingly outdated and that it was
time that it was expressly departed from73. He went on to point out that "it is now
clearly established as part of the law of England and Wales...that in construing
any provision in domestic legislation which is ambiguous in the sense that it is
69 JL Murdoch, "The European Convention on Human Rights in Scots Law", [1991] PL 40.
70 Loc cit.
71 T StJ Bates, "Treaties in the Courts" 1981 Statute Law Review 40.
72 Lord Hope of Craighead, "Devolution and Human Rights" [1998] EHRLR 367, 370.
73 The opportunity had in fact been missed in Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications Ltd 1989
SLT 705 when the House of Lords, in a Scottish appeal, followed the English authorities and used
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capable of bearing a meaning which either conforms or conflicts with the [Human
Rights] Convention, the Courts will presume that Parliament intended to legislate
in conformity with the Convention, not in conflict with it".
This is, of course, entirely consistent with the residual effect of treaties
contemplated in Salomon. In that case, almost immediately after the passage
quoted above about the sovereign power to break treaties, Lord Diplock went on
to say: "...if the terms of the legislation are not clear but are reasonably capable of
more than one meaning, the treaty itself becomes relevant, for there is a prima
facie presumption that Parliament does not intend to act in breach of international
law...if one of the meanings which can reasonably be ascribed to the legislation is
consonant with the treaty obligations and another or others are not, the meaning
which is consonant is to be preferred". Lord Diplock was to repeat this view
within a few months in Post Office v Estuary Radio74 and the position was to be
reinforced in Fothergill v Monarch Airlines15, when the House of Lords reviewed
the development of the law and Lord Roskill said76: "In my judgement it is now
clear law that where the source of the legislation in question is not the ordinary
Parliamentary process but is an international treaty or convention and the statute
is designed to give effect to that treaty or convention, it is legitimate to look at
that source in order to resolve ambiguities in the legislation which has made those
treaty or convention provisions part of the municipal law of this country"77. An
example of this being done is to be found in R v Bow Street Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate and others ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 3)™ in which the
House of Lords, in seeking to determine whether the double criminality principle
in the 1989 Act applied at the date of the offence or at the date of the extradition
request, considered the travaux preparatoires of ECE for what assistance could
ECHR as an aid to interpretation but without explicitly considering whether that could be done
and without reference, disapproving or otherwise, to Kaur.




77 This passage was strictly obiter because the treaty in question had in fact been incorporated in a
Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act 1961.
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be derived79.
In T, Petitioner, the Lord President adopted language similar to that used
by Lord Roskill in Fothergill, saying that the Scottish courts should now apply
the same approach as the English, so that "when legislation is found to be
ambiguous in the sense that it is capable of a meaning which either conforms to or
conflicts with the Convention, Parliament is to be presumed to have legislated in
conformity with the Convention, not in conflict with it". This must be regarded as
the definitive articulation of Scots law on the subject80; though one qualification
must be made. Even before T, Petitioner, Lord Justice-General Hope was
prepared, in Anderson v HM Advocate8', to consider the case law of ECtHR,
distinguishing those cases which limit reference to unincorporated treaties on the
basis that the High Court was not in Anderson concerned with statutory
interpretation, so that the need to recognise the supremacy of Parliament, which
has always been a matter of concern to the courts, did not arise.
The availability of an unincorporated treaty as a aid to statutory
interpretation is confined to those circumstances in which the legislation is
ambiguous, in which case if it can be construed so as to be consistent with the
Convention it should be so construed. Gilmore and Neff have pointed out that the
use of ECHR as an aid to interpretation is subject to the inherent limitation that it
can only arise where domestic law is "in a state of uncertainty"82. It remains the
position that, as Davitt, P. put it for Irish law in Gearoid O LaighlisS3, "where
there is an irreconcilable conflict between a domestic statute and the principles of
international law or the provisions of an international convention, the Courts
administering the domestic law must give effect to the statute". It is true that
78 [1999] TLR 222 (March 25, 1999).
79See especially the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson. The case is considered in more detail
below, 114.
80 It may also be noted that it is the approach criticised by Evans, in commenting on Kaur, as
lacking rigour: see AC Evans, op cit, 62.
81 1996 SLT 155.
82 WC Gilmore and SC Neff, "On Scotland, Europe and Human Rights" in HL MacQueen, ed,
Scots Law into the 21st century; Essays in Honour ofWA Wilson W Green/Sweet & Maxwell,
1996, 265, 267.
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Brownlie has asserted that treaties may be used to identify latent ambiguities in
their implementing statutes84 but (subject to the effect of the Human Rights Act
199885 ("HRA")) that proposition cannot at present be supported by UK authority,
runs contrary to the insistence in Salomon that "if the terms of the legislation are
clear and unambiguous, they must be given effect to, whether or not they carry out
Her Majesty's treaty obligations, for the sovereign power of the Queen in
Parliament extends to breaking treaties" and seems to be excluded by the
approach taken by the House of Lords in Brind v Secretary ofState for the Home
Department86, which has been summarised as being that "the presumption that
legislation complies with treaty obligations does not apply so as to limit the
meaning of clear general words, but can be applied only where there is a real
ambiguity, ie where the words are capable ofbearing more than one meaning"87.
That the theory is as described is a proposition which is well supported by
the cases cited. In at least one asylum and one mutual legal assistance case
recently, however, the House of Lords and the Divisional Court have used
international law material more freely than Brind might have led one to expect.
The asylum case is T v Home Secretary88 and the mutual assistance case is R v
Secretary ofState for the Home Department, exp Fininvest SpA and Others89.
In T v Home Secretary the appellant sought to overturn the Home
Secretary's refusal of his asylum application and the case depended on whether or
not the act of causing an explosion which killed 10 people was a political crime.
The House of Lords proceeded on the basis that the concept of the political
offence is identical as between asylum law and extradition law.
In concluding that the appellant's crime was not within the scope of the
83 [1960] IR 93.
841 Brownlie, Principles ofPublic International Law, 5th edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998,
48; a passage quoted (from the 3rd edition) with approval by the Canadian courts in National
Corn Growers Association v Canadian Import Tribunal (1990) 74 DLR (4th) 449,483.
85 See 52 below.
86 [1991] AC 696.
87 Lord Browne-Wilkinson, "The Infiltration of a Bill ofRights" [1992] PL 397, 404.
88 [1996] 2 WLR 766.
89[1997] 1 All ER 942.
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concept, Lord Mustill considered international material for the light which it shed
on the perceptions of the international community about the degree of protection
which should be given to refugees who have committed violent crime which has
harmed the public at large. He examined, inter alia, the European Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism 1977 (to which effect has been given in UK law90)
and the League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism 1937 (which never entered into force). Lord Mustill's exposition of the
concept of the political offence was masterly; but at no stage did he explain the
theoretical basis on which reference to such material could be justified.
In T v Home Secretary, Lord Mustill was concerned with an international
law concept and was not concerned with an unadorned question of the application
of a statute. One can understand why he thought the international material
relevant and also why he might not have regarded the limitations on the use of
international material as requiring his attention. The emphasis in cases such as
Salomon and (as regards customary international law) Mortensen v Peters91 is on
the sovereignty of Parliament. Where that concept was not really in issue, the
need to take care to keep international law in a subordinate position within the
domestic legal system did not arise. In Fininvest, however, a statutory provision
was in issue and it rather appears that the theory was overlooked.
The point at issue was whether the Secretary of State ought, in exercising
his discretion to refer to the Serious Fraud Office a request for mutual assistance
received by him92, to consider whether or not the request concerns a political
offence. In dealing with that, Simon Brown LJ devoted substantial consideration
to the question whether the Home Secretary should have had regard to Article 2(a)
ECMA93. He referred to ECMA for two propositions. The first related to an
90 Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978, now re-enacted, with enlargements, by the Extradition Act
1989.
91 See n 30 above.
92 See 191 below.
93 Gage J, who sat with him, simply agreed with Simon Brown LJ's judgement and Lords Lloyd of
Berwick, Steyn and Hope ofCraighead in due course refused leave to appeal to the House of
Lords, so that Simon Brown LJ's judgement is the only reasoned opinion we have in the case.
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attempt by the applicants for judicial review to persuade the court to understand
the reference to "evidence" in section 4 of the 1990 Act in the restricted way the
word had been understood before the passing of that Act. He replied to this that
"the 1990 Act... created a wholly new scheme for mutual assistance with regard
to criminal investigations, a scheme under which it would plainly be necessary to
examine altogether more material than would ultimately constitute evidence at
any trial. True, the word 'evidence' continues to be used, but Parliament cannot
thereby have intended to confine assistance within the relatively narrow limits
prescribed by the Westinghouse case and Re State ofNorway's Application (No I).
That in effect would be to defeat the very change being brought about by the 1990
Act. The terms of art 1 of the 1959 Convention should in this regard be noted"94.
He then quoted Article 1 ECMA and went on to say that "that consideration of
itself is sufficient to defeat the applicants' central contentions here with regard to
the width of disclosure sought in this case". One cannot quarrel with the
conclusion that the intention of the 1990 Act was to make assistance more widely
available than had previously been the case; but it is doubtful whether the word
"evidence" in the context of the 1990 Act is really ambiguous so as to make it
legitimate for the Court to refer to the unincorporated Convention.
When Simon Brown LJ referred again to ECMA he recorded that the
Home Secretary had founded on the silence of the 1990 Act as regards political
offences and that this silence was contrasted with the making of explicit provision
as regards fiscal offences. He said, however, that the Home Secretary's position
was "plainly unsound" because section 4(3) deals only with some fiscal offences
and not all of them and does so merely by removing the discretion which would
otherwise exist with regard to them. He went on to say "This leaves other fiscal
offence requests to be considered, just like any political offence requests, under
the remaining provisions of s4, which expressly confer upon the Home Secretary
a general discretion in the matter. It seems to me quite impossible to contend that
in exercising this general discretionary power the Home Secretary is entitled to
94 Emphasis added.
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ignore the express discretion arising under art 2. The Secretary of State would in
my judgement plainly be overlooking a material consideration if, for example, he
simplyforgot the existence ofart 2(a)"95.
An assumption underlies Simon Brown LJ's remark that the Secretary of
State is not entitled to ignore the treaty provision. That assumption is that the
question whether or not the Secretary of State complies with the treaty is
justiciable at the instance of an individual as an exception to the general rule that
reference may only be made to treaties where an ambiguous statutory provision
requires to be interpreted. There is no authority for the proposition that there is
any such exception and Simon Brown LJ did not support his reference to the
treaty by reasoning. At best, it is suggested, the basis on which reference was
made to the treaty in Fininvest is very doubtful.
Conclusion
In theory, treaties require legislative transformation before they can properly be
invoked in municipal law, except where implementing legislation is ambiguous.
In that case, the effect of the presumption that the UK intends to legislate in
conformity with its treaty obligations is to make treaties available as interpretative
tools. Especially as regards Scots law, that presumption has been developed under
reference to ECHR. Most of the rights guaranteed by Part 1 of ECHR are now
being incorporated into UK law by HRA. Whether the presumption will be further
developed in relation to other treaties remains to be seen.
There has in some cases been a lack of clarity about the principles to be
applied to the interpretation of incorporated treaties and, although the use of the
contractual analogy will often achieve the same result as a theoretically more
sound approach, that cannot be guaranteed. The principles of the interpretation of
contracts are sophisticated and some of them (such as those relating to implied
terms) could produce highly unsatisfactory results if applied to treaties.
The use of the contractual analogy suggests that some judges have an
95 Emphasis added.
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uncertain grasp of the law as to the effect of treaties in domestic law. The same
conclusion is suggested by the reference made to ECMA in Fininvest even though
the legislation is not obviously ambiguous. Other cases, however, suggest that
certain judges have sought, in a rather deliberate way, to limit the effect of the
restrictions on the use of unincorporated treaty material. Lord Mustill made wide
ranging reference to international material in T v Home Secretary. In Anderson,
Lord Hope distinguished the situation in which the question before the court
related to common law rather than statute, so as to permit reference to the ECHR
case law. In McLeod, Petitioner*6, Lord Rodger said that the Convention case law
could be used for its persuasive effect. Since the case law interprets the
Convention, one may wonder how meaningful the distinction actually is.
Accordingly, although in theory the law makes a clear distinction between
incorporated and unincorporated treaties, in practice the distinction may be
somewhat blurred. Generally, however, it seems clear that, in the theoretical
relationship between international law and municipal criminal law, it is municipal
law which takes priority. Cases such as T v Home Secretary, Anderson and
McLeod do not address the main issue of the relationship between treaties and




The structure of this chapter
Extradition is a subject with a long history and a correspondingly large literature.
It would therefore have been possible to write this thesis under exclusive
reference to extradition. To have done so, however, would have limited the
conclusions which could be drawn. Themes which recur in several areas of the
law can be regarded as a more reliable guide to the relationship between
international law and criminal law in general than those which are identified in
relation to only one subject area. The desirability of treating of other subject areas
imposes a useful discipline on this chapter, which is necessarily selective in its
treatment of extradition. It begins with some general introductoiy material and
then proceeds to aspects of the UK's international extradition arrangements.
Thereafter, it examines aspects of municipal extradition law. Finally, some
conclusions are drawn as to the relationship between international law and
criminal law as it appears from extradition in particular.
Introduction
The nature of extradition
Extradition is the return in accordance with law of a person ("the fugitive"97) from
the country where he is found ("the requested state") to the country where he is
accused of, or has been convicted of, an offence ("the requesting state"). The
return of such fugitives is a transaction between governments98 and a state which
enters into extradition arrangements is likely to have a complex mixture of
motives for so doing. As a requesting state, it will wish to strengthen its law
enforcement activities by denying fugitives from its justice a safe haven
anywhere. As a requested state, it will wish to prevent itself from becoming a
haven for foreign criminals, who might represent a threat to its own law and order
97The word does not necessarily imply actual flight. The person may simply have returned to his
home country in the normal course of affairs before the crime came to light or he came to be
suspected.
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but whom it might, for a variety of reasons (including obligations under human
rights treaties and the right to freedom ofmovement conferred by Article 48 EC)
be unable to deport". It will also wish to benefit from reciprocity in other cases
when it is in turn the requesting state100.
Extradition also has a protective aspect, though there is a case for saying
that the safeguards in extradition law are designed to serve the interests of the
requested state more than those of the fugitive101. Relatively recent developments
in the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") have, however, made it clear
that human rights obligations can in some circumstances affect the way in which a
requested state deals with extradition102.
The division of responsibility
The availability of extradition from the UK depends on the existence of an
international extradition arrangement103. That arrangement may be bilateral,
multilateral or ad hoc. The municipal legal framework is contained in the 1989
Act, under which responsibility for extradition is shared between the judiciary
(which determines whether the criteria for return set out in the law are satisfied)
and the executive (which determines whether or not to surrender in fact a person
whom the courts have determined to be liable to return as a matter of law). The
limits on the functions of the courts and the nature of the functions of the
executive in such a system were perhaps most clearly articulated in United States
98See Report of the Working Party on The Extradition Act 1870, 1974, 8 ("the 1974 Working Party
Report").
99 For an example of the relevance of ECHR to the deportation of a recidivist, see Moustaquim v
Belgium (1991) 13 EHRR 802. As to the restrictions which the right to freedom ofmovement
imposes on deportation, see R v Bouchereau [1978] QB 732.
100 JD McCann, "United States vJamieson: the Role of the Canadian Charter in Canadian
Extradition Law" 30 Cornell International Law Journal 139, 141-2 (1997). Gilbert has suggested
(Geoff Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1998, 30) that common law states place a higher priority on being able to rid
themselves of undesirables than on securing reciprocity.
101 See International Law Association, Committee on Extradition and Human Rights, First Report,
Report ofthe Sixty-Sixth Conference, (Buenos Aires Conference, 1994), 146; John Dugard and
Christine Van den Wyngaert, "Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights" 92 AJIL 187, 188
(1998).
102 See 59.
103 Extradition Act 1989 si.
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v Jamiesonm, where a Canadian court noted that the court should not usurp the
discretionary authority of the minister, who must consider comity, reciprocity,
treaty obligations and national security interests105. It has been said that the
foreign policy considerations relevant to a decision to surrender are often known
only to those in the highest positions in the executive and that only they are in a
position to "engage in the discreet diplomatic manoeuvring the process may
require"106. An example of this in practice is to be found in Re Schmidt107 in which
the House of Lords, distinguishing R v Horseferry RoadMagistrates' Court ex p
Bennettm, held that the remedy for a fugitive lured by deception to the UK in
order that he might thereupon be extradited to Germany lay in the discretion of the
Secretary of State109. To this it may be added that the decision to enter into an
extradition arrangement in the first place, which entails in UK practice a
judgement about whether the standards of justice and penal administration in the
proposed treaty partner are acceptable110, is a prerogative matter and hence one for
the executive. It is traditionally within the province of the Home Office111.
In summary, then, "extradition law is a blend of international and national
law. Treaties may provide for the rendition of criminal fugitives between states,
but it is for municipal law to determine whether the fugitive is to be surrendered
in accordance with the extradition treaty"112 It follows from the nature of
extradition law and practice that the existence of a relationship between
international law and municipal law may, in the context of extradition, be treated
as given. The task in this thesis is to examine the nature of that relationship.
104 93 CCC3d 265.
105 See JD McCann,"United States vJamieson " 162.
106 J Semmelman, "Federal Courts, The Constitution, and the Rule ofNon-Inquiry in International
Extradition Proceedings", 76 Cornell Law Review 1198, 1229-30 (1991).
107 [1994] 3 WLR 228.
108 [1994] 1 AC 42.
109 Schmidt is further considered at 140 below.
no 7974 Working Party Report, 15. The report went on to concede that a difficulty arises where
conditions change in a state with which the UK has a treaty arrangement.
111 Ibid.
112 Dugard and Van den Wyngaert, "Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights", 188.
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The Anglocentricity of UK extradition law
During the formative and primary developmental periods of extradition law (at
least as regards the UK's involvement), UK domestic law was governed
principally by the 1870 Act as amended113. The procedure which the Act
prescribed was based very closely on English committal procedure. It epitomised
the "essentially 19th century view" that "as a common law jurisdiction, with well
established mechanisms for ensuring the fairness and effectiveness of criminal
proceedings, it was neither right nor possible to take much cognisance of other
countries' judicial processes"114; and it reflected the fact that the UK was
"protected by the sea from extensive traffic in fugitive criminals, its Parliament
infected with a Dicyean suspicion of things continental and legal and its public
opinion firmly resolved to protect fugitives waging revolution against continental
despotisms"115. Moreover, although the 1870 Act was a UK statute, it was
quintessential^ English in its philosophy and content116. With one exception,
fugitives found in Scotland were removed to London, there to be dealt with at
Bow Street Magistrates' Court, under procedure which did not to any extent
reflect Scots law and practice. As the 1985 Green Paper, Extradition, pointed out:
"few legal systems would deny recourse to a person arrested within their
jurisdiction to a court of that jurisdiction, and this is what happens at present in
Scotland in extradition cases, where the fugitive's only recourse is to the English
courts"117. As a consequence, Scotland developed almost no extradition
jurisprudence of its own.
The exception arose as a result of sections 10, 11 and 16 of the 1870 Act,
which, taken together, gave the sheriff an extradition jurisdiction in relation to
crime committed on board a vessel on the high seas. In Wan Ping Nam v Federal
113 Especially by the Extradition Acts 1873 and 1932.
114 A Harding, "Treaty Making in the Field of International Co-operation: The United Kingdom
Experience", in A Eser and O Lagodny, (eds) Principles and Proceduresfor a New Transnational
Criminal Law, Society for the Reform ofCriminal Law and Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Criminal Law, 1992, 235-6.
115 Colin Warbrick, "The Criminal Justice Act 1988 (1) The New Law on Extradition" [1989]
Crim LR 4.
116 See W Finnie, "The Procedure of Extradition from Scotland" 1983 SLT (News) 25, 41.
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German Republic Minister of Justice and Othersm, the fugitive was alleged to
have committed homicide on a German registered vessel and, the ship having
called at Greenock, was arrested and placed before the sheriff pursuant to an
extradition request from Germany. The sheriff committed him for return and he
petitioned the nobile officium. In delivering the Opinion of the Court, Lord
Justice-General Emslie noted that the Act was "couched in language which
plainly has the jurisdiction and the procedure of the English courts primarily in
mind". In particular, it provided that a fugitive committed for return had the right
to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. That, of course, is an English law remedy,
wholly unknown in Scots law. The Court held that, since the clear intention of the
Act was that relief should be available to persons committed for return and since
the Act plainly did not intend that persons committed in Scotland should be in any
less advantageous position than those committed in England, the petition to the
nobile officium was competent119.
The 1870 Act, then, almost always required that a fugitive found in
Scotland should be taken to London and dealt with under English law. In the
exceptional cases in which there was a Scottish jurisdiction, the Scottish courts
were required to apply a procedure which had been modelled on an aspect of
English criminal procedure (committal) and which was so ill-suited to the Scottish
legal context that it had to be supplemented by the nobile officium of the court, a
remedy which was to be characterised by the Court in Wan Ping Nam as "the
power of interfering in extraordinary circumstances for the purpose of preventing
injustice or oppression"120. Criticising the practice of drafting "Anglo-Scottish
legislation" in English terms and then adapting it for Scotland121, the Renton
Committee remarked that "a bicycle intended to be ridden by two people ought to
be designed as a tandem from the outset, and not as a solo to which a second seat
117 Extradition, Cmnd 9421, 1985, 16.
"T972 SLT 220.
'"Ultimately, however, it failed.
l20Emphasis added.
121 Committee on the Preparation of Legislation, The Preparation ofLegislation (Cmnd 6053),
1975, chapter XII.
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will later be attached"122. The 1870 Act illustrated their point rather well.
As we proceed, we shall see many examples of rules ofmunicipal law or
treaty provisions which have been enacted or agreed in terms which sit uneasily
with Scots law. It would go too far to say that such rules and provisions are
impossible to implement in Scots law; but it is true to say that they give or have
the potential to give difficulty of varying degrees. The flexibility of Scots law is
such that it can cope but it is in principle undesirable to have to rely on that
flexibility to deal with a situation brought about by the terms of specific
legislative or treaty provisions in the context ofwhich the Scottish position should
have been appreciated and taken into account.
The dominance of municipal law
The influence of the 1870 Act was not confined to domestic law. The key to
understanding the UK's extradition treaty practice is section 4(2) of the 1870 Act,
now consolidated in section 4(2) of the 1989 Act. So far as is relevant, that section
provides that an Order in Council, giving effect to extradition arrangements
(typically a treaty) "shall not be made unless the general123 extradition
arrangements to which it relates...are in conformity with the provisions of this Act
and in particular with the restrictions on return contained in Part II...". At one
level, of course, this simply reflects the impossibility of going, in subordinate
legislation (such as an Order in Council), beyond the parameters set by the
primary legislation124. For the UK to negotiate a treaty which went beyond what
was authorised by the municipal legislation would court adverse comment by the
Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments125 and a refusal by Parliament to give
legislative effect to the treaty. Section 4(2) is the key to understanding the subject
not because ofwhat it prescribes but because it gives legislative expression to the
122 At 73.
123 The word is used to distinguish the situation in which an extradition treaty or the like is
concluded from that in which special arrangements are made for the extradition of a particular
person to a particular requesting state in connection with a particular offence (as to which, see 105
below).
124 See Bennion, op cit, 183.
125 See Sir Donald Limon and WR McKay, Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges,
Proceedings and Usage ofParliament, 22nd edition, Butterworths 1997, 591.
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approach which the UK has taken to extradition treaty-making. The starting point
has always been municipal law, so that Lord Parker CJ was correct when he said
in R v Governor ofBrixton Prison ex p MinerviniU6 (referring to the 1873 treaty
with Norway and justifying the interpretation of that treaty in light of the
municipal legislation), that "the two contracting parties in 1873 must have had in
mind the Act of 1870 and the fact that an Order in Council would be made
referring to the treaty and applying to it the provisions of the Act"127. This
approach, which gives pre-eminence to domestic law, indicates that, in relation to
the bilateral treaties made under the 1870 Act (of which several remain in force)
Gilbert's remark that "domestic legislation reflects treaty provisions"128 does not
describe UK practice accurately.
The extradition treaty with the United States ofAmerica
Introduction
We move now to consider aspects of some of the UK's international extradition
arrangements. The principal arrangements to be considered are the treaty with the
USA, ECE, the Commonwealth Scheme for the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders
("the Commonwealth Rendition Scheme") and Article 6 of the 1988 UN Drugs
Convention. Certain other international obligations and arrangements will be
considered incidentally.
We begin with extradition between the UK and the USA, which is dealt
with under a treaty concluded in 1972 and incorporated into UK law by Order in
Council in 1976129. This treaty is the latest in a series which goes back to 1794130.
Until accession to ECE131, bilateral treaties of this sort were the norm for the UK's
126 [1958] 3 WLR559.
127 At 563. It is not obvious why Norway would have had UK municipal primary legislation in
mind, or why Norway should have been expected to understand the subtleties ofUK secondary
legislation. Contrast Dutch law, which provides that if a treaty is concluded which is inconsistent
with the statute, the statute is to be amended, so that international law is said to take precedence
(Bert Swart, "Extradition" in Bert Swart and Andre Klip (eds), International Criminal Law in the
Netherlands, Max Plank Institut, 1997, 89-90).
128 GeoffGilbert, Aspects ofExtradition Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991, 2.
129 United States of America Extradition Order 1976 (SI 1976 No 2144).
130 Michael Forde, The Law ofExtradition in the United Kingdom, Round Hall Press, 1995, 23.
131 As to which, see 79 below.
39
international extradition arrangements (other than with the Empire and
Commonwealth132). Although, following Belgian ratification of ECE on 29
August 1997, the treaty with the USA is now the only bilateral treaty which
retains practical importance133 it was in the context of requests made under treaties
such as this that UK extradition case-law developed; indeed a significant
proportion of those cases concerned requests from the USA. The 1989 Act was
drafted so as not to disturb existing bilateral extradition treaties left in place after
accession to ECE and what amounts to a distinct procedural code was enacted for
them in Schedule 1.
The pattern of the UK/US treaty is typical of extradition treaties of all
kinds. It begins with an obligation to extradite and then prescribes the procedural
steps which must be taken before extradition may be granted and the
circumstances in which, even if the procedural requirements are met, extradition
may not be granted. If the procedural requirements are met and the case is not
brought within one of the specific exceptions, the requested State has no option
but to surrender the fugitive or be in breach of its treaty obligation, no matter how
hard the case might be.
There are 3 issues arising in relation to the UK/US extradition treaty
which are of particular significance for our purpose. The first is the way in which
the crimes for which extradition is available ("extradition crimes") are identified.
The second is the restrictions which the treaty places on return, even for an
extradition crime. And the third is the relationship between human rights law and
international extradition law. In dealing with the third of these, we shall take the
opportunity to summarise the relationship between international human rights law
and criminal law more generally. Underlying all of this, however, is the fact that,
despite the importance in practice of the treaty with the USA, there has been no
Scottish jurisdiction as regards extradition requests from that country since at least
1870.
132 See 94 below.
133See JM Ferley, Law and Procedure ofExtradition, Shaw & Sons, 1994, para 1.09.6.
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Extradition crimes under the treaty
Article III of the treaty defines, by the enumerative method, the offences for
which extradition is possible. They are those acts or omissions which disclose
offences within any of the descriptions listed in the Schedule to the Treaty,
provided that the offence is punishable under the laws of both Parties by
imprisonment or other form of detention for more than a year or by the death
penalty, that the offence is extraditable under UK law and that it constitutes a
felony under US law.
The list of offences in the Schedule is strikingly similar to that in the First
Schedule to the 1870 Act and uses Anglo-American legal categories. From the
UK side, this is a product of the list in the First Schedule to the 1870 Act, which
not only uses English law terms but which provides explicitly that the list of
crimes "is to be construed according to the law existing in England...at the date of
the alleged crime...". So it has been said that, "every one of the extradition
crimes...are taken from English law, and everyone who is at all familiar with such
subjects must be well aware of the fact that the definitions of crimes given in the
law of England are peculiar to English law"134. This contrasts with some UK
practice before 1870. Clarke tells us that the 1852 treaty with France listed
extradition crimes "by the names appropriate to them in the French penal code, in
the law of the United Kingdom and, where necessary, in that ofScotland,I35. The
use of English law terms in the UK/US treaty complicates extradition between
Scotland and the USA in two ways, though neither is insurmountable.
The first relates to requests from Scotland. The need to formulate the
request under reference to a list of offences drawn from English law renders the
preparation of an extradition request from Scotland more complex than it need
have been, though it does not appear that any Scottish extradition request has
failed because of confusion caused by this. The second relates to extradition from
Scotland and the fact that in such a case the double criminality requirement is
134 Stephen, J in J? vJacobi and Hitler (1881) 46 LTR 592 at 595.
135 Emphasis added.
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applied under reference to English law.
That requirement, set out in Article 111(1 )(a), has to be read under
reference to Article I, under which the obligation to extradite arises in relation to a
fugitive "found" in the territory of the requested party. Suppose the fugitive is
arrested in Edinburgh. No Scottish court has any applicable extradition
jurisdiction. The extradition proceedings take place in London (usually at Bow
Street Magistrates' Court) and are subject to review in the English courts136. The
fugitive arrested in Edinburgh and being dealt with in London has not been found
in England. He has been taken there under compulsion137. The double criminality
test is applied according to English law. The magistrate and the English appellate
courts are in no position to apply the law of Scotland, even though that is where,
on this example, he is found. Indeed, paragraphs 5 and 7 of Schedule 1 to the
1989 Act, which provide for warrants and committal respectively, insist that it is
English law which must be applied. The obvious conclusion is that those who
negotiated the treaty simply forgot about, or ignored, the existence of Scots law.
The practice which the 1989 Act perpetuates of dealing in London with the
extradition of persons sought by the USA does not merely prevent the fugitive
from having recourse to the courts of the jurisdiction in which he has been
arrested, namely Scotland. It also means that the legal test applied in his case will
not be that which would have applied in the jurisdiction in which he was arrested.
There is no record of any fugitive taking this point and it is not clear on
what basis it could be taken. The procedure under which the fugitive is dealt with
in London is that which was prescribed by the 1870 Act and is now prescribed by
136Seel26 below.
137 It is recognised that in R v Larsonneur (1933) 24 Cr App R 74 the English Court ofAppeal
held that a woman deported from Ireland and brought under arrest to Holyhead by the Irish police
was "found" in the United Kingdom in contravention of the Aliens Order 1920; but that case has
been "almost universally condemned" (CHW Gane and CN Stoddart, A Casebook on Scottish
Criminal Law, 2nd edition, W Green & Son, 1988, 56), Gordon commenting that the decision is
"ludicrous, one might almost say ingenuous" (GH Gordon, The Criminal Law ofScotland 2nd
edition, W Green and Son Ltd, 1978, 288). See, however, D Lanham, "Larsonneur Revisited"
[1976] Crim LR 276 and Rakesh C Doegar, "Strict Liability in Criminal Law and Larsonneur
Reassessed" [1998] Crim LR 791 for another view.
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the 1989 Act138 and an objection to what the legislation prescribes is scarcely
worth making. There might be a question whether the denial of recourse to a court
in the jurisdiction in which the person is arrested (Scotland) is a breach ofArticle
5 ECHR but that question is quite difficult to answer, because of the unique
constitutional nature of the UK and because of the fundamental irrationality of the
arrangement which sees fugitives arrested in Scotland taken to England for the
extradition hearing. No other Council of Europe member State has faced the
problem. It may be said, however, that the purpose of the Article 5(3) ECHR
requirement that an arrested person should be brought before a judge is so that it
may be decided, by reference to legal criteria, whether there are reasons to justify
detention and so that the detained person may be released if there are no such
reasons139. It is noticeable that ECtHR thinks in terms of review of the detention,
which is a continuing state. It does not think in terms of reviewing the legality of
the arrest. The English court of committal is not, then, reviewing something which
happened in Scotland but rather a state of affairs which exists in England and has
been brought about by the explicit words of the statute. The mischief at which
Article 5(3) is aimed-arbitrary imprisonment-is met by the present system. It is,
therefore, doubtful whether a breach ofECHR could be made out simply by virtue
of the taking of the fugitive to London. Nevertheless, the 1985 Green Paper noted
that it is unsatisfactory that a person arrested in Scotland should be denied
recourse to the Scottish courts140 and the 1989 Act corrected that situation for
most cases. The 1985 criticism continues to apply with full force as regards the
arrangements with the USA.
Although the definition of extradition crime in the Treaty begins with the
enumerative method, it goes on (unusually) to apply eliminative criteria. The
offence must be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, be
extraditable under UK law and be a felony in US law141. Because the Treaty is
138 Section 1(3) and Schedule 1 para 5(3).
139 Scheisser v Switzerland (1979-80) 2 EHRR 417.
l40See 31 above.
141 Article VII(2)(d)(ii) requires the provision of a statement that the matter is a felony.
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incorporated by Order in Council, it is beyond doubt that it may be invoked in UK
courts and that some of those courts are entitled to seek to construe it142. However,
their efforts to do so offer further evidence of the lack of facility with which
domestic courts interpret treaties.
The understanding which the English courts have of the provision was first
articulated in Government of the United States of America v Jennings and
Another143. In that case, a British woman driving in California had collided with
another car, driven off at speed and, in the course ofher flight, knocked down a 13
year old cyclist. She was charged with "felony drunk driving". In breach of a
condition of bail, she left the USA and returned to the UK. When the cyclist died
from his injuries, there was substituted a charge of manslaughter. This was a
felony and carried a potential penalty of three years' imprisonment. The USA
sought her extradition.
The point with which the House of Lords was principally concerned was
whether the creation of the statutory offence of causing death by reckless
driving144 had meant that conduct such as that of the accused no longer amounted
to manslaughter in English law. This had nothing directly to do with extradition
law but did affect the answer to the question whether there was double criminality
in respect of a listed offence (namely manslaughter). The House concluded that
such conduct could still amount to manslaughter where it occurred in England.
The meaning of Article 111(1) of the Treaty was not analysed in Jennings.
Lord Roskill simply asserted that there were four prerequisites to a successful
application, these being first that the crime was one of those listed, secondly that
the offence was punishable under the laws of both countries with imprisonment
for more than one year, thirdly that the offence was a felony in US law and
fourthly that the prima facie case requirement was satisfied. He then proceeded to
apply these prerequisites, holding in the event that they were all satisfied and
142 But see 124 below on the position of the court of committal.
143 [1982] 3 WLR 450; also reported at [1983] 1 AC 624 sub nom R v Governor ofHollo-way
Prison ex p Jennings .
144 Then dealt with under the Road Traffic Act 1972 si.
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restoring the stipendiary magistrate's order committing the accused for return.
Lords Bridge of Harwich and Brightman concurred without making separate
speeches. Since this is not the only possible construction of the treaty provision,
the failure of the House of Lords to arrive at its interpretation by a process of
reasoning is unsatisfactory. The relationship between international law and
criminal law should not depend on assumptions.
Lord Roskill's approach to the treaty was affirmed in Government of the
United States of America v McCaffery 145, in which Lord Diplock said, citing
Jennings but still without analysing the treaty provision, that "the requirements of
paragraphs (a) and (c) must be satisfied as respects offences listed in the schedule
to the treaty as well as respects any other offence".
The position adopted in these two cases as to the meaning of the Treaty is
undeniably tenable; but it does not proceed on any reasoned basis. It concentrates
on a close reading of the language and its effect is to superimpose the eliminative
method upon the enumerative so that both must be satisfied. By demanding that
both enumerative and eliminative tests should be satisfied the House made
extradition more difficult under the treaty with the USA than under any other
extradition arrangement. To be sure, it is likely that the penalties available for
offences listed in the treaty will satisfy the eliminative test. That is not the point.
The fact that a hurdle may be cleared without undue difficulty does not mean that
it ceases to be a hurdle and the approach which the House took does affect the
content of incoming extradition requests to the extent that it must now be
established in every case that the offence is a felony in US law.
From a US perspective, Molner at least has a different understanding of
the treaty. He writes that "Under the 1972 Treaty, the United States and the
United Kingdom must extradite individuals accused of a wide range of scheduled
offenses or any offense, attempt or conspiracy which is punishable in each
country by more than one year in prison (or death) and is both a felony under
145 [1984] 1 WLR 867.
45
United States law and extraditable under United Kingdom law"146. There is a case
for the proposition that Molner is right and the House of Lords wrong. One of the
problems which the 1974 Working Group recognised with the use of the
enumerative method was its inherent lack of flexibility; they thought that this
could be overcome by the use of a provision which then formed part of the UK's
model extradition treaty and which provided that extradition might also be
granted, at the discretion of the requested party, for any other offence if that
offence would, according to the law of both parties, be extraditable147. Although it
does not conform to the wording of that particular model, Article 111(1),
understood as Molner understands it, would achieve the same result. The
alternative position, which represents the law of England and which, because
extradition requests from the USA are all dealt with under English law, would
apply equally to a fugitive found in Scotland, has been reached without any
obvious reasoning process.
We have noted above that the English courts have erected the analogy
between treaties and contracts into a canon of interpretation148. We have also
noted that in Fininvest the court referred to an unincorporated treaty without going
through any process of reasoning to justify the making of such reference. In
Jennings and in McCaffery we see once again that courts have taken a stance on
the meaning of a treaty without going through any reasoning process. In terms of
what courts actually do, it seems that Gardiner was excessively kind when he
wrote that there has been cherry picking from the Vienna principles149. Courts
dealing with international criminal law treaties, on the evidence ofArton, Beese,
Postlethwaite, Fininvest, Jennings and McCaJfery do not seem to apply any overt
process of reasoning to the use and interpretation of those treaties. The emphasis
of the Vienna rules on the ordinary meanings of words in their context will often
146 See TE Molner, "Extradition: Limitation of the Political Offence Exception" 27 Harvard
International Law Journal 266(1986) (emphasis added).




mean that no harm is done; but as the contrast between Molner's interpretation of
Article 111(1) of the UK/US Extradition treaty and that of the House of Lords
demonstrates, there will be occasions on which there is a material difference.
Restrictions on extradition
Article V begins by providing that extradition is not to be granted if the person
sought would, if proceeded against in the territory of the requested party for the
offence for which his extradition is requested, be entitled to be discharged on the
ground of a previous acquittal or conviction in the territory of the requesting or
requested Party or of a third state. Although not specifically provided for by the
1870 Act, it was held in Atkinson v United States Government150 that this
represents a plea available to the fugitive arising out of the magistrate's ordinary
powers in dealing with a committal hearing151. In the case of a fugitive arrested in
Scotland and transported to Bow Street the effect must be that the main thrust of
the court's consideration will be directed to the English law rules relating to
autrefois acquit and autrefois convict rather than to the (in the circumstances,
more appropriate) Scots law rules relating to tholed assize152. In many cases,
however, the practical outcome will be the same; and no-one seems to have tried
to take the point.
Article V(l)(c) of the treaty deals with the political offence exception,
which requires to be considered in the light of the 1985 Supplementary Treaty
between the UK and the USA153. It represents an area in which UK extradition
law, expressed in the case law of the English courts, has made an identifiable
contribution to wider international extradition law.
The Article provides that "extradition shall not be granted if...the offence
for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requesting state as one of a
political character". This compares with section 3(1) of the 1870 Act, which
150 [1971] AC 197.
151 See especially Lord Reid at 231G.
152 See farther 160 below.
153 Supplementary Treaty concerning the Extradition Treaty between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland signed at London on 8 June 1972, 1985.
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provided, inter alia, that "a fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the
offence in respect of which his surrender is demanded is one of a political
character...".
The political offence exception is well-nigh global in its coverage, though
no fully satisfactory definition of it exists154. Understandings of its scope vary
from legal system to legal system. Van der Wilt notes155 that the political
incidence test, developed by the English courts in re Castioni156 has exercised
considerable influence in the common law world157. The Scottish courts have not
so far had an opportunity to consider the point. It should therefore be kept in mind
in reading the following account of the political offence exception that, in seeking
from the USA the extradition of a fugitive whose crime was arguably political,
Scotland would require to work within a treaty and conceptual framework to
which Scots law has not contributed; and that a fugitive found in Scotland would
be taken to London and there dealt with under that same framework.
The political incidence test as formulated in Castioni required that the
crimes should be incidental to and form part of political disturbances. During the
1970s, however, in cases in which US courts upheld the political offence
exception in relation to alleged members of the Provisional IRA158, it became
clear that US law still applied Castioni in a somewhat undeveloped way159. In a
series of cases160 the English courts had tried to address the fact that the political
154 See Harmen van derWilt, op cit, and the remarks ofViscount Radcliffe in Schtraks v
Government ofIsrael [1964] AC 556 at 589.
155 Op cit, 29-35.
156 [1891] 1 QB 149.
157 Van derWilt also notes (op cit) that the proportionality theory developed by the Swiss courts
has had similar influence on the civilian systems.
158 See TE Molner, op cit; William M Hannay, "An Analysis of the US-UK Supplementary
Extradition Treaty" 21 International Lawyer 925, 926 (1987); Michael P Scharf, "Foreign Courts
on Trial: Why US Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquiry provision of the Supplementary US-
UK Extradition Treaty" 25 Stanford Journal ofInternational Law, 257 (1988-89).
159 Op cit, 927.
160 Van derWilt, op cit, 31; R v Governor ofBrixton Prison, ex parte Kolczynski and Others
[1955] 2 WLR 116. See generally Chapman J's account of the development of the concept in In re
Extradition Act 1870, ex parte Treasury Solicitor [1969] 1 WLR 12 and the fuller accounts given
in chapter 6 ofGeoff Gilbert, Aspects ofExtradition Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991 and
chapter 6 of Alun Jones, Jones on Extradition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995.
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offence exception has in this century come to be prayed in aid by terrorists
seeking to undermine democracy rather than the liberal idealists for whose benefit
it was first developed161.
In the mid 1980s both the US and the UK, for reasons associated with
difficulties with terrorist groups, found it desirable to limit the ambit of the
political offence exception. From the UK point of view, it was the problem of
terrorism in connection with the affairs of Northern Ireland and the difficulties
which would arise if the USA was to become a safe haven for terrorists which
prompted the Supplementary Treaty. The UK had already agreed the limitation of
the political offence exception in a Council of Europe context in the European
Convention on the Suppression ofTerrorism 1977162, though reservations by other
States Parties rather limited the effect of that instrument. From the US
perspective, the negotiation of the Supplementary Treaty was part of a wider
response163 to increasing terrorist activity against Western democratic countries,
involving attempts to negotiate similar treaties with other such countries164 and in
some circumstances the claiming of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction on the
basis of the passive personality principle165.
Both countries, then, were engaged in attempting, through their municipal
laws, to deal with terrorism. Treaties such as the Supplementary Treaty and the
161 Van derWilt, op cit, 26. See also Bradley G Kulman, "Eliminating the Political Offense
Exception for Violent Crimes: The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Supplementary
Extradition Treaty" 26 Virginia Journal ofInternational Law 755, 757 (1986) and John Patrick
Groarke, "Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of the Political Offense Exception Under the
1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplemetary Extradition Treaty" 136 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1515 (1988).
162 Not further considered in this thesis.
163 Including calls by the American Bar Association for the exclusion of terrorist crime from the
political offence exception (American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice,
"Report on United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty" 21 International Lawyer 271
(1987)).
164 Groarke, op cit, ("Revolutionaries Beware..."), 1515; Kulman, op cit, ("Eliminating the
Political Offense Exception for Violent Crimes..."), 756; but the results of negotiations with
countries other than the UK have been described as "mixed"-see Douglas Stringer and Diane
Marie Amann, "International Criminal Law: The US-UK Supplementary Extradition Treaty and
the Political Offense Exception" 31 International Lawyer 622, 623, n89 (1997).
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European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism represent the international
law side of a struggle which was also reflected in developments in municipal law.
As negotiated, the Supplementary Treaty provided166 that, for the purpose
of the treaty, none of a list of types of offence were to be regarded as offences of a
political character. These included offences established under certain multilateral
conventions, murder, manslaughter and assault causing grievous bodily harm167,
and offences involving bombs, firearms or incendiary devices if any person was
endangered. To this extent, the Supplementary Treaty stood firmly in the tradition
of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. However, and
notwithstanding the US Administration's view that the Supplementary Treaty
represented "a significant step in improving law enforcement and combating
terrorism"168, the difficulties which it faced during the US ratification process
were considerable, essentially because of doubts expressed about the fairness of
the "Diplock Courts", which sit without a jury169. By way of a compromise, an
additional Article was added to the treaty by the US Senate, whereby extradition
is not to occur if the fugitive establishes "to the satisfaction of the competent
judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request for
extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account of
his race, religion, or political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be
prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by
reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions". This, it is said,
echoes US civil rights and asylum statutes170 but it also echoes the wording of
Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 and of
paragraph 10(2) of the Commonwealth Rendition Scheme. A similar test had been
165 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act 1986 (US), enacted following the murder
of a US citizen aboard a foreign registered ship, the Achille Lauro, hijacked thousands ofmiles
from US waters by middle eastern terrorists.
166 Article 1.
167 "Manslaughter" and "grievous bodily harm" are, of course, terms used in English law but not in
Scots law. It is questionable whether culpable homicide and assault to severe injury are precisely
equivalent to them.
168 See Letters ofTransmittal to the US Senate, 24 ILM 1104 (1985).
169 Scharf, op cit, ("Foreign Courts on Trial"), 264.
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applied by the UK extradition legislation in dealing with those subject specific
multilateral conventions by which the UK accepts an obligation to extradite to
states with which it would not necessarily do general extradition business171. The
original provision was not, therefore, innovative and (since even in one of the
cases which prompted the negotiation of the Supplementary Treaty, the US judge
concerned expressed the view that "both Unionists and Republicans who commit
offenses of a political character can and do receive fair and impartial justice"172) it
was unlikely to undermine the object of the treaty which was to achieve the
surrender of terrorists173.
The political offence exception demonstrates how the decision of an
English court on the meaning of a concept found in both legislation and treaties
has influenced the understanding which other common law states have of that
concept. Where the law of the influenced state treats English law as merely
persuasive, developing understandings of the concept may change from that
common starting point. This meant, in the case of the political offence exception,
that US courts, founding on the English case of Castioni, held that the exception
applied, even though the English understanding of that case and the development
of the English case law would have led to a different conclusion. In order to
reconcile these differences, the two Governments adopted an approach first
elaborated in a multilateral European treaty but US legislators, anxious about
aspects of UK municipal law, qualified that treaty with words found in other
multilateral treaties and in the municipal laws of both states. The interpenetration
170 Douglas Stringer and Diane Marie Amann, op cit, 624.
171 Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978 ss3 & 3A; Civil Aviation Act 1982 s934(l)-(3);
Taking ofHostages Act 1982 ss3A & 4; Aviation Security Act 1982 s9A; Nuclear Material
(Offences) Act 1983 s5A.
172 In re Doherty 599 F Supp 270 (SDNY 1984) at 276, per Judge Sprizzo.
173 In Matter ofRequestedExtradition ofSmyth 61 F 3d 711 (9th Cir 1995) a panel of the US
Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit construed the treaty defence narrowly, specifically so as to
avoid frustrating the overall purpose of extradition treaties, which they characterised as being to
facilitate criminal prosecution and punishment. The Court required an individualised inquiry
which depended not on general evidence ofpolitical violence and persecution in Northern Ireland
but on evidence showing that the particular fugitive would be disadvantaged because of his
religious or political status. This is, of course, a very difficult burden to meet and the decision in
Smyth has been criticised on that ground (Stringer and Amman, op cit, 625).
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of international and municipal law in this process is substantial.
Extradition and human rights
Introduction
In 1992 the organisers of a Max Planck Institute workshop dubbed human rights
law the "Third Dimension" in international criminal law174. We have noted above
the protective aspect of extradition law175. The UK/USA extradition treaty
provided the context for ECtHR to decide Soering v United Kingdom176, one of its
most significant cases. Soering makes it clear that international human rights law
can impose limits on what States do under their extradition treaties but does not
make it clear how far it can do so. We shall examine that case, and others like it,
below; but first it is necessary to set out the basics of the relationship between the
ECHR and Scots law.
We have seen already that it was under reference to ECHR that much of
the law on the use of unincorporated treaties as an aid to the interpretation of
statute developed177. We have also seen that it is only recently that the Scottish
courts have even been prepared to go that far. Murdoch has demonstrated that a
lack of awareness of the content and possibilities of ECHR amongst Scots
practitioners has led to a situation in which, for all its vaunted continental roots,
Scots law has hitherto accorded ECHR a standing which is in fact weaker than the
standing which it enjoys in any other Western European legal system178.
The 1998 legislation
All of this is in the process of change, driven by HRA and sections 29 and 57 of
the Scotland Act 1998. According to the White Paper, Rights Brought Home: The
Human Rights Bill119, "the essential feature of the [Act] is that the United
174 See Stephan Breitnmoser, "Report on the Proceedings of Session IV" in Albin Eser and Otto
Lagodny (eds), Principles and Proceduresfor a New Transnational Criminal Law, Max Planck
Institute, 1992, 689.
175 See 34.
176 (1989) 11 EHRR439.
177 See 24-28.
178 Jim Murdoch, "Scotland and the European Convention", in Brice Dickson (ed), Human Rights
and the European Convention, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, 113.
179 Cm 3782, October 1997.
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Kingdom will not be bound to give effect to the Convention rights merely as a
matter of international law, but will also give them further effect directly in our
domestic law"180. Hitherto the UK system "has been one of negative rights and
prohibitions built into the common law-the 'electric fence approach' as it has been
called"-rather than the system of positive rights and freedoms built into the
Convention"181. So far as other international human rights instruments are
concerned (of which the chief is the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 1976-"ICCPR"), the law remains unchanged. Those instruments to which
the UK is party may be used as tools for the interpretation of a statute which is
ambiguous. That having been said, the double constraints of non-incorporation
and UK refusal to ratify the Optional Protocol to ICCPR which would give a right
of individual petition to the Human Rights Committee, have so far kept ICCPR
"in the shadows" in the UK182. It is clear that the Government intends it to remain
so183.
HRA seeks to achieve its objective in two principal ways. By section 3(1),
"so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention
rights". And by section 6(1), "it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way
which is incompatible with one or more of the Convention rights". Section 6(1)
will undoubtedly inform and constrain the practices of Scottish Courts and
Scottish prosecutors. Its importance is considerable and the way in which they
will work out in practice is as yet unknown184. Lord Reed has suggested that one
consequence will be the development of the common law in a way which is
180 Para 2.1.
181 Lord Hope of Craighead, op cit, 369.
182 Rosalyn Higgins, "Ten Years on the UN Human Rights Committee: Some Thoughts upon
Parting" [1996] EHRLR 570, 576.
l83See the recent debate on the issue in the House of Lords (HL Debs Vol 600 No 81, 12 May
1999, Cols 1276 to 1290).
184 See the general speculations in Alan Miller, "Human Rights and the Scottish Parliament"
[1998] EHRLR 260.
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consistent with ECHR185. If that is correct, it would produce in the common law
an effect parallel to HRA section 3(1), which represents a significant development
in the relationship between treaties and municipal law. There will no longer
merely be a presumption that a statute is intended to be in conformity with ECHR
and it will no longer be necessary to find an ambiguity before reference can be
made to ECHR. Instead, there will be a positive requirement to construe a statute
so that it is in conformity unless the legislation is so clearly incompatible with the
Convention that it is impossible to do so186. As Lord Steyn has summarised the
nature of the change: "Traditionally the search has been for the one true meaning
of a statute. Now the search will be for a possible meaning that would prevent the
need for a declaration of incompatibility. The questions will be: (1) What
meanings are the words capable of yielding? (2) And, critically, can the words be
made to yield a sense consistent with Convention rights? In practical effect there
will be a rebuttable presumption in favour of an interpretation consistent with
Convention rights. Given the inherent ambiguity of language the presumption is
likely to be a strong one"187. In some cases, the need to find an alternative
meaning which will be consistent with ECHR might lead the courts into seeking
latent ambiguities in a way which they are not otherwise entitled to do188.
Moreover, the rule that reference may only be made to unincorporated treaties
where there is ambiguity on the face of the statute will in future, it is thought,
have to be recast so that such reference is permissible only where the statute
remains ambiguous even when read in light of ECHR. And there is no guidance
yet about what is to be done when ECHR and other relevant treaties conflict189.
There is considerable force in Ovey's assertion that "no Article of the
Convention is without implications for criminal law, if only to the extent that the
l85Lord Robert Reed, "Taking Human Rights Seriously", lecture given at University of Aberdeen,
11 May 1999 (writer's notes).
186 Lord Irvine of Lairg, "The Development ofHuman Rights in Britain under an Incorporated
Convention on Human Rights" [1998] PL 221, 228.
187 Lord Steyn, "Incorporation and Devolution-A Few Reflections on the Changing Scene" [1998]
EHRLR 153, 155.
188 See 27-28 above.
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existence or non existence of criminal sanctions may give rise to a violation of the
right safeguarded"'90. Even if it is correct to maintain that the fact that Article 6
ECHR (for example) is focused narrowly on the trial process rather than on
criminal justice as a whole, and is therefore relatively limited in its impact191, the
emphasis must be on the word "relatively". A very large part of the jurisprudence
of ECtHR and of the European Commission of Human Rights ("EComHR") has
related to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 as they affect criminal cases. Dennis has argued
that the increasing willingness of the Court and the Commission to pronounce on
matters of criminal evidence and procedure "indicates the arrival ofmore detailed
pan-European norms of criminal process"192. The effect of HRA in relation to
criminal law will be at least as significant as its effect in any other area of law.
Moreover, section 2(1) HRA requires, that "a court or tribunal determining
a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into
account" the Convention case-law, including the case-law of ECtHR. Ashworth
has noted that "the Convention text should not be read as it stands, without
reference to the jurisprudence of the European Court"193. HRA therefore requires
that UK courts should interpret a statute in a way which is in conformity with a
treaty and should, in so doing, have regard to the case law of an international
court whose task it is to interpret that treaty. It follows that UK courts, including
Scottish criminal courts, will henceforth require to work within a framework
which includes international law. This does not, however, mean that international
law will have a dominant position. It was the Government's clear policy, in
enacting HRA, not to interfere with the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty.
The Government's expectation when a court finds it impossible to find an
189As to which, see the discussion of Soering v United Kingdom at 63 below.
190 Clare Ovey, "The European Convention on Human Rights and the Criminal Lawyer: An
Introduction" [1998] Crim LR 4, 6. See also David Feldman, "The Developing Scope ofArticle 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights" [1997] EHRLR 265.
191 See Sybil Sharpe, "The European Convention: A Suspect's Charter?" [1997] Crim LR 848.
192IH Denis, "Human Rights and Evidence in Adversarial Criminal Procedure: The Advancement
of International Standards", in IF Nijboer and JM Reijntjes (eds), Proceedings ofthe First World
Conference on New Trends in Criminal Investigation and Evidence, Koninklijke Vermande
bv/Open University of the Netherlands, 1997, 523.
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interpretation of a piece of legislation which is consistent with the Convention
rights is clear. At Second Reading of the Human Rights Bill in the House of
Lords, the Lord Chancellor said that "the Bill does not allow the courts to set
aside or ignore Acts of Parliament" and that section 3 "preserves the effect of
primary legislation which is incompatible with the Convention"194. Later in the
same debate, he said that the intention of the legislation was to maximise the
protection to individuals "while retaining the fundamental principle of
Parliamentary sovereignty" l95. The remedy provided for the situation in which a
court cannot find a way to construe legislation compatibly with the Convention
rights is the declaration of incompatibility, which will not affect the validity,
continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is
given and which will not bind the parties to the proceedings in which it is made196.
Such a declaration might well prompt the Government to make legislative change
but will not oblige it to do so. This, it is suggested, is absolutely consistent with
the rule in Salomon that, when treaty and statute conflict, statute wins.
There is a further, rather subtler, way in which HRA might well mediate
international law into UK and Scots law, though it is important that it should not
be over stated. ECtHR is accustomed to reasoning within the context of the
Council of Europe and sometimes bases its decisions in part on what it perceives
to be the current goals of the Member States197. Those goals are expressed, inter
alia, in Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers and, perhaps pre¬
eminently, in the Council of Europe's multilateral treaties, many ofwhich apply to
the criminal law field (and especially to international co-operation)198. In Chinoy v
193Andrew Ashworth, "Article 6 and the Fairness ofTrials" [1999] Crim LR 261, 271.
194 HL Debs, 3 November 1997, cols 1230-1231.
195 HL Debs, 3 November 1997, col 1294.
196 Human Rights Act 1998 s4(6).
197 See, for example, the Court's use of the goal of the advancement of the equality of the sexes in
Burghartz v Switzerland Series (1994) 18 EHRR 101, 116.
198 See Hans G Nilsson, "The Council of Europe Laundering Convention: A Recent Example of a
Developing International Criminal Law", in Albin Eser and Otto Lagodny (eds), Principles and
Procedures for a New Transnational Criminal Law, Max Planck Institute, 1992, 457; Peter
Csonka, "Corruption: The Council of Europe's Approach" in Barry AK Rider (ed), Corruption:
The Enemy Within, Kluwer, 1997, 343; and Peter Csonka, "Organised and Economic Crime: (an
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UnitedKingdomEComHR took account of the "international campaign against
the drugs trade and the laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking" in finding
no breach of Article 8 ECHR in connection with the detention of the accused for
extradition (where the evidence against him included tape recordings of his
conversations made illegally in France by US agents).
ECtHR could not, of course, overtly apply treaties other than ECHR.
Apart from other considerations (such as the inability of individuals to invoke
treaties and the political consequences liable to follow any overt reference by the
Court to a treaty to which a given respondent State was not actually party), the
Court has only the jurisdiction conferred on it by ECHR-and that does not extend
to other treaties. Nevertheless, it is perhaps possible to perceive in cases such as
Raimondo v Italy200 some grounds for believing that the approach of the Court
will sometimes be influenced by other Council of Europe conventions. The case
was decided in February 1994, less than six months after the coming into force
(on 1 September 1993) of the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime 1990 ("the
Laundering Convention"). Italy was a signatory to the Laundering Convention but
had not at that time ratified. The applicant, who had been charged with being a
member of a mafia type organisation, attempted to argue that seizure and
confiscation of his assets prior to trial201 violated his property right under Article 1
of Protocol 1. Such action is, however, positively required by Article 3 of the
Laundering Convention. ECtHR, which is normally courteous and forbearing to a
fault with undeserving applicants202, rebuffed Raimondo on that point in language
which was robust and uncompromising. It seems reasonable to think that the
Court's remarks were made against the background of knowledge of the
Overview of the Relevant Council of Europe Activities)" in Peter J Cullen and William C Gilmore
(eds), Crimes sans Frontieres, David Hume Institute/ Edinburgh University Press, 93.
'"15199/89, 4 September 1991.
20° (1994) 18 EHRR237.
201 They were returned on his acquittal.
202 See, for example, the dead-pan way in which they dealt with the litigious and intemperate
applicant in Ravnsborg v Sweden (1994) 18 EHRR 38.
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Laundering Convention and its requirements. They said that such seizures were
provisional measures of a sort which were justified by the general interest and
that, in view of the economic power of organisations like the Mafia, it could not
be said to be disproportionate. The Court said that it was fully aware of the
difficulties encountered by Italy in the fight against the Mafia and that
confiscation is an effective and necessary weapon "against this cancer". For the
Court to have decided otherwise would have been to undermine the whole basis of
the Laundering Convention. Reference may be made again to the stress laid in
Chinoy203 on the international campaign against the laundering of the proceeds of
drug trafficking. That case was dealt with in 1991, shortly after the adoption of the
Laundering Convention but before it entered into force.
If, then, ECtHR is sometimes influenced in what it does by other Council
of Europe Treaties and if HRA requires UK courts to take account of the
jurisprudence of ECtHR (as it does), it follows that, at least at the level of general
policy, the approach of those other treaties may be mediated subliminally into
UK law.
HRA will enter into force on 2 October 2000204. A more limited but more
immediate incorporation of ECHR has taken place for Scotland as a result of
sections 29(2) and 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998. Section 29(1) provides that an
Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law so far as any provision of the Act is
outside the legislative competence of the Parliament and section 29(2)(d) provides
that a provision is outside that competence if it is incompatible with any of the
Convention rights. Section 57(2) provides that "a member of the Scottish
Executive has no power to...do...any act...incompatible with any of the
Convention rights". The expression "Convention rights" is defined as having the
same meaning as in the Human Rights Act205. In terms of section 44(1 )(c) of the
Scotland Act, the Lord Advocate is a member of the Scottish Executive (as is the
Solicitor General). It follows that any act of the Scottish Parliament which is
203Supra.
204 HC Written Answer by Home Secretary, 18 May 1999, Col 293.
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incompatible with the Convention rights will be capable of being challenged and
that any act of the Lord Advocate which is incompatible with the Convention
rights will be ultra vires and capable of being challenged. These provisions took
effect on 20 May 1999206. To the extent that Acts of the Scottish Parliament deal
with criminal law and procedure and to the extent that the Lord Advocate
discharges his core responsibility of the prosecution of crime, ECHR will have an
immediate and important effect on Scots criminal law and practice207. That having
been said, extradition is a matter reserved to Westminster208 and will not therefore
be affected directly by the Scotland Act provisions.
ECHR and extradition
The UK's participation in ECHR does not subject its extradition law to
international law influence to the extent one might at first expect. There is, as
ECtHR said in Soering, no right in ECHR not to be extradited. Indeed, there is
only one reference to extradition in ECHR209 and that reference does not create a
right. On the contrary, it qualifies the Article 5 right to liberty and security of
person by specifying detention with a view to extradition as one of the permitted
exceptions to the rule that persons are not to be deprived of their liberty. This is
not to say that there is no role for ECHR in relation to extradition; but that role is
a somewhat indirect one. As the Court went on to say in Soering, "in so far as a
measure of extradition has consequences adversely affecting the enjoyment of a
Convention right it may, assuming the consequences are not too remote, attract
the obligations of a Contracting State under the relevant Convention guarantee"210.
Accordingly, ECHR cases relating to extradition have tended to relate to the way
in which a step in extradition has been carried out or to the consequences of
extradition in the particular case where they are particularly prejudicial rather than
to the mere fact of the taking of that step or to consequences which would found a
205 Scotland Act sl26(l).
206Scotland Act 1998 (Commencement) Order 1998 (SI 1998 No 3178).
207At the time ofwriting, the provisions had not yet been construed by the Justiciary Appeal Court.
208Scotland Act 1998 Schedule 5 Part II Head B11.
209 Article 5(l)(f).
210 Ibid, para 85.
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finding of breach if they occurred in a State Party to ECHR. Since the same
considerations apply to deportation (and since deportation is sometimes used as a
form of disguised extradition211), the cases on extradition and on deportation tend
to proceed along such similar lines that the two subjects are often treated
together212.
Attention has been called above to the fact that extradition has both co¬
operative and protective aspects213. The protective aspects, albeit they might be
intended primarily for the benefit of the requested state214, serve the function of
the protection of human rights. Since section 4(2) of the 1989 Act requires that
treaties should be in conformity with the Act "and in particular with the
restrictions on return" it is reasonable to characterise the appearance of those
restrictions in treaties as a result of the influence ofmunicipal law on international
law. In UK practice, the political offence exception is the most obvious example
of this phenomenon but an even clearer example exists in the civilian tradition.
Many states from that tradition have in their municipal law a prohibition on the
extradition of their own nationals. The reasons for that relate in part to the view
that an alleged offender's national judges are the natural judges of his offence, in
part to "a state's alleged duty to protect its own nationals and...the fear that a
foreigner would be prejudiced at a trial in the locus delicti"215 and in part, it seems,
to concerns about substandard prison conditions in some requesting states216.
Accordingly Article 6 ECE gives states parties the right to refuse extradition of
their own nationals and Article 4 of the UN Model Treaty on Extradition contains
a similar provision. The Manual on the Model Treaty points out that municipal
law might well turn this optional ground of refusal into a mandatory one217. Both
211 See Bozano v France (1986) 9 EHRR 297.
212 And see Kemp's article arguing that refugee law law should supercede the political offence
exception (Susan L Kemp, "Refugee Law as a Source in Extradition Cases" [1998] Crim LR 774).
213Pages 33-34.
2X4Ibid.
215 Gilbert, Aspects ofExtradition Law, 96.




ECE and the Model Treaty reflect this and the civilian tendency to take
jurisdiction on the active personality (or "nationality") principle218 by applying an
aut dedere autjudicare requirement in that situation.
So the inclusion in extradition treaties of restrictions on extradition will
often reflect municipal law. To this it may be added that these safeguards are
entirely dependent upon the terms of the treaty under which extradition is sought
and that accepted wisdom persists in denying the common restrictions the status
of customary norms219. The human rights protections in municipal law therefore
contribute to those aspects of conventional international law which are sufficiently
common to find place in the UN Model Treaty but not to customary international
law. However, the UK's extradition relationship with the USA has been the
context in which it has become clear that ECHR (to which the USA is not, of
course, Party) may have a significant effect on the application of the extradition
Treaty. As soon as HRA enters into force it will also have a justiciable effect on
what the Secretary of State does once a court of committal has found the fugitive
liable to surrender.
EComHR considered extradition between the UK and the USA in
Kirkwood v United Kingdom220 and ECtHR did so in Soering. It is necessary first,
however, to take notice of AItun v Federal Republic of Germany221 because that
case laid the foundation for the approach which was taken in Kirkwood and
Soering. In Altun, the proposed extradition involved two States that were both
party to ECHR-Germany and Turkey. The latter country had not accepted the
right of individual petition to EComHR at that time. The applicant asserted that if
he was returned to Turkey he was at risk of torture. Turkey did not dispute that
torture was a feature of Turkish prisons. It was clear that the applicant was at risk
and also that he would have had no means of raising the matter with the
218 European Committee on Crime Problems, Extraterritorial criminaljurisdiction, Council of
Europe, 1990, 10.
219 International Law Association, Committee on Extradition and Human Rights, op cit.
220 37 DR 158 (1984).
221 36 DR 209 (1984).
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Strasbourg organs if the risk had materialised after extradition.
ECHR may be regarded as well-nigh foundational within the structure of
the Council of Europe. A State which aspires to membership of the Council of
Europe must guarantee to everyone within its jurisdiction the enjoyment ofhuman
rights and fundamental freedoms222. Extradition between Germany and Turkey
was governed by a Council of Europe instrument-ECE. Given the foundational
nature of ECHR within the Council of Europe and the absolute nature ofArticle 3
ECHR, and given too the very clear evidence of risk that the applicant would be
treated in a manner inconsistent with Article 3, it is not surprising that EComHR,
whilst recalling that "Increased co-operation as regards mutual assistance in legal
matters is an area where Council of Europe activity has been fruitful" and
insisting, as it was to do in other cases, that there must be some certainty that ill
treatment would occur on return223, was able to give ECHR priority over the
obligation to extradite and held the application in Altun to be admissible.
However, when the Strasbourg organs came to deal with the UK's extradition
relationship with the USA, that high level of common ground was absent. The
USA was not a member of the Council of Europe and the extradition treaty
between the UK and USA is not a Council of Europe instrument. Nor did the
USA concede for a moment that conditions in its prisons might breach relevant
international human rights provisions.
In Kirkwood, EComHR was prepared to consider that the UK's
responsibility might be engaged but held that the threshold of certainty of ill-
treatment was not reached. The applicant was arrested at Heathrow as the subject
of an extradition request from the USA for a double murder in California, where
the death penalty was available. An assurance was obtained that "should the
applicant be convicted of ...murder...and if the death penalty is imposed... a
representation will be made in the name of the United Kingdom that it is the wish
222 The Council ofEurope: achievements and activities, Directorate of Information, Council of
Europe, 1993, 3.
223 See X v Switzerland 24 DR 205 (1981) and Kozlov v Finland 69 DR 321 (1991), in each of
which the Commission said that Article 3 will only apply in "exceptional circumstances"
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of the United Kingdom that the death penalty will not be carried out". The
applicant was committed for return and the Secretary of State ordered his
surrender. The applicant complained inter alia that, bearing in mind the
probability of the imposition of the death penalty in the event of his conviction
(having regard to his criminal record for offences of violence) and taking account
of the automatic appeal procedure and consequent delays, his extradition to the
USA would breach the guarantee against inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment in Article 3 ECHR. The Government argued that what happened to
the applicant in the USA would be the sole responsibility of the USA and that the
UK's involvement was insufficiently proximate to engage State responsibility.
Although EComHR reaffirmed the rule in AItun that "if conditions in a country
are such that the risk of serious ill-treatment and the severity of that treatment fall
within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention, a decision to deport, extradite or
expel an individual to face such conditions incurs the responsibility under Article
1 of the Convention of the Contracting State which so decides", it went on to hold
that in the instant case the applicant had not been tried or convicted and the risk of
his exposure to death row was uncertain. It had not been established that the
treatment to which he might be exposed and his risk of such exposure were so
serious as to breach Article 3 and the application was therefore inadmissible.
Soering v United Kingdom
In Soering, however, whilst recognising the importance of extradition224, the Court
held that the UK's responsibility was engaged by the conditions in the USA to
which it proposed to surrender the applicant.
Soering is usually discussed for its significance for the human rights
obligations of the requested State in an extradition case. It is not intended to
repeat here what has been written elsewhere about Soering and human rights
224 It said that there is a "search for a fair balance between the demands of the community and the
requirement of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights...it is increasingly in the
interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should be brought to justice.
Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would not only result in danger for the
State obliged to harbour the protected person but also tend to undermine the foundations of
extradition".
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law225. Rather, it is sought to call attention to the complexities which it illustrates
in the relationship between international law and criminal law.
Put shortly, the facts were that the parents of the applicant's girlfriend had
been murdered in Bedford County, Virginia in March 1985. The applicant was
arrested in England in April 1986 in connection with a cheque fraud. Whilst in
custody in England, the applicant made a statement in which he admitted the
murders. The USA requested his extradition on charges, inter alia, of capital
murder. After serving a prison sentence for the cheque fraud, the applicant was
arrested pursuant to the extradition request. The UK sought an assurance that the
death penalty, if imposed, would not be carried out. However, the only assurance
which was forthcoming was similar to that in Kirkwood. The prosecutor would
inform the sentencing court that it was the wish of the UK that the death penalty
should not be imposed. It emerged later that he himself intended to seek the death
penalty.
The Minister of State at the Home Office told the House of Commons that
the undertaking received was in standard terms and that it represented a clear
understanding that the death penalty would not be carried out226. That, however,
was not what it said. Article IV of the Treaty provides explicitly that where the
225 The effect ofSoering has been substantial. It defines ECHR law on the application ofArticle 3
to extradition and deportation. It has influenced the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
Pratt andMorgan v Attorney General ofJamaica [1993] 4 All ER 769 (PC). And it has spawned
a considerable literature, which includes: John Quigley and S Adele Shank, "Death Row as a
Violation ofHuman Rights: Is It Illegal to Extradite to Virginia?" 30 Virginia Journal of
International Law 189 (1989); Wilson Finnie, "Extradition and the Death Penalty" 1990 SLT
(News) 53; Sharon A Williams, "Extradition to a State that Imposes the Death Penalty" 1990
Canadian Yearbook ofInternational Law 117; Christine Van den Wyngaert, "Applying the
European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?" [1990] 39
ICLQ 757; Richard B Lillich," The Soering Case" 85 AJIL 128 (1991); Donald K Piragoff and
Marcia VJ Kran, "The Impact ofHuman Rights Principles on Extradition from Canada and the
United States: The Role ofNational Courts", 3 Criminal Law Forum 225 (1992); William A
Schabas, "Soering's legacy: The Human Rights Committee and the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council take a Walk Down Death Row" [1994] 43 ICLQ 913; Harmen G van der Wilt,"
Apres Soering: The Relationship between Extradition and Human Rights in the Legal Practice of
Germany, The Netherlands and the United States" 42 NILR 53 (1995); and John Dugard and
Christine Van den Wyngaert, op cit. These articles and the issues which they raise are not
examined in detail here because our concern is with the relationship between international law
(including human rights law) and criminal law rather than with human rights and extradition as
such; and space is limited.
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offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death in the requesting
state but not in the requested state, extradition may be refused "unless the
requesting Party gives assurances satisfactory to the requested Party that the death
penalty will not be carried ouf221. It may be commented that, if the UK had
chosen to insist on what it was entitled to in terms of the plain words of the treaty-
namely an undertaking that the death penalty would not be carried out-the issue in
the Soering case would never have arisen.
Meanwhile, an extradition request from Germany in which jurisdiction
was based on the nationality principle was refused since the evidence in support,
which was solely an admission to a German prosecutor made without a caution
having been administered, did not satisfy theprima facie case requirement.
At the extradition hearing at Bow Street Magistrates' Court the
Government of the USA adduced evidence of the applicant's guilt ofmurder, so
as to satisfy the requirement of Article VII(3) of the extradition Treaty that there
should be produced "such evidence as, according to the law of the requested
Party, would justify...committal for trial"228. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
committed the applicant for return. The applicant sought judicial review but that
application failed because it was premature-the Secretary of State had not yet
decided whether or not to order surrender and so there was no decision to review.
The applicant applied to EComHR on the basis, inter alia, that,
notwithstanding the assurance given to the UK Government, there was a serious
likelihood that he would be sentenced to death if extradited to the USA and that,
having regard to the death row phenomenon, he would thereby be subjected to
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
EComHR held that there was no breach of Article 3 but referred the case to
226 HC Debs 10 March 1987, Col 955 (Mr David Mellor).
227 Emphasis added.
228 In other words, aprima facie case did exist but the evidence was in the hands of the USA, not
ofGermany. In light of the difficulties which were to follow for the UK, it seems legitimate to
comment that the refusal of the German request, although inevitable given the content ofUK law,
was somewhat artificial. ECtHR was to comment that extradition to Germany would have avoided
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ECtHR, as did Germany.
ECtHR considered that the issue was whether Article 3 could be
applicable when the adverse consequences would be suffered outside the
jurisdiction of the extraditing state as a result of treatment or punishment
administered in the receiving state. It noted that Article 1 ECHR sets a territorial
limit on the reach of the Convention and that the Convention neither governs the
actions of States not party to it nor purports to be a means of requiring the
Convention States to impose Convention standards on other States. The Court
declined to read Article 1 as justifying a general principle to the effect that,
notwithstanding its extradition obligations, a contracting state could not surrender
an individual unless the conditions awaiting him in the country of destination are
in full accord with each of the safeguards of the Convention. Nor did it think it
could ignore the beneficial purpose of extradition in preventing fugitive offenders
from evading justice in determining the scope of application of the Convention
and of Article 3 in particular. It considered, however, that Article 3 enshrines one
of the fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the Council of
Europe and that it would not be compatible with the underlying values of the
Convention if a Contracting State were knowingly to surrender a fugitive to
another State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be
in danger of being subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly
committed. In the Court's view, this inherent obligation not to extradite also
extended to cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a
real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed
by Article 3. Since it could not be said that the undertaking to inform the
sentencing judge of the UK's position as regards the death penalty would
eliminate the risk of that penalty being imposed, especially since the prosecutor
proposed to seek that penalty, the likelihood of the feared exposure of the
the difficulty in relation to the possibility of the death sentence and the consequent "death row
phenomenon" which formed the basis on which the case was decided.
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applicant to the death row phenomenon229 was such as to bring Article 3 into play.
The Secretary of State's decision to extradite the applicant to Virginia would, if
implemented, give rise to a breach ofArticle 3.
There were several interests at stake in this and, because ECtHR only has
jurisdiction to interpret and apply ECHR, it could not and did not take account of
all of them.
The applicant himself had a right of individual petition to EComHR in
respect of the breach ofhis Article 3 right. That was addressed.
Germany, as a party to ECHR, had an interest in the UK's compliance
with that Convention.
The USA had an interest in the UK's compliance with the extradition
treaty but no interest in ECHR.
The UK owed obligations to both Germany and the USA and its obligation
to Germany was to secure the Article 3 right to Soering's enjoyment. These
obligations conflicted. There is nothing in the extradition treaty with the USA
which permits the UK to refuse extradition if the fugitive would be treated in the
USA in a way which would breach ECHR. Nor is this unusual. The ILA
Committee on Extradition and Human Rights has pointed out that "no treaty
clearly confronts the difficult question of what a requested state is to do when
faced with a conflict between an obligation contained in an extradition treaty and
an obligation in a multilateral human rights convention"230.
In terms of general international law, the position of a State which finds
that it has inconsistent treaty obligations is governed by Article 30 of the 1969
Vienna Convention. In general, that gives later treaties priority over earlier ones
but where the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier
229 A condemned prisoner in Virginia could expect to spend 6 to 8 years on death row and the fact
that most of that time would be a result ofhis taking advantage of all avenues of appeal did not
alter the fact that he would have had to endure those conditions for many years and the anguish
and mounting tension of living in the ever-present shadow of death. The applicant would have
been (necessarily) subject to a severe regime. He was young and suffering from disturbed mental
health.
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one, the treaty to which both States are party takes precedence over that to which
only one of them is a party231. As between the UK and the USA, this would have
meant that the extradition treaty should have taken precedence over ECHR. That
rule, however, applies only as between those two states. The UK could not, by
concluding a conflicting treaty with the USA, unilaterally avoid its obligation to
Germany and its derived obligation to Soering. That, in effect, was the issue
which underlay the case. The decision left unresolved the problem of the UK's
obligation to the USA under the extradition treaty. In the event, that problem was
solved by extraditing Soering to Virginia on lesser charges which did not carry the
possibility of the death penalty232. Had the USA not been accommodating in that
respect, however, the issues which would have arisen would have included the
legal effect of the UK's habit of accepting assurances which were less than those
to which it was entitled as regards the death penalty and the effect of ICCPR, to
which both the UK and the USA are Parties. That entered into force in 1976, after
the UK/US extradition treaty but before the Soering affair. It contains at Article 7
wording which is identical to that of Article 3 ECHR. There must be a case for
saying that the provisions of ICCPR should have prevailed over the those of the
extradition treaty. Certainly, the USA was sufficiently concerned about the effect
of the decision in Soering to make reservations to both the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984
and ICCPR so as to exclude the death row phenomenon from the interpretation of
the phrase "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"233.
Soering was concerned with Article 3 ECHR. Harris and others point out
230 International Law Association, Tapei Conference (1998), Committee on Extradition and
Human Rights, Third Report, 3.
231 Art 30(4).
232 See Susan Marks, "Yes, Virginia, Extradition May Breach the European Convention on Human
Rights" [1990] CLJ 194.
233 Soering was applied but distinguished on the facts by the UN Human Rights Committee in
Kindlerv Canada 470/1991 (1993). In Ng v Canada 469/1991 (1994) the Committee held that
extradition to the USA where the fugitive faced the possibility of death by cyanide gas
asphyxiation (which might cause agony for up to 10 minutes) would violate Article 7 ICCPR.
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that other cases might fall within Article 8234 and EComHR was prepared to
consider such an argument inX v Switzerland5, though in that case the necessary
threshold was not reached. In Bulus v Sweden236 EComHR held that to separate a
teenage boy from most of his family by deporting him would breach Article 8.
One might imagine extreme circumstances in which Article 8 issues would arise
in an extradition context.
Van den Wyngaert has argued, on the basis of Soering, that, whilst it
cannot be said that the Strasbourg organs accept the inherent priority of
obligations under ECHR over other treaty obligations, the mere fact of applying
the Convention to extradition seems to indicate a view that in the case of a
conflict ECHR should prevail. At least, she maintains, the Strasbourg organs,
without expressly addressing the issue of the ranking of treaties in priority, accept
that certain human rights can be independent obstacles to extradition237. That
having been said, in Chinoy238 EComHR took account of the UK's obligation to
the USA in terms of the extradition treaty in finding that the detention of an
alleged drug trafficker with a view to his extradition to the USA did not breach
Article 8 ECHR. Evidently, just as ECHR must be taken into account in
understanding what a State can do in relation to extradition, so relevant
extradition treaties must be taken into account in determining the application of
ECHR to a given case. What does seem clear is that, since Soering, one has to
accept that, even where there is an unambiguous treaty provision such as the
obligation to extradite constituted by Article I of the UK/USA extradition Treaty,
the relationship between international law and criminal law will be tripartite,
involving international extradition law, municipal extradition law and
international human rights law, at least to the extent that it is opposable to the
234 Op cit, 73.
235 24 DR 205 (1981).
236 3 5 DR 57 (1984).
237 Christine Van den Wyngaert, "Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to
Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box" (1990) 39 ICLQ 757, 763-4.
238Supra.
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requested State and has some effective enforcement mechanism239.
The European Convention on Extradition
Introduction
In practical terms, ECE is the most important international extradition
arrangement to which the UK is party, not only because it is the vehicle for a
significant proportion of extradition requests but also because it provides the
foundation for European extradition law. It has special significance for Scots law
because it was accession to ECE which provided the context for the creation, in
the 1989 Act, of a Scottish extradition jurisdiction. As we shall see below240,
efforts are being made within the context of the EU to "streamline" extradition
and the UK has been one of the states pressing for such development. We shall
consider the development of the Convention and of the UK's attitudes to it.
Thereafter, we shall examine the basis on which the UK acceded.
The development of the Convention
The history of ECE is set out conveniently in the Introduction to the Explanatory
Report provided by the Council of Europe241. Following an initiative by the
Consultative Assembly and a Recommendation242 a committee of Government
experts was established to establish extradition principles acceptable to all
Member States and whether these should be implemented by a multilateral
convention or left to serve as a basis for bilateral treaties. Considerable agreement
was reached about the principles which should govern extradition and a new
Recommendation was adopted in 1954243 urging that the work should continue
"even if it were to appear subsequently that certain Member States find
themselves unable to become parties to such a convention". It is Council of
239So the extradition legislation in Switzerland, Austria and Germany has adopted the principle
that extradition is to be refused if procedure in the requesting State is contrary to ECHR Van den
Wyngaert, op cit, 759. In Ireland and the Netherlands the Courts have developed a similar
approach (Bert Swart, "Extradition"; Hilary Delaney and Gerard Hogan, "Anglo Irish Extradition
Viewed from an Irish Perspective" 1993 PL 93, 108).
240 Page 92.
241 Explanatory Report on the European Convention on extradition, Council of Europe, 1985, 5-7.
242 R (51) 16, On the preparatory measures to be taken to achieve the conclusion ofa European
Convention on Extradition.
243 R (54) 66.
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Europe practice not to make travaux preparatoires available (providing
explanatory memoranda in their place)244 and so we cannot know what prompted
this. We can, however, guess that the UK was in this the Member State uppermost
in the minds of the Assembly. There is available at the Public Record Office in
London the draft brief for the UK representative for the October 1953 meeting to
consider principles acceptable to all Member States245 which gives a clear
indication of the approach which was to be taken by the UK delegate in relation to
the issues to be discussed at the meeting. It was not constructive.
The introduction to the draft brief, having offered the opinion that "[i]t
seems unlikely that...general agreement will be reached on many principles",
concluded with the remark that "[w]e have no desire to hasten the work on this
subject and it would be an advantage if this meeting did no more than undertake
some preliminary discussion and determine what principles should be further
examined". It is difficult to interpret this as anything other than an elegantly
framed instruction to be obstructive. Since in fact a considerable measure of
agreement was reached it appears that the UK misread the situation quite
seriously.
Although nowhere stated explicitly, there seems to have been a fear
underlying the brief that the whole exercise would result in continental
approaches to extradition being imposed on the UK. The most obvious example of
this relates to the question of the non-extradition of nationals, a principle
entrenched in the constitutions of certain countries (such as Germany246). The UK
244 H-J Bartsch, "The Implementation of Treaties Concluded within the Council ofEurope", in FG
Jacobs and S Roberts (eds), The Effect ofTreaties in Domestic Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987, 207.
nd
It is argued in Sir Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, 2 edn, Manchester
University Press, 1984, 129 that such explanatory reports form part of the context of the treaty for
interpretation purposes, falling within the reference in Article 31(2) of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties to "any agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty".
245 FO 371/108050, WU 1591/10.
246 See the declarations and reservations set out in Schedule 3 to the European Convention on
Extradition Order 1990 (SI 1990 No 1507).
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delegate247 was instructed to maintain the strong preference of the UK for the
principle of surrender of nationals. He was instructed that the aut dedere aut
judicare principle (now found in many multilateral instruments248) could not be
accepted as compensation for refusal to surrender nationals and was instructed to
advance in support of that position arguments which related entirely to the
inability of English criminal procedure to deal with the extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction which such an approach necessitates and which failed completely to
recognise either that other countries approach jurisdiction in a different way249 or
that change in English criminal procedure might be considered. It should be said
that there is no reason to suppose that Scots law would have been any better
equipped to deal with bases of jurisdiction other than the territorial one but there
is no evidence in the draft brief that the Scottish position was considered.
The inescapable conclusion from the draft brief and the related material is
that the UK had a deep antipathy to the whole idea of a multilateral convention
and had no intention of allowing its extradition practice to be modified so as to
reflect any treaty which did not itself conform to the parameters set by the 1870
Act. The UK did not at that time sign ECE.
The UK attitude to the Convention between negotiation and 1990
The UK's lack of enthusiasm for ECE at the stage of negotiation persisted. The
Report of the 1974 Working Party noted that UK accession to the EEC (as it then
was) and the increasing amount of traffic between the UK and "Europe" which
was likely to result prompted the question whether extradition between the UK
247 He was Mr FLT Graham-Harrison, Assistant Secretary at the Home Office (Public Records
Office, Foreign Office Doc 371/108050 1591/13A, Report of the Committee of Experts on
Extradition, CM (53) 129, 15).
248 See the discussion in M Cherif Bassiouni and Edward M Wise, op cit, especially 7-19.
249 For a summary of the different bases ofjurisdiction used by Council of Europe member States,
see European Committee on Crime Problems, Extraterritorial criminaljurisdiction, Council of
Europe 1990. See also PJ Slot and E Grabandt, "Extraterritoriality and Jurisdiction" (1986) 23
CMLR 545. Some things do not change. On 24 March 1999, Kate Hoey, Under-Secretary of State
at the Home Office, who manifested no understanding whatever of the issues involved in the bases
of jurisdiction, said in public that the refusal of civilian jurisdictions to extradite their own
nationals was "eminently unreasonable" (House of Lords Select Committee on the European
Communities, Prosecuting Fraud on the Communities' Finances-the Corpus Juris, HL Paper 62,
1999, 106). See the writer's attempt at damage limitation (ibid).
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and its European partners might not be more effectively secured if the UK became
a party to ECE. The Working Party went on to say that the UK "took an active
part in the drawing up of the Convention, and delegates of other states tried to
help us find a way round the problems which it presented to us"250. Nevertheless,
they said that "[t]he main obstacle to accession to the Convention has always been
that it does not follow our firmly established rule that before a person may be
extradited to a foreign country, a prima facie case must be made out against him
to the satisfaction of a court"251. Their conclusion, after examination of several
aspects of ECE, was that accession would have to be accompanied by a
reservation preserving the UK's right to insist on aprima facie case. They took the
view that a decision by the UK to become a party would be favourably received
by other parties even with such a reservation252. Yet they stopped short of
recommending accession, perhaps because their terms of reference focused on
amending and updating the 1870 Act.
It is suggested that the stress which the Working Party laid on the prima
facie case requirement was misplaced and that their argument does not support
their conclusion. If, as the Working Party recognised and as Israel proved, a
reservation preserving the right to insist on aprima facie case was possible it must
follow that the fact that ECE did not incorporate such a test cannot have been the
"main" obstacle to accession. There must have been some deeper objection.
Similarly, the Working Party's assertion that the need to study the reservations
made by other parties and make supplementary agreements with many of them
would render illusory the saving of work in negotiating new treaties with states
which were party to ECE253 does not stand up to examination. It is less onerous to
250 Op cit 110. This analysis of the UK part in negotiations seems to involve some reinterpretation
of history.
251 Op cit 113. This was softened, in the 1982 Working Party's Report, to "the difficulty of
reconciling our own criminal law and procedures with those of Continental countries" (para 16.5).
The prima facie case requirement is not dealt with in the draft brief, apparently because it was not
an issue raised in the memorandum by the Council ofEurope Secretary General which prompted
that brief.
252 Op cit 116.
253 Ibid.
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negotiate a supplementary treaty dealing with one or two aspects of extradition
than to negotiate a treaty dealing with all aspects of the subject, and in fact, such
supplementary agreements have not been necessary since accession in February
1991. It is suggested that a better explanation for the UK attitude is a UK
preference at that time for bilateral treaties, combined with a continuing suspicion
of all things continental and legal, rather than any difficulty with any particular
provision of ECE. In a minute on the subject from the responsible Foreign Office
official in July 1953 it is recorded that "the Home Office were reluctant to have
the suggestion pursued at all. Sir Eric Becket, however,...persuaded the Home
Office to agree that HMG, while opposing any drafting of a multilateral
Convention, should join in any study of extradition questions by experts"254.
We should, then, read the draft brief and also the report of the 1974
Working Party against the background that the UK had in 1953 had objections to
the very principle of a multilateral Convention and not merely to particular
provisions in ECE. Nevertheless, arguments were advanced about particular
provisions and must be presumed to have been seriously intended, even if they
were not in fact the underlying reason for the UK's delay of over 30 years in
signing the Convention. Those arguments related to English law pre-occupations.
In the draft brief they related to the taking of extraterritorial jurisdiction in order
to deal with non extradition of nationals and in the Working Party report they
related to the prima facie case. The subject of this thesis is the relationship
between the criminal law of Scotland and international law. We must ask, then,
how far those pre-occupations reflected Scots law.
The difficulties in relation to extraterritorial jurisdiction probably did
apply to Scots law as much as they did to English (though there is no evidence of
that being considered). Although Scots law, with its emphasis on the place of
conduct255, can probably in practice deal with a wider range of offences than can
254 Public Records Office, FO Doc 371/108050 WU 1591/6, minute from Mr Bushe-Fox, 21 July
1953 (emphasis added).
255 Laird v HMAdvocate 1984 SCCR 469.
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English law with its emphasis on the place of the final element of the offence256,
both are firmly territorial in their approach. Such extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction as exists in Scots law is somewhat exceptional257. Since, however, the
arguments based on the jurisdictional difficulty missed the point entirely in
relation to aut dedere aut judicare and since the law in relation to jurisdiction did
not have to be changed in either Scotland or England in order to accede to ECE it
would seem that such limitations as exist in Scottish criminal jurisdiction were not
of actual significance in relation to that accession258.
The pre-occupation with the prima facie case requirement did not reflect
Scots law at all. The 1982 Working Party recognised259 that Scottish domestic
practice is "akin to that of other European countries". To the (somewhat
questionable) extent that the absence of the prima facie case requirement from
ECE did indeed represent a "main" obstacle to accession, it follows that Scots law
was denied the benefits which earlier accession might have brought simply
because English law had a problem. There appears to have been no occasion on
which the UK has refrained from participation in a treaty which was congenial to
English law but where Scots law had a problem. On the contrary; the UK ratified
the Laundering Convention before Scotland had any confiscation mechanism for
crime other than drug trafficking and terrorism and before there was any
immediate prospect of such a mechanism being provided. That was dealt with by
a reservation excluding Scotland from the relevant Article. There is no reason in
principle why the UK could not have acceded to ECE with a reservation like
Israel's insisting on the prima facie case requirement except where the fugitive is
found in Scotland. In practice, of course, an admission by the UK that what was
256 See Colin Warbrick and GR Sullivan, "Territorial Jurisdiction: Criminal Justice Act 1993",
[1994] 43 ICLQ 460; GR Sullivan and Colin Warbrick, "Territoriality, Theft and Atakpu" [1994]
Crim LR 650; Geoff Gilbert, "Who has Jurisdiction for Cross-Frontier Financial Crimes" [1995] 2
Web Journal ofCurrent Legal Issues 76; Matthew Goode, "Two New Decisions on Criminal
'Jurisdiction': The Appalling Durability ofCommon Law" 20 Criminal Law Journal 267 (1996).
257 GH Gordon, Renton and Brown's Criminal Procedure, 6th edition, W Green, 1996, 10.
258 It would seem from section 2(l)(b), (2) and (3) of the 1989 Act that the UK now fully
acknowledges the validity (or at least the existence in practice) of the active personality principle.
259 Para 4.3.
75
trumpeted as a fundamental right of all British citizens was no such thing might
have led to some hard questions260.
Reconsideration of this position was forced in 1978 when Spain
denounced its extradition treaty with the UK as a result of the difficulties it
experienced over the prima facie case requirement261. The Interdepartmental
Working Party on Extradition, which had originally reported in 1974, was
reconvened in 1982 and their Report noted that developments in the nature of
international crime and in the measures taken by states to deal with it demanded a
complete re-examination of the subject. The growth of transnational crime
associated with increased freedom of movement within Europe was in particular
regarded as a development which required attention262. It dawned gradually upon
the UK that the difficulties arising from the differences between the English
common law system and the civilian system "may have meant in some cases that
criminals have escaped justice"263.
This view became firmer as the 1980s progressed (and was to affect the
UK attitude to other forms ofmutual assistance too), until in Lords Committee on
Part I of the Bill which became the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the Earl of
Caithness was to say that the fact that the UK was not party to ECE had become
"a major stumbling block in our negotiations throughout Western Europe to get a
more comprehensive agreement on crime where people who are committing
crimes can easily hop from one country to another"264. A little later in the same
260One response of the Crown Office to the incorporation of ECHR has been to recognise that Full
Committal on Petition requires that the prosecutor should have aprima facie case and to provide a
statement of that case; but it has stopped short of disclosing the identities of witnesses or
statements in the way traditionally required by English law.
261 Extradition, Cmnd 9421, 1985, 5. Leigh has noted that Spain was prepared to negotiate a
replacement treaty with the UK which contained aprima facie case requirement (I Leigh,
Criminal Justice Act 1988, Current Law Statutes Annotated 1988, 33-27) but Gilbert points out
(Aspects ofExtradition Law, 56) that the evidentiary test was less stringent. It may also be noted
that history has a way of repeating itself. In 1865, France terminated its extradition treaty with the
UK on the ground that the prima facie case requirement insisted on by the UK was an insuperable
obstacle to extradition. By doing so, France prompted the overhaul of the law which resulted in
the 1870 Act.
262 1982 Working Party para 1.9.
263 Ibid, para 1.11.
264 HL Debs Vol 489 (No 1369) Col 22 (20 October 1987).
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debate, he said that the clear implication of the decisions of certain countries not
to even try to obtain extradition from the UK is that serious offenders were known
to be in the UK but no attempt was being made to extradite them265. Evidently it
had finally been realised by the Government that it was denying itself the
opportunity which extradition requests present to be rid of foreign criminals.
There seems also to have been a realisation that the UK's own approach to
extradition was inconsistent with the Government's developing general
international criminal law policy, which was that "international crimes can only
be dealt with in an international framework"266 and that what was needed was
"practical means of co-operation which will prevent criminals from using
jurisdictional barriers to evade justice"267. In short, the Government now wished to
emphasise the co-operative aspect of extradition law.
The 1982 Working Party saw its task as being to determine how, "whilst
preserving as far as possible our own legal traditions, we can bring extradition law
in the United Kingdom up to date and into line with modern developments
elsewhere in the world and, in particular, in Europe". We may note the emphasis
on the preservation of existing legal traditions-the Working Party was not starting
from scratch-but also the importance which was being attached to making the law
work in a European context, where there was, of course, continually increasing
freedom ofmovement both in fact268 and in law269.
The question of accession to ECE was regarded by the 1982 Working
Party as being outwith its remit270. Nevertheless, it made substantial reference to
265 Ibid, col 44.
266 Sir Michael Havers, "Legal Co-operation: A Matter ofNecessity" 21 International Lawyer 185
(1987).
267 Ibid, 193.
268 It has been pointed out that "passenger volume on international flights is estimated to have
risen from 26 billion passenger miles in 1960 to between 600 and 700 billion by 1992" (WC
Gilmore, Dirty Money, Council of Europe Press, 1995, 13).
269 Within the EC, the Treaty ofRome sought to achieve free movement ofworkers by 1969 (see
CH Church and D Phinnemore European Union and European Community, Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1994, 108). As to the possible effects of that on extradition practice, see Mark Furse
and Susan Nash, "Free Movement, Criminal Law and Fundamental Rights in the European
Community" 1997 JR 148.
270 Ibid, para 16.9.
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ECE as being the basis of the extradition arrangements between most European
states, and did express the view that such accession would in practice carry with it
several advantages, especially if the prima facie case requirement was discarded
(a matter on which the Working Party was unable to reach agreement)271.
The 1982 report resulted in the 1985 Green Paper, Extradition, which
accepted much of the 1982 Working Party's reasoning, recognised that about a
third of all extradition requests received by the UK failed as a result of the prima
facie case requirement and also recognised that foreign states were being deterred
from making requests as a result272.
After the 1985 consultation and a 1986 White Paper273, and having regard
to serious concerns about terrorism, drug trafficking and international fraud274,
extradition provisions were included in Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
That was pre-consolidation legislation, and did not itself ever govern extradition
in practice. The 1988 Act provisions, together with some of the provisions of the
1870 Act and of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 (which governed rendition
within the Commonwealth) were consolidated in the 1989 Act. The primary
purpose of the exercise was to place the UK in a position to become party to ECE
and one element was power to "dispense selectively with the prima facie case
requirement"275. The opportunity was also taken to create a quite extensive,
though not unlimited, Scottish extradition jurisdiction. The UK signed ECE in
December 1990. Accession took place on 13 February 1991, and ECE came into
force as regards the UK on 14 May 1991276. It was incorporated into UK law by
the European Convention on Extradition Order 1990277. The Additional Protocol
(which deals with aspects of the political offence exception and cases in which
271 Loc cit.
272 Ibid 4.
273 Criminal Justice: Plans for Legislation, Cmnd 9658, 1986.
274 Havers, op cit.
275 The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr Douglas Hurd) HC Debs Vol 125, Col
682 (18 January 1988). Minutes later, and in the same column, Mr Alex Carlisle MP was to repeat
the fallacy that "no British subject...can be committed for trial by a court in this country unless the
prosecution has established a prima facie case against him".
276 Ibid.
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final judgement has been rendered in a third state) was not signed. The Second
Additional Protocol (which deals with accessory extradition for offences which
carry only pecuniary sanctions, fiscal offences, judgements in absentia, amnesties
and the form of the request) was signed but not acceded to. The UK was to
explain its position in relation to the two Protocols by saying that both contain a
mixture of provisions, some of which could but some of which could not be
adopted immediately. By way of example, it was explained that accessory
extradition, in the Second Additional Protocol, caused problems because there is
no power in UK law to extradite for offences punishable with only a pecuniary
sanction278. This, of course, begs the question. The UK had just passed
extradition legislation and could in that have legislated so as to be able to accede
to the Additional Protocols. What the UK meant was that it had chosen not to do
so. It is clear from the reservations and declarations made by all States Party to
ECE279 that municipal law plays a significant part in what states are prepared to do
in relation to extradition. Indeed, that is clear from the text of the Convention
itself. So, for example, Article 6 ECE gives Parties a right to refuse to extradite
their own nationals and many states from the civilian tradition have made it clear
by declaration that they have provisions in their national laws which compel them
to invoke that right.
Accession with reservations
What the UK did in the 1989 Act was to legislate in terms which were compatible
with ECE but which did not directly apply ECE. On accession, reservations were
made, some of which were explained as being conditioned by the Act. Thereafter,
ECE was incorporated by Order in Council. Given the UK's somewhat
unconstructive attitude to the negotiation of ECE, there is little to be gained by a
detailed analysis of ECE's provisions in light of the 1870 Act (which governed
277 SI 1990 No 1507.
278 European Committee on Crime Problems; Committee of Experts on the Operation of European
Conventions in the Penal Field (PC-OC), 21st Meeting, 23-26 April 1991, Secretariat
Memorandum (hereafter, "PC-OC Memorandum"), para 8.
279 These are all set out in convenient form in the European Convention on Extradition Order 1990
(SI 1990 No 1507) Schedule 3.
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UK extradition law when ECE was negotiated). The UK was not, at the time of
negotiation of ECE, prepared to become a Party. The very idea of a multilateral
treaty was unacceptable. So was the use of the eliminative method of defining
extradition crime280 and the possibility for States to refuse to extradite their own
nationals281. The draft brief for the UK representative at the negotiation of ECE
instructed that he should "refuse to accept the proposition that the principle of
non-surrender, if other countries insist on it, should be compensated by an
obligation on the country concerned to prosecute". In support of this, he was to
argue that since the English system of prosecution required the personal
attendance of witnesses and since there was no means of compelling the
attendance of witnesses from overseas, there would in most cases be no means of
trying the accused282; that such limited extraterritorial jurisdiction as is possessed
by the UK courts could not practicably be extended; and that "we cannot be
expected to make wholesale inroads upon our traditional conceptions of the
powers of the courts, or of the rules that should govern the admissibility of
evidence in a criminal trial"283. It is perfectly clear from this that the UK did not,
at that time, regard a pan-European extradition regime as sufficiently important to
contemplate changes in existing practice. Only after the process of re-examination
described above284 did that position alter.
When in the mid 1980s the UK came to consider amending its extradition
law and acceding to ECE, it no longer had the opportunity to contribute to what
was written on a blank page. Rather, it had to accept what was written, subject to
a limited right to make reservations. In the reservations, by which the UK was to
some extent able to "personalise" the Convention, we can find material which will
help us to understand the interaction sought to be achieved between the
Convention and UK municipal law. They are annexed to the European
280 Article 2 ECE.
281 Article 6.





"numerous and difficult...in practice", the UK answered as though the English law
requirements would apply throughout the UK and failed to explain that a different
standard might apply in Scotland287.
Article 1 ECE contains the basic obligation to surrender "all persons
against whom the competent authorities of the requesting party are proceeding for
an offence or who are wanted by the said authorities for the carrying out of a
sentence". The UK has reserved the right not to extradite persons convicted in
absence. Neither Scots nor English law permits such conviction in relation to any
imprisonable (and hence potentially extraditable) offence. An alternative approach
would have been to ratify the Second Additional Protocol, Article 3 of which
provides for certain protections in the case of conviction in absence.
The origins of this provision in the Second Additional Protocol lie in the
Dutch reservation to Article 1 ECE, to the effect that extradition would not be
granted if the accused had not been able to exercise the rights provided for in
Article 6(3)(c) ECHR288. Certainly, ECtHR in Soering did contemplate that an
unfair trial in the requesting state, in breach ofArticle 6 ECHR, might give rise to
liability on the part of the requested state. Accordingly, although the UK's
objection to extraditing in cases of conviction in absence does reflect municipal
law, it also reflects a wider concern about such convictions and (whether
consciously or not we do not know) the possibility that such extraditions might on
occasion breach international human rights law.
Article 2 defines the offences which are extraditable. They are those
"punishable under the laws of the requesting Party and of the requested Party by
deprivation of liberty or under a detention order for a maximum period of at least
one year or by a more severe penalty". The UK reservation provides that it "may
decide to grant extradition in respect of any offences which under the law of the
requesting state and the law of the United Kingdom are punishable by a sentence
of imprisonment for a term of 12 months or any greater sentence, whether or not
287 PC-OC Memorandum para 18.
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such a sentence has in fact been imposed". A further reservation permits the UK
to refuse extradition "if it appears, in relation to the offence or each of the
offences in respect of which...return is sought that, by reason of its trivial nature
or because the accusation is not made in good faith in the interests of justice, it
would in all the circumstances be unjust or oppressive to return him".
The UK explained to PC-OC that both of these reservations are designed
to reflect the terminology of the UK legislation289. The "trivial offence"
reservation repeats, almost verbatim, section 11 (3)(a) and (c) of the 1989 Act.
That section is derived from the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 section 8(3), which
itself was a response to paragraph 9(3) of the Commonwealth Rendition Scheme
and derived from the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 section 10 (but is not traceable
to the 1870 Act). In a Commonwealth setting, the provision makes sense, because
both the Imperial legislation and the Scheme which succeeded it proceeded (until
the Scheme was revised) by the enumerative method. The eliminative method is
intrinsically more apt to weed out trivial offences, especially in the legal systems
of civilian states where the sentences available for particular offences fall
generally within tighter bands than those in any of the UK systems290. The breadth
of the sentencing bands available in the UK (and perhaps especially in Scotland)
might well have meant that some sort of reservation in respect of trivial offences
would have been required anyway; but the particular reservation made represents
the application to late 20th century Europe of law developed to deal with rendition
within the 19th century British Empire. That was not explained to PC-OC, though
the UK did hasten to assure it that it was thought unlikely that the safeguard for
accusations not made in good faith in the interests of justice would be relevant in
the context of requests made by parties to ECE291.
It was explained to PC-OC that the reservation about the definition of
288 Essentially, to defend himself in person. See Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the
SecondAdditional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, para 24.
289 PC-OC Memorandum, para 10 and 11.
290 See 1974 Working Party Report, 23 para 41c.
291 PC-OC Memorandum para 11.
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extraditable offences reflects the terminology of the 1989 Act and it was said that
the Act was framed so as to enable the UK to accept the ECE definition292. The
obvious question is why the 1989 Act definition was so different from the ECE
definition as to require clarification by reservation. Indeed PC-OC had some
concern that the reservation amounted to a derogation293. What the UK might have
explained, but did not, was that the definition of extradition crime in the 1989 Act
is intended to satisfy all those extradition arrangements which are within Part III
of the Act and not only ECE. The Commonwealth Rendition Scheme is the other
obvious example.
The UK has made no reservations to Article 6, which deals with
extradition of nationals. It will be recalled that the non-extradition of nationals
and its corollary, aut dedere aut judicare, (now to be found in Article 6(2)) were
issues which provoked particular opposition from the UK during the negotiation
of ECE. That the UK has been prepared to accept Article 6 without reservation
demonstrates how significantly its priorities have been modified by the passage of
time; though two further points will demonstrate that the UK has not undergone
any kind of conversion on the issue and that its position is pragmatic. The first is
that it is difficult to see what reservation could have been made which would have
had any practical effect. And the second is that, in the context of negotiations
about extradition within the context of the EU, the possibility of extraditing
nationals is not only on the agenda294 but now finds expression in Article 7 of the
as yet not-in-force Convention relating to Extradition between the member States
of the European Union295. The writer holds a copy of an unpublished Paper
presented by the UK to the European Council (Justice and Home Affairs), dated 1
November 1993 and commenting on the statement on extradition made by the
292 Ibid.
293 Ibid.
294 G Vermeulen and T Vander Beken, "Extradition in the European Union: State of the Art and
Perspectives" 3 European Journal ofCrime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 200, 220 (1996);
and, by the same authors, "New Conventions on Extradition in the European Union: Analysis and
Evaluation" 15 Dickinson Journal ofInternational Law 265, 294 (1997).
295 OJ 96/C 313 02; and see the Explanatory Report on that Convention (OJ 97/C 191/03)
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Ministers of Justice at Limlette on 28 September 1993. That Paper notes that the
UK had proposed in July 1992 that the Twelve should agree, as between
themselves, to remove restrictions on extradition of own nationals. More recently,
a paper submitted by the UK to the K4 Committee of the European Union in
March 1999 urged that "we should aim in the longer run for the complete
abolition within the EU of...restrictions on extradition of own nationals"296.
Article 9 deals with non bis in idem. It provides that extradition "shall not
be granted if final judgement has been passed by the authorities of the requested
Party upon the person claimed in respect of the offence or offences for which
extradition is requested. Extradition may be refused if the competent authorities of
the requested Party have decided either not to institute or to terminate proceedings
in respect of the same offence or offences". The UK reservation effectively
rewrites this so that it will apply municipal law. It "reserves the right to refuse to
grant extradition of a person accused of an offence, if it appears that that person
would if charged with that offence in the United Kingdom be entitled to be
discharged under any rule of law relating to previous acquittal or conviction".
This is straightforward but it is worth putting down the marker at this point that
the UK has made a reservation to ECMA dealing with the same issue in a
different and less satisfactory way. That is discussed below297.
Extradition and the Third Pillar of the EU
Introduction
Two extradition conventions have been concluded within the context of the Third
Pillar of the European Union. Although they are not yet in force, the UK has
signed them and is thus both qualified to proceed to ratification and, more to the
point, subject to "an obligation in good faith to refrain from acts calculated to
frustrate the objects of the treaties]"298 and they offer some insight into the kind
of development to which the UK is prepared to become party. They can be
296 Home Office, "Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions and Judgements in Criminal Matters",
1999, para 25.
297Page 159.
298Ian Brownlie, Principles ofPublic International Law, 5th edition, Clarendon Press, 1998, 611.
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considered quite briefly; but they offer the opportunity to describe the Third Pillar
arrangements in general as they impinge on criminal law. There is reason to think
that the Third Pillar will be of considerable significance for European (and hence
Scots) international criminal law in the next few years299.
The Third Pillar described
The first sentence of the preamble to the Treaty Establishing the European
Community 1957 states the determination of the Contracting Parties to "lay the
foundation of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe". The working
out of that and associated objectives has resulted in the creation (in some respects,
"evolution" might be a better word) of "a unique form of legal and political
organisation"300. This has involved, most fundamentally, substantial economic
integration and that has entailed the taking of a multitude of steps to make intra-
Community trade easier. These have included the substantial relaxation of border
controls. One effect of this has been to make life easier for transnational
criminals. Organised crime is a business301 and therefore benefits from anything
which makes business easier. Accordingly, such crime represents a particular
problem for the EU302 and it is necessary to address it at EU level. The Action
Plan to Combat Organized Crime adopted by the Council of the EU in 1997303
asserts that "crime is increasingly organizing itself across national borders, also
taking advantage of the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons...if
Europe is to develop into an area of freedom, security and justice, it needs to
organize itself better, and to provide strategic and tactical responses to the
challenges facing it. This requires a political commitment at the highest level"304.
299 See 317 below.
300 Dominic McGoldrick, International Relations Law ofthe European Union, Longman, 1997, 1.
301 United Nations Economic and Social Council, "Problems and Dangers Posed by Organized
Transnational Crime in the Various Regions of the World" (Background document for World
Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, Naples, 21-23 November 1994), UN
Doc E/CONF.88/2, para 9.
302 See, amongst many others, Martin Brown, "The Single Market After 1992-Free Movement for
Criminals?" in William C Gilmore (ed) Action Against Transnational Criminality, Commonwealth
Secretariat, 1992, 80; and Petrus van Duyne, "Implications of cross-border crime risks in an open
Europe" 1993 Crime, Law and Social Change 99.
303 OJ 97/C 251/01.
304 Op cit, para 1.
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Such efforts, however, bring into tension the desire of the Member States
to co-operate effectively against crime and their reluctance to relinquish control
over criminal evidence and procedure, which is traditionally seen as linked closely
to national sovereignty305. It could not be said at present that the relationship
between criminal law and EU law (especially EC law) has really stabilised. What
can be said, however, is that EU law already has a significant effect on some
aspects of criminal law and has the potential to have a very significant effect over
a wide range of criminal law subject areas.
The Treaty on European Union 1992 (the Maastricht Treaty-"TEU")
established the European Union with a "pillared" structure. The central, or "First"
Pillar consists of the 3 European Communities. The Second Pillar is the Common
Foreign and Security Policy; and the Third Pillar is Justice and Home Affairs306.
The First Pillar is characterised by the full involvement of the Community
institutions. The Second Pillar is intergovernmental, with a role for the
Commission which is not insignificant but which is weaker than its role under the
First Pillar307. However, although the Second Pillar arrangements apply in
principle to all areas of foreign policy308, relatively little progress has been made
within the field309 and such progress as there has been has not related to criminal
law matters. The Third Pillar is intergovernmental, with rather restricted roles for
the European Court of Justice ("the ECJ") and the Commission. We shall address
the First Pillar below, in the context of proceeds of crime, and the Third Pillar
here. The Second Pillar is not relevant to our purpose and will not, therefore, be
considered.
Conventions under the Third Pillar are international instruments properly
305 See, for example, Mark Furse and Susan Nash, op cit.
306 See David AO Edward and Robert Lane, European Community Law: An Introduction, 2nd
edition, Butterworths, 1995, 14; Paul Beaumont and Gordon Moir, European Communities
(Amendment) Act 1993 with the Treaty ofRome (as amended), Sweet & Maxwell, 1994, 32-4.
307 McGoldrick, op cit, 141.
308 Ibid.
309 Xavier Denoel, "The United Kingdom In or Out? The British Approach to the 1996
Intergovernmental Conference" (1996) 2 European Public Law 543, 555.
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so called310. Their relationship with UK municipal law should be exactly the same
as that of any other kind of treaty, though the fact that, at the time ofwriting, only
one Third Pillar convention is yet in force precludes confirmation of that by
reference to actual practice311.
The history of co-operation between EC, and now EU, member States in
justice and home affairs matters is not simple. Indeed Walker has described it as
"a historical record which is marked by discontinuity and institutional complexity,
full justice to which would require detailed analysis"312. Fortunately, such detailed
analysis is not required here. Instead, we sketch out the development of the Third
Pillar but do so primarily to make the related points that, since Third Pillar
conventions are international law proper with all that means as regards the degree
of control a state can exercise over the obligations which it accepts, the UK has
preferred the Third Pillar over the First and that there is reason to believe that
Third Pillar instruments might well come to assume very considerable
significance in the relationship between international law and criminal law.
The EC treaty did not address justice and home affairs matters. Nor would
the UK have been willing to accept the discussion of such matters within the
formal EC structure. When an attempt was made by the Commission to specify
the use of the criminal law in the context of the Money Laundering Directive it
was the UK that took the lead in suggesting a somewhat artificial device to avoid
conceding the competency issue whilst maintaining the strongest possible line
against the mischief which the Directive sought to address313. Inevitably, however,
the interests which the EC Member States had in common made it expedient for
them to develop a particular degree of co-operation and that began in 1975 with
the Trevi system, which provided "an intergovernmental forum for member States
310 PC Miiller-Graff, "The Legal Bases of the Third Pillar and its Position in the Framework of the
Union Treaty" (1994) 31 CMLR493.
311 The Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) (OJ
95/C 316/2) came into force on 1 October 1998.
312 Neil Walker, "Current Developments: European Community Law: II Justice and Home Affairs"
(1998) 47 ICLQ 231.
313 See 275 below.
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to develop common measures, first in respect of counter-terrorism and latterly
concerning drugs, organised crime, police training and technology and a range of
other policing matters"314. It was the UK which suggested the establishment of
that group315 and, in light of the UK's attitude to the requirement to criminalise in
the proposal for the Money Laundering Directive, it is significant that although
membership of Trevi was limited to EC Member States, the grouping was kept
technically outside the EC framework316.
In 1962 the Benelux countries, as a result of a combination of
geographical proximity and legal similarities, and under the imperative of the
abolition of border controls within the Benelux Economic Union317, concluded a
treaty318 which contemplated, inter alia, cross border pursuit by police officers of
persons alleged to be guilty of extraditable offences319. Beginning in 1985 similar
considerations, over a wider geographical area, led and enabled a majority of the
member states of the European Union to participate in the Schengen
Convention320 which "contains a number ofprovisions designed to supplement the
1959 European Convention and the Benelux agreements"321. These include
following suspects across borders for the purpose of surveillance, though not
arrest322. Requests for assistance may be sent directly between legal authorities
rather than requiring to go through central authorities323 and procedural documents
may be sent directly by post to persons in the territory of other state parties324.
314 Walker, op cit.
315 David McClean, International Judicial Assistance, Clarendon Press, 1992, 128.
316 McClean, loc cit.
317 See WC Gilmore, Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Business RegulatoryMatters, Cambridge
International Documents Series, Volume 8, Cambridge University Press, 1995, Introduction, xv.
318 Benelux Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1962.
319 Article 27.
320 Convention of 19 June 1990, applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic ofGermany and
the French Republic, on the Gradual Abolition ofChecks at their Common Borders. For an
account of the history and an analysis of Schengen, see Aleidus Woltjer, "Schengen: The Way of
No Return?" 2 MJ 256 (1995).





Execution of requests for assistance can only be refused where the penalty
available for the offence does not reach a minimum threshold-in other words,
where the offence is minor-or where what is asked would be unlawful in the
requested state325.
These were, however, measures which addressed particular problems and
did not offer a general framework for co-operation in justice and home affairs
matters. For the reasons identified above, such a framework became essential with
the Single Market introduced in 1992. The Co-ordinators Group on the Free
Movement of Persons was established in 1988 to oversee the measures
necessitated by what was planned for 1992 and in what was known as the "Palma
Document" argued that "the effective functioning of the Community post-1992
demanded that the member States adopt a number of compensatory measures in
response to the anticipated loss of national security consequent upon the abolition
of internal frontier controls. These should include new measures to tackle
international terrorism, drug trafficking and other illegal trade [and] improved
police and judicial co-operation"326. At about the same time the Judicial Co¬
operation Working Group, which had been part of European Political Co¬
operation in the late 1970s, was revitalised and there were established the Mutual
Assistance Group 1992 and the European Committee to Combat Drugs.
Much of this activity was brought together under Title VI TEU. Those
provisions were something of an uneasy hybrid "reflecting continuing
ambivalence about the appropriate degree of international control over internal
security matters"327. They are superseded by the restructuring of justice and home
affairs matters under the Treaty of Amsterdam. Detailed description of the highly
elaborate and multi-layered structure which serves the Third Pillar is unnecessary.
Under the Treaty of Amsterdam certain matters relating to free movement
of persons are taken into the First Pillar and the Schengen acquis is incorporated
into the framework of the EU. At the time ofwriting, a Council working group is
325 Article 51.
326 Walker, op cit, 233.
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dealing with the distribution of the acquis between the First Pillar and the Third
Pillar328. However, judicial co-operation in criminal matters and police and
customs co-operation remain firmly in the Third Pillar. As a result, the structures
necessary to serve justice and home affairs matters are rendered somewhat
complex and Walker for one anticipates that the benefits of the co-ordinated
approach to justice and home affairs matters which TEU sought to achieve might
well be endangered by the variable geometry thus introduced329. He does speculate
that it might be that the measures taken by integrationist states will become the
standard to which all member States will aspire in due course330. If he is right
about that it would mean that developments within the EU would mirror what
happened within the framework of the Council of Europe as regards extradition
and mutual legal assistance331, with the UK remaining out of the arrangements
until circumstances made such a position untenable.
This is speculative, of course, but not entirely so. It is to be noted that the
UK's position as regards Schengen has moved from one of complete refusal to
participate to one in which it has, under Article 4 of the Protocol integrating the
Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union ("the Schengen
Protocol")332 annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam333, a right at any time to request
to take part in some or all of the provisions of the acquis334. In December 1997 a
senior Home Office official told the House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Communities that "it would be inconsistent with our general stance on
internal frontiers for us to want to participate in much of the Schengen co¬
operation that would be put into the First Pillar. By contrast, in regard to the Third
327 Walker, op cit, 234.
328 See House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Session 1997-98, 21st
Report, Defining the "Schengen acquis", (HL Paper 87), Minutes of Evidence at 1 (evidence ofMr
MJ Eland, Home Office).
329 Op cit, 238.
330 Loc cit.
331 See 72 above and 154-158 below.
332 OJ 97/C 340/93.
333 OJ 97/C 340/01.
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Pillar, where we have taken the view that we want to co-operate very fully in
police and judicial co-operation, there is a presumption that we will want to look
very carefully at the scope for co-operating in Schengen arrangements
incorporated into the Third Pillar"335.
The UK attitude to Schengen is significant. For all the rhetoric of
successive UK Governments about the importance of international co-operation336
the much greater readiness to consider participation in matters dealt with under
the Third Pillar than in those dealt with under the First suggests that the UK is less
ready to subordinate its municipal law to supranational developments than almost
any of the other member states of the EU337.
The Third Pillar extradition conventions
There are 2 Third Pillar extradition conventions, though neither is in force. Both
of them proceed under reference to ECE and may be regarded as "daughter"
conventions of the sort sanctioned by Article 28(2) ECE. The first, the
Convention on simplified extradition procedure between the Member States of the
European Union338, which aims to speed up extradition procedure where the
334 The right to request to take part is just that-a right to request-which requires unanimity on the
part of the Schengen member States before it can be granted (Schengen Protocol Art 4); and see
House of Lords Select Committee, Defining the Schengen acquis (above, n328 at 1)).
335 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Session 1997-98, 12th
Report, Evidence by the Minister ofState, Home Office, on the United Kingdom Presidency Work
Programme on Justice andHome Affairs, (HL Paper 65) at 2 (evidence ofMr P Edwards).
336 See Havers, "International co-operation...", the remarks of the Home Office Minister of State
(Earl Ferrers) in the Second Reading debate on the Bill which became the 1990 Act (HL Debs Vol
513 (12December 1989) cols 1214-1221 and now, from a Labour Home Office Minister of State
(Ms Joyce Quinn), remarks on the importance, during the UK Presidency, of the usefulness of,
and desire to make progress with, co-operation in justice and home affairs (House of Lords Select
Committee on the European Communities, Session 1997-98, 12th Report, Evidence by the
Minister ofState... at 1.
337 The UK thinks that Ireland shares its views (see House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Communities, Session 1997-98, 12th Report, Evidence by theMinister ofState... at 3).
Barrett, however, implies that Ireland has gone along with the UK with regard to Schengen
because the UK attitude to abolition of border controls has placed Ireland in a difficult position
(see Gavin Barrett (ed), Justice Co-operation in the European Union, Institute ofEuropean
Affairs, 1997, at ix and at 7.
338 OJ 95/C 78/2.
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accused consents to return, by reducing the attendant formalities339. Such
simplified procedure with consent is not to be found in ECE but is clearly and
explicitly contemplated by UK law340. The UK was not, therefore, in the
negotiations for the Convention, faced with any fundamental incompatibility
between the Convention and municipal law.
The Convention relating to extradition between the member States of the
European Union341 is a more ambitious instrument, which inter alia seeks to
eliminate or substantially reduce the application of the political offence exception
as between EU member states342 and to eliminate or substantially reduce refusal to
extradite own nationals343. The UK was amongst the states which pressed for this
development344. Amongst other things, the effect which the Convention would
have on the political offence exception would greatly reduce the effect of the
reservations made by other States to the European Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism345
Much of the Convention is consistent with existing UK law. The UK will
not, for example, have any difficulty in making extradition available for
conspiracy to commit one of a range of specified offences346. On the contrary, the
use which English law makes of the offence of conspiracy is sufficiently
significant that the acceptance by civilian states of an obligation to extradite in
conspiracy cases can only work to the advantage of the UK. Scots law makes less
use of conspiracy charges and is therefore likely to be less affected by this
development. Legislation is, however, likely to be required to permit the UK to
339 For discussion of the convention in some detail, see G Vermeulen and T Vander Beken,
"Extradition in the European Union: State of the Art..." and the similar article by the same
authors, "New Conventions on Extradition in the European Union...".
340 1989 Act sl4.
341 OJ 96/C 313/02.
342 Article 5.
343 Article 7.
344 Draft Report from Permanent Representatives Committee to Council (Justice and Home
Affairs) Doc 10318/93 JUSTPEN 11, 22 November 1993; and Home Office Briefing document
dated 12 May 1994 for meeting of Steering Group III on 20 May 1994 (copies of both on file with
writer).
345 See 49 above.
346 Article 3.
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implement at least Articles 2 and 11. Article 2 modifies the definition of
extradition crimes so as to retain the one-year's imprisonment threshold as regards
the requesting state but so as to reduce the threshold in the law of the requested
state to 6 months. That said, the bands of sentencing options available to UK
courts are sufficiently wide that it seems likely that only a limited range of
offences would be brought newly within the scope of extradition by Article 2. The
narrower sentencing bands typically available in civilian jurisdictions might mean
that the provision would have a more significant effect in the case of requests
made by the UK.
Article 11 is permissive. It allows states to declare that consent to waiver
of the specialty rule may be presumed to have been granted. The UK is not, of
course, obliged to make such a declaration and has in place a reservation to ECE
permitting it to insist on the application on the rule of specialty347.
The Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime set a target of the end of
1998 for the ratification of these two conventions. That target was missed and
there seems to be no immediate prospect of completion of the ratification process.
The Commonwealth
Introduction
The UK/US treaty exemplifies the UK's traditional bilateral approach to
extradition arrangements. ECE is the foundation of developing European practice
and is the multilateral treaty which provides the context for much of the UK's
current extradition business. There are, however, other categories of arrangement
which require our attention, though not in the same detail as was necessary for the
UK/US treaty and ECE. The most important of these is the Commonwealth
Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders ("the Commonwealth
Rendition Scheme").
The Scheme is derived from Westminster's historic right to legislate for
the Empire. The Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 set out rules for rendition of alleged
fugitive offenders within the Empire, including a backing ofwarrants arrangement
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where colonies were contiguous348. It was "an imperial Act applying throughout
HM dominions, which provided for the return of fugitive offenders between the
various parts of a widely dispersed colonial empire and certain features commonly
found in extradition treaties were absent from it eg a list of returnable offences
and restrictions on the return of political offenders"349. At this stage, of course, it
was effectively UK law which governed rendition throughout the colonies and, for
that matter, between colonies and third states. When the UK concluded its 1901
extradition treaty with Belgium, that treaty applied not only to the UK itself but
also to the colonies350.
The justification for the use of imperial legislation was that "Her Majesty
could hardly enter into a treaty with a territory which was part of her dominions.
Imperial legislation, and not a treaty arrangement, was the appropriate method of
establishing a relationship, such as is involved in extradition, between a
metropolitan power and its colonies"351.
The 1881 Act proved, in time, to be "an unsatisfactory basis upon which to
conduct extradition between parts of the Commonwealth which had since evolved
from colonies, protectorates or trust territories into independent Sovereign
States"352. Accordingly discussions were held to establish new arrangements.
Although it would have been open to the Commonwealth to proceed by
multilateral treaty (and that course was considered353), it had not been the practice
for Commonwealth agreements to take treaty form and it was considered that
similarities in the legislation of the various Commonwealth countries made it
347 See European Convention on Extradition Order 1990, Schedule 4, Article 14.
348 Such an arrangement still exists between New Zealand and Australia.
349 Report ofthe Working Party on the Extradition Act 1870, 1974, 9.
350 Article XIV.
351 PL Robinson, "The Commonwealth Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders: A
Critical Appraisal of Some Essential Elements" (1984) 33 ICLQ 614. One consequence of this is
that the current Canadian extradition legislation (contained in the Extradition Act 1985 (RSC
1985, c E-23) may be traced directly back to the 1870 Act, through the (Canadian) Extradition Act
1877.
352 IA Shearer, "Commonwealth Extradition Arrangements: Explanatory Documentation prepared
for Commonwealth Jurisdictions", in Schemes Relating to Mutual Assistance in the Administration
ofJustice within the Commonwealth, Volume Five, Part 1, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989, 219.
353 Report of the Working Party on the Extradition Act 1870, 1974, 16.
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possible for another course to be followed354. Those similarities existed and still
exist in some cases because the UK Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 applied by
paramount force355 and because much of that legislation was modelled very
closely on the 1870 Act. In Canada, for example, the current extradition
legislation, contained in the Extradition Act 1985 is almost identical to the
(Canadian) Extradition Act 1877, which was based very closely indeed on the
(UK) Extradition Act 1870. Blanchflower tells us that the current Canadian
legislation "has similar definitions, provisions, procedures and forms as the
United Kingdom's 1870 Act"356.
The arrangements which were arrived at were contained in the
Commonwealth Rendition Scheme. That Scheme is "not a treaty; it is a basis
agreed among the member states for national legislation conforming
substantially357 thereto in order to achieve reciprocity and similarity of
procedures"358. Rendition arrangements within the Commonwealth depend,
therefore, on the content ofmunicipal law.
The critical difference between the Scheme and a treaty is that the Scheme
imposes no obligation to surrender fugitives. Beyond that, however, the Scheme is
difficult to distinguish from a multilateral treaty359. Indeed, since the Scheme is
written under reference to similarities in legislation and since that legislation, in
all Commonwealth countries, owes a great deal to the 1870 Act, the Scheme
comes very close to being the erection of aspects of English criminal procedure
law into a multilateral international instrument.
The UK legislation which gave effect to the Scheme was the Fugitive
354 Ibid.
355 Dianne Stafford, "Combatting Transnational Crime: The Role of the Commonwealth" in Peter J
Cullen and William C Gilmore (eds) Crimes sans Frontieres, Hume Papers on Public Policy,
Edinburgh University Press, 1998, 44,45.
356 MC Blanchflower, "Interpretation and Application of Extradition Crime in the Extradition Act"
(1992) 34 Criminal Law Quarterly 158 at 166-7.
357 In 1989 the Commonwealth Secretariat published a revised version of its Survey ofExtradition
and Fugitive Offenders Legislation as Between Commonwealth Jurisdictions, listing all of the
relevant legislation in Commonwealth countries as it then stood.
358 1A Shearer op cit, 217.
359 See Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law, 42.
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Offenders Act 1967, under which (by contrast with the 1870 Act) the Scottish
courts did have a jurisdiction. That Act is now consolidated in the 1989 Act.
Procedures under Part III of the 1989 Act apply to all colonies360 and are applied
to Commonwealth countries by designation by Order in Council361.
By 1989, 37 countries had legislated in accordance with the
Commonwealth Rendition Scheme and the UK Fugitive Offenders legislation had
been applied by Order in Council to a further 14362. Most of those countries
already had extradition legislation which followed the UK model quite closely. It
was this similarity which made the Scheme possible; but the Scheme itself is a
constraining influence on the development of extradition practice in
Commonwealth countries. Few states, having enacted legislation to give effect to
one rendition scheme, will wish to have to operate an entirely different kind of
scheme in parallel. Even the UK has tried hard to ensure that the main body of the
1989 Act applies both to its partners in ECE and to those in the Commonwealth
Scheme. So Robinson has criticised the Scheme on the ground that "in
perpetuating the UK's dichotomous approach to extradition [it] has imposed on
Commonwealth countries which have adopted it the burden of a system of
extradition which is unnecessarily confusing and difficult to apply by a country
seeking to unify and integrate its extradition laws in relation to all other States"363.
The content of the Scheme
Clause 1 states that the provisions of the Scheme will govern the return of a
fugitive offender from one part of the Commonwealth, in which he is found, to
another, in which he is accused of an offence. It specifies that return will only be
precluded by law or subject to refusal by the competent executive authority in the
circumstances mentioned in the Scheme. As in extradition treaties, therefore, the
position is that rendition will be made unless the case is brought within a
360 1989 Act s5(2).
361 1989 Act s5(l) and (3). The Order made is the Extradition (Designated Commonwealth
Countries) Order 1991 (SI 1991 No 1700).
362 Survey ofExtradition and Fugitive Offenders Legislation as Between Commonwealth
Jurisdictions, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989.
363 Op cit, 617.
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particular ground of refusal. Clause 2 of the Scheme provides that a fugitive will
only be returned for a "returnable offence". The expression "extradition crime" is
avoided, as is the word "extradition" throughout the Scheme, reflecting the
absence of obligation creating provisions. Returnable offences were originally
identified by the enumerative method, following UK practice and using a list of
offences identified by their English law names (and hence, of course, the names
by which they were known in the overwhelming majority of Commonwealth
States). Returnable offences are now, however, identified by the eliminative
method, as offences which are punishable in both affected parts of the
Commonwealth by imprisonment for two years or a greater penalty. That change
followed a change in Australian law to the eliminative method and a proposal by
Australia which noted not merely that there was a move internationally towards
that method but also that the UK 1986 White Paper proposed such a change for
UK law364. To that extent, UK law was still exercising a persuasive authority on
the content of the Scheme. It should also be said that Australia called attention in
its proposal to the fact that the eliminative method was preferred by most
European countries365.
Clauses 5 to 15 provide a detailed procedural code which is strikingly
similar to that which existed and exists under the UK extradition legislation. We
do not need to examine that code in detail. It is, by and large, "nuts and bolts"
stuff. Its significance for our present purposes lies in its clear origins in English
law. In relation to the Commonwealth Scheme, the relationship between
international law and national law is, in general, clear. The Scheme is derived
from English law and shows substantial English law influence. It shows no Scots
law influence. Moreover, it depends on national law. International obligations are
not part of the arrangements.
One of the clearest derivations from English law is clause 5(4). In terms of
that clause, the court may commit the fugitive to prison to await his return if "(a)
364 Government of Australia, "Suggestions for a Review of the Scheme Relating to the Rendition
of Fugitive Offenders within the Commonwealth", Doc LMM(86)5, paras 4, 5 and 9.
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such evidence is produced as establishes aprima facie case that he committed the
offence of which he is accused, and (b) his return is not precluded by law".
Otherwise, he is to be discharged. The prima facie case requirement has thus
been retained in the Scheme despite an Australian proposal in 1986 to dispense
with it366. That proposal pointed out that it is the requirement that evidence to
establish a prima facie case be admissible under the laws of the requested country
which "has in the past permitted fugitives to evade justice on technical as opposed
to meritorious grounds". Australia (which had dispensed with the requirement in
its own law) argued that the mutual trust which is fundamental to the existence of
extradition arrangements obviates a need for critical analysis of the evidence and
that the fugitive is adequately protected by the restrictions on return which are
found in paragraph 10 of the Scheme. This is similar to the basis on which the UK
Government was to justify the abrogation of the prima facie case requirement as
regards ECE states and similar too to the reasoning which leads Dutch law, for
example, to assume that the authorities of the requesting state do not seek
extradition without good reason, so making a prima facie case requirement
irrelevant367. Noting that the UK was to abolish the requirement as regards non-
Commonwealth states, Australia argued that within the Commonwealth, where
there is a common legal heritage, there would appear to be no need for the prima
facie case requirement.
Notwithstanding such persuasive effect as the UK's proposed change may
have had, the Australian proposal did not meet with sufficient approval to give it
effect. It is recorded in a Discussion Paper prepared by Canada for the meeting of
Commonwealth Senior Officials in June 1989368 that there was a Canadian
objection to the notion that the adequacy of evidence should not be determined by
365 Paragraph 6 of the Proposal.
366 Government ofAustralia, "Suggestions for a Review... , paras 10-14.
367 Swart, "Extradition", 118.
368 Government of Canada (Department of Justice), "Discussion Paper: Proposals for Modification
of the Requirement for a Prima Facie Case under Article 5 of the London Scheme on the
Rendition of Fugitive Offenders between Member States of the Commonwealth", in Schemes
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the courts of the requested country. Canada did, however, recognise not only that
the requirement as it stood was too onerous but also that the procedures required
to satisfy it were too "prolix, time consuming and costly".
Canada noted that the theory that procedure and standards should be
similar to municipal committal proceedings so as to promote equality of treatment
among all persons put in jeopardy before the municipal courts falls down where
non common law states are required to comply with standards radically different
from their own. Canada made specific proposals to address the deleterious effect
which theprima facie case requirement has on international law enforcement. The
crux of those proposals was to permit the court in the requested jurisdiction to
receive an authenticated "record of the case" including a "distinct and specific
enumeration of the evidence". Such a requirement could be satisfied without
difficulty under Scottish practice because the Crown Precognition, which is a
volume containing the precognitions of witnesses, is required (by instructions
internal to the Procurator Fiscal Service) to contain both a narrative of the facts of
the case and an analysis of the evidence369. The Canadian proposal met with
general, but by no means unanimous, approval370 and was given effect by Annex 3
to the Scheme. Clause 19(2) contemplates that two or more parts of the
Commonwealth may agree that this annex will replace clause 5(4); otherwise the
prima facie case requirement remains in the Scheme.
Ireland
There are certain parallels between the arrangements which apply to the
Commonwealth and those which apply to Ireland, though the arrangements with
Ireland are not the subject of any international law instrument. A system of
backing of warrants developed whilst Ireland was still part of the United
Relating to Mutual Assistance in the Administration ofJustice within the Commonwealth, Vol 5,
Part 1, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989, 251.
369 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, Book ofRegulations, 1984 and updates, para
4(29)(xii-xiii) .
370 See Commonwealth Law Ministers, "Communique", para 15, in 1990 Meeting of
Commonwealth LawMinisters and Senior Officials, Memoranda Part 1, xi.
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Kingdom371 and, as befitted what were domestic arrangements, that system was
founded on legislation and not upon treaty. The system continued to operate
following the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1921 but in 1965 the
decisions of two courts, one British and one Irish, brought this arrangement to an
end and necessitated its being placed on a proper legislative footing. The House of
Lords held, in R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex p Hammond372, that the
continued operation of the system was incompatible with Ireland's status as an
independent state and the Irish Supreme Court held, in State (Quinn) v Ryan313
that it was unconstitutional because it denied the person arrested in Ireland the
opportunity to seek redress in the (Irish) High Court374. There had in fact been
earlier attempts to challenge the system, which had come to nothing375, but the
Ryan case occurred after the system of endorsing warrants broke down in
practice376 and the Garda and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, in a premature and
unfortunate flowering of police co-operation, began the mutual and unregulated
surrender of persons with a fine disregard for the existence of a national border.
It would at this point have been possible for the UK and Ireland to have
concluded a bilateral extradition treaty. They chose not to do so. Instead, the
arrangement was overhauled and set out in reciprocal legislation. The UK statute
is the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965 ("the 1965 Act")377.
The municipal legislation, in the arrangements with Ireland, entirely excludes any
international instrument of any kind. Municipal law not only dominates the field;
it occupies it completely. Aspects of that law are considered below378.
371 M McGrath, M, "Extradition: Another Irish Problem" [1983] 34 Northern Ireland Legal
Quarterly 292.
372 [1965] AC 810.
373 [1965] IR 70.
374 See especially Kingsmill-Moore J at 123.
375 State (Dowling) v Kingston (1937) ILTR 225; State (Duggan) v Tapley (1951) ILTR 22 (in
which the Court also rejected the proposition that the political offence exception is a matter of
customary international law).
376 See M McGrath, op cit 295.
377 The Irish equivalent is Part III of the Extradition Act 1965, which legislation was enacted to
enable Ireland to ratify the European Convention.
378See 132.
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Article 6 of the 1988 UN Drugs Convention
Bilateral extradition treaties, multilateral extradition conventions such as ECE and
arrangements such as the Commonwealth Scheme are all concerned with
adjectival law and form part of what Cassese has called "an emerging branch of
law, namely the law of international criminal procedure"379. Many multilateral
conventions in the criminal law field, however, deal with particular substantive
crimes of international interest. It is common for such conventions to include
provisions as to extradition380 and these have been becoming longer and more
comprehensive from Convention to Convention over the years. The 1988 UN
Drugs Convention was intended to be a "comprehensive, effective and operative"
instrument directed specifically against illicit drug trafficking381 and Article 6
makes provision, in 12 sub-paragraphs, for extradition382. Overall, it bears a
certain resemblance to the UN Model Treaty on Extradition. This is hardly
surprising, since the Model Treaty was developed after wide consultation and
adopted by the General Assembly in 1990383, less than two years after adoption of
the 1988 Drugs Convention. It is intended by the UN "to be used as a basis for
international co-operation and national action against organised crime and
terrorist crime"384 and to provide a "frame of reference for negotiating States"385.
Moreover, Article 6 was never intended to amount to a detailed mini-treaty on
extradition. There were already well developed extradition mechanisms in place
in relation to drug trafficking386.
It is very important to remember that the UK was not negotiating the
379 Antonio Cassese, "Opinion: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and Human Rights" 1997 EHRLR 329.
380 See, for example, Article 8 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others 1949 and Articles 8-10 of the International
Convention Against the Taking ofHostages 1979.
381 Preamble.
382 Article 8 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others 1949 had only 3 sub-paragraphs.
383 International Review ofCriminal Policy, Nos 45 and 46, 1995, Preface, iv.
384 Loc cit.
385 Op cit, iii.
386 See United Nations, Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, UN Doc E/CN.7/590, 1998, 152.
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extradition provisions in isolation from the rest of the Convention. The UK had
become seriously concerned about its growing drug problem and this concern had
become the impetus for serious engagement in international efforts to combat that
problem387. Although the Minister of State for the Home Office was speaking with
particular reference to forms of judicial assistance other than extradition when he
said "[hjaving recognised the inadequacies of our existing legislation, we have
been determined to secure arrangements which will place us in the first rank
internationally in our ability to co-operate with other countries in this most
important of areas"388, his comment was made in the context of legislation389
which was itself a response to drug trafficking in particular390. What he said sums
up rather accurately the approach which the UK was taking in the late 1980s to all
international initiatives which addressed drug trafficking391. It is unlikely,
therefore, that the UK would have been prepared to see the negotiations for the
1988 Convention as a whole founder on disagreements over extradition or that the
UK would have declined to become party to the Convention over doubts about
Article 6 unless there had been thought to be some fundamental incompatibility
between that Article and the principles upon which the UK criminal justice
systems were perceived to be founded. As the Minister of State said during the
Third Reading debate on the 1990 Act, "our view was that the most important
consideration of all was that the United Kingdom should ratify the [1988] Vienna
Convention as soon as possible"392.
It might well be that this position was easier for the UK to arrive at
because what was to become Article 2 of the Convention was interpreted during
the Conference to Adopt as expressing "the principle of the supremacy of
387 See William C Gilmore, "International Action Against Drug Trafficking: Trends in United
Kingdom Law and Practice" 24 Int'l Law 365 (1990) for a particularly clear account of the way in
which UK involvement on the international plane was prompted by the drug problem.
388 HL Debs, Vol 513, 12 December 1989, Col 1217.
389 The 1990 Act.
390 See Harding, op cit.
391 So, for example, after years of hesitation about the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic
Substances 1971 the UK put its doubts aside and ratified in 1986 (see Gilmore, "International
Action Against Drug Trafficking: Trends...", 367).
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domestic law"393. That Article, which deals with the scope of the Convention,
states that Parties will take the necessary measures to comply with the Convention
"in conformity with the fundamental provisions of their domestic legislative
systems", that they will carry out their obligations "in a manner consistent with
the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of
non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States" and that "a Party shall not
undertake in the territory of another Party the exercise of jurisdiction and
performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that
other Party by its domestic law".
The terms of Article 2, the fact that it was introduced as an amendment by
Canada and Mexico and the opposition which it provoked from the USA394 give
rise to the suspicion that, although neither Canada nor Mexico said as much, it
was actually intended as a means of denying the USA the opportunity of invoking
the Convention in support of its extraterritorial law enforcement activities395. Be
that as it may, it was understood at the Conference as stating the supremacy of
municipal law; and that position was entirely consistent with the traditional UK
perception.
Article 6(2) requires that each of the offences to which the Article applies
should be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition
treaty existing between Parties and must be included as extradition offences in any
392 HL Debs Vol 515, 15 February 1990, Col 1472.
393 United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Official Records Vol II, Summary Records ofMeetings of
the Committees of the Whole (UN Doc E/CONF.82/3 and Corr.l) at 173 (intervention ofMr
Schutte).
394 United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Official Records Vol II, at 155-7.
395 As Abramovsky has described the position, "the United States has faced...problems when
conducting law enforcement operations in such countries as Colombia and Mexico...[and has]
employed several means of sanctioning individuals and countries who pose a threat to US law
enforcement, ranging from diplomatic and economic sanctions to aggressive pursuit or even
outright kidnapping of persons suspected ofmurdering US law enforcement agents. Thus, where
co-operation is notforthcoming fromforeign authorities, the United States has acted to compel it"
(Abraham Abramovsky, "Prosecuting the 'Russian Mafia': Recent Russian Legislaton and
Increased Bilateral Co-operation May Provide the Means" 37 Virginia Journal ofInternational
Law 191, 205 (1996) (emphasis added)).
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future extradition treaty. This general approach has been in use in such
conventions for a considerable period of time396 but it is worth noting that Canada
at least perceived the mandatory nature of the provision as a significant advance
over the equivalent, but merely hortatory, provision in the 1971 Psychotropic
Substances Convention397.
Article 6 applies398 to those offences established in terms of Article 3(1),
which was intended to be "an all-inclusive list of illicit drug trafficking
offences"399. The extradition arrangements in the Convention are therefore limited
to drug trafficking, which was the subject matter of the Convention, but apply to
all those aspects of drug trafficking of which the Conference could conceive. This
approach has more in common with the enumerative approach than with the
eliminative400 but it has two important differences from the standard "list" based
enumerative method. First, Article 3(1), and hence Article 6, deal with conduct,
not with nomen iuris. And secondly, Article 3(4) requires parties to make the
Article 3(1) offences liable to sanctions "which take into account the grave nature
of these offences, such as imprisonment". It is, therefore, likely that an eliminative
approach would be satisfied and this may well be one of the matters which
underlies Article 6(5) which makes extradition subject to conditions provided for
by the law of the requested party. Many states, including in particular those which
are party to ECE, have extradition legislation which adopts the eliminative
method. This particular approach to defining the crimes to which extradition
applies achieves the combination of the enumerative and the eliminative at which
the UK/US Treaty seems to aim without the complexities demonstrated in
Jennings .
396 Once again, Article 8 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution ofOthers 1949 provides an example.
397 "Draft Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances" 1988
Canadian Yearbook ofInternational Law 308, 309.
398 Paragraph (1).
399 "Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances" (reproduced in
International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, edW Gilmore, Grotius, 1992, 101).
400 Article 2 of the UN Model Treaty adopts the eliminative approach.
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Special extradition arrangements
The final type of international extradition arrangement which we need to note is
the possibility of the special extradition arrangement contemplated by section 15
of the 1989 Act. Such arrangements relate to particular individuals and only one
has so far been made401. That was an arrangement made in 1993 with Brazil,
which is believed to have related to one Paolo Cesar Farias402. The procedure is
that the Secretary of State issues a certificate which embodies the extradition
arrangements403. In the case of the arrangement with Brazil, the arrangement404
was based very closely on the 1989 Act. Although Home Office say that "by their
nature special arrangements are exceptional" and that the text of the arrangement
"is not to be considered as a model text", it nevertheless seems likely that any
future section 15 arrangement would also start from the 1989 Act. There are two
things to be said about that. The first is that, in the case of an arrangement with
Brazil, such an approach would accord well with that country's own approach to
extradition, which is based on reciprocity as a self sufficient basis for extradition
without treaty405. The second is that the basing of the arrangement on the 1989 Act
rather than on any of the treaty models available both constitutes a further piece of




It is convenient to treat extradition procedure under the 1989 Act as having three
phases. The first pertains to the arrest of the fugitive, the second is the judicial
phase and the final phase is the "executive" phase, in which the Secretary of State
decides whether or not to surrender a fugitive who has been found by the courts to
401 Except as otherwise indicated, the information about this arrangement comes from a letter
received by the writer from the Home Office Organised and International Crime Directorate,
Judicial Co-operation Unit, dated 3 November 1998.
402 "Britain 'to extradite Brazilian'", The Times, 4 November 1993.
403 1989 Act si5(2).
404 Copy on file with writer but subject to Home Office embargo on wider circulation.
405 See Jose Francisco Rezek, "Reciprocity as a Basis of Extradition" 1981 LII BYb Int'l L 171.
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be liable to extradition. This tripartite division provides the main framework for
our consideration ofmunicipal legislation. It will also be necessary to take a little
time to consider the position of the fugitive returned to the UK.
The arrest phase
The UK's international extradition arrangements have little to say about the arrest
of the fugitive. That matter is left almost exclusively to municipal law. ECE is
typical. The issue is addressed only in Article 16, which permits the requesting
state to seek provisional arrest in case of urgency, sets out the minimum
requirements for the content of such a request and places an absolute time limit of
40 days on the continuation of provisional arrest if the full extradition request is
not received within that time. Article 5 ECHR is, however, of some relevance.
Article 5(1) states the general principle that there is a right to liberty and that,
before deprivation of liberty will be compatible with the Convention, it must be
brought within one of the six heads of exceptions to the general right permitted by
Article 5(1) subparagraphs (a) to (f)406. Subparagraph (f) permits "the lawful arrest
or detention of a person ... against whom action is being taken with a view to ...
extradition", so that arrest with a view to extradition is within the contemplation
of the Convention407. The need, in terms of ECHR, for the arrest phase of
extradition to be regulated by municipal law appears most clearly from Bozano v
France40*. In that case the applicant had been the subject of an unsuccessful
extradition request to France from Italy. He was released following the failure of
the request. About a month later, 3 plain clothes policemen forced him into an
unmarked car. He was taken to Police Headquarters and served with a deportation
order. He was then placed in a car and taken, not to the Spanish border (which
was the closest) but to the Swiss border, twelve hours and several hundred
kilometres away. From Switzerland he was extradited to Italy and there
incarcerated to serve the life sentence which had been imposed on him in his
nd
406 See Francis G Jacobs and Robin CA White, The European Convention on Human Rights, 2
edition, Clarendon Press, 1996, 80.
407 It was, however, held in Quinn v France (1995) 21 EHRR 529 that there was a breach where
the French authorities held the applicant in custody while they solicited an extradition request.
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absence. Viewing the circumstances as a whole, ECtHR concluded that the
applicant's deprivation of liberty was neither lawful nor compatible with the right
to security ofperson and there had been a breach ofArticle 5(1).
There have been no reported cases from the UK of such disregard for the
rule of law409; but France is a developed, western democracy and the fact that
Bozano could happen there should cause the UK to hesitate before making any
claims about the impossibility of such an occurrence here. On the assumption,
however, that, where the UK receives a request for the extradition of a person who
is found in Scotland, municipal law is applied correctly and the kind of rendition
which occurred in Bozano is not attempted, the position will be as follows.
The two preconditions for extradition from the UK are that the request
relates to an extradition crime within the meaning ofUK law and that there is an
extradition arrangement in place between the UK and the requesting state
concerned410.
The move from the enumerative to the eliminative criterion in defining
"extradition crime" was achieved by section 1(5) of the 1988 Act and consolidated
in section 2(1) of the 1989 Act. The change followed a recommendation of the
1982 Working Party411, endorsed by the Government in the Green Paper,
Extradition412. Perhaps because the change did not provoke significant
controversy413, the arguments are not elaborated in much detail anywhere. The
fullest account comes in the 1982 Working Party Report414 and it is clear from that
that it was the inflexibility of the enumerative system which persuaded the
Working Party that there should be change. Reference was made to Article 2(1)
ECE but that was as an example and model of an eliminative approach, not as an
argument in favour of the adoption of such an approach.
408 Supra.
409 But see Amekrane and Others v United Kingdom 16 YB 356 (1973), which comes quite close.
410 1989 Act si.
411 Op cit, paras 3.3-3.24.
AnOp cit.
413 The eliminative approach was already in use with Ireland.
414 Loc cit.
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The necessity for the existence of an extradition arrangement has been a
feature ofUK law since before the 1870 Act and is provided for by section 1(1) of
the 1989 Act. The arrangement may be a treaty embodied in an Order in
Council415, the Commonwealth Rendition Scheme (where the requesting State is
designated under the Extradition (Designated Commonwealth Countries) Order
1991416, made under section 5(1) of the 1989 Act) or a treaty embodied in an
Order in Council made under the 1870 Act417, in which case procedure is
governed by Schedule 1 to the 1989 Act. The Scottish courts have no jurisdiction
as regards Schedule 1 and that Schedule is, therefore, not further considered. As
noted above, the only treaty of practical importance to which Schedule 1
procedure applies is that with the USA; but the amount of traffic with the USA is,
of course, such that the omission of that Treaty from the jurisdiction of the
Scottish courts is significant.
The preconditions being satisfied, the first step is the issue of a warrant for
arrest. No arrest for an extradition crime is lawful in domestic law without a
warrant418. This may be either a warrant following the receipt of an "authority to
proceed" or a provisional warrant. An authority to proceed may be issued by the
Secretary of State in pursuance of the receipt of an extradition request which
furnishes particulars of the person whose return is requested, particulars of the
offence of which he is accused and either the foreign warrant or a certificate of
conviction419. Such an authority is capable of being held to be defective where it
does not specify what offence would have been committed in the UK had the facts
occurred here (as is required by the dual criminality requirement)420.
Both sorts ofwarrant may be issued by a metropolitan magistrate or by the
sheriff of Lothian and Borders. A provisional warrant may be issued by a
metropolitan magistrate, a justice of the peace in any part of the UK or by a
415 1989 Act s4(l).
416 SI 1991 No 1700.
417 1989 Act sl(3).
418 Diamond vMinter [1941] KB 656.
419 Section 7.
420 In re Farinha [1992] COD 602.
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sheriff, but only where there is information that the person is, or is believed to be
in or on his way to, the UK. In either case, the test is that the grantor of the
warrant must have been supplied with such information as would justify the issue
of a warrant of arrest in a domestic case421. The application of this test was said, in
R v Weil422 to be entirely a matter of discretion. Following ex p Pinochet Ugarte
(No 5/23, that comment must now be read subject to the (rather obvious)
qualification that the offences for which extradition is sought must be extradition
crimes.
Where a provisional warrant is issued, notice must be given to the
Secretary of State424 who may either cancel the warrant or issue an authority to
proceed425. In English law at least, the Secretary of State's decision is amenable
to judicial review; though in relation to Pinochet the (English) High Court has
taken the view that judicial review at this stage "would needlessly disrupt the
extradition process and postpone the machinery which will afford General
Pinochet every proper opportunity to advance his case and protect his position426.
All of this addresses the fundamental requirement of Article 5 ECHR that
there should be a procedure prescribed by law. The rules described are not
significantly different from those which were set out in the 1870 Act. The position
is that, to this extent, UK municipal law is consistent with ECHR but it cannot be
said that it has been influenced by ECHR. The same may be said as regards the
particular rights which Article 5(2) and (4) desiderate for the person who has been
arrested.
Section 9(1) of the 1989 Act provides, inter alia, that a person arrested in
pursuance of a warrant under section 8 must be brought as soon as possible before
a court consisting of the sheriff of Lothian and Borders. That court is given the
421 Section 8(3) and (3A).
422 (1892) 9 QBD 710.
423 See 114 below.
424 The Act simply refers to the "Secretary of State". For Scotland, the functions of the Secretary
of State under the 1989 Act are performed by the Secretary of State for Scotland.
425 Section 8.
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like powers as if the proceedings were summary proceedings in respect of an
offence alleged to have been committed by the fugitive. The effect of this, it is
suggested, is to place the arrested fugitive in as nearly as possible the same
procedural position as he would have been in had he been arrested in connection
with a purely domestic matter. Article 5(4) ECHR requires that everyone who is
arrested must be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his
detention is decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is
not lawful. In this context, we may refer to the case ofBennett, Petitioner*21.
A petition warrant had been issued in Aberdeen for the arrest of Bennett
on charges of fraud. He was also the subject of an English arrest warrant in
relation to charges of deception. Bennett was arrested in South Africa, having
entered that country from Australia on a false passport. The South African
authorities decided to deport him and, for reasons which were a matter of some
dispute, chose to put him on a flight which stopped over at Heathrow, where he
was arrested on the English warrant. He was in due course able to persuade the
Divisional Court that there had been impropriety in the deportation via
Heathrow428 and had already persuaded the House of Lords that impropriety of
that sort should lead to the quashing of his committal for trial in England429.
However, the English committal having been quashed (and Bennett's attempt to
prevent the English police from executing the Scottish warrant having failed430),
Bennett was arrested on the Scottish warrant and petitioned the nobile officium of
the High Court, seeking to suspend the warrant, it being argued on his behalf that
there had been illegality in the manner of his return to the UK (as the English
courts had found). In the event, the High Court held that there had been no
illegality in the events which resulted in the petitioner's return to the UK (in other
words, that the English Divisional Court had arrived at the wrong result on the
426Ognall, J, reported in "Pinochet bid for judicial review fails", The Times, Friday May 28, 1999,
10.
427 1995 SLT510.
428 R v Horsferry RoadMagistrates' Court exp Bennett (No 3) [1994] TLR 187.
429 R v Horsferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [1994] AC 42.
430 R v Commissioner ofPolice ofthe Metropolis exp Bennett [1995] QB 313.
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facts) and that accordingly the issue did not arise. If, however, it had been held
that there had been illegality in the return of the petitioner there would have arisen
the question whether his continuing detention was consistent with article 5(4)
ECHR. The answer might well have been that it was431.
The judicial phase
Introduction
The relationship between international law and the law which governs the hearing
in the court of committal is somewhat complex. We can begin, however, by
setting to one side issues which arise from ECHR. Although what the court of
committal does by discharging a fugitive to whom one of the mandatory grounds
of refusal applies helps to avoid the UK breaching Article 3 ECHR by returning
the fugitive to a place where he would be treated inhumanly, it is clear that in
terms of procedure ECHR has nothing to say about the hearing in the court of
committal. In Kirkwood v United Kingdom,32, the applicant was the subject of an
extradition request from the USA. He was committed for return by the court of
committal and ordered to be returned by the Secretary of State. He argued that
since he had not been permitted to cross examine witnesses against him at the
extradition hearing, there had been a breach of Article 6. The Commission held
that committal proceedings do not form part of or constitute the determination of a
criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 and that this aspect of his
complaint was incompetent ratione materiae.
The hearing in the court of committal is governed primarily by section 9 of
the 1989 Act. By section 9(3), the court is to have the like powers as if the
proceedings were proceedings in respect of a summary offence alleged to have
been committed by the fugitive (in Scotland). And by section 9(8), where the
court of committal is satisfied that the offence to which the request relates is an
extradition crime and that the evidence is sufficient to make a case requiring an
answer (except where Order in Council otherwise provides), it must, unless his
431 See the consideration of Stocke v Germany at 138 below.
432 37 DR 158 (1984).
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committal is prohibited by any other provision of the Act, commit him to await
the Secretary of State's decision as to his return.
The issues which arise out of this are, first, what is an extradition crime,
secondly, the circumstances in which there must be evidence sufficient to make a
case to answer and, thirdly, the circumstances in which committal is prohibited by
other provisions of the Act.
Extradition crime
"Extradition crime" is defined by section 2, as regards those cases in which the
Scottish courts have jurisdiction, according to the eliminative method. Put shortly,
the offence must be one punishable in both the requesting State and the UK with
imprisonment for 12 months or by any greater punishment. This is, of course, the
approach which is taken by Article 2(1) ECE and also by the Commonwealth
Scheme (though the threshold there is two years433) but the legislative history does
not support the conclusion that the eliminative method was adopted so as to make
it possible to accede to ECE and comply with the Scheme. The 1982 Working
Party examined the alternative methods of defining extradition crime for their
own merits and concluded that the eliminative method would represent an
improvement434. Its consideration was informed by the knowledge that ECE uses
the eliminative method but the fact that its adoption would help to make accession
to ECE possible was not something which the Working Party took into account.
The furthest they went was to note at a late stage in their Report that some of the
changes which they proposed would in fact make accession "less difficult"435. The
1985 Green Paper followed that approach436. The Commonwealth Scheme was, it
will be recalled, amended so as to use the eliminative approach in the knowledge
that the UK had proposed to legislate to that effect437. It would therefore be




436 Paras 4.1 -4.7.
437 See 98 above.
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being amended in the light of any particular treaty.
We have mentioned the Pinochet case above438. One of the key issues in
that case was the question whether the double criminality rule applies as at the
date of the offence or as at the date of the extradition request439. So far as relevant,
the facts were that Pinochet was the former head of State of Chile and his
extradition was sought by Spain in connection with a series of offences, alleged to
have been committed between 11 September 1973 and 31 December 1992.
Certain of the offences were extraterritorial offences of torture. Torture committed
extraterritorially was not a crime under UK law until 29 September 1988, when
section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 entered into force440. On the
principle of double criminality, the leading speech was that of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. Lord Hope of Craighead adopted Lord Browne-Wilkinson's reasoning
and then applied it to the facts of the Pinochet case itself.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson reasoned that the 1989 Act regulates at least 3
types of extradition. The first is extradition to a Commonwealth country and the
second is extradition under ECE. The third is extradition in cases in which there is
an Order in Council in force under the 1870 Act, as to which Schedule 1 to the
1989 Act provides the procedural regime. This analysis was correct, though it
might have been added that the Act also regulated ad hoc extradition under
special extradition arrangements.
Only Schedule 1 contains a clear indication of the date which is relevant
for double criminality. Lord Browne-Wilkinson proceeded to use the law in
relation to this third class of case as a tool for the interpretation of the law relating
438 See 110.
439The case is also of significance for the extent to which a former head of state has immunity
from prosecution, for the ambit of the offence of torture and for the responsibilities of a judge who
finds himself dealing with a case in which an organisation in which he has an interest appears as
amicus curiae. The temptation to review those matters is resisted here.
440 That provision was passed to implement the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984. In Pinochet Lord Millet expressed the
view that the systematic use of torture on a large scale and as an instrument of state policy had
become an international crime of universal jurisdiction by 1973; accordingly, since customary
international law is part of English common law, torture committed extraterritorially was a crime
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on the point at issue. As we have seen441, the extradition provisions enacted first in
the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and then consolidated in the main body of the 1989
Act represented a deliberate departure from significant aspects of extradition law
as it stood under the 1870 Act. The means of identifying extradition crimes was
one aspect which changed and the provisions of Schedule 1 as to the identification
of such crimes are materially different from those which apply in the body of the
Act. That being so, in reasoning by analogy between the Schedule and the body of
the Act itself, one should proceed with considerable caution. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson's comment that it would be "extraordinary" if the Act required
criminality under English law to be shown at one date for one form of extradition
and at another date for another put the matter too high. It would simply be
undesirable; but the extradition regimes under the body of the Act and its
Schedule are sufficiently different to make it perfectly possible that different rules
might apply as to operative date. As to the silence of the travaux and the
government papers, that indicates no more than that the point was not actually
considered. What Lord Browne-Wilkinson did, in effect, was to construe
legislation which was framed in light of ECE and the Commonwealth Scheme in
light of the UK's thoroughly anglocentric pre-1989 law and practice.
The case to be made
In terms of section 9(8) the court of committal must be satisfied that the evidence
"would be sufficient to make a case requiring answer", "unless an Order in
Council giving effect to general extradition arrangements under which the request
was made otherwise provides". Section 9(4) provides that where there is an
extradition request from a foreign state and such an Order in Council is in force in
relation to that state there is no need to furnish the court of committal with
evidence sufficient to warrant the trial of the fugitive. Paragraph 3 of the
European Convention on Extradition Order 1990442 applies that exception to
States Parties to ECE.
"^'See 78 above.
442 SI 1990 No 1507.
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In introducing the Commons Second Reading debate on the Bill which
became the 1988 Act, the Home Secretary recognised that the prima facie case
requirement was the "single most significant impediment to extradition from this
country"443 and the discarding of that requirement was both the most significant
and the most controversial444 step taken in the 1988 Act. The issue here is how far
the discarding of the requirement represents the influence of international law on
municipal criminal procedure law.
If it is accepted (as it must be) that extradition is, in part at least, a matter
for international law, and if it is also accepted that extradition arrangements are
made "to serve the purpose of bringing to justice those who are guilty of grave
crimes committed in either of the contracting states"445, it follows that any change
in municipal law so as to render such international arrangements more effective
may be characterised as international law influencing municipal law. Such an
assertion is, however, too vague to be of much value. What is of much greater
interest is the question whether the discarding of the prima facie case requirement
took place primarily in order to permit the UK to accede to ECE.
The evidence seems to indicate that accession to ECE was not the
Government's primary motivation. In his speech on Commons Second Reading446,
the Home Secretary did not mention ECE at all. Rather, in defending the change,
he stressed the difficulty which European countries of the civilian tradition found
in securing extradition from the UK and the difficulties which that caused the UK
in negotiating agreements with those countries for the return of fugitives from
British justice. In the House of Lords the Home Office Minister had taken a
similar line447.
One should, of course, remember that Government ministers are not
443 Mr Douglas Hurd, HC Debs vol 125, col 681 (18 January 1988).
444 See for example the speech of Mr Alex Carlisle in Commons Second Reading (HC Debs vol
125, col 682 (18 January 1988)) and Ian Leigh's assessment in "Criminal Justice Act 1988"
Current Law Statutes Annotated 1988 33-27.
445 Government ofBelgium v Postlethwaite [1987] 2 All ER 985 at 991 per Lord Bridge.
446 HC Debs vol 125, cols 681-684 (18 January 1988).
447 The Earl of Caithness, HL Debs, vol 489 (No 1369) cols 44-45 (20 October 1987).
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necessarily entirely frank with Parliament about their motives. Presentational
considerations argue for stress to be laid on those arguments most likely to
persuade waverers. A blunt assertion that the UK had decided to ratify ECE and
depart from a cherished principle of extradition law in order to "come into line
with Europe" would have been politically dangerous. An argument which
appealed to law and order concerns was more likely to attract the support of
Government back benchers and to be difficult for the Opposition to dispute448. It is
clear from remarks made by the Home Office Minister in the House of Lords that
there was indeed a desire to accede to ECE and that failure to do so was perceived
as hindering the UK's wider efforts to address international crime449.
These ministerial pronouncements have also to be seen, however, against
the background of the 1982 Working Party report which450 concluded that the
prima facie case requirement as it then operated put "unnecessarily stringent
demands on requesting states". The balance of opinion in the Working Party was
in favour of discarding the requirement. Just as was the case in relation to the
adoption of the eliminative method of defining extradition crimes, in describing
the case for discarding the requirement, the Working Party made no reference at
all to ECE451. Presentational considerations are likely to have carried much less
weight with that Working Party than with those who drafted the Home Secretary's
Second Reading speech. Again, the Green Paper, Extradition, which did not state
policy but sought views, focused consideration of the requirement on the
difficulties which it caused in terms of law enforcement rather than on its effect
on accession to ECE452. What ministers said in Parliament was entirely consistent
with these approaches. The weight of evidence seems, then, to favour the
448 It also enabled the Governement to sidestep Lord Irvine of Lairg's point that the UK could
follow Israel's example (European Convention on Extradition Order 1990 (SI 1990 No 1507)
Schedule 3 Part 10) of acceding to ECE under reservation insisting on the prima facie case
requirement (HL Debs Vol 488 (No 1367) col 951 (14 July 1987).
449 The Earl of Caithness, HL Debs, vol 489 (No 1369) col 22 (20 October 1987).
450 Op cit, para 4.14.
451 Op cit, paras 4.6-4.8.
452 Op cit, paras 2.5-2.13. ECE was mentioned only in the context of an option of discarding the
requirement only in respect of parties to ECE.
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conclusion that the principal motive for discarding the requirement was to make
extradition easier. The possibility of accession to ECE which this would open up
seems to have been seen as attractive, both because it would avoid the need to
negotiate new treaties453 and because it would remove an obstacle to achieving
agreement on other international crime issues454; but accession for accession's sake
does not seem to have been the main impetus for change.
Upon this analysis we should conclude that the discarding of the prima
facie case requirement took place because of concerns about the relative
ineffectiveness of UK extradition law and the difficulties which that caused for
the Government's wider policy of "set[ting] the pace in international agreements
and action to grip international crime"455. It did not represent action taken with the
primary purpose of putting UK law into a state which would permit accession to
ECE. It is an example of international law having an influence in municipal
criminal law only in the broad general sense that any legislative change designed
to make extradition easier represents such an influence. It does not represent the
influence of a particular treaty in municipal law.
There is a further issue in relation to the requirement, in Commonwealth
cases, that the court of committal should be satisfied that there is evidence
"sufficient to make a case requiring an answer...if the proceedings were the
summary trial of an information". This form of words was introduced by the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and it is depressing that no-one seems
to have noticed at that time that there is, in Scots law, no such thing as the
"summary trial of an information". By ignoring what the Act says in favour of
what it should have said the procedure can be made to work. What it evidently
means is that the evidence must be such as to satisfy the test applied on a
submission of "no case to answer" made in terms of section 160 of the Criminal
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. Or perhaps not quite, because that section
provides for such a submission to be repelled even if there is insufficient evidence
453 1982 Working Group Report, para 16.7.
454 The Earl ofCaithness, loc cit.
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to prove the principal charge, provided there is sufficient to prove any alternative
offence of which the person could be convicted456. Given the rule of specialty-
which is not, of course, really a matter for the court of committal at all because it
is expressed in section 6(4) of the 1989 Act in terms which relate to the law of the
requesting state-what section 9(8) must mean is that the evidence must be
sufficient to satisfy the "no case to answer" test as regards the particular crime for
which extradition is sought and as regards that crime only.
Section 35(5) of the 1989 Act defines evidence which would make a case
requiring an answer as evidence which would warrant or justify the committal for
trial of an accused person. In R v Brixton Prison Governor ex p Schtraks457 Lord
Reid said that the evidence must be such that, if it "stood alone at trial, a
reasonable jury, properly directed, could accept it and find a verdict of guilty"458.
The debate in English law has always been about the admissibility of various
forms of evidence459. In R v Governor of Pentonville Prison ex p Kirby460, for
example, a failure to comply with the best evidence rule led to the quashing of the
committal. More recently, in R v Governor ofBrixton Prison ex p Gross461 the
Divisional Court allowed an application for habeas corpus where (on a request
from the USA, dealt with under Schedule 1) the magistrate had refused to allow
the fugitive to give evidence. But in Scotland there is a still more fundamental
consideration. If the procedure is to be that appropriate to summary proceedings
alleged to have been committed by the fugitive, and if the test relates to the
sufficiency of evidence as if on a submission of no case to answer, it follows that
the search must be for corroboration. As the Lord Justice-General (Rodger) said in
455 Mr Douglas Hurd, HC Debs vol 125, col 684 (18 January 1988).
456 Section 160(1 )(b).
457 [1964] AC 556, 580.
458 Though it is clear that English law understands this to include some "weighing" of the evidence
(R v Governor ofPentonville Prison ex p Osman [1990] 1 WLR 277) and this process is, in Scots
law, excluded by Williamson v Wither 1981 SCCR 214.
459 See Michael Forde, The Law ofExtradition in the United Kingdom, 69-73; Joyce M Ferley, op
cit para 5.10-5.11.2.
460 [1979] 2 All ER 1094.
46l[1999] QB 538.
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Smith v Lees*62', "...the doctrine of corroboration has always been an important part
of our law...The safeguard against wrongful conviction which the requirement of
corroboration affords is needed as much today as ever it was". That corroboration
is required in order to provide a sufficiency of evidence in any Scottish
prosecution463 is undeniable. The effect must be that a Commonwealth country
seeking the extradition of a person found in Scotland must make a fully
corroborated case. Such a requirement is alien to English law and hence alien to
those systems based on English law.
This is an absurd state of affairs. Having discarded the requirement for
countries of the civilian tradition to meet evidential tests which are alien to them,
Parliament has, no doubt unwittingly, brought about a state of affairs in which
Commonwealth countries seeking extradition from Scotland have to meet an
evidential test which is alien to them.
Circumstancesprecluding return
We turn now to consider the circumstances in which return is precluded by
provisions of the 1989 Act other than section 9 and how far those other provisions
are influenced by international law.
So far as the court of committal is concerned, those other provisions are to
be found in section 6. By that section, a person shall not be returned if it appears
to "an appropriate authority" (at this stage, the court of committal) that the offence
is a political one, that the offence is one under military law which is not also an
offence under the general criminal law, that the request for his return is in fact
made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race,
religion, nationality or political opinions or that he might, if returned, be
prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by
reason of one of those things ("non refoulment")464. In a case where the fugitive
has been convicted in his absence in the foreign state he must not be returned if it
462 1997 SCCR 139, 142.
463 There are a few very minor statutory exceptions.
464 Section 6(1).
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appears that it would not be in the interests ofjustice to return him465. He must not
be returned if it appears that, if charged with the relevant offence in the UK he
would have been entitled to be discharged under "any rule of law relating to
previous acquittal or conviction" ("non bis in idem")466. Nor must he be returned
unless provision is made in the relevant law or extradition arrangement for the
respecting of the rule of specialty467.
All of these restrictions on return occur very commonly in extradition
treaties. Every one of them except for the restriction in the case of a conviction in
absence is to be found in ECE, for example468 and they are, without exception, to
be found in article 3 of the UN Model Treaty on Extradition469. But this is not to
say that they have a treaty source. It will be recalled that section 4(2) of the 1989
Act, like its 1870 Act predecessor, prevents the making of an Order in Council to
give effect to extradition arrangements unless the arrangements are in conformity
with the provisions of the Act "and in particular with the restrictions on return"470.
The political offence exception and the rule of specialty were provided for in
section 3 of the 1870 Act. As has already been established, the UK was at that
time making only bilateral extradition treaties, and those within the framework
provided by the 1870 Act. Non bis in idem, whilst not explicitly provided for in
the 1870 Act, was held in Atkinson v United States Government*71 to be a plea
available to the fugitive arising out of the magistrate's ordinary powers in dealing
with a committal hearing. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appearance of these
three grounds of refusal in the 1989 Act owes anything to international law.
The military offence exception did not exist in its own right in UK law
before the passing of the 1989 Act. However, it will be recalled that the definition




468 The political offence exception is in Article 3(1); military offences in article 4; non refoulment
in article 3(2); non bis in idem in article 9; and the rule of specialty in article 14.
469 General Assembly Resolution 45/116 of 14 December 1990.
470 Section 4(2)(b).
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offences which were not also crimes under the general criminal law did not appear
in the list of extradition crimes and so it was unnecessary to provide for a free
standing restriction on return. The enactment of such a restriction reflects and
goes beyond Article 4 ECE, which excluded such offences from the ambit of the
Convention but does not preclude extradition for such offences. Article 11 of the
Commonwealth Scheme does preclude extradition for military offences.
Assuming, however, that the UK shared the widespread disinclination to extradite
for such offences472, specific provision was required once the eliminative method
was used to define extradition crime.
The origins of Article 4 ECE are not disclosed in the Explanatory Report;
but it does appear that France was precluding extradition for military offences at
least as early as 1927473. It may, therefore, be that Article 4 reflects the municipal
policy of certain States involved in the negotiation of ECE. At least it may be said
that there is a very large municipal law and policy component in the existence of
the military offence exception. It by no means represents the simple translation of
international law into municipal law.
The principle of non-refoulment did arise first in international law, most
influentially in the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951474 but
also in Article 3(2) ECE. It was (and is) a feature of the Commonwealth Rendition
Scheme475 and that led to its recognition in UK law in section 4(1 )(c) of the
Fugitive Offenders Act 1967, whence it has found its way into the 1989 Act. It
represents, therefore, an example of a principle developed in international
instruments which has influenced the content ofUK municipal extradition law. As
such, it is in a definite minority.
The hearing in the court ofcommittal
Although some of the UK's former bilateral extradition treaties had a good deal to
471 [1971] AC 197.
472 See Gilbert, Aspects ofExtradition Law, 101.
473 Gilbert, loc cit.
474 See generally Gilbert, Aspects ofExtradition Law, 232 et seq.
475 Article 10(2)(a).
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say about the procedure to be followed in the municipal courts476, ECE has little to
say directly about the hearing. It sets out the criteria which States Parties must or
may apply to extradition and the obligations which the States Parties undertake
but the way in which any State Party goes about determining how those criteria
apply in a given case is left to its internal arrangements. Indeed, Article 22 ECE
provides explicitly that "the procedure with regard to extradition and provisional
arrest shall be governed solely by the law of the requested party". Amongst the
States Parties to ECE, whilst it may be said that there will be a court hearing in
any extradition case, the nature and function of that hearing and the stage at which
it takes place varies quite widely477. It follows from the nature of the
Commonwealth Scheme that it does prescribe procedure in outline. We have,
however, seen above that there is substantial interpenetration between UK law and
the Scheme and it would be incorrect to say that the 1989 Act contains the
procedure it does simply in order to comply with the Scheme.
If the court of committal is satisfied that the offence for which extradition
is requested is an extradition crime, that there is a prima facie case (where that is
required) and that none of the section 6 restrictions on return apply, it has no
discretion. Section 9(8) provides that it shall commit the fugitive for return. It has
no power to apply general international extradition law and, in particular, no
power to examine the treaty and compliance with it by the requesting state. Such
right as the judiciary has to examine the treaty arises only obliquely, in the context
of judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision to order return. The position
of the court of committal under the 1870 Act was put most succinctly by Lord
Ackner in R v Governor ofPentonville Prison, ex p Sinclairm, when he invited
his brethren to agree with him (as they did) that: "...the magistrate has no
jurisdiction to decide either whether there has been an abuse of the process of the
476 See, for example, Article II of the UK's 1902 Treaty with Belgium (reproduced in Order in
Council Directing that the Extradition Act shall apply in the case ofBelgium SI 1902 No 208),
now superceded as a result of Belgium's accession to ECE.
477 See International Criminal Policy Division, Home Office, Extradition: A Guide to Procedures
ofECMember States, 1993.
478 [1991] 2 AC 64 at 91.
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court, or whether the requirements of the treaty have been satisfied, his powers
being limited to those in sections 3(1), 8, 9 and 10". Jones maintains that the 1989
Act contains "no indication" that the court of committal is charged with duties as
regards the content of the treaties and maintains that cases such as ex p Sinclair
still represent the law479.
Jones' argument and the cases upon which it is founded do not explain
how the prohibition on the Court of Committal examining the treaty is to be
reconciled with what Lord Widgery CJ said in ex p Sotiriadis4*0 and what Lord
Diplock said in re Nielsen4*1. In Sotiriadis Lord Widgery said that it was clear
from section 5 of the 1870 Act that where there was a variation between the terms
of the Act and those of the treaty the treaty should prevail so as to afford to the
fugitive any advantages conferred by the treaty but not by the Act. In Nielsen
Lord Diplock said that the jurisdiction conferred on the magistrate by the Act is
the widest that he may lawfully exercise in relation to extradition but that it may
be restricted as regards a given country by the terms of the treaty with that
country. This being so, it is, of course, wasteful and a nonsense to prevent the
court of committal from looking at the treaty at all. It would be better to
understand what Lord Ackner said in Sinclair narrowly, so that it is not for the
court of committal to determine whether the requirements of the treaty have been
479 Jones on Extradition, 104. Jones bases his analysis on a series of cases which were concerned
chiefly with the undesirability of the court of committal hearing evidence of the content of foreign
law as regards the dual criminality requirement. Those cases are Re Nielsen (1984) 79 Cr App R 1
(Divisional Court-the case later went to the House of Lords, where it is reported at [1984] 2 WLR
737, though the treaty point did not arise); R v Bradshar February 28, 1984 (unreported)
(CO/310/83); Government ofthe United States ofAmerica vMcCaffery (supra); ex p Jennings
(supra); R v Governor ofAshford Remand Centre exp Postlethwaite [1988] AC 924; R v
Governor ofPentonville Prison exp Herbage (No 3) (1987) 84 Cr App R 149, DC; Re Naghdi
[1990] 1 WLR 317; exp Sinclair (supra). The prohibition on examination of the treaty arises
because it is a fortiori of the reasoning applied to examination of foreign law. This is a pity,
because whilst foreign law is a question of fact, upon which, if courts of committal were to
consider it, they would require evidence (and did so, over several days in Nielsen), treaties
incorporated into UK law by Order in Council and are therefore directly available for the court's
consideration as matters of law. The particular mischiefwhich the appellate courts were anxious
to address, namely the inordinate amount of time spent on such inquiries, did not therefore arise in
connection with examination of treaties.
480 [1974] 2 WLR 253, 255.
481 [1984] 2 WLR 737, 741.
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satisfied, leaving it open to the court of committal to consider the treaty in relation
to any restriction it makes in the jurisdiction to commit for return. The treaty will,
of course, be incorporated by Order in Council and so imbued with the character
of statute482; but the same cannot be said of the Commonwealth Rendition
Scheme.
What is clear is that, despite the incorporation of extradition treaties into
Orders in Council (and hence UK law), there is some limitation on treaties
operating at the judicial stage of extradition procedure and on the ability of the
fugitive to invoke treaty provisions in the representations which he makes against
being found liable to return. If this analysis is wrong and Jones' approach does not
require the qualification suggested, the effect of the treaty in the court of
committal is still more limited.
Appeals
The second stage in the judicial phase of extradition is the appeal. Where the court
refuses to commit for return, the requesting state has a right of appeal to the High
Court of Justiciary by stated case, on a point of law483. Review at the instance of
the person committed for return is, however, on a different basis.
Section 11 requires a court which commits a person for return to inform
him of his right to make an application for habeas corpus484. The section does not
create such a right. It merely makes provision for what is to happen if it is
exercised. Along with its existing jurisdiction on such applications, the (English)
High Court may order the discharge of the fugitive if it considers, on the basis of
fresh evidence if need be, that return would be unjust or oppressive by reason of
the trivial nature of the crime, the passage of time since it is alleged to have been
committed or because the accusation is not made in good faith in the interests of
justice485. These are matters which the court of committal cannot take into account
but which may be of considerable importance in avoiding a Soering type situation.
482 See 21 above.
483 1989 Acts 10.
484 1989 Act si 1(1).
485 1989 Act si 1(3).
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In the application of section 11 to Scotland, references to an application
for habeas corpus are to be construed as references to an application for review of
the order of committal and references to the High Court are to be construed as
references to the High Court of Justiciary486. It is worth comment here that this
makes the assumption that such a right of review by the High Court of Justiciary
exists. The Act does not create such a right. In the event, the fugitive in Triplis,
Petitioner™1, the only case in which the procedure has so far been pursued, had to
use the nobile officium. That is a residual remedy, intended for circumstances
which are "both extraordinary and unforeseen"488 and where the absence of a right
of appeal is the result of "an omission to provide what is necessary as a means of
carrying out a statutory intention"489. It is not satisfactory that the right of an
accused to review by a higher court depends on a remedy for unforeseen
circumstances, especially where the lacuna in the 1870 Act had been pointed out
by the High Court in Wan Ping Nam490.
Triplis was a Greek national who had been detained in Greece in 1984 in
connection with a series of break-ins and thefts at business premises. He had been
released pending trial on a financial security and with a condition that he should
report to a police station twice a month. Shortly thereafter, he left Greece and
travelled to Glasgow, where he married a British national. His whereabouts seem
to have been unknown to the Greek authorities until 1992, when he wrote to them
and applied to renew his passport. In 1994, Greece requested his arrest and
extradition and in October 1996 the Secretary of State for Scotland granted
authority to proceed. Triplis was arrested in November 1996 and placed before
Edinburgh Sheriff Court, sitting as a court of committal. After due procedure he
was, in January 1997, committed for return.
The argument made on his behalf in the High Court was that it would be
486 1989 Act si 1(6).
487 1997 SCCR 398.




unjust or oppressive to return him, first because of the trivial nature of the
offences and secondly by reason of the passage of time.
The High Court noted that under Greek law the charges were capable of
being punished with a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment
and that, especially if taken together, they were of a sort which were capable of
attracting a prison sentence in Scotland. That possibility is, of course, essential to
their qualification as extradition crimes; but the High Court went further and,
looking at the particular offences alleged against Triplis, said that "whilst the
charges may not be among the most serious which can be envisaged, they can on
no view be described as trivial"491. The first leg of the argument that it would be
unjust or oppressive to return Triplis therefore failed.
The argument as to delay turned on the fact that Triplis had been detained
in Greece in 1984 and released on conditions. The High Court took the view that
his departure from Greece in 1984 necessarily involved breach of the conditions.
He could, the High Court said, "properly be regarded as having fled the
country"492. The Court followed Lord Diplock's reasoning, in Kakis v Government
of Cyprus493, that delay brought about by the accused fleeing the country,
concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest could not be relied upon. Such an
approach is consistent with the attitude of the High Court in Watson v HM
Advocate494 in which the Crown obtained an extension to the ordinary time limits
for bringing an indictment case to trial when it was learned that the accused had
decamped from his domicile of citation, possibly to the Republic of Ireland. It is
also consistent with the attitude of ECtHR to the Article 6(1) ECHR guarantee of
trial within a reasonable time495.
Because Triplis' whereabouts were unknown to Greece until he applied for




494 1983 SCCR 115.
495 Girolami v Italy A 196-E (1991).
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account. The delay from 1992 to October 1996 was said by the High Court to be
explicable in part by the need for the extradition request to be considered
properly. This, with respect to the High Court, seems somewhat feeble. It is
suggested that if the key issue had been delay in absolute terms, some more
substantial explanation would have been required. However, the critical issue,
from the point of view of the High Court was whether the delay had made it
impossible for Triplis to have a fair trial. Since it was not suggested on his behalf
that such a consequence did arise, the prayer ofhis petition was refused.
Although the High Court did not analyse section 11, the approach which
they took is consistent with the fact that the ultimate test is whether return would
have been "unjust" or "oppressive". The test is not whether there had been an
inadequately explained delay simpliciter. It seems likely (though they did not say
so) that the High Court had in mind municipal jurisprudence on mora as a plea in
bar of trial. In McFadyen v Annan496, a full bench case, Lord Justice-Clerk Ross
said "the real question which the Court has to consider in all cases where delay is
alleged is whether the delay has prejudiced the prospects of a fair trial...cases
where such a plea in bar of trial will be upheld will be rare and exceptional". A
similar approach had been taken in Higginson v Secretary of State for Scotland
and HM Advocate*91 when the question of lapse of time arose under the Fugitive
Offenders Act 1967 section 8(3)(b). That Act, as we have seen498, represented a
stage in rendition arrangements with the Commonwealth. The Scottish courts had
jurisdiction under the Act, though cases were rare.
In Higginson, the Lord Justice-General (Emslie) said that, as to the crime
in question (rape), neither Scotland nor Canada (the requesting jurisdiction) had a
time-bar. The delay had been for 3 years and the Lord Justice-General said that
"in the case of a person accused of rape in Scotland it would be no answer to
arrest for trial in Scotland just over 3 years later, that in the interval, the accused
had settled and married in England and in the light of this consideration we find it
496 1992 SCCR 186.
497 1973 SLT (Notes) 35.
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impossible to discover any injustice or oppression in returning the petitioner to
Canada". He went on to say that, although the passage of time might have
dimmed the recollection of many witnesses, "this is a factor common to many
cases and, where it is not suggested that the evidence of any particular defence
witness is in question, the impairment of recollection is unlikely to be to the
prejudice of the accused"499. The petition for review of the order for committal for
return therefore failed. With this, we may contrast Re Mohammed Anwar500 in
which the Divisional Court held that the passage of time would have rendered it
unfair to return the fugitive to Denmark. This was because 14 years had passed
since the commission of the crime and witnesses' memories would have faded.
Schiemann, J pointed out that this was broadly in line with the approach taken to
English cases. The test applied was, therefore, a domestic law one, just as it was
in Higginson.
What the Divisional Court failed to consider, however, was whether the
fairness of the trial procedure should not be a question primarily for the requesting
State. Section 11 of the 1989 Act, after all, requires the court to consider whether
the returning of the fugitive would be "unjust" or "oppressive"-not to pre-empt
any decision which the courts of the requesting state might take as to a plea in bar
of trial. It should be recalled that the European Commission of Human Rights has
been very slow to hold that trial conditions in a requesting state could give rise to
a breach of ECHR on the part of the requested state. In Kozlov v Finland601, the
applicant had been called up for compulsory military service in the USSR, of
which country he was a national and resident. After a fortnight he told the Soviet
authorities that he could not continue his military service because it caused him
moral and ethical problems. He was thereupon incarcerated in a military hospital
and injected with "sulphuric substances" which damaged his sight, hearing and
speech. He was then certified mentally ill, as a consequence of which he was
498 Page 78.
499 Emphasis added.
50OUnreported, Divisional Court, 4 March 1994 (CO/1055/93).
501 69 DR 321 (1991).
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denied the opportunities to continue his studies, to work, to choose his domicile,
to obtain a passport or driving licence, to marry and found a family and to vote.
He hijacked a civilian airliner to Helsinki and requested asylum. In Finland
proceedings were commenced against him for the hijacking but the USSR then
requested his extradition for that offence, producing a warrant issued by the KGB.
He was extradited to the USSR, where he was examined and found to have
become "mentally sound". He was eventually placed on trial under conditions
which, the Finnish Government conceded, might not have been "in full harmony
with the requirements ofArticle 6 of the Convention". Since he was caged during
the trial and prevented from communicating with his lawyer, one might think that
the concession was something of an understatement. Nevertheless, the European
Commission ofHuman Rights decided that the Soviet trial procedure could not be
said to be such a flagrant denial of the right to a fair trial as to found a finding of
breach ofArticle 6 by Finland in surrendering him. The application was dismissed
as inadmissible.
In both Higginson and (more recently) Triplis, then, the High Court, in
determining whether it would be unjust or oppressive to return the accused, had
regard both to the seriousness of the offence in Scots law and to the domestic test
for mora of prejudice in the conduct of the defence502.
The executive phase
We can deal with the executive phase quite briefly. Where a person is committed
for return and not discharged by the High Court the Secretary of State may by
warrant order him to be returned unless his return is prohibited by the Act503. The
general discretion which this gives to the Secretary of State is circumscribed by
section 9(2), which provides that the Secretary of State shall not make an order if
it appears to him that, by reason of the trivial nature of the offence, the passage of
time since it was committed or because the accusation against him is not made in
502 It is tempting to see a parallel with Article 6(1) ECHR and the guarantee of trial within a
reasonable time; as to that, it is understood that EComHR operated a rule of thumb that no delay
of less than 3 years would be considered. However, it is clear that Article 6 does not apply to
extradition procedure (Soering) and the basis of comparison would not, therefore, be satisfactory.
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good faith in the interests ofjustice it would be unjust or oppressive to return him.
These considerations are, of course, the same as those which are to guide the High
Court. The same section goes on to permit the Secretary of State to make no order
where the fugitive could be sentenced to death in the requesting state but could
not have been so sentenced had he been prosecuted in the UK. The death penalty
consideration in section 9(2)(b) addresses precisely the situation in Soering.
It seems evident from this that it is only at the stage of the Secretary of
State's consideration that the Article 3 ECHR problem may be addressed. It
cannot be brought within any of the restrictions on return set out in section 6. Nor
can it be brought within the grounds for ordering discharge on review by the High
Court.
The other area which requires some attention is that of judicial review of
the Secretary of State's decision. One might have expected to find a useful
comparator with Finivest, in which the Secretary of State was expected to have
regard to the treaty. The area is, however, less fruitful than one might have hoped.
For reasons of English procedural law504, habeas corpus has been preferred even
after committal for return. And, whichever procedural route has been followed, it
is clear that the cases have turned on the statute rather than on the treaties505.
Ireland
There are some differences in the procedure in Irish cases. The writer has analysed
the legislation in detail elsewhere506 and that analysis need not be repeated
exhaustively here. Some comment is, however, appropriate in order to illustrate
the point that the arrangements for the return of fugitives to Ireland depend
entirely on municipal law.
Under the Backing ofWarrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965, a warrant
for a returnable offence, having been issued by the judicial authority in Ireland, is
transmitted to the United Kingdom, not through any central authority but directly
503 Section 12(1).
504See Jones, op cit, 234.
505See Jones, op cit, chapter 10.
132
to the relevant police force. Thereafter, the procedure contemplates that "an
application for the endorsement of the warrant is made to a justice of the peace in
the United Kingdom by a constable who produces the warrant and states on oath
that he has reason to believe the person named or described therein to be within
the area for which the justice acts or on his way to the United Kingdom"507. By
section 10(3), in Scotland, "justice of the peace" is to include a sheriff and a
magistrate.
The application having been made, the sheriff or magistrate (assuming the
provisions of the Act are complied with) has no discretion. In terms of section 1
of the Act he must endorse the warrant "in the prescribed form" for execution
within the part of the United Kingdom comprising the area for which he acts. The
absence of discretion was confirmed by the Divisional Court in R v Metropolitan
Police Commissioner, ex p Arkins508. Although the point has not been tested, it
appears that this rule must limit the reviewability of such warrants to questions
relating to the satisfaction of the formal requirements of the statute509.
Provisional arrest is contemplated by section 4 of the Act. A justice of the
peace in the United Kingdom, on the application of a constable may510 issue a
warrant in prescribed form if the constable states three things on oath. The first of
these is that he has reason to believe that a warrant has been issued by "a judicial
authority in the Republic for the arrest of a person accused or convicted of an
indictable offence against the laws of the Republic" but that the warrant is not yet
in his possession. The second is that he has received a request made on grounds of
urgency by a member of the police force of the Republic holding the rank of
inspector or above for the issue in the United Kingdom of a warrant for the arrest
of that person. The third is that he has reason to believe that person to be within
506Alastair N Brown, "The Backing ofWarrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965: A Critical
Analysis of Some Essential Elements" 1998 SLPQ 52.
507 Section l(l)(b).
508 [1966] 1 WLR 1593.
509Contrast the position as regards ordinary extradition, described at 109-110 above.
510 It is to be noted that this is one of the few places in the Act where the court has any real
discretion.
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the area for which the justice acts or on his way to the United Kingdom.
The requirement to bring the person arrested before the sheriff as soon as
practicable arises from section 4(3), which also provides that if the Irish warrant is
produced at that time the court may proceed as if the fugitive had been arrested on
that warrant. If the Irish warrant is not so produced, the court may remand the
fugitive for not more than seven days. Other than in Scotland, subsection (4)
provides that if within that time the warrant is produced the remand determines
and the fugitive is to be treated as if he had been arrested "at that time" under that
warrant and subsection (5) provides that if it is not produced, he is to be
discharged.
Subsection (6) provides that, as respects Scotland, subsections (4) and (5)
are not to apply but that if a warrant issued and endorsed "as aforesaid"
(presumably, as contemplated in section 1) is not produced within the period of
the remand, the fugitive is to be discharged. This provision is curious, first
because unlike subsection (4) it does not say what is to happen if a warrant is
produced and, secondly, because there is not on the face of subsections (4) and (5)
anything which would cause difficulty for Scots law and so it is not obvious why
they have been disapplied.
The effect of the arrival of the warrant in England and Wales, where
subsection (4) applies, must be to bring into play section 2(1), which requires that
a person arrested on an endorsed warrant should be brought before a magistrates'
court "so soon as is practicable". Section 4(4) therefore interrupts the period of
remand so as to have the fugitive brought before the court for the next stage in
procedure. Had this applied to Scotland, it should not have caused a Scottish court
any difficulty at all. However, the absence from subsection (6) of an equivalent
for subsection (4) seems to make it competent for the fugitive to be left on remand
for the full seven days even if the warrant arrives well before they expire.
Once an endorsed warrant is available and the fugitive has been arrested
(on that warrant or on a provisional warrant), section 2 of the 1965 Act requires
that he should be brought before the court. Reading section 2 under reference to
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the application to Scotland in section 10(3), that means the sheriff court. The court
before which he is brought is required, subject to the provisions of section 2, to
order the fugitive to be delivered to "some convenient point of departure from the
United Kingdom" into the custody of a member of the Garda. The administrative
discretion of the Secretary of State to surrender or decline to surrender a person
found by the courts to be liable to extradition, which is an important feature of
extradition legislation in the strict sense511, is thus completely excluded and no
discretion is given to the court in its place. The fugitive must be surrendered
unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the case falls within a
specified exception.
The procedure is, then, set out in considerable detail in the 1965 Act and it
admits of very little discretion. A procedure is set out in the legislation and, if the
case is within that procedure, return of the fugitive will be well nigh automatic.
The fugitive returned to the UK
Most of the 1989 Act is concerned with the position when the UK is the requested
state. Sections 18 to 20, however, deal with the position of the person who is
returned to the UK as requesting state; but they require little attention. Sections 18
and 19 apply the rule of specialty to domestic criminal law (reflecting, for
example, Article 14 ECE512) and section 20 requires the restoration of a person
who is not tried or who is acquitted. Ofmore interest, however, is the position of
the person who is returned to the UK irregularly and outside the usual treaty
framework.
Irregular rendition, if not developed in the USA, has at least been elevated
into an art-form there. The most celebrated-or notorious-case is United States v
Alvarez-Machainsn, in which the US Supreme Court held that a defendant
forcibly abducted from Mexico, a country with which the USA has an extradition
treaty and of which he was a national, does not thereby acquire protection against
511 Extradition Act 1989 si2(2). For the reasons for such discretion, see JD McCann, "United
States v Jamieson... 162 and J Semmelman, op cit, 1129.
512 In the event of the Third Pillar Convention on extradition entering into force, sections 18 and
19 will require adjustment to take account of the presumed waiving of the rule.
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the jurisdiction of the US criminal courts. This decision was criticised by
Steinhardt-and he was only one of many-as "a stunning endorsement of
lawlessness"514. Be that as it may, the US Supreme Court was careful to point out
that they were deciding only the question of municipal jurisdiction, not the
international law question of Mexican territorial integrity, and that they came to
their decision notwithstanding the fact that "[rjespondent and his amici may be
correct that respondent's abduction was 'shocking' and that it may have been a
violation of general international law principles".
It is necessary at this point to return to Bennett, Petitioner, the facts of
which are given above515. It was maintained on the petitioner's behalf that a Full
Bench ought to be convened to reconsider the law of Scotland as expressed in
Sinclair v HMAdvocate5*6, which may be summarised in the maxim male captus,
bene detentus.
The High Court declined to take the opportunity to reconsider Sinclair,
though Gane and Nash have interpreted some of what Lord Justice-General Hope
had to say as a hint that they might be prepared to do so in some future case517, a
position which the High Court has itself confirmed in Torres v HMAdvocate51*. In
Bennett, the High Court held that there had been no illegality in the events which
resulted in the petitioner's return to the UK (in other words, that the English
Divisional Court had arrived at the wrong result on the facts) and that accordingly
the issue did not arise. It should not, however, be assumed that Sinclair is
necessarily incompatible with the position at which the House of Lords arrived in
exp Bennett.
Sinclair was an unsuccessful Bill of Suspension. The accused was wanted
513 112 SCt 2188 (1992).
514 Statement ofRalph G Steinhardt, Professor of Law, Before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, US House ofRepresentatives,
reproduced in 4 Criminal Law Forum 135 (1993).
515 See 111.
516 (1890) 17R38.
517 C Gane, and S Nash, "Illegal Extradition: The Irregular Return of Fugitive Offenders" (1996)
SLPQ277, 292.
518 1997 SCCR 491, 498.
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on petition warrant in Glasgow for embezzlement. He fled to Portugal where he
was arrested and put on board a British ship in the custody of a police officer from
Glasgow who held a warrant granted pursuant to the UK's extradition treaty with
Spain but which was of no effect in Portugal. That officer brought him back to
Scotland. The High Court declined to look behind the warrant by which Sinclair
was brought before the Court. The Court's reasoning was summed up by Lord
McLaren as follows: "The extradition of a fugitive is an act of sovereignty on the
part of the State who surrenders him. Each country has its own ideas and its own
rules in such matters. Generally it is done under treaty arrangements; but if a State
refuses to bind itself by treaty and prefers to deal with each case on its merits, we
must be content to receive the fugitive on these conditions, and we have neither
title nor interest to enquire as to the regularity of the proceedings under which he
is apprehended and given over to the official sent out to receive him into
custody...I have no doubt that [the officer] was entitled to take the suspender into
custody as soon as he was on board a British ship. The objection that the ship was
then in Portuguese waters, is one belonging to the region of diplomatic
controversy, and could only be taken by the Portuguese authorities. But they were
not objecting. On the contrary, by handing the prisoner over to a British officer
they intimated that their authority ceased...the public interest in the punishment of
crime is not to be prejudiced by irregularities on the part of inferior officers of the
law in relation to the pursuer's [sic] apprehension and detention. I may say further
that as the Lord Advocate might have the suspender immediately re-apprehended,
I should on this ground also be indisposed to sustain this bill, because the
liberation obtained under it would not be effective".
We should recall at this point the distinction which ECtHR drew in
Bozano between cases in which State agents act unlawfully but in good faith and
those in which they set out knowingly to use unlawful means to achieve an
objective. That distinction lay at the heart of what the House of Lords did when
they considered Bennett in the context of the disputed power of the (English) High
Court to stop proceedings which had become oppressive. As Lord Griffiths put it,
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"your Lordships should now declare that where process of law is available to
return an accused to this country through extradition procedures our courts will
refuse to try him if he has been forcibly brought within our jurisdiction in
disregard of those procedures by a process to which our own police, prosecuting
or other executive authorities have been a knowingparty"519.
Nothing in Sinclair contradicts this. There is a perfectly respectable
argument that the means by which a foreign jurisdiction delivers up a fugitive in
response to a UK extradition request is a matter within the sovereign jurisdiction
of that country into which the UK courts should not inquire. Indeed, one can even
argue, on the basis of Stocke v Germany520, that the return of a fugitive secured by
fraud will not breach ECHR, at least as long as officials of the State in which the
fugitive is wanted are not in any way involved in the deception.
In Stocke, the applicant was a German national who fled to France in order
to avoid arrest for tax offences. A police informer offered to assist the German
authorities to trace the applicant. He was told that such assistance might be taken
into account as an extenuating circumstance at his own trial but it was emphasised
to him by the public prosecutor that any action had to be lawful and designed
either to discover the applicant's whereabouts so that an extradition request could
be made or to induce him to return to Germany of his own accord. The informer
found the applicant and persuaded him to board an aeroplane chartered for the
purpose and bound ostensibly for Luxembourg where the applicant thought he
was going to discuss investment in a building project in Spain in which the
informer had engaged his interest. In fact, the aircraft landed at Saarbriicken,
where police officers, forewarned by the informer of the applicant's arrival (but
not of the means used to secure it) arrested him. He was in due course convicted
of fraud and sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment.
In the course of its judgement, the German court dealt with the means by
which the applicant had been brought within the German jurisdiction. It
519 Emphasis added.
520 (1991) 13 EHRR 839.
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considered that it had not been established that the public prosecutor's office had
known of the "kidnapping" in advance or that it had supported it. The applicant's
arrest on German territory under a lawful warrant was not unlawful and was not
contrary to international law. Even if the informer had acted with the knowledge
of the German police and with their help, at the time ofhis arrest the applicant had
been subject to the jurisdiction of the German courts. He could not rely on a
breach of the Franco-German extradition treaty because that treaty created rights
and obligations only between the two contracting states. Any violation of it could
only affect the mutual relations of those states and could not avail the individual
concerned. It was for the aggrieved State to assert its right to ask for the return of
the person kidnapped but France had not done so. On the contrary, it had dropped
proceedings initiated there on the applicant's claim to have been kidnapped and
had intimated that fact to the German authorities.
On appeal in Stocke, the Federal Constitutional Court held that there was
no rule of international law to prevent a State's courts from dealing with a person
brought before them in breach of the territorial sovereignty of another State or of
an extradition treaty and that it was apparent from American, Israeli, French and
British case law that in such an event the court did not decline jurisdiction unless
the other State protested521.
ECtHR and EComHR dealt with the case very briefly. They held it not to
have been established on the facts that the German State authorities had anything
to do with the deception practised upon the applicant and that therefore there had
been no breach of the Convention.
It may be said, then, that not every irregularity in the return of a fugitive
will result in the dismissal of the prosecution. Even in the House of Lords Bennett
case, the knowing involvement of the UK authorities in the irregularity was an
important factor. The same consideration influenced ECtHR in Stocke. This sort
of approach to the problem may be seen as consistent with the rule of municipal
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law that some irregularities may be excused so that evidence thus obtained may be
admitted522. The extreme approach in Alvarez-Machain takes a completely
disjunctive attitude to the relationship between international law and municipal
law. The Scots position, whilst it is liable to be reconsidered and might well move
towards that which the House of Lords reached in Bennett, is not so extreme and
disjunctive. The question of how to deal with the fugitive returned by irregular
means has not, in either Scotland or England, really turned on international law
issues at all. Rather, the two issues which have been critical to the decisions have
been whether or not there is a breach of foreign law and whether or not the UK
authorities have been knowingly party to that breach.
It would be misleading to stop at that point for 2 reasons. The first is that
in re Schmidt5™ the House of Lords limited the application ofBennett to cases in
which England is the jurisdiction in which the accused is to be placed on trial. In
that case, a German national had been the subject of an unsuccessful extradition
request from Germany to Ireland. An English police officer deceived him into
travelling to the UK, where he was arrested for extradition to Germany. On his
application for habeas corpus, arguing that the UK extradition proceedings were,
in the circumstances, an abuse of the process of the English courts, it was said by
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle that, on an application of Bennett, "the position in
relation to a pending trial in England is wholly different to that in relation to
pending proceedings for extradition from England"524. Lord Jauncey reasoned
that, whereas in relation to a trial the power of the High Court to intervene is the
defendant's only protection against oppression, in the case of extradition nthe
fugitive is protected both by the discretion of the Secretary of State and by the fact
that the courts of the requesting state are likely to have powers similar to those
held to exist in Bennett.
521 It is not known what cases the Constitutional Court had in mind. However, their consideration
significantly pre-dated Bennett. The Israeli case was probably that ofAdolfEichmann 36 ILR 5
(1961) which was so unusual as to constitute a very unsafe precedent.




Having regard to the attitude of the German courts in Stocke, of the US
Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain and to that of the High Court of Justiciary in
Bennett, Petitioner, Lord Jauncey may have been over-optimistic. It is, however,
clear that the House of Lords was seeing Bennett as restricted in its application
and was not prepared to apply it to facts in which a UK police officer had
circumvented the law of Ireland by fraud.
Despite that-and this is the second reason for not stopping above-much
was said in Bennett about the fact that the court would stop a trial process not only
where the defendant had been brought to the UK in breach of foreign law but also
where he had been brought in breach of international law. In Bennett, that was
strictly obiter because there was no identified breach of international law in that
case. An unsuccessful attempt was made to apply it in R v Dean and Bolden525and
it was invoked successfully by the defence in R v Charrington and Others526.
These cases were concerned with the interdiction of drug trafficking on the high
seas as contemplated in Article 17 of the 1988 UN Drugs Convention. In the case
of Charrington, the Council of Europe Agreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea
Implementing Article 17 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1995 was also relevant.
In Charrington, UK Customs Officers had boarded a maltese-registered
ship 100 miles off the coast of Portugal. They had obtained Maltese consent to the
boarding by telling the Maltese authorities that the ship was "off the coast of the
UK" at a time when it was actually tied up in a Portugese harbour.
Judge Foley's reasoning is not a model of lucidity. One suspects that it
assumes knowledge of the debate which had preceded it. At its most essential,
however, he was presented with a case in which he considered that UK Customs
Officers had exhibited what he called "carelessness and recklessness for disregard
for the rules of procedures, Convention of Maltese law, British law, and
international law" and had also destroyed evidence. Nowhere in his judgement did
525 (1998) 2 Cr App R 171.
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he say in clear terms exactly why he was staying the proceedings as an abuse of
process; but he did refer to Bennett and it is clear that breach of the international
law of the sea by boarding a vessel flagged in a foreign sovereign State, consent
having been obtained by deceit, was a component in his decision.
As authority, Charrington is worth very little. At least, however, it may be
said that Bennett has in it the potential for breach of international law to be used
as a basis for a finding of abuse of process such as to justify the stopping of a
prosecution. Further support for this position may be derived from R v Mullen527
in which UK security forces had procured the deportation of the appellant from
Zimbabwe by unlawful means in circumvention of extradition procedures and, in
the words of Rose LJ, "in breach of Public International Law" (it appears that it
may have been international human rights law that he had particularly in mind).
The conviction was quashed.
Conclusion
Certain themes emerge from the foregoing consideration of extradition law. The
most obvious of these is the continuing Anglocentricity of the law. While the
1870 Act governed the procedure, Scots law was almost entirely excluded. To the
very limited extent that the Scottish courts did have a jurisdiction, they were
required to operate legislation which assumed the operation of habeas corpus and
so necessitated the use of the nobile officium. And, although there is now a
Scottish extradition jurisdiction, the law continues to have a substantial
Anglocentric component. Notwithstanding what the High Court said in Wan Ping
Nam, the legislation assumes that there is a direct Scottish equivalent to habeas
corpus. The Scottish jurisdiction continues to be excluded from the arrangements
for extradition to the USA. English law has exercised a major influence on the
Commonwealth Rendition Scheme and the arrangements with Ireland, to the
exclusion for all practical purposes of Scots law.
526 Unreported, Bristol Crown Court, 4 February 1999; transcript ofjudgement of Judge Foley on
file with writer.
527 Unreported, Court of Appeal, 4 February 1999 (coincidentally, the same date as Charrington).
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The UK's attitude to ECE has also been highly Anglocentric. That was
clearly apparent in the unconstructive attitude taken to the original negotiations
and in the development of the UK's thinking on the subject. Even on accession,
the information which the UK gave to PC-OC took no account of the existence of
Scots law or of a Scottish jurisdiction.
It is not suggested that the UK has ever taken a deliberate decision to
marginalise Scots law in relation to extradition. That marginalisation is more
likely to reflect the assumptions of the Home Office, which is, after all, a
territorial department whose principal remit relates to England and Wales and not
to either Scotland or Northern Ireland. One may wonder whether it also reflects a
failure on the part of the Scottish Office to appreciate the significance of
developing extradition law and to attend appropriately to the interests of Scots
law.
The second theme which emerges is that municipal law is placed clearly in
a dominant position; and this does appear to be a matter of policy. At least, it is
manifested in the policy choices demonstrated in the UK's legislation and treaty
reservation practice and one hopes and assumes that these are matters of
deliberate policy and not simply the manifestation ofunconscious assumption.
Fundamentally, section 4(2) of the 1989 Act requires that municipal law
should be given a dominant position. Beyond this, it is clear that both the
Commonwealth Rendition Scheme and the arrangements with Ireland depend on
municipal statute. In the context of ECE, the UK has made reservations which
reflect municipal law substantially. The single special extradition arrangement
into which the UK has entered drew on the 1989 Act rather than on any treaty.
The priority of municipal law is also reflected in the judicial phase of
extradition where the UK is the requested state. To some extent, this might be a
matter of the domestic preoccupations of judges; but even if that is so, it can be
said that it is a tendency which is encouraged by a legislative structure which
takes its tone from section 4(2) of the 1989 Act. So we see an insistence that the
court of committal should not attempt to construe even a treaty which has been
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incorporated by Order in Council. We also see the courts reasoning by analogy
with municipal law as to the effect of delay on the extradition process but also as
to the principles by which extradition treaties are to be interpreted by those courts
which are allowed to consider them.
All of this tends to confirm the conclusion drawn from the last chapter, on
the theory of the relationship. Scots law follows the general UK practice of
affording international law a lesser priority than municipal law. The same
conclusion can be drawn from the UK preference for the Third Pillar of the EU
over the first, considered in this chapter in the context of, but not under exclusive
reference to, extradition. We shall in fact see the same tendency in mutual
assistance law, though somewhat less strongly.
Only in one area is this municipal law priority significantly compromised
and that is in relation to European human rights law. We have seen from Soering
and the cases which led up to it that the acceptance and manner of discharge of
international extradition arrangements will be affected significantly by ECHR;
and it is also possible that international law other than human rights law may in
some cases be mediated into Scots law through the Strasbourg cases.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that in the event of direct conflict between the
Convention rights and UK primary legislation (but not legislation of the Scottish
Parliament), the legislation will take precedence. We are justified in concluding
that we need not, in the light of extradition, modify to any significant extent the
proposition that, in the relationship between international law and municipal law,
municipal law has priority.
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4. MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
Introduction
In its widest sense, the expression "mutual legal assistance" includes everything
from extradition to the informal exchange of information and practical help by
police forces or other law enforcement agencies, including business regulatory
bodies. The expression is used here, however, in the sense in which it has been
used by Gilmore in the introduction to his collection of materials on the subject:
"By mutual legal assistance is meant the process whereby one state provides
assistance to another in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences...a
'broad consensus' has developed as to the core measures which are covered. These
include...providing written and documentary evidence for use in foreign court
proceedings; the service of summonses and other judicial documents on behalf of
another country; making arrangements for the personal attendance ofwitnesses at
court hearings abroad; and, the search for and seizure of materials for use in
evidence in overseas proceedings. More recently a trend has developed...to extend
the traditional reach of mutual assistance to encompass the tracing, freezing and
confiscation of the proceeds of crime"528. This definition (which is derived directly
from the speech of the Home Office Minister of State during the Second Reading
debate on the 1990 Act529) excludes extradition, police co-operation530 and co¬
operation between business regulators531.
By contrast with its extradition practice, the UK does not require the
existence of a mutual legal assistance treaty ("MLAT") before it will give or seek
such assistance. Its mutual assistance legislation, the Criminal Justice
528WC Gilmore (ed), Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Business RegulatoryMatters, Grotius,
1995, xii.
529HL Debs Vol 513, 12 December 1989, col 1215.
530 For accounts ofpolice co-operation see, inter alia, Malcolm Anderson, Policing the World,
Clarendon Press, 1989; EA Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders; and Bill Hebenton and Terry
Thomas, Policing Europe: Co-operation, Conflict and Control, St Martins Press/ Macmillan
Press, 1995.
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(International Co-operation) Act 1990 ("the 1990 Act") is applicable in any case
in which a request is received or sent. Notwithstanding that, however, the UK is
party to a web of MLATs, some multilateral and others bilateral. Accordingly,
although the existence of a relationship between international law and municipal
law is not entrenched in relation to mutual legal assistance in quite the way it is as
regards extradition, that relationship remains fundamental to mutual assistance
law.
One might have thought that developments in international trade, the
multiplication of means of locomotion and the phenomenon of criminal gangs
operating continuously over several countries, all as described by Clarke and von
Liszt in the passages quoted on the first page of this thesis, would have led states
to develop general mutual legal assistance alongside extradition. As early as 1896
the Hague Conference on Private International Law agreed a Convention on Civil
Procedure, which made provision, inter alia, for the service of process in civil and
commercial matters. The development of judicial co-operation in the private law
field has been continuous since then532. In the criminal law field, however, matters
proceeded much more slowly. Gilmore attributes this to factors which include "a
strong disinclination to enforce the penal laws of third countries" and the orthodox
international law position which he summarises as "the absence of a duty to
render such assistance in the absence of a treaty coupled with a well established
customary rule that judicial and enforcement activities in a foreign state, absent
consent, constitute violations of territorial sovereignty"533.
To these we may add some particular features of municipal law. The
jurisdiction of the UK criminal courts proceeds essentially upon the territorial
531 For accounts of such co-operation, see Gilmore, Mutual Assistance...xxiv and Bridget Chase,
"Mutual Assistance to Overseas Business Regulatory Bodies" in Action Against Transnational
Criminality Volume II, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993, 27.
532 For an account of that development see David McClean, International Judicial Assistance,
chapters 2-4.
533 Gilmore, Mutual Assistance..., loc cit.
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basis, such variations from that as exist being exceptional534. Where offences are
prosecuted within the territorial jurisdiction in which their facts occurred there
will almost always be less need to obtain evidence from a foreign jurisdiction than
in a case where jurisdiction is taken on some other basis, such as the active
personality principle. Most of the witnesses and real evidence535 are likely still to
be within the territory and the need for assistance is likely to be small. In 1996-97
there were from Scotland outgoing requests for mutual assistance by the taking of
evidence in only 21 cases536 but in the same period there were 149,112
prosecutions before the Scottish municipal courts537. We do not know in how
many of those 21 cases the evidence from other jurisdictions was crucial but even
if it was essential in all of them (which is unlikely) the loss of 21 cases (even
serious cases) out of over 149,000 would have been statistically insignificant.
Next, Article 8 ECMA precludes the punishment of a witness who, having
been cited in a foreign territory (and not re-cited whilst voluntarily within the
territory of the requesting state), fails to appear. This, it is said, reflects "an
international custom by which witnesses...are completely free not to go to the
requesting country"538. The absence of any means by which a witness in a foreign
territory could be compelled to attend at the trial meant that a facility for
534 For an analysis of the various bases of jurisdiction applied in Council of Europe member states,
see European Committee on Crime Problems, Extraterritorial criminaljurisdiction, Council of
Europe, 1990. See also (amongst many others) Piet Jan Slot and Eric Grabandt, op cit; Albin Eser,
"The Vicarious Administration of Justice: An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction" 31 Harvard
International Law Journal 108 (1990); GeoffGilbert, "Crimes sans Frontieres: Jurisdictional
Problems in English Law" (1992) 63 B Yb Int'l L 414; Paul Coggins and William A Roberts,
"Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: An Untamed Adolescent" in W Gilmore (ed), Action Against
Transnational Criminality, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1992, 33; Colin Warbrick and GR
Sullivan, "Territorial Jurisdiction..GeoffGilbert, "Who Has Jurisdiction for Cross-Frontier
Financial Crimes?" [1995] 2 Web JCLI 76; Matthew Goode, "Two New Decisions... ; A Mark
Weisburd, "Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?" 35 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 379 (1997); and Matthew Goode, "The Tortured Tale ofCriminal Jurisdiction"
21 Melbourne University Law Review 411.
535 The expression is used in its technical sense, to mean physical objects which have features of
probative significance (see AG Walker and NML Walker, The Law ofEvidence in Scotland, Wm
Hodge & Co Ltd, 1964,440).
536 Richard G Stott, "Mutual Legal Assistance: The View From the Scottish Trenches" in Cullen
and Gilmore (eds), Crimes sans Frontieres, 191, 192.
537 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, Annual Report 1996-97,41.
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obtaining the statement of that witness was of limited value to a legal system,
such as that of England or Scotland, which demanded the physical presence of the
witness in court before the evidence of the witness could be regarded as
admissible539. As an inter-departmental working group put it, there was a belief
that such agreements "were in general unlikely to be of significant use to us
because the insistence of our law on oral testimony left little scope for the
admission ofwitness statements and other documents, which form the bulk of the
traffic"540. Accordingly, few of the prosecutions which must have failed because it
was not known what evidence a witness in a foreign territory could give would
have been saved merely by the existence of a means of obtaining a statement.
They would still have foundered on the inability of the UK as requesting state to
compel the attendance of the witness. In order to make significant use of
international judicial assistance, the UK would have required to revise its
municipal laws so as to enable it to make significant use of written evidence.
Although such revision has now taken place541, the state of the law of criminal
evidence and procedure in both England and Scotland until at least the late 1980s
was such that there was little incentive to enter into arrangements by which
evidence could be obtained from foreign states. It was unlikely that it could be
used even if it was obtained. Even now, the UK is anxious to secure a means of
enforcing witness citations in other EU Member States. In the context of the paper
submitted to the K4 Committee entitled "Mutual Recognition of Judicial
Decisions and Judgements in Criminal Matters"542 the UK, arguing in support of
wide cross-border enforceability of decisions of criminal courts, notes and prays
in aid the complaints of practitioners about the unenforceability of witness
538 Council ofEurope, Explanatory report on the European Convention on mutual assistance in
criminal matters, 1969, 18.
539 McClean, op cit, 121-123.
540 International Mutual Assistance in CriminalMatters: Report to Ministers from the Inter-
Departmental Working Group, July 1987 (not yet in the public domain) (hereafter, "Working
Group").
541 See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s259(l) and (2)(b).
542 See 84-5 above.
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summonses543 served in foreign jurisdictions.
None of this, of course, has any relevance to the provision of assistance to
foreign states which sought to obtain evidence within the UK. Although it seems
that by 1975 at the latest the Crown Office in Scotland was arranging for the
evidence of witnesses resident in Scotland to be obtained for foreign criminal
proceedings544, this was not done as a matter of obligation, was ad hoc and
somewhat informal and, in the absence of legislation giving power to carry out
searches on behalf of foreign authorities, cannot have extended to compulsory
measures. The UK did not engage in mutual assistance in any formal way and
municipal law was, as will be described shortly, far from adequate. Harding
probably got nearest the mark when he observed that the UK took the attitude that
"as a common law jurisdiction with well-established mechanisms for ensuring the
fairness and effectiveness of criminal proceedings, it was neither right nor
possible to take much cognisance of other countries' judicial processes"545.
Certainly such an attitude seems perceptible in the accounts noted by McClean of
official attitudes to commissions rogatoires received at the turn of the century546. It
will be recalled that one of the incentives for states to enter into extradition
arrangements is the facility they provide for getting rid of undesirables. Where the
undesirable is already in a foreign country, that incentive is removed. Absent that
incentive, absent the incentive of rendering convictions more probable in a
significant number of cases before the municipal courts and, having regard to the
UK's dismissive attitude to other legal systems (as reinforced by international law
orthodoxy), it is perhaps not surprising that the UK's engagement in mutual legal
assistance to any significant extent was long delayed.
The development of the law
The law before the 1990 Act
Whatever the underlying reasons for the UK's lack of enthusiasm for mutual legal
543 Citations.
544 Criminal Procedure in Scotland (Second Report) Cmnd 6218, 1975, para 43.27.
545 Op cit, 235.
546 Op cit, 123. The USA was tarred with the same brush-see Jones, op cit, 538-545.
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assistance, it is clear that municipal law on general assistance was in an
unsatisfactory state until the late 1980s. Section 5 of the Extradition Act 1873
made provision for the Secretary of State to order a police magistrate or justice of
the peace to take evidence for the purpose of any criminal matter pending before a
foreign (criminal) court in the same way as if the witness were appearing in
connection with a charge on indictment; but that provision was little used. In the
mid-to late 1980s, the Home Secretary signed about 25 such orders a year547.
However, the practical application of that provision to Scotland was said to be
"unclear as it is based on procedures which are peculiarly English"548. This was, of
course, entirely consistent with the Anglocentricity of everything else in the
Extradition Acts of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. But even in English law
there were problems. In particular there was doubt whether a case which was
before a grand jury in the USA or being dealt with by an examining magistrate in
a civilian jurisdiction could be said to be "pending" before a court or tribunal,
which was an essential pre-requisite to the giving of assistance. This made it
difficult to provide assistance to foreign authorities and also made it difficult to
give the assurance of reciprocity which Switzerland, for example, required before,
in the absence of a treaty relationship, it could give assistance to the UK549.
The alternative was an application under section 5 of the Evidence
(Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975. That Act was passed in order to
enable the UK to ratify the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters 1968550 and section 5 represented the application
to criminal matters of provisions drafted under reference to a treaty which dealt
essentially with private international law issues. It is hardly surprising that the
procedure creaked somewhat. Its legacy remains with us in form 23-1 annexed to
the Act of Adjournal (Criminal Procedure Rules) 1996 which is required to be
547 Working Group, Annex B, para 3.
548 Ibid.
549 Ibid.
550 See Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, Current Law Statutes Annotated,
1975,34.
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used in connection with applications for letters of request other than under the
1990 Act. The form is derived from the 1968 Hague Convention and is
inappropriate to criminal procedure551.
Section 5 provided for an application to the High Court (in England) or the
Court of Session (in Scotland) for an order authorising the examination of
witnesses following a request from a court or tribunal outside the UK for evidence
for use in criminal proceedings "instituted" in that country. The Working Group
noted552 that this formula raised for England and Wales precisely the same
difficulties as regards grand juries and examining magistrates. So far as Scotland
is concerned, the Working Group noted that this difficulty did not arise because
"different procedures apply"553.
The procedure in Scotland involved a petition to the Inner House of the
Court of Session554, which was somewhat cumbersome, but at least the existence
of the petition warrant procedure, which could properly be regarded as the
commencement of proceedings555 and which is not altogether dissimilar to (though
by no means identical with) the stage in civilian practice at which a juge
d'instruction becomes seized of a case, meant that Scots law was rather better
placed than English to provide assistance. This was entirely fortuitous (because
the 1975 Act was drafted in English legal categories) and was not mentioned by
the Home Office Minister of State when he was explaining the shortcomings of
existing law to the House of Commons556. Members were left to assume (unless
they knew better) that the whole UK was afflicted by a problem which was in fact
particular to English law.
The state of the law as to outgoing requests from Scotland for assistance
from foreign authorities was little better. The issue of the obtaining of evidence
from a foreign jurisdiction for use in Scotland seems first to have been canvassed
551 See 217 below.
552 Op cit, Annex B, para 4.
553 Ibid.
554 Rules of the Court of Session, R14.3(f).
555 Hamilton v HMAdvocate 1996 SCCR 744.
556 HL Debs Vol 513, 12 December 1989, cols 1214-1221.
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in 1975 in the Second Report of the Thomson Committee. That Committee noted
(without giving any detail) that it was "common practice" for the Crown Office to
arrange for the evidence of witnesses resident in Scotland to be obtained for
foreign criminal proceedings but that no similar procedure was available for
obtaining evidence from abroad for use in Scotland; that the "considerable
increase" in foreign travel meant that the obtaining of evidence from witnesses
abroad was becoming a "real problem" for the Crown and that some serious cases
had had to be dropped because the principal witness was abroad and refused to
attend. They therefore considered whether there should be some method whereby
in a criminal trial the written record of the evidence of a witness abroad should be
admissible. They noted that the objection would be that a judge and jury would
not have the chance to see or hear the witness giving evidence but considered that
it was "unfortunate" that the prosecution or defence might be unable to prove its
case because an essential witness was abroad. They recommended the application
of the model used for taking evidence on commission from ill or infirm witnesses
within Scotland should be applied to the case ofwitnesses abroad557.
Provision was made in section 32 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act
1980 permitting the sending of a Letter of Request, provided that the evidence
could be received without unfairness to either party, but it appears that the
Government expected the procedure to be used only in relation to formal
evidence. Introducing the provision, the Solicitor-General said that "either side
can object to such a request if there is the slightest suggestion that the evidence
will be controversial..."558.
The first occasion on which the procedure was used was in HMAdvocate v
Lesacher559. The accused was a German coach driver who was charged with
causing death by reckless driving. He was alleged to have driven on the wrong
side of the road and collided with an oncoming car, killing its occupants. The
defence sought a Letter of Request, explaining that they required the evidence of
557 Criminal Procedure in Scotland (SecondReport) Cmnd 6218, 1975, paras 43.27-43.30.
558Hansard, First Scottish Standing Committee, 24 June 1980, Cols 1482-1483.
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passengers on the coach, all of whom were German residents, and that there was
no means of compelling their attendance. Of the 3 who were most essential to the
defence, one had not replied to a letter, one had said that she "would probably"
attend the trial and the third had said that his state of health precluded his
attendance.
The procurator fiscal opposed the issuing of the Letter, arguing that the
evidence sought to be recovered was "of such a sensitive nature and so crucial that
it required to be tested by cross-examination. Accordingly it would be unfair to
the Crown to allow such evidence to be tested by interrogatories"560. The sheriff,
however, took the view that the unfairness to which the Act referred could not
involve inability to cross-examine because if it did no important evidence could
ever be sought by Letter of Request561. On the basis of the Solicitor-General's
remarks, quoted above, it may be that such was precisely the intention of the
Government. Be that as it may, the sheriff granted the application for a letter of
Request and it was sent. Evidence was obtained and read to the jury, which in due
course acquitted the accused562.
The approach of the sheriff in Lesacher was such as to make the section a
useful tool and Gordon commented that the case showed that Parliament had
enacted a wider power than the Government had intended563. However, in
Muirhead vHMAdvocate564, Lord Cameron took a different view, more consistent
with the Government's expectations.
The case concerned an indictment for fraud. The accused wished to obtain
the evidence of an accountant in Dublin, who refused to give evidence or give a
precognition to the Crown. He sought to obtain the evidence of the accountant by





562The transcripts of the evidence obtained are reproduced in the report of the case.
563/7MAdvocate v Lesacher, Commentary, 1982 SCCR431.
5641983 SCCR 133.
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Lord Cameron was much influenced by the fact that no explanation had
been given for the refusal of the witness to attend and does not seem to have
appreciated that there is an international practice whereby witnesses have an
absolute right to refuse to attend a court in a foreign jurisdiction and that there is
no requirement for them to give explanations. In the course of refusing the
application, he said that "This procedure is entirely novel; I can well appreciate
that it has value in respect of formal evidence...but I think it reasonably clear...that
it would be difficult to be satisfied in the case of a witness whose evidence is
other than formal, that there could be no unfairness to the opposite party, be he
prosecutor or accused, if he were deprived of the opportunity of oral cross-
examination..."565. With these words, Lord Cameron gave the procedure the kiss
of death. The provision remains on the statute book (now as section 272 of the
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995) but it is unused.
Before leaving section 32 of the 1980 Act, it should be noted that in both
Lesacher and Muirhead it was the Crown which was arguing for a very restricted
application of the provision, in line with the Government's intentions. This, of
course, was before the Government had decided that international co-operation
was a matter of necessity. Having regard to the policy of positive engagement in
international co-operation which was to be adopted in the late 1980s and to the
fact that it is usually the law enforcement community which calls for increased
co-operation, it may be that the Crown attitude in Lesacher and Muirhead should
be regarded as shortsighted and mistaken.
The European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
The first significant multilateral development in mutual legal assistance had
occurred in 1956 when the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
instructed the preparation of a draft multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters566. This followed a recommendation of the Committee of
Experts discussing extradition. Those experts thought that such a convention
565At 142.
566Council of Europe, Explanatory report on the European Convention on mutual assistance in
criminal matters, 1969, 5.
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would be acceptable to more of the Council's Member States than the Extradition
Convention and noted that some countries were already party to bilateral mutual
legal assistance treaties567. The outcome was ECMA, which established the
foundations for such assistance within Europe. More recent developments, such as
those within the framework of the European Union, have all proceeded under
reference to ECMA, whilst trying to overcome its disadvantages (such as its
retention of the "delay inducing features of the traditional system of letters
rogatory"568).
The UK did not participate in the negotiation of ECMA and,
notwithstanding Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe exhorting member States which had not done so to ratify ECMA as
soon as possible569, did not sign until June 1991. Ratification followed in August
of that year and the Convention came into force as regards the UK on 27
November 1991. The minute from Home Office Criminal Policy Department
which sent copies of the 1987 Working Group Report round other Departments570
noted that the decision to set it up "arose from consideration of the line to be taken
by the British delegation at the Commonwealth Law Ministers' Meeting in June
1986" when the draft Commonwealth Scheme for Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters ("the Harare Scheme") was discussed.
The Commonwealth Scheme
Preparation of the Harare Scheme had begun in 1983, Australia having been a
567 Ibid. Jones asserted in 1953 that states from the civilian tradition has already "covered the
globe with a network of treaties to assure judicial assistance among 'civilian' courts" (Harry Leroy
Jones, "International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform" 62 Yale
Law Journal 515, 516 (1953); emphasis in original).
568 C Gane and M Mackarel, "The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained from Abroad into Criminal
Proceedings-The Interpretation ofMutual Assistance Treaties and Use of Evidence Irregularly
Obtained" 1996 European Journal ofCrime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 98 at 100.
569 Resolution (71) 43 On the Practical Application of the European Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (14 December 1971); Recommendation No R (80)8 Concerning
the Practical Application of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(27 June 1980); Recommendation No R (87)1 on European Inter-State Co-operation in Penal
Matters (19 January 1987).
570 Minute from WJ Bohan to Mr Korniki dated 31 July 1997. Copy on file with author but, since
it discusses policy advice to ministers, it is part of a class ofmaterials to which confidentiality
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prime mover571. The draft was circulated for Government observations in June
1984 and published in October 1985. It was discussed at a meeting of Senior
Officials in January 1986 and adopted in the following July572. The Scheme is the
same type of instrument as the Commonwealth Rendition Scheme; that is to say it
is not a treaty573 (though it reads like one but for the absence of obligation).
Rather, it is an agreed set of recommendations for legislative implementation by
each Government574. Those recommendations, in the Scheme as adopted,
encompass assistance in identifying and locating persons, serving documents,
examining witnesses, search and seizure, obtaining evidence, facilitating the
personal appearance of witnesses, effecting a temporary transfer of a person in
custody to appear as a witness, obtaining production ofjudicial or official records
and tracing, seizure and forfeiting the proceeds of criminal activities575. This level
of assistance is said to be "more comprehensive than that available under most
existing bilateral and regional arrangements"576. Given the existing state of UK
law, severe difficulty was likely to be encountered in providing such assistance
unless legislation was enacted. On the other hand, the essentially common law
perspective of the Scheme (reflecting the nature of Commonwealth legal systems)
did mean that there were no fundamental incompatibilities between the Scheme
and the principles which underlay UK (and especially the English) criminal
justice systems.
The problem recognised
The Home Office minute covering the report of the Working Group noted the
attaches and can only be made available for reference after author has obtained specific authority
for release.
571 Working Group Report para 7.
572 McClean, International JudicialAssistance, 150.
573 Jamaica was critical of the Scheme for this very reason, as it had been of the Rendition
Scheme. The Summary Record of the discussions of Commonwealth Senior Officials contains at
its start a quite lengthy set-piece speech by the Jamaican delegate recording that criticism (Mutual
Assistance in the Administration of Justice: Meeting of Senior Officials to Consider Draff
Schemes, 27 January-7 February 1986: Summary Record, Commonwealth Secretariat).
574 McClean, op cit, 151.
575 Harare Scheme, para 1(3).
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need to address the Harare Scheme and noted more generally that the UK was
"seriously hampered" in providing mutual assistance because of the inadequacy of
existing legislative provisions. This, it was said, had earned the UK a bad
reputation for negative responses to reasonable requests for assistance and had
"caused serious problems for our own prosecution authorities as a result of other
States refusing to render us assistance because of lack of reciprocity". Moreover,
the continued reliance by the UK on what the Working Group called "antiquated
and limited powers to give assistance to foreign courts" amounted to an obstacle
to assisting in investigations. The Working Group noted that this had "caused
considerable difficulties and has been a point of friction with the United States.
The effect is that the United Kingdom is isolated through its inability to offer
other countries reciprocal treatment. We have a good reputation for co-operation
in the exchange of information already available to our investigatory agencies, but
a bad reputation in terms of the provision of hard evidence for criminal
prosecutions". The Working Group also reported that "foreign countries,
including some of our European partners and the United States, are privately
highly critical of the United Kingdom's performance"577 . The Working Group
concluded that there were "strong arguments in favour of reform of United
Kingdom mutual assistance law with a view to participation in formal mutual
assistance arrangements" and suggested consultation followed by the introduction
of legislation in the 1988/89 session578. At the same time, the 1988 UN Drugs
Convention was under negotiation and this included what amounted to an internal
MLAT at Article 7579
The modernisation of UK mutual assistance law
The legislation which was introduced was Part I of the 1990 Act, which may be
described aptly with the words which the UN Manual on the Model Treaty on
576 Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in CriminalMatters within the Commonwealth: Further
ExplanatoryMaterial preparedfor Commonwealth Jurisdictions by Professor DavidMcClean
andMr WJMenary, Vol 2, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1988, 15.
577 Working Group Report, para 5.
578 Working Group Report, para 20.
579 See 176 below.
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Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters uses to describe the optimum legislation
on the subject. It is "a general instrument that can be used to implement all mutual
assistance treaties and conventions", which mirrors the scope of the treaties "by
establishing a scheme applicable to all offences included in the treaties", which
allows "for applications for different types of compulsory orders that are
consistent with the types of assistance listed in the treaty", which permits
applications to be "made in relation to foreign matters that are at the investigation
or proceeding stage" and which includes "powers for requests to be made by or
through domestic authorities to a foreign state for assistance"580.
The UK duly signed and ratified ECMA and became party to the Harare
Scheme. These arrangements are general. The UK also negotiated bilateral
MLATs with 3 foreign states, namely the USA581, Thailand and Canada.
There are obvious parallels between the development of the UK approach
to mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and the development of extradition.
The UK did not engage seriously with its continental European neighbours in
relation to either subject until the middle 1980s when it was finally realised that
the difficulties which UK law put in the way of giving assistance to other
jurisdictions was undermining the UK Government's stress on law and order and
the necessity of fighting drug trafficking. In the case of both the Anglocentricity
of UK policy during the middle years of the twentieth century meant that it was
necessary at the end of the 1980s to accept multilateral European Conventions to
which the UK had made no constructive contribution (in the case of ECMA, no
contribution at all) and the content of which was not, therefore, necessarily what
the UK would have chosen as most congenial from the point of view of its
municipal law. It was therefore necessary for the UK to attempt some
"personalisation" of both instruments by the use of reservations.
580 United Nations, International Review ofCriminal Policy Nos. 45 and 46, 1995, 31.
581 The UK had, as colonial power, entered into an MLAT with the USA as regards the Cayman
Islands in 1986; but that treaty did not as such affect UK law in general or Scots law in particular
and so it is not discussed here. For a description of its provisions, see Gilmore, Mutual Assistance
in Criminal and Business Regulatory Matters, xx.
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ECMA and the UK
Introduction
Although the UK's review of its approach to mutual assistance was prompted
most immediately by the need to define its negotiating position in relation to what
became the Harare Scheme, that Scheme itself represented an attempt to catch up
with European developments and to "adapt the 1959 Convention to reflect more
fully Commonwealth traditions and concerns and to break new ground"582. ECMA
was, then, foundational, even for the Commonwealth arrangements, and so it is
convenient to consider it first.
As we have already noted, the UK did not participate in the negotiation of
ECMA and did not, therefore, take the opportunity to exert any direct influence on
the drafting583. At the time of accession the UK, by definition, found ECMA
acceptable, though in the absence of any overwhelming incompatibility with the
fundamental principles of national law, the acceptability of a treaty to a given
state will depend on how badly that state wants the benefits which the treaty may
be expected to bring. As we have seen, the UK decided, in the mid to late 1980s
that international co-operation had become a matter ofnecessity.
The general principle of the Convention is stated in Article 1. The parties
"undertake to afford each other...the widest measure of mutual assistance in
proceedings in respect of offences the punishment of which, at the time of the
request for assistance, falls within the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities of the
requesting Party". This is particularised in Articles 3 and 7. By Article 3, the
requested Party is required to execute, in the manner provided for by its law, any
letters rogatory relating to a criminal matter and addressed to it by the judicial
authorities of the requesting party for the purpose of procuring evidence or
transmitting articles to be produced in evidence, records or documents. Article 7
makes provision for the service ofwrits and records ofjudicial verdicts, the word
582 Gilmore, Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Business RegulatoryMatters xvii.
583 Ireland did participate in the negotiations, so the treaty which resulted was not entirely
uninfluenced by the common law.
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"writs" being wide enough to include the citation of witnesses584. However,
Article 8 prevents a witness who has been served with a citation, other than in the
territory of the state in which he is required to appear, from being penalised for
failure to answer the citation.
The obligation to assist is by no means unqualified. Purely military
offences are excluded from the ambit of the treaty altogether585, Article 2 permits
refusal of assistance in the case of a political offence 586 and Article 5 authorises
certain reservations as regards the execution of requests for search and seizure.
Reservations
Since the UK did not contribute to the drafting of ECMA the most fruitful field
for examination from the point of view of this thesis will be the reservations
which it made on acceding to the treaty. These reflect UK attitudes to the
provisions of the Convention in a way which the bare fact of accession cannot do.
Article 2 provides that assistance may be refused if the request concerns an
offence which the requested party considers a political offence, an offence
connected with a political offence or a fiscal offence587. Article 2 also permits
refusal of a request if the requested Party considers that the execution of the
request is likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other
essential interests of its country. The UK has reserved the right to refuse
assistance if the person who is the subject of a request for assistance has been
convicted or acquitted in the UK or in a third State of an offence which arises
from the same conduct as that giving rise to proceedings in the requesting state in
respect of that person.
At first sight this is an unexceptionable application of the ne bis in idem
584 Explanatory report on the European Convention on mutual assistance in criminalmatters,
1969, 17.
585 Article 1(2).
586 It also authorises refusal in the case of a fiscal offence but that is modified by Article 1 of the
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1978.
587 The facility for refusing assistance in relation to fiscal offences was, the subject of Article 1 of
the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
1959, 1978, which provided that the parties would not exercise their right to refuse assistance
solely on the ground that the request concerns a fiscal offence.
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principle, which finds expression in Scots law in the plea of tholed assize. On
examination, however, it may be questioned whether the reservation is
appropriate, either at all or in its particular terms. Its potential effect, especially in
combination with the requirement of English (but not Scots) law that proceedings
should have been commenced before search and seizure may be carried out on
behalf of a foreign authority588 is to place a significant restriction on investigative
assistance.
The expert committee which drafted ECMA considered the inclusion of
such a clause on the model of ECE and decided not to do so because it would
have reduced the scope of the Convention and would have required the requesting
party to take a decision on the case without having full information589. At the
stage of investigation, the general nature of the offence will probably be known
but the decision whether or not to prosecute or continue with a prosecution and
the selection of the particular charge must usually await the result of inquiries.
The balance which both international human rights law and municipal criminal
law seek to find between the interest of the community in the proper investigation
of crime and the protection of the rights of the individual590 may be argued to
favour full investigation within the law so that a decision can be taken on the basis
of all the relevant information with the position of the accused being protected by
a plea in bar of the trial.
Both Scots law and English law permit the accused to take a plea in bar of
further proceedings based on the ne bis in idem principle591 and recognise that the
plea may be founded by proceedings in a foreign court592. The immunity of a
person from a second trial for the same offence is guaranteed by both Article 4 of
588 See 202 below.
589 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the European Convention on mutual assistance in
criminal matters, 1969, at 13-14.
590 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 at 468 (para 89); Doorson v The Netherlands
(1996) EHRR 330 at 358 (para 70); Milne v Cullen 1967 JC 21 at 30.
591 Renton and Brown's Criminal Procedure, 6th edition, W Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, paras
9-08 - 9-13; Archbold; Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998, paras
4-116 - 4-119; Blackstone's Criminal Practice, Blackstone Press, 1997, paras D10-28 - D10-37.
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Protocol 7 ECHR (to which the UK is not a party) and Article 14(7) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (to which it is). It is possible,
but undecided, that ne bis in idem is within the ambit of Article 6 ECHR593. The
ne bis in idem principle is, accordingly, well recognised in international law. A
truly co-operative attitude, manifesting mutual trust, would, it may be argued,
leave the matter to be dealt with by the trial jurisdiction. One may perhaps
perceive in the reservation a symptom of continuing distrust of foreign judicial
process, akin to that which underlay the prima facie case requirement in
extradition law. Both represent an insistence on the application of UK domestic
law to a foreign process. In an extradition context, La Forrest, J said in the
(Canadian) case ofArgentina v Mellino594 that "the assumption by an extradition
judge that...defences... would not be given appropriate consideration by the
foreign court...amounts to a serious reflection not only on a foreign Government
to whom Canada has a treaty obligation but on its judicial authorities concerning
matters that are exclusively within their competence". Just such an assumption
seems to underlie the UK reservation.
There is a further (presumably inadvertent) parallel with the effect of the
prima facie case requirement. We have seen that the effect of that requirement
was and is to impose judicial scrutiny of the prosecution case even though there is
no equivalent scrutiny in Scottish domestic criminal procedure. In a mutual
assistance context, the reservation to Article 2 imposes a greater restriction on
investigation on behalf of a foreign authority than applies to a domestic
investigation.
The reservation applies to a previous conviction or acquittal for "an
offence which arises from the same conduct as that giving rise to proceedings in
the requesting state in respect of' the person who is the subject of the request. By
592 MacGregor and Inglis (1846) Ark 49 at 60; Aughet (1919) 13 Cr App R 101; Treacy v Director
ofPublic Prosecutions [1971] AC 537 at 526; Thomas [1985] QB 604.
593 DJ Harris, M O'Boyle and C Warbrick, Law ofthe European Convention on Human Rights,
Butterworths, 1995,217.
594 [1987] 1 SCR 436 at 554.
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referring to an offence arising from the same conduct as the earlier proceedings,
rather than to an earlier prosecution for the same offence, this is wider than the
formula in both Article 14(7) ICCPR and Article 4, Protocol 7 ECHR, both of
which preclude further trial for "an offence for which [the person] has already
been finally convicted or acquitted". It is also wider than the formula used in
Article 9 ECE, which deals with the situation in which judgement has been passed
by the authorities of the requested party "in respect of the offence or offences for
which extradition is requested". The UK's reservation to Article 9 ECE is to refuse
extradition "if it appears that that person would if charged with that offence in the
United Kingdom be entitled to be discharged under any rule of law relating to
previous acquittal or conviction"595; on this formula, domestic law is engaged with
precision. The reservation to Article 2 ECMA, on the other hand, uses a formula
of its own. Assistance may be refused if the offence arises from the same conduct
as that which gave rise to the conviction; but in neither Scots nor English law is it
enough that the offence merely arises from the conduct. As Lord Morris made
clear in Connelly v DPP596, the offence upon which it is sought to prosecute must
be the same or substantially the same as the one in which there has been a
previous acquittal or conviction. In Scots law, a telling example is to be found in
Tees v HM Advocate591. In that case the accused had been indicted for attempted
murder. He pled guilty to a reduced charge of assault to severe injury, danger of
life and permanent impairment, for which he was sentenced to seven years'
imprisonment. About 3 months after that sentence was imposed the victim died
and Tees was indicted for culpable homicide. In relation to that charge, Tees had
already been convicted of an offence which arose from the same conduct as that
giving rise to proceedings-precisely the test set out in the UK reservation. The
victim was the same, the conduct was the same and Tees had been convicted of
595 European Convention on Extradition Order 1990 (SI 1990 No 1507) Sched 4; this is consistent
with Article 2(4) of the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition 1975,
which permits the application of "wider domestic provisions relating to the effect of ne bis in
idem".
596 [1964] AC 1254, HL, especially at 1310-28.
597 1994 SLT710.
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endangering the victim's life. All that had changed was the result. The result of the
conduct is not a factor in the test set out in the reservation; but the High Court,
after reviewing what it called a "long line of authorities", held that the result was
critical. It was the supervening death which took the case out of the ambit of res
judicata.
This reservation, then, has the potential to permit the UK to place an
insuperable obstacle in the way of a foreign investigation in circumstances in
which no such obstacle would be placed in the way of a national investigation.
The issues are subtle and it seems unlikely that the reservation was formulated
consciously so as to bring about the situation described.
Article 3 provides that the requested Party shall execute requests "in the
manner provided for by its law". This formula leaves open the possibility that
municipal law in the requested state will permit execution according to the
procedures of the requesting state, a course Dutch law takes in relation to requests
under its bilateral MLATs with the USA and Canada598. US law provides a similar
facility by permitting the person appointed by the court dealing with the request to
apply "in whole or in part the practice and procedure of the foreign country"599.
The UK legislative approach is, by contrast, to apply municipal procedures, albeit
with some relaxation as regards the compellability of witnesses600. The kind of
difficulties which can result from this approach may be illustrated by a Norwegian
case601 in which English police officers had, for the purposes of a case pending
before Norwegian courts, given evidence before English courts without stating
their true identities. This was permissible in English law. The evidence was,
however, held to be inadmissible in Norway, where the law is that police officers
598 Rijnhard Haentjens, "Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters", in Bert Swart and Andr Klip
(eds), International Criminal Law in the Netherlands, Max Planck Institute, 1997, 123 at 134.
599 28 USC 1782.
600 Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 Sched 1.
601 Hyesterett (39B/1997) May 27, 1997 [1997] Rt 869, [1997] 12 Euro CL 138 (para 132).
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are only able to give evidence anonymously in exceptional circumstances602. The
UK "reserves the right not to take the evidence of witnesses or require the
production of records or other documents where its law recognises in relation
thereto privilege, non-compellability or other exemption from giving evidence".
This again is consistent with a deep seated distrust of foreign process.
It is important to recognise that the UK reservation to Article 3, both in its
terms and in its subject matter, has to do with the law of evidence. It refers to
privilege and non-compellability as exemptions from giving evidence. It does not
address or seek to protect property rights in records and documents or to make any
exception on the basis of contractual arrangements as to the confidentiality of the
information which such records and documents contain.
Non compellability relates particularly to the position of the spouse of an
accused person603. The issue of legal professional privilege came before the courts
in Crown Prosecution Service on behalf ofDirector ofPublic Prosecutions for
Australia v Holman Fenwick & Willanm. In that case, a Justice of the City of
London had refused an application under section 4 of the 1990 Act for
documentary evidence, required for a prosecution in Australia, held by the
defendant's London solicitors, who were the respondents to the application and to
this appeal. The justice decided that the documents sought were privileged and
that he could not require their production. The position of the solicitors was that
their client had not agreed that there be any waiver of privilege or confidentiality
attaching to documents held and that accordingly they could not produce them
without a Court Order. Their client had been convicted of offences in Australia
and they had been unable to get instructions. Nor did they expect to be able to get
them in the future.
602 The principles developed by the European Court ofHuman Rights are somewhat similar to the
Norwegian position-see the summary of ECHR law in Karen Reid, A Practitioner's Guide to the
European Convention on Human Rights, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998.
603 Casey v HMAdvocate 1993 SLT 33 makes it clear that a mere cohabittee, as in that case, is not
in any special position, and Renton & Brown para 24-27 suggests that a former spouse is always
compellable.
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Since paragraph 4(1 )(a) of Schedule 1 to the 1990 Act provides that a
person shall not be compelled to give in the proceedings any evidence which he
could not be compelled to give in criminal proceedings in the part of the United
Kingdom in which the nominated court exercises jurisdiction, Morland J, who
delivered the judgement, said that he was required to consider English law, which
on the subject of legal professional privilege is set out in section 10 of the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That Act does not apply in Scotland and so its
detail need not concern us. Upon a construction of that statute, he held that
confidentiality is not the test by which material sought is exempt from production
but that the sole test is whether the material in the documents is covered by legal
privilege as defined by the statute. He examined sundry cases from the English
courts on the construction of the relevant part of PACE but he also drew on an
Australian case605 in which the scope of legal professional privilege was
considered and found to be somewhat narrower than it is in England. On the
particular facts of the case he held that the Justice had been wrong to refuse the
application and so the appeal was allowed.
There was no suggestion in the case that the Divisional Court was bound
to consider Australian law or even that they did so because the case involved a
request from that country. The Australian case is handled simply as comparative
material from another common law jurisdiction. Nevertheless, there must be a
certain attraction for a court in being able to indicate that the outcome would be
the same even if the law of the requesting State was applied.
The underlying purpose of legal professional privilege is said to be "to
enable a man to consult his solicitor freely, without the risk of everything that
passed being revealed to some future opponent"606. Similar protection does not
arise ex lege with regard to communications with any other category of adviser607
604 Unreported, Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List), 13 December 1993 (Transcript
available on Lexis Nexis).
605 Baker v Campbell [1983] 153 Commonwealth Law Reports 52.
606 Walkers on Evidence para 393; cf Ventouris vMountain [1991] 1 WLR 607 at 611 per
Bingham LJ.
607 See Walkers on Evidence para 397; Wheeler v LeMarchant [1881] 17 Ch D 675.
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and such contractual obligations of confidentiality as might apply between
persons and such other advisers will not defeat a demand that evidence be
given608.
The argument which may be put in favour of applying this somewhat
complex branch ofUK evidence law to a request for assistance in connection with
an investigation in another European jurisdiction is that the UK rules have a
public policy foundation and that to take the evidence of the witness or seize the
documents or records would defeat that policy even if they were never used in
evidence.
Against that, however, it may be said that the rules about privilege and
non-compellability are not there to protect a person's secrets for their own sake.
They do not relate to any kind of property interests. Rather, they relate
specifically to the law of evidence. Moreover, the reservation in terms relates to
exemptions from giving evidence, not to the protection of property rights of any
kind, nor to any privilege of the witness founded on public policy. Where the UK
is the requested state and a witness claims that the evidence which he is being
required to give is evidence which he could not be compelled to give in the
requesting state, Schedule 1 paragraph 4 to the 1990 Act requires that the
evidence be taken but not transmitted if the court in the requesting state upholds
the witness's claim. Rules on privilege and compellability equivalent to, and
sometimes wider than, UK rules do apply in other legal systems609. The scheme
provided by Schedule 1 paragraph 4 of the 1990 Act would, it is suggested, be
sufficient to meet the real interests in the case. The reservation made by the UK to
Article 3 places UK laws in a dominant position which is not necessary.
Article 5
Article 5 permits Parties to reserve the right to make the execution of a request for
search or seizure of property dependent on double criminality, the extraditability
of the offence or the consistency of execution of the request with the law of the
608 Walkers, loc cit.
609 See Hatchard, Huber and Vogler, op cit, 75, 79, 146.
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requested party. As the Explanatory Report points out, these conditions do not
apply to mutual assistance in general under the Convention610. Most Parties have
availed themselves of the opportunity.
The UK has selected the first and third options, so that it reserves the right
to make execution of a request for search and seizure ofproperty dependent on the
satisfaction of a double criminality test and on the execution of the request being
consistent with the law of the UK. The need for execution of the request to be
consistent with the law of the requested state is self evident; but the double
criminality requirement is of some significance. This is a requirement which, as
regards mutual legal assistance, has come under some criticism in recent years. In
June 1996 the P8 Lyon Summit agreed recommendations made by a Senior
Expert Group on Transnational Organised Crime611, the third of which was that
"States should, where feasible, render mutual assistance, notwithstanding the
absence of dual criminality". It could, of course, be argued that such assistance
without double criminality is not feasible in the case of search and seizure,
because the property rights of third parties may be involved. Such a position
would be understandable. However, in an EU context, the Action Plan to Combat
Organized Crime urges the conclusion between the EU Member States of a
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters which should aim at
rendering superfluous the reservations to ECMA. The double criminality
requirement is singled out for special attention in this respect612
Abramovsky has described the double criminality requirement in the 1995
Russian/US MLAT as "a key deficiency" because "the elements of criminal
offences in the United States and Russia do not entirely overlap. Thus corrupt
enterprises operating in the United States and Russia may not fall within the
purview of the Agreement if their members commit no acts specifically
610 Op cit 15.
611 Dated 12 April 1996; copy on file with author.
612 Para 8(4). See also the consideration of the double criminality requirement in the context of
extradition at 113 above.
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criminalized within the Russian Federation"613. A background paper for the 1994
World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime noted, with
apparent approval, that no double criminality requirement applies to search and
seizure under the USA's 1988 MLAT with Thailand614.
Polimeni has pointed out that the double criminality requirement can
prove to be a severe obstacle to investigations in relation to the Italian offence of
participation in a criminal organisation of a mafia type, an offence which has no
direct equivalent in UK law or in the laws ofmany other European countries. That
offence has, he says, been "the cornerstone" of such success as Italian anti-mafia
efforts have experienced615. A similar assessment of the value of such legislation
was made in another background paper for the 1994 World Ministerial
Conference616. Yet the existence of a double criminality requirement would mean
that the UK could not provide assistance by way of search to an Italian
investigation focused on such an offence unless some other offence, such as
money laundering, could be shown to be involved617. As we shall see in
considering the Harare Scheme618, the retention of a double criminality
requirement indicates a lack of confidence in the basis on which a treaty partner
decides what conduct to penalise and how seriously to treat penalised conduct. To
put it another way, it indicates a distrust of foreign criminal justice systems.
A draft of a Third Pillar Convention on mutual assistance in criminal
matters is under discussion at the time of writing and a version of that draft
613 Abraham Abramovsky, op cit, 209.
614 Most Effective Forms ofInternational Co-operation for the Prevention and Control of
Organized Transnational Crime at the Investigative, Prosecutorial andJudicial Levels (UN Doc
E/CONF.88/4, 1 September 1994) para 68 (copy on file with author).
6,5 G Polimeni, European Policy Responses to International Organized Crime, Europa Institute,
University of Edinburgh, Occasional Paper 3, 1995, 11-12.
616 National Legislation and its Adequacy to Deal with the Various Forms ofOrganized
Transnational Crime; Appropriate Guidelinesfor Legislative and Other Measures to be Taken at
the National Level (UN Doc E/CONF.88/3, 25 August 1994) para 20 (copy on file with author).
617 The EU has, on 19 March 1998, adopted a Joint Action on Making it a Criminal Offence to
Participate in a Criminal Organization in the Member States ofthe European Union, by which
the Member States undertake to criminalise participation in the activities of a criminal
organisation (Council Press Release 6889/98, with text of Joint Action annexed).
618 See 174 below.
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appears in the Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the subject619. In
that draft, the Article which would deal with double criminality is left blank. This
was explained to the Committee on the basis that discussion of the issue was
proceeding but that there was no immediate likelihood of proposals being put
forward to remove the requirement620. The Committee noted that "during
discussions of the draft Convention no examples have been given of co-operation
not proving possible on account of dual criminality requirements and the
Government sees no need for Member States to abandon requirements of dual
criminality for search and seizure purposes"621. In light of the literature reviewed
above, such a position is astonishing. One could understand the UK Government
taking the considered position that, notwithstanding the clear advantages which
departing from the requirement would have for international co-operation against
crime, the potential prejudice to innocent third parties in possession of property
sought under a request for assistance is too great to dispense with a requirement
which at least means that such property can only be seized for a foreign authority
where it could be seized for a UK authority. Such a position would be defensible
in terms of the property guarantees in Protocol 1 ECHR referred to above. But
that is not the position as the Government explained it publicly to the Lords
Committee.
In the event, the UK Government seems to have undergone a conversion.
In its paper for the EU K4 Committee, referred to above, the UK proposes that
"the EU should agree in principle on the objective of abolition of dual criminality
restrictions on granting mutual legal assistance. This would be consistent with the
principle of the recognition of the validity of the legal systems of EU partners"622.
The only restriction contemplated is the development of agreed minimum rules to
ensure that requests for the use of coercive powers are proportionate. This
619 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Session 1997-98, 14th
Report, MutualAssistance in CriminalMatters (HL Paper 72).
620 Op cit, Minutes ofEvidence, at 5 (evidence ofMr G Stadlen). In the latest draft the blank has
disappeared and the issue is not addressed at all.
621 Op cit para 54.
622 Para 23.
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development might indicate a tendency to move (albeit slowly) towards trusting
the criminal justice processes of other EU countries at least. Such trust is inherent
in the way ECMA is formulated; but it is suggested that our consideration of the
UK's reservations to ECMA indicates that it might have been lacking hitherto.
The Harare Scheme
The point has already been made that Commonwealth schemes owe a very large
amount to English law, as a result of the English law heritage of almost all
Commonwealth countries. This bears emphasis. Where the thinking which
underlies a multilateral instrument owes a large amount to a given legal system it
would be surprising if the country whose legal system that is found much to
dispute in the instrument in terms of principle. It is therefore not surprising that
the UK's interventions in the negotiations for the Harare Scheme related, by and
large, to matters of practical detail623, with occasional comment on how far
political will would support proposals (such as intimate body searches624). Overall,
those interventions give the impression of a generally conservative approach, the
tone of which was set by the UK's first intervention, in which it opposed a
Jamaican attempt to move away from the Scheme approach and establish a full¬
blown multilateral treaty625. The attempt was unsuccessful and the Scheme
accordingly begins, not with the creation of any obligation, but with a statement
that its purpose is to increase the level and scope of assistance rendered between
Commonwealth Governments in criminal matters. The kinds of assistance which
it contemplates are listed, but the list is not exhaustive626. Most of the Scheme is
623 See, for example, Commonwealth Secretariat, Mutual Assistance in the Administration of
Justice: Meeting ofSenior Officials to ConsiderDraft Schemes, 27 January-7 February 1986,
Summary Record, 41, where the extent to which confidentiality can be assured was under
discussion and 43, on whether or not requests should be in writing.
624 Summary Record, 45.
625 Summary Record ,30.
626 As amended by Commonwealth Law Ministers in April 1990, the list is as follows:
"1(3) Assistance in criminal matters under this Scheme includes assistance in
(a) identifying and locating persons;
(b) serving documents;
(c) examining witnesses;
(d) search and seizure;
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"nuts and bolts" stuff and need not be discussed here but it should be said that
paragraph 7 permits the refusal of assistance in certain cases, which include the
situation in which there is no double criminality, that in which the offence is of a
political character, that in which the offence is purely military and that in which
the request relates to conduct in respect of which the person accused or suspected
has already been convicted or acquitted in the requested country.
There were two issues on which the negotiations shed a certain amount of
light on the UK's attitude to the relationship between the Scheme and existing UK
law. The first, and more substantial of these, relates to the scope of the Scheme. It
was a matter of consensus that assistance should be available in relation to
"criminal matters" and that this phrase would cover the situation in which
proceedings have been instituted in a criminal court. Thereafter, it was for
consideration whether the phrase, and hence the scheme, also covered either or
both of two other situations. These were, first, the certification by the Central
Authority of the requesting state that the institution of such proceedings is
contemplated and, secondly, certification by that Authority that there is
"reasonable cause to believe that an offence in respect ofwhich such proceedings
could be instituted has been committed". The UK's position was that "it would be
sensible to extend the Scheme to contemplated proceedings but not to go so far as
a reasonable suspicion that an offence had been committed. Coercive powers
required a firmer base than reasonable suspicion. The unwarranted search for
information required safeguards which the contemplated proceedings formula
would satisfy...investigatory inquiries could be handled by the existing ICPO-
INTERPOL arrangements"627.
McClean notes628 that, of the two extreme positions available, the UK
(e) obtaining evidence;
(f) facilitating the personal appearance ofwitnesses;
(g) effecting a temporary transfer of persons in custody to appear as a witness;
(h) obtaining production of judicial or official records; and
(i) tracing, seizing and confiscating the proceeds or instrumentalities of crime.
627 Ibid, 34.
628 David McClean, International Judicial Assistance, 154.
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inclined to support the Australian position, which was to make assistance
available for the investigation of offences. New Zealand, on the other hand,
wished to restrict assistance to cases in which proceedings had already been
instituted. In light of the foregoing quotation of the UK statement of its position,
however, McClean's assertion needs some qualification. Whilst it is true that the
UK was willing to relax its position as set out in the Evidence (Proceedings in
Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, it was not willing to go beyond the case in which
proceedings were "contemplated". The UK's position therefore remained rather
restrictive. Having regard to the terms of its intervention, the UK clearly
contemplated that the effect of refusing to give assistance where there is a
reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed would be to prevent the
use of compulsory powers (such as search) where the identity of the perpetrator of
an offence is unknown.
This would have placed searches on behalf of Commonwealth requesting
states in a more restricted position than applied to the UK's own national
investigations. Section 8(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
provided for the issue of a search warrant where there were "reasonable grounds
for believing", inter alia, that a serious arrestable offence had occurred629. In
Scotland, there is Full Bench authority in the civil courts for the proposition that a
search warrant may be granted competently before any person is arrested or
charged630 and High Court authority which reaffirms the right of the procurator
fiscal to obtain a search warrant to enable him to complete inquiries which he
deems necessary "before he can reach a decision as to whether he should institute
criminal proceedings" against a particular person631. Indeed, in the Scottish cases,
it is the phrase "reason to suspect" which recurs as the basis on which warrants
have been sought632 and that represents, arguably, an even more subjective state of
629 Although this is couched in the past tense, reflecting the state of English law at the time of the
meeting under consideration, it should be said that the law remains unchanged.
630 Stewart andAnother v Roach 1950 SLT 245.
631 MacNeill, Complainer 1984 SLT 157, 159.
632 See especially Stewart andAnother v Roach.
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mind than "reasonable grounds to suspect".
It is to be assumed that the UK delegation, which included representatives
of the Home Office, Scottish Office and Crown Office, was aware of the relevant
UK law. The position adopted can, therefore, be explained only on the basis that
the UK was not willing to find itself obliged (even in the limited and moral sense
in which a Commonwealth Scheme involves obligation) to place in
Commonwealth countries the same degree of confidence which it placed in its
own police officers, procurators fiscal and courts. (It might, of course, be that
such a position was fully justified in light of the underdevelopment of criminal
justice systems of certain Commonwealth countries and the nature of the
Governments of those countries. Nigeria, for example, was represented at the
meeting). In the event, other counsels prevailed and the Scheme as adopted makes
assistance available where the Central Authority of the requesting country
certifies that criminal proceedings have been instituted in a court or that there is
reasonable cause to believe that an offence in respect ofwhich proceedings could
be instituted has been committed.
The second matter relates to grounds for refusal of assistance. The draff
did not include within those grounds any double criminality requirement but
Professor McClean (who had been largely responsible for the drafting) invited the
delegates to consider whether such a requirement was needed. The consensus was
that it was, and paragraph 7(1) of the Scheme as adopted provides that the
requested country may refuse to comply in whole or in part with a request for
assistance if it appears to the Central Authority of that country to concern conduct
which would not constitute an offence under the law of that country. The UK
approach to this was to support the Maltese position. That country argued that,
since mutual assistance might lead to deprivation of liberty, there should be a
discretionary double criminality rule. "Certain states" might consider it
"repugnant" to give assistance which might lead to a conviction for conduct which
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was not a criminal offence in the requested state633. The UK agreed that there
should be a discretion to refuse assistance on this ground, and that such a
discretion "might especially be used in the case of compulsory measures which
might be considered to constitute an invasion of the privacy of the individual"634.
The example given by McClean and Menary in their explanatory note on
paragraph 7(1) relates to the tendency for some countries whose criminal law is
particularly influenced by religious or ideological considerations to penalise
heavily conduct which is either accepted or only penalised lightly in other
countries635.
The Scheme as adopted included the absence of double criminality as a
discretionary ground of refusal and the UK's position was, therefore, in line with
that of the majority of countries. Since the application of a double criminality test
necessarily applies a municipal law standard, it may be said that the fact that the
UK favoured that approach is consistent with its general emphasis on municipal
law; but its significance lies more in its combination with other evidence of such a
preference than in its own right.
Article 7 of the 1988 UN Drugs Convention
Article 7 of the 1988 UN Drugs Convention has been described as "in itself...a
mini-mutual legal assistance treaty" which "contains a comprehensive regime for
mutual assistance in respect of the specific criminal law activity at which it is
aimed. More simply put, drug trafficking enjoys its own specialized mutual legal
assistance regime"636. The language ofArticle 7 is strikingly similar to that of free
standing MLATs. It begins, for example, with the obligation to afford "the widest
measure of mutual assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial
proceedings"637.
633 Summary Record, 39.
634 Ibid.
635 David McClean and WJ Menary, Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in CriminalMatters
within the Commonwealth: FurtherExplanatory Material Preparedfor Commonwealth
Jurisdictions, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1988 Vol II, 21.
636 DW Sproule and Paul St-Denis, op cit, 285, 287.
637 Article 7(1).
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The UK did not in fact contribute to the discussion of the draft ofArticle 7
during the Vienna Conference. It would be unsafe to construct any very
substantial argument on the basis of the UK's silence in negotiations and
consideration ofArticle 7 is, at this point, brief for that reason.
It does seem legitimate to conclude from the UK's silence that the draft
contained nothing to cause it any significant concern. It deals with drug
trafficking, which is one of the types of offence identified by the then Attorney
General638 as those which make mutual assistance a matter ofnecessity. Moreover,
it contains no obligation not already in contemplation as a result of the UK's
participation in the Harare Scheme and decision to accede to ECMA.
Paragraph 1 has been quoted. It is of interest here not because it involves
an obligation to give the widest measure of assistance but because that assistance
is required to extend to investigations. The word "investigations" is not defined
but its context suggests that it refers, or is capable of referring to, a point before
proceedings are actually in contemplation. As noted above, the UK was reluctant
to go quite that far during consideration of the Harare Scheme. If such reluctance
remained, it was not voiced at the Vienna Conference. This may be explained by
three factors, though which of them applied cannot be known. First, the UK had
already "lost" on that issue in the Commonwealth context and was expecting to
become party to ECMA, which covers the investigative stage. There would,
therefore, have been little point in fighting the battle again in Vienna. Secondly,
the drug trafficking context might well have made the UK less sensitive to the
perceived rights of those under investigation that would have been the case in
relation to other sorts of crime. The UK was prepared to take a more
"draconian"639 approach which to the proceeds of drug trafficking than to those of
other sorts of crime. And, thirdly, it might simply be that UK Government
thinking had developed to the point at which it no longer had the same concerns
about the investigative stage. Such development might, of course, have been
638 Havers, op cit.
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influenced by involvement in negotiations such as those which led to the Harare
Scheme.
To go further would be to speculate. The most we can say is that there may
be grounds for thinking that the UK's developing involvement in international
mutual legal assistance affected its policy on this issue.
Bilateral MLA Ts
In his paper on the UK's experience of treaty-making in the field of international
co-operation, Harding explained that, following the enactment of DTOA and the
confiscation provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and before the adoption
of the 1988 UN Drugs Convention, the UK decided that bilateral agreements
would be necessary to ensure reciprocity and the effective operation of
confiscation as between different jurisdictions. Accordingly, the UK embarked on
the negotiation of a round of bilateral agreements640. There is now a substantial
number of these but almost all of them relate to the investigation of drug
trafficking and/or confiscation of the proceeds of crime. Those agreements will be
considered under the heading of the proceeds of crime. However, in the case of 3
countries-Canada, the USA and Thailand-there are general bilateral MLATs and
aspects of those MLATs are for consideration here. There would be something to
be said for full analysis of these treaties, which no-one has yet provided; but the
subject of this thesis is the relationship between international law and criminal
law, so that considerations of relevance and space preclude full description.
The Canadian Treaty takes the form of a 1992 Exchange of Notes,
amending an earlier drug-specific treaty641. The Treaty with the USA642 is ffee-
639 The word is terribly over-used but is chosen here because it is the word which UK ministers
and officials used to describe the approach to the proceeds of drug trafficking.
640 Harding, op cit, 239.
641 Exchange ofNotes between the Government of the United Kigdom ofGreat Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of Canada amending the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters (Drug Trafficking) signed at Ottawa on 22 June 1988.
642 Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of the United States of America on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
1994.
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standing but followed an earlier drug-specific treaty643 (which itself was
subsequent in time to the 1986 Treaty regarding the Cayman Islands644). Both of
the earlier, drug-specific treaties contemplated the negotiation of a general MLAT
to supplement or replace the drug-specific treaty645. The Treaty with Thailand646 is
free-standing but both the UK and Thailand were already Party to the 1988 UN
Drugs Convention. Accordingly, in the case of each of the UK's general bilateral
MLATs negotiations proceeded in the context of an existing drug-specific treaty
relationship, to which the UK's attitude had been conditioned by its existing
municipal law in the shape ofDTOA.
The 3 general MLATs all begin with the obligation to provide mutual
assistance-in the case of the Canadian Treaty, "the widest measure of mutual
assistance"-in criminal matters. This obligation is elaborated by a non-exhaustive
list of forms of assistance. These lists are not identical.
All of the treaties include the taking of testimony from persons, the service
of documents, the execution of requests for search and seizure, the transfer of
persons in custody to be witnesses, the location of persons and the provision of
assistance in restraint and forfeiture proceedings. The wording by which these
forms of assistance are expressed varies as between the treaties but not in a way
which is of any material significance for our present purpose. To these forms of
assistance, the treaties with the USA and with Thailand add the provision of
documents, records and evidence. The Treaty with Canada, however, gives rather
more specification under this head. Under that Treaty, the parties undertake the
"provision of information, documents and other records, including criminal
643 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the United States ofAmerica concerning the Investigation ofDrug
Trafficking Offences and the Seizure and Forfeiture of Proceeds and Instrumentalities ofDrug
Trafficking 1988.
644 Treaty between the United States of America and the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and
Northern Ireland Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters 1986.
645 Article III of the 1988 Treaty with Canada and Article 13 of the 1988 Agreement with the
USA.
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records, judicial records and Government records" and the "delivery of property,
including lending of exhibits"647. The Canadian Treaty also seems to go further
than the other 2 when it includes an obligation of "facilitating the appearance of
witnesses or the assistance of persons in investigations", in addition to the
obligation to transfer persons in custody for that purpose.
It is, of course, possible that the Canadian Treaty is simply more detailed
than the others; but if so it is also more detailed than the Harare Scheme and more
detailed than the MLAT between Canada and the USA648. In particular, the
reference to the provision of criminal records, judicial records and Government
records does not occur elsewhere. It may be speculated that this is to be explained
by the traditionally close relationship between the UK and Canada. That having
been said, the point has no great significance for this thesis and it is not, therefore,
followed further.
All 3 of the MLATs go on to provide that their provisions are not to give
rise to a right on the part of a private party to obtain or exclude evidence649. The
Treaties with the USA and with Thailand state plainly in this context that they are
intended solely for mutual legal assistance between the Parties. This provision is
important for our purpose because it is an element in what has become a
widespread practice of placing a fence between the means by which evidence is
gathered in a foreign jurisdiction and questions of admissibility of evidence in
trial courts. The elements of that practice may be discussed conveniently here.
We begin where we are, with the exclusion in the UK's bilateral treaties of
the possibility of such treaties giving rise to rights in individuals. Such clauses in
treaties were developed in US practice. US MLATs are intended to be self-
executing and to operate in conjunction with the extremely short mutual legal
646 Treaty between the Government of the Kingdom ofThailand and the Government of the
United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
1994.
647 Article II(3)(b) and (e).
648 Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 1985.
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assistance provision at 28 USC 1782650. The US Court of Appeals has held that
this object has been achieved651. As a result of the self-executing nature of such
treaties in US law, there is a real possibility that, absent clauses such as that under
discussion, individuals, whether defendants or witnesses, could litigate on the
basis of treaty provisions about the assistance being given or obtained in any
given case. At best, the result would be the introduction of significant delays; but
embarrassing decisions from municipal courts would be another possibility.
Accordingly, it became standard practice to include clauses such as this in US
MLATs652. The position of the individual was considered to be sufficiently
protected by the possibility of sending letters rogatory653.
The protection of the individual in US law is not the subject of this thesis.
It may be commented, however, that letters rogatory, whilst allowing an
individual to try to gather evidence to tender in his defence, do not assist him in
securing the exclusion of evidence gathered under a treaty but in a way which
might, in a purely municipal context, have resulted in successful objection. A
treaty clause which says, as the UK's Treaty with Canada does, that a private
party is not entitled to rely on the Treaty to exclude evidence, must have the effect
of closing off any argument that the Treaty was not complied with, even if a way
can be found to refer to it in the absence of legislative transformation654.
Each of the treaties includes a provision as to the execution of requests.
That provision, in the Treaty with Thailand, is very brief, providing only that
649 Treaty with Canada, Article 11(4); Treaty with USA, Article 1(3); Treaty with Thailand, Article
1(4).
650 See, for example, Letter of Submittal relating to the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance
between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, together with a related
Exchange ofNotes, signed at the Hague on June 12, 1981, 974 Congress, 1 Session, Treaty Doc
97-16.
651 United States v Erato 2 F 3d 11 (2°d Cir 1993).
652 See Technical Analysis of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Between the United States of
America and the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Cayman
St . .
Islands, 101 Congress, 1st Session, Senate, Exec Rept No 101-8, reproduced in WC Gilmore,
Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Business Regulatory Matters, Grotius, 1995, 298, 299.
653 Ibid, 300.
654See further on this the consideration of section 3(9) of the Criminal Justice (International Co¬
operation) Act 1990 at 222 below.
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"The Central Authority of the Requested Party shall promptly comply with the
request or, when appropriate, shall transmit it to the authority having jurisdiction
to do so. The competent authorities of the Requested Party shall execute the
request to the extent permitted by their domestic laws". The equivalent provision
in the Treaty with Canada is not very much longer. It requires the central authority
of the requested state to take whatever steps it considers necessary to secure the
prompt execution of a request and it goes on to provide that a request is to be
executed in so far as permitted by the law of the requesting state and in so far as
possible in accordance with any specific requirements stated in the request. The
provisions in the Canadian and Thai treaties, then, adopt a very similar approach
to ECMA, as discussed above.
By contrast, the "execution of requests" provision in the US Treaty
(Article 5) is long and detailed. Paragraph (1) begins by providing that "as
empowered by this treaty or by national law, or in accordance with its national
practice, the Requested Party shall take whatever steps it deems necessary to give
effect to requests received from the Requesting Party". The meaning of this is not
altogether clear. The reference to the provision of assistance "as empowered by"
the treaty may be presumed to reflect the self-executing nature of such treaties in
US law, since (in light ofUK dualism) the treaty does not itself empower the UK
authorities to do anything. On this analysis, the reference to assistance "as
empowered...by national law" would have primary reference to the UK, where the
power to provide assistance is to be found in the 1990 Act. The reference to
"national practice", which follows, may refer to something in US law or may refer
to informal sorts of assistance provided by law enforcement agencies outside the
framework of legislation. The US Securities and Exchange Commission, for
example, has developed "information sharing arrangements on a bilateral basis
with various foreign authorities"655. These include a Memorandum of
655 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Reportfor Fiscal Year 1992, 20.
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Understanding (MOU) with the UK Department of Trade and Industry656 which
contemplates assistance in regulatory matters going beyond the recognisably
criminal. It may be that arrangements of this sort are what the Treaty has in
contemplation but this is very uncertain.
Whatever the precise meaning of the first sentence of paragraph (1), it can
be said that it assumes a predominant position for national law. Even the self
executing nature ofMLATs in US law, which seems to underlie the paragraph's
opening words, is derived from fundamental US domestic law. However,
paragraph (1) goes on to make requirements of municipal law, by providing that
"the courts of the Requested Party shall have authority to issue subpoenas, search
warrants or other orders necessary to execute the request". From a UK
perspective, the 1990 Act already contained such powers. Article 5(1) should,
however, be read in the light of Article 8, which deals with taking testimony and
producing evidence in the territory of the requested party. That Article has a very
close equivalent in Article 8 of the Treaty with Thailand and the suspicion must
be that the provision of the US Treaty was used as a model. The equivalent
provision in the Canadian Treaty is both different and much briefer, providing
only that a request may be made for the taking of evidence in the Requested State
and that the Requesting State may specify questions to be put to a witness.
Article 8(1) of the Treaty with the USA provides that a person in the
territory of the Requested Party from whom evidence is requested may be
compelled to appear in order to testify or produce documents or other articles by
subpoena or "such other method as may be permitted under the law of the
Requested Party". This clearly assumes that there is a method under the law of the
requested party whereby a person required to attend as a witness can be compelled
to produce documents and other articles. The assumption is presumably justified
in the case ofUS law and seems to be justified in the case of English law in terms
of the venerable measure known as the subpoena duces tecum. Whether the
656 Reproduced in WC Gilmore, Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Business Regulatory Matters,
401.
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assumption is justified as regards Scots law is, however, at best doubtful. It
follows that the Treaty, having been made in apparent ignorance of the Scottish
position657 may in this respect be difficult to comply with in the case of a witness
situated in Scotland.
There is in Scots law no such thing as a subpoena duces tecum. The
nearest equivalent is the citation of a person to produce writs or other articles of
evidence during the precognition process, authority for which is given explicitly
in the petition warrant by which solemn criminal proceedings are commenced658.
The power to secure the presence of witnesses in relation to requests for mutual
legal assistance is to be found in Schedule 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1990 Act.
Paragraph 1 gives the court "the like powers for securing the attendance of
witnesses...as it has for the purpose of other proceedings before the court"; and
paragraph 2 empowers Scottish courts to issue a warrant to officers of law to cite
witnesses. It goes on to apply section 320 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland)
Act 1975 (now consolidated in section 156 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland)
Act 1995). That provision relates to summary criminal procedure. There is no
mechanism under summary procedure for requiring a witness to produce
documents or other articles. The petition warrant, which is the explicit and only
source of power to make such requirements under solemn procedure, is a warrant
to require witnesses to attend for precognition, not to attend for proceedings
before the court. Precognition is a step in investigation.
The fact that the assumption which underlies Article 8(1) of the Treaty
with the USA is not justified for Scotland does not make it impossible to obtain
documents and other articles for the USA. It does, however, mean that this must
be done by search and seizure, which is the subject of an entirely different Article
in the Treaty659. The equivalent provision in the Treaty with Thailand provides
657 There was no Scottish representation during negotiation. Channel Islands Law Officers and the
writer were presented with the Treaty as afait accompli at a meeting at Home Office and all
protested, to no avail, that in our several legal systems there were obligations in the treaty which
could not be fulfilled.
658 Renton and Brown's Criminal Procedure, para 12-05.
659 Article 14.
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that a person summoned to give testimony or produce documents or articles may
be compelled to do so "in the same manner and to the same extent as in criminal
investigations, prosecutions or proceedings in the Requested Party". This is a
good deal easier to live with.
A more difficult problem which arises in the context of Article 8 of the
Treaty with the USA is that of the authentication of business documents. The
Treaty, it will be recalled, was signed in 1994. The UK had legislated for Scotland
on the subject of the admissibility and evidential significance of business
documents and copies of such documents in the Prisoners and Criminal
Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 Schedule 3 and various forms were prescribed
by Act of Adjournal. The legislation and forms are now to be found in the
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 Schedule 8 and the Act of Adjournal
(Criminal Procedure Rules) 1996660 Rule 26.1 and Forms 26.1 A and B. They are
in identical terms to their originals in the 1993 Act and its associated provisions.
They may be summarised (and simplified somewhat) in the following way. A
copy is to be deemed a true copy and treated for evidential purposes as if it were
the original if-but only if-it purports to be authenticated in the prescribed form661.
The form prescribed662 requires the person granting the certification to state the
capacity in which he grants it. The categories which are recognised are author,
person in possession and control or authorised representative of the person in
possession and control. He must go on to certify that the document is "a true
copy" of the original. A statement in a business document (or authenticated copy
business document) is admissible in criminal proceedings as evidence of any fact
ofwhich direct oral evidence would be admissible if three conditions are satisfied.
They are, first, that the document was created or received in the course of a
business, secondly that it was kept by a business and, thirdly, that the statement
was made on the basis of information supplied by a person who had personal
660 SI 1996 No 513 (S47).
661 Schedule 8 para 1.
662 Form 26.1A.
184
knowledge of the matters dealt with in it663. The second of these criteria may be
shown to be satisfied by the docqueting of the document in prescribed form664.
The prescribed form is a certificate by an office-holder in the business that the
document "is a document kept by a business, namely (insert name and address of
business...)". The enactment of this legislation followed detailed consideration of
the issue by the Scottish Law Commission665.
Article 8(5) of the Treaty provides that documents produced pursuant to
the Treaty may be authenticated in the form indicated in Appendix A to the Treaty
and that "no further authentication or certification shall be necessary in order for
such documentary information to be admissible in evidence in proceedings in the
territory of the Requesting Party".
Appendix A consists of a form in which a person is required on oath or
affirmation before a notary public or judicial officer to "attest on penalty of
criminal punishment for false statement or false attestation" that he is employed
by a particular business, with a particular official title, that the record is the
original or a duplicate (which is not specified) of records in the custody of a
named business and, further, that the records were made at or near the time of
occurrence of the matters set forth by a person with knowledge of those matters,
that the records were kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,
that the business activity made the records as a regular practice and that if any of
the records is not an original it is a duplicate of the original.
Difficulties arise from the point of view of Scotland as the requesting
jurisdiction. The facility for agreeing an alternative form of authentication which
is provided by Article 8(5) is understood not to have been operated, so what will
be delivered will be a document-probably a copy-certified in terms of Appendix
A. Several difficulties will stand in the way of the admission of such a document
into evidence in a Scottish criminal court.
663 Schedule 8 para 2(1).
664 Schedule 8 para 4.
665 Scottish Law Commission (Scot Law Com No 137) Evidence: Report on Documentary
Evidence andProofofUndisputed Facts in Criminal Proceedings, 1992.
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First, the aspects of the Appendix A form which deal with "duplicates" of
documents do not meet the requirements of Schedule 8 and the Act of Adjournal
as regards authentication of copies. The Treaty form does not say whether or not
what is produced is a copy. It does not state the capacity in which the certificate is
granted in terms which can be recognised for the purposes ofForm 26.1-A. And it
merely states that the record is a "duplicate", not that it is a true copy.
This may seem pedantic. However, copies are admissible in terms of
Schedule 8 paragraph 1 only if they purport to be authenticated "in the prescribed
form" and, although it is true that Rule 1.3 in the Act ofAdjournal permits the use
of a form "substantially to the same effect" as a form provided in the Rules, it
would be hard to argue convincingly that a form which departs in every respect
from that prescribed by the Act of Adjournal could be said to be substantially to
the same effect as that prescribed.
Secondly, the aspects of the Appendix A form which deal with the
admissibility of business documents fall short of what is required by Scots law. It
will be recalled that, in terms of Article 8(5) of the Treaty, "no further
authentication or certification shall be necessary in order for such documentary
information to be admissible in evidence". Although the Appendix A form
contains statements of the matters prescribed in Form 26.1-B, and would probably
satisfy the requirements of Schedule 8 paragraph 4 for a certificate that the
documents produced had been kept by a business, it could not satisfy the
requirement to establish that the document had been created or received in the
course of a business and neither could it satisfy the requirement that the
statements in the document had been made on the basis of information supplied
by a person who had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the
statement. To be sure, the Treaty certificate purports to certify things which come
very close to these two criteria. However, there is in Scots municipal law no
provision for these criteria to be satisfied by certificate evidence, even if it is
given on oath. The oral evidence of a witness is necessary; but Article 8(5) of the
Treaty, by providing that no further authentication is to be necessary for
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documentary information to be admissible, might well preclude obtaining the
attendance of a witness under the Treaty where the only purpose of the attendance
of that witness would be to give verbal certification of matters with which the
Treaty certificate purports to deal.
The provisions of what is now Schedule 8 to the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1995 and of the Act ofAdjournal (Criminal Procedure Rules) were
developed with care and each of their requirements is based on detailed reasoning
in the Scottish Law Commission Report. The inescapable conclusion is that those
who negotiated the Treaty on behalf of the UK ignored entirely what Parliament
had legislated for only the previous year; and no effort has been made since the
conclusion of the Treaty to amend the legislation so as to make it possible to
admit in evidence in a Scottish court documentary evidence obtained under the
Treaty. Moreover, the Appendix A form has been copied exactly into the Treaty
with Thailand, so compounding the problem.
The proposed EU MutualAssistance Convention
The Third Pillar Mutual Assistance Convention is, at the time of writing, still
under negotiation. Substantial comment on it is, therefore, inappropriate as liable
to be overtaken by developments in that negotiation. However, the UK
Government has said that it attaches particular priority to the completion of the
Convention666 and it clearly represents one of the most important vehicles for the
future development of UK mutual assistance policy. A brief outline is,
accordingly, appropriate667.
The draft proceeds on the basis that EU member States have a common
interest in ensuring that mutual assistance between them is "provided in a fast
and efficient manner compatible with the basic principles of their national law"668.
Evidently, there is no intention to make fundamental changes in national legal
666 Memorandum by Home Office in House of Lords Select Committee on the European
Communities, Prosecuting Fraud...92, 98.
667 This part of the thesis is based on the draft which was under discussion in March 1999.
668 Preamble.
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systems. So far as it concerns the UK, it is intended to supplement ECMA669.
By Article 3, Parties would undertake to comply with formalities and
procedures expressly indicated by the requesting State and this might require
review of the basing ofUK mutual assistance procedures on domestic procedural
models670. Article 4 would permit the sending ofprocedural documents directly by
post rather than through central authorities; within certain limits, the UK takes a
relatively relaxed view of the activities of foreign law enforcement agencies in its
territory671 and this provision would require less of the UK than it would of certain
other member States. Consistent with this, Article 5 would contemplate the direct
transmission of requests for assistance from judicial authority to judicial authority.
Article 9 would contemplate the taking of evidence by video conference672.
The difficulties in completing the work are caused by Title III of the draft,
which deals with the interception of telecommunications. The text is at present so
far from being settled that discussion of it here is not appropriate; alternative
versions ofmost articles exist and there are many scrutiny reservations made by
states engaged in the negotiations. The importance of such interceptions is such
that agreement will have to be reached (unless the Convention is to be a relatively
toothless instrument) but it is too early to say what form that agreement will
ultimately take. What can be said, however, is that the agreement should on any
view speed up the process of mutual assistance somewhat. Given the tight time
limits which characterise Scots law, that can only be an advantage.
Municipal law
There is no mechanism at common law for the provision of assistance to foreign
judicial authorities or for dealing with evidence obtained in a foreign jurisdiction
and which it is sought to use in the Scotland. The Criminal Justice (International
Co-operation) Act 1990 provides a statutory framework for dealing with such
cases. It is supplemented by section 27(2) of the Criminal Law (Consolidation)
669 Article 1.
670 See 196 below.
671 But see the case of Gross, considered at 205 below.
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(Scotland) Act 1995 ("the (Consolidation) Act") as regards serious fraud cases
and sections 272 and 273 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which
deal with evidence by letter of request or on commission and television link
evidence from abroad respectively. Chapter 36 of the Act of Adjournal (Criminal
Procedure Rules) 1996 makes provision as to the 1990 Act and Chapter 23 of that
Act ofAdjournal makes provision for letters of request in general.
The UN Manual on the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters maintains that the optimum legislation on mutual legal assistance in
criminal matters is "a general instrument that can be used to implement all mutual
assistance treaties and conventions", which mirrors the scope of the treaties "by
establishing a scheme applicable to all offences included in the treaties", which
allows "for applications for different types of compulsory order that are consistent
with the types of assistance listed in the treaty", which permits applications to be
made in relation to foreign matters that are at the investigation or proceeding
stage" and which includes "powers for requests to be made by or through
domestic authorities to a foreign state for assistance"673. Part I of the 1990 Act is
well described by these criteria. It is a general instrument which permits the UK to
offer and request assistance whether or not it has a treaty relationship with the
other State concerned674. It is not supplemented by the incorporation of any treaty
and so exemplifies Bennion's first category in describing the effect of treaties in
municipal law; though it is atypical in that it had more than one international
arrangement in view.
We deal first with the 5 sections by which the UK is enabled to provide
assistance to foreign jurisdictions. They, and their subject matter, are as follows:
Section Subject matter
1 Service of overseas process in the UK.
672 For the Scots law position, see 222 below.
673 UN International Review ofCriminal Policy, Nos 45 and 46, 1995, 31.
674 See UK Central Authority, Internationalmutual assistance in criminal matters: United






Obtaining evidence in the UK for use overseas.
Transfer ofprisoner from the UK to give evidence or assist
investigation overseas.
Search and seizure.
Enforcement of overseas forfeiture orders.
These can be dealt with in three groups. Sections 4 and 8 are both
concerned with the obtaining of evidence within the UK for use overseas and can
be taken together quite naturally, with section 8 being treated as a special case
within the scope of what is dealt with by section 4. Similarly, section 5 can be
treated as an extension of one aspect of section 1, Section 9 stands alone.
Sections 4 and 8
By section 4(1), section 4 applies where 3 criteria are satisfied. The Secretary of
State must have received from a country or territory outside the UK ("the
requesting State") a request for assistance in obtaining evidence in the UK. That
request must be from a criminal court, a prosecuting authority or another authority
which appears to have the function of making requests of the kind to which the
section applies. And the request must be in connection with criminal proceedings
that have been instituted or a criminal investigation that is being carried on in the
requesting State.
The first of the criteria makes it clear that section 4 is triggered by a
request. In this, it follows the approach of all of the general MLATs675.
Circumstances could arise in which the UK authorities discovered evidence which
seemed relevant to an offence which occurred within the jurisdiction of another
State. Section 4 would not make it possible for them to take the initiative and
simply send the material to that other State; but neither would it prevent them
from telling that other State that the evidence existed, so prompting a request
675 An exception arises in the case ofArticle 10 of the Laundering Convention, which permits a
Party, without request, to forward information to another Party where it considers that the
disclosure of such information might assist that other Party in initiating or carrying out
investigations.
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which would bring the case within the treaties and the Act.
The second of these criteria, which restricts the categories of those to
whose requests the UK can respond, emphasises the fact that mutual legal
assistance, like extradition, is a transaction between States. The defence cannot, at
their own hand, request the assistance of the UK. They require to persuade the
court, the prosecutor or such other mutual assistance authority as exists in the
requesting State (all emanations of the State) to make the request for them.
The third criterion is that the request must relate to a criminal case, in
which proceedings have been instituted or in which a criminal investigation is
being carried on. By making assistance available for investigations, the 1990 Act
extends the facility beyond what was available under the 1964 Act. It will be
recalled that the difficulties over, for example, Grand Jury proceedings in the
USA and the work of the examining magistrate in countries of the civilian
tradition represented a particular difficulty under that regime.
Where the section applies, the Lord Advocate, if he is satisfied that an
offence under the law of the requesting state has been committed or that there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that such an offence has been committed and
that proceedings have been instituted for that offence or that an investigation is
being carried on there, may nominate a court to receive such of the evidence676 to
which the request relates as may appear to the court to be appropriate for the
purpose of giving effect to that request677. We shall review the law as to the
nominated court shortly.
Section 4 was amended and extended by section 164 of the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 so as to make the special investigative powers
conferred on the Lord Advocate in relation to fraud cases available for the
investigation of foreign offences. The amendment was drafted with English law
primarily in contemplation and then applied to Scotland. As it applies in Scotland,
the 1994 Act inserted a new subsection (2B) into section 4 of the 1990 Act
676 The word "evidence" includes documents and other articles (section 4(5)).
677 Section 4(2).
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whereby, if the Lord Advocate is satisfied that the same criteria which apply to
nominating a court under subsection (2) are met and that the request relates to an
offence which involves serious or complex fraud he may give a direction under
what was section 51 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987, now
consolidated as section 27 of the (Consolidation) Act. The making of such a
direction brings into play section 28 of the (Consolidation) Act by which the Lord
Advocate's nominated officer may require persons to answer questions and
produce documents. By section 28(3) the sheriff is empowered to grant a search
warrant in circumstances which may be summarised as being those in which a
person fails to comply with a requirement made by the Lord Advocate's
nominated officer or where the making of a requirement to produce material
might seriously prejudice the investigation. Material recovered under this
procedure on behalf of a foreign authority is required to be furnished to the
Secretary of State for transmission to the requesting State678.
So far as statements are concerned, the utility of the provision is limited by
section 28(5) of the (Consolidation) Act, which prevents the use of the answers
given as evidence in the prosecution of the offence under investigation. The
answers are only available as information. Any other rule would infringe Article
6(2) ECHR679. Where a foreign authority requires statements which are admissible
in evidence, the nomination of a court in terms of section 4(2) is the appropriate
vehicle for obtaining them.
Latham J pointed out in R v Bow StreetMagistrates' Court, exp Zardarim
that the nominated court has some discretion about what evidence it regards it as
appropriate to receive; but the issue was not considered in any greater detail and
the factors which should guide the exercise of that discretion were not elaborated.
It was, however, made clear in Fininvestm that it is not for the Secretary of State
678 Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 s28(8).
679 See Saunders v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 313.
68° Unreported, Queen's Bench Divisional Court, 29 April 1998 (CO/1593/98) (Transcript
available on Lexis Nexis).
681 Supra.
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to exercise any discretion as to the breadth of the request but that such
considerations are for the nominated court. There seems to be no reason why that
same division of responsibility should not apply in Scots law also.
The Lord Advocate is required to regard as conclusive of the matters as to
which he must be satisfied a certificate issued by such authority in the requesting
State as appears to him to be appropriate682. No particular form is desiderated for
such a certificate and in practice the Lord Advocate nominates a court simply on
the basis of the request for assistance. In the case of a request from a
Commonwealth country, paragraph 13 of the Harare Scheme stipulates that
information is to be given about the proceedings where they have been
commenced and that, where they have not been commenced, the Central
Authority of the requesting country must state the offence which it has reasonable
cause to believe to have been committed with a summary of the known facts. A
somewhat similar approach is taken by Article 7(10) of the 1988 UN Drugs
Convention. ECMA, on the other hand, makes no requirement about the
specification of these matters and the UK has not made any reservation which
would add such a requirement. The Act cannot, therefore, be fully reconciled with
either of these instruments. In the case of ECMA, more is required than is
contemplated by the treaty. In the case of the Commonwealth Scheme and the
1988 UN Drugs Convention, however, the requirement for a summary of the
known facts suggests that the intention is to place the authorities of the requested
State in a position to make their own judgement about whether there is reasonable
cause to believe that an offence has been committed. The 1990 Act replaces this
with a certificate. The Notes on Clauses683 do not explain this difference. In the
case of a state with which there is a treaty relationship, one might think that it
reflects the idea that, having entered into such a relationship, the UK should
682 Section 4(4).
683 Copy on file with author.
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assume good faith on the part of its treaty partner684. That is all very well but the
1990 Act does not require a treaty relationship. In the case of a requesting State
with which such a relationship does not exist, the UK is, of course, under no
obligation to provide assistance (though the level of adherence to the 1988 UN
Drugs Convention means that, in relation to drugs cases, there are relatively few
such states) and the Lord Advocate could avoid being required to simply accept
the word of such a State that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an
offence has been committed. In other cases, however, the requirement to accept a
certificate as conclusive does seem to make the requirement to be satisfied of the
matters specified rather redundant. Whatever the reasoning, the UK Central
Authority has issued guidance on the making of requests to the UK which reflects
this and states that "where the evidence is to be taken before a court, certification
should be provided by the authority forwarding the request to the Central
Authority to the effect that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an
offence has been committed, and either that proceedings in respect of the offence
have been instituted or that an investigation is being carried out within its
jurisdiction"685.
It appears that the nomination of a court might not be irrevocable. In
Zardarim a request for assistance had been received from Pakistan, the
Government of which country asserted that proceedings had been commenced
against the applicant for judicial review. There was said by Latham J to be
evidence that the assertions made by that Government for the purpose of obtaining
assistance were "fraudulent" and the applicant argued that, in those circumstances,
the proceedings in the UK pursuant to the request constituted an abuse of process.
In dealing with the application, Latham J analysed aspects of section 4. He
said that "the wording of the subsection makes it abundantly plain that there are
684 There is, perhaps, a superficial similarity to the rule of non-inquiry in extradition proceedings,
analysed in Jaques Semmelman, op cit but that similarity does not stand up to examination. The
rule of non-inquiry binds the courts, not the executive.
685 UK Central Authority for Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, International mutual
assistance in criminal matters: United Kingdom Guidelines, Home Office, 1991, 7.
686 Supra.
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two discretions and two discretions only envisaged by the subsection. One is the
discretion in the Secretary of State which is expressed in the phrase: 'if he thinks
fit'. The second is the discretion in the court that has been nominated to receive
such of the evidence to which the request relates 'as may appear to the court to be
appropriate'". As to the first of these discretions, he went on to say that it seemed
"arguable that the Secretary of State's discretion is one which he is entitled to
exercise, not merely by way of nomination, but also by way of retraction of that
nomination, if material comes to his attention which would suggest that the
conditions, which he considered were present so as to justify his nomination in the
first instance, no longer exist". Since the Secretary of State was not a party to the
proceedings before the Divisional Court in Zardari, the extent to which the
Secretary of State can retract a nomination was not resolved. The application itself
was for judicial review of the magistrate's decision not to hear the abuse of
process argument. What Latham J said about retraction of the nomination must,
therefore, be regarded as obiter but if it was right it would presumably mean that
the Lord Advocate too can retract a nomination. Such a power would have an
evident utility where there is no insistence on a treaty relationship before mutual
assistance is given and hence neither general screening out of unreliable
requesting States analogous to that which applies when a bilateral extradition
treaty is contemplated nor treaty based dispute resolution mechanisms687.
Article 2(a) ECMA provides that assistance may be refused "if the request
concerns an offence which the requested Party considers a political offence, an
offence connected with a political offence, or a fiscal offence". The 1990 Act
makes no provision about political offences but section 4(3) provides that, where
the request relates to a fiscal offence in respect of which proceedings have not yet
been instituted, the Lord Advocate is not to nominate a court unless (a) the request
is from a Commonwealth country or is made pursuant to a treaty to which the UK
is a party; and (b) he is satisfied that the conduct would constitute an offence of
687 Within the framework of the Council of Europe, difficulties with regard to the operation of
ECMA could be raised in the Committee ofMinisters. Ultimately, alleged breaches of treaty
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the same or a similar nature had it occurred in the UK. This reflects the traditional
reluctance to enforce foreign revenue laws, though the House of Lords made it
clear in Re State ofNorway's Application (No 2)68S that the provision of evidence
in such a case is not the enforcement of the foreign law. The reference to requests
pursuant to treaties reflects the fact that the Additional Protocol to ECMA
precludes refusal of assistance solely on the ground that the offence is a fiscal one
(so modifying Article 2(a) ECMA). As regards the Commonwealth, the Scheme
does not make the fiscal nature of the offence a permitted ground of refusal.
Aspects of this were canvassed before the Divisional Court in Fininvest, a
case which we have considered above in relation to the use made by the court of
an unincorporated treaty689. On its facts, the argument was that the Secretary of
State ought, in exercising his discretion690, to consider whether or not the request
concerns a political offence within the meaning of Article 2(a) ECMA. The
request in that case was from Italy and narrated that several prominent Italian
politicians were alleged to have committed fraud on a very large scale and to have
laundered some of the proceeds through London. One element of the alleged
frauds involved illicit donations to a political party and it was this which gave rise
to the argument that the possibility that the offence was a political one ought to
have been considered. Simon Brown LJ was able to dispose of that possibility
quite shortly with the observation that "I reject the applicants' basic proposition
that making payments to politicians or political parties (whether by way of bribes
or illicit donations to my mind matters not) constitutes political offending in any
relevant sense. It is not intrinsically political, nor is it made so because the
offender hopes to change policy by buying political influence, nor because the
judiciary by prosecuting him hope to clean up politics. In short, none of the
applicants' arguments, whether taken individually or cumulatively, begin to
persuade me that the present offences are political. I just cannot see corrupt
obligations can be raised in the ICJ.
688 [1989] 1 All ER 701 (CA).
689 Page 29.
690 In that case, to refer the case to the Serious Fraud Office.
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political contributors as 'today's Garibaldis'".
All of the foregoing matters relate to what might be called "conditions
precedent" for the provision of assistance. The procedural detail for the taking of
evidence by a UK court in the course of providing the assistance requested is
spelled out in Schedule 1 to the Act, which is given effect by section 4(6). That
Schedule operates by applying national procedure to the taking of such evidence.
The Court has "the like powers for securing the attendance of a witness for
the purpose of the proceedings as it has for the purpose of other proceedings
before the court"691. In Scotland, the court is empowered to issue a warrant to
officers of law to cite witnesses and the power to issue warrant to apprehend a
witness who fails to answer a citation is applied692. The witness is not to be
compelled to give evidence which he could not be compelled to give in domestic
criminal proceedings before the nominated court693 (so that national rules of
evidence apply694), to give evidence if his doing so would be prejudicial to the
security of the UK695 or to give evidence in his capacity as a servant or officer of
the Crown 696. In the case of an objection by the witness that his evidence could
not be compelled in the requesting state, his evidence is nevertheless to be taken
unless the requesting State concedes the point but not transmitted if a court in the
requesting state upholds the claim697.
Chapter 36 ofAct ofAdjournal offers some further procedural guidance to
nominated courts. Rule 36.8 regulates participation in proceedings before such a
court and provides that the procurator fiscal or Crown Counsel shall participate698
691 Schedule 1 para 1.
692 Para 2.
693 Para 4(1 )(a).
694 See R v Bow StreetMagistrates' Court ex p King andAnother, unreported, Queen's Bench
Divisional Court, 8 October 1998 (CO/3489/97) (Transcript available on Lexis Nexis). For an
example of English law being thus applied, see Crown Prosecution Service on behalfofDirector
ofPublic Prosecutions for Australia v Holman, Fenwick and Willan, unreported, Queen's Bench
Divisional Court, 13 December 1993 (Transcript available on Lexis Nexis).
695 Para 4(4).
696 Para 4(5).
697 Para 4(1 )(b), (2) and (3).
698 Rule 36.8(l)(a). Notwithstanding this, Crown Counsel have never done so and it is unlikely
that they would.
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and that the prosecutor of the requesting country may do so699. Where the request
originates from current criminal proceedings, any party to or persons "with an
interest in" those proceedings may attend and, with leave of the court, may
participate in any hearing. On its plain wording, this would seem to permit the
participation not only of prosecution and defence but also of an established partie
civile. The limits of the expression "with an interest in" are not indicated in the
rule and so it is not clear whether a pressure group, for example, could participate.
Nor is it clear whether the witness cited to give evidence at the proceedings has a
sufficient interest in them to participate in the sense of being represented by
solicitor or counsel. However, Rule 36.8(2) requires the nominated court, in
considering whether to grant leave to participate, to consider any relevant
representations made by the "party making the request" under section 4(1) of the
1990 Act. Since Rule 36.8(l)(d) makes particular provision for the judge or
investigating magistrate in any current criminal proceedings to participate, it
might reasonably be expected that special attention would be given to his or her
views on the participation of persons who are not party to the proceedings but
who nevertheless claim an interest in them.
In practice it does happen from time to time that a judge from the
requesting state attends and participates. The writer, as procurator fiscal, dealt
with the first such request ever processed in Scotland under the 1990 Act and the
sheriff, once the writer had dealt with the formalities required to get the
proceedings under way, permitted the Dutch investigating judge in attendance to
examine the witnesses.
The approach of the Act of Adjournal thus places a particularly co¬
operative gloss on Schedule 1 to the Act which, as noted above700 tends rather to
give priority to municipal law. Whilst it cannot derogate from the statutory right
of a witness to rely on such privilege as might exist in Scots law701 it is suggested




and Lords Commissioners of Justiciary, in promulgating the rules, intended Scots
law to provide a facility for the taking of evidence by or on behalf of foreign
courts and authorities rather than representing an obstacle thereto.
Search
Section 8 deals with the more invasive procedure of search. The legislative history
of the section is that the Bill as introduced made no provision for search and
seizure in Scotland. Clause 7, however, did make such provision for England and
Wales. Section 8 was inserted on Report in the House of Lords702. The obvious
purpose of including section 8 in the Bill was to enable the UK, within Scotland,
to meet the international obligations which it proposed to accept and the obvious
method to do that would have been to examine those obligations, examine
existing Scots law on search and seizure and then draft legislation which would
make whatever amendments were deemed necessary to Scots law to make it
possible to meet those obligations. This was not, however, the approach which
was taken. According to the Notes on Clauses703, the purpose of the amendment
which introduced the clause (which was clause 7A) was said to be "to bring
Scotland into line with the provisions proposed...for England and Wales".
Moreover, the approach was to make provision which had "been adapted for
Scotland from Clause 7 of the Bill". Clause 7 was said to be "based on, and ...
written in terms of, the powers of entry, search and seizure contained in the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
Finnie wrote a highly critical account ofwhat was done when what is now
section 8 was introduced into the Bill704. Much of that account was concerned with
the difficulties which would have been caused by clause 7 as originally drafted,
which simply sought to apply Part II of PACE throughout the UK. As such, it
need not concern us. He then went on to deal with the introduction of clause 7A
and called attention to the fact that the Home Office Minister of State who had the
701 Schedule 1 para 4(1).
702 The Bill had been introduced in the House of Lords, so the clause was in place before the Bill
went to the second House.
703 Copy on file with author.
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handling of the Bill said of the clause only that it represented a drafting
amendment, which did not alter the substance of the Bill. The Minister offered
further explanation but none was required, so that the amendment went through
"on the nod".
Finnie maintained that it was "nonsense" to assert that the substance of the
Bill was not altered, first because the powers of search and seizure conferred in
Scotland are more extensive than those in England and Wales and secondly
because, whereas section 8 simply gives the sheriff the like power to grant search
warrants as he has at common law, section 7(2) gives English magistrates power
to issue warrant to a constable authorising him to enter and search premises
throughout the United Kingdom.
One can agree with Finnie in much of his criticism of this legislative
process. We have noted already that the 1990 Act was very much a rushed piece
of legislation but this is not really an acceptable excuse. It is one thing to legislate
deliberately to different effect in Scotland and in England but quite another to do
so inadvertently and, it would appear, without any proper consideration being
given to the context in which the Scottish provisions would operate. At its heart,
section 8 simply provides that the Scottish common law of search shall apply to
the giving of assistance in response to letters of request. Neither the legislation
nor anything in the Parliamentary progress of the Bill suggests that anyone
actually thought about what that law is and considered how it relates to the
various international obligations which were in contemplation. To that task, we
shall turn in a moment.
First, however, we have to recall that section 4(2B) of the 1990 Act makes
the serious fraud powers available for mutual assistance and that one of the
powers conferred by the Lord Advocate's nomination is a power to require the
production of documents. It therefore offers, for serious fraud cases, a more
streamlined mechanism than the obtaining of a search warrant from a court under
section 8 of the 1990 Act.
704 Wilson Finnie, "International Co-operation..." .
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The exercise of the equivalent powers, both in domestic cases and in
relation to requests from foreign authorities, by the Serious Fraud Office has
attracted a good deal of case law. The exercise of the Lord Advocate's powers has
attracted none. The only Scottish case on these powers, Harris, Petitioner705
concerns the obtaining of a warrant in Scotland by the Serious Fraud Office. The
SFO cases which relate to requests from foreign authorities have primarily
concerned the use of search warrants and these are discussed in the context of
search generally.
The scheme established by section 8 proceeds begins with the receipt by
the Secretary of State of a request from either (a) a court or tribunal exercising
jurisdiction in an overseas country or territory or a prosecuting authority in that
country or territory; or (b) any other authority in that country or territory which
appears to him to have the function ofmaking requests for the purpose of section
8706. Since the Home Office provides the Central Authority for mutual assistance
in criminal matters in the UK, requests are received by the Home Secretary. Those
requests which require action in Scotland are sent on to Crown Office without
further intromission at Home Office. Where such a request is received, the Lord
Advocate may make a direction under the section707 and the procurator fiscal may
apply to the sheriff for a warrant708. Provided 2 criteria are satisfied, the sheriff, as
we have seen, is to have "the like power to grant warrant authorising entry, search
and seizure by any constable as he would have at common law in respect of any
offence punishable at common law in Scotland"709. The criteria are, first, that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that an offence under the law of a country or
territory outside the United Kingdom has been committed and, secondly, that the
conduct constituting the offence would constitute an offence punishable by







This raises a number of issues, the first of which is that, although the
matter has not been tested in the courts, it appears that, because of the different
legal context, there is a difference in the law as to the kind of direction which may
be given as between Scotland and England. In England the Divisional Court, in R
v Central Criminal Court ex p Propend Finance Property Ltd and Another110,
noted that the Secretary of State, under the equivalent English provision, had
given the police (to whom his direction was addressed) a choice of applying for a
warrant under the 1990 Act, applying for one of 2 types of search warrant under
PACE or applying for a production order under PACE. The Court held that the
Act places the responsibility on the Home Secretary to decide what instrument is
to be used and so to direct the police.
The various PACE options are not, of course, available in Scotland, and
whilst production orders are available for use in relation to foreign cases, their
availability is limited to investigations into drug trafficking711 or, in other cases, to
investigation into whether a person has benefited from the commission of an
offence (the focus being on benefit rather than on the investigation of the offence
as such712).
A further difference between Scotland and England arises in the criteria as
to which the judge must be satisfied before he may grant the warrant. In English
law, section 7(2) makes it necessary that he should be satisfied that criminal
proceedings have been commenced in the foreign jurisdiction or that a person has
been arrested in the course of a criminal investigation carried on there. Since the
serious fraud powers, including search warrant, are available at the stage of
investigation without the need for anyone to have been arrested, they offer a
means of providing assistance at an earlier stage than does section 7. In Scotland,
by contrast, in order to grant a search warrant under section 8 the sheriff has only
to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an offence has
been committed in the foreign jurisdiction. It is not necessary that any person
710 [1996] 2 Cr App R 26 (QBD).
711 Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 s31.
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should have been arrested. This reflects the test which is applied in domestic cases
but the result is that search and seizure will be available in Scotland in some cases
where it would only be available in England and Wales if the serious fraud powers
could be invoked.
Having regard to the fact that the Harare Scheme deliberately sets out to
make assistance, including assistance by search and seizure, available where there
is "reasonable cause to believe that an offence has been committed in respect of
which...criminal proceedings could be...instituted"713 and that the UK has not
made any reservation to ECMA insisting that proceedings should have been
commenced, it appears that Scots law is more consistent with the UK's
international arrangements than is English. The drafting origins of section 8 are
obscure but it may be that its wording simply reflects the fact that "reasonable
cause to believe that an offence has been committed" is the test applied in
domestic cases.
Section 8 also sets a double criminality test. We have seen above that the
UK made a reservation insisting on the satisfaction of such a test before search
and seizure would be available and section 8(1 )(b) reflects that. However, the test
as enacted requires that the equivalent Scottish offence must be capable of being
punished by imprisonment. Given the breadth of coverage of Scottish common
law offences714 and the imprisonability of all common law offences, it is likely
that most things recognised as offences by foreign law would have a Scottish
equivalent for which prison was available, so the restriction is unlikely to have
very much practical effect. Nevertheless, it is there on the face of the statute and it
represents a restriction which is sanctioned neither by the Harare Scheme nor by
the UK's reservation to Article 5 ECMA. That reservation simply requires that the
712 See R v Crown Court at Southwark, exp Bowles [1998] 2 All ER 193 (HL).
713 Para 3(1), emphasis added.
714 As the High Court put it in McLaughlan v Boyd 1934 JC 19, "It would be a mistake to imagine
that the criminal common law of Scotland countenances any precise and exact categorisation of
the forms of conduct which amount to crime...such is not the nature or quality of the criminal law
of Scotland. I need only refer to the well-known passage in the opening of Baron Hume's
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offence be one which is "punishable" under both the law of the requesting party
and the law of the UK. It might well be that the requirement that the offence
should be punishable with imprisonment is in the Act to achieve some
equivalence to the requirement of section 7(1) that the offence by which the dual
criminality requirement is satisfied in English law should be a "serious arrestable
offence" in terms of PACE. That term is defined in rather technical terms by
section 116 of PACE. The limitation is unsupported by the international
arrangements. In the result, both Scotland and England have restrictions on search
and seizure which are not consistent with the UK's international obligations.
One may go further and argue that, even if there is a case for such a
limitation in order to prevent individuals being harassed by searches in pursuit of
trivial foreign offences, that object could equally well have been met by
exercising the discretion to make a direction in a way which is informed by
Article 8 ECHR. That Article demands respect for private and family life, home
and correspondence but permits interference with that to the extent that it is
necessary in a democratic society, inter alia, for the prevention of disorder or
crime. This, of course, requires the application of a proportionality test and such a
test, properly applied, should weed out the trivial.
There have been no Scottish cases about the approach which sheriffs
should take to applications for search warrants under section 8 and the English
cases on the subject are of relatively limited value because they proceed very
much on the basis of the law set out in PACE. It was, for example, said in ex p
Propencf]5 that a judge who is asked to issue such a warrant is "exercising a
draconian jurisdiction" and in R v Southwark Crown Court andHM Customs and
Excise, ex p Sorsky Defries716 that such a judge should "exercise great caution
before granting the application".
No doubt because it seeks to bring into play existing municipal law,
institutional work in which the broad definition of crime-a doleful or wilful offence against
society in the matter of 'violence, dishonesty, falsehood, indecency, irreligion' is laid down".
715 Supra.
716 [1996] COD 117.
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section 8 of the 1990 Act makes no provision regulating the execution of the
warrant and what may be seized under it. Here again there is a distinction between
Scotland and England because in English law PACE makes detailed provision for
these matters. In Scots law, the cases on the execution of search warrants have
arisen principally in the context of the admissibility or otherwise of the evidence
which is recovered rather than as attempts to challenge the legality of the seizure
as such. By section 8(2), any evidence seized by the constable who carries out the
search must be "furnished...to the Lord Advocate for transmission" to the
requesting jurisdiction. No provision is made for review by a Scottish court of
what has been done under the warrant or of whether the material should be so
transmitted. Nor have there been any attempts to use the civil courts to prevent the
transmission of seized material whereas in England civil process has been invoked
on several occasions. Three of those cases offer some assistance.
In Sorsky Defries the Divisional Court held that material not covered by
the warrant should not have been seized. The basis for this was that section 19(3)
of PACE must refer to a domestic offence, which, in context, meant one
committed in the requesting jurisdiction. That might be a correct construction of
PACE but it is disturbing that McCowan LJ and Waller J, as late as 1996, thought
that Lord Halsbury LC's remark in 1891 that "All crime is local. The jurisdiction
over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed"717 justified
this approach without qualification or further explanation.
As just stated, Scots law has dealt with the lawfulness of search primarily
in the context of arguments about the admissibility of the evidence recovered. In
a purely domestic case, one would refer to the general principle that once the
police are lawfully on premises with a search warrant or the permission of the
occupier they may take any suspicious articles they happen to see, even if these
are outwith the strict terms of the warrant (or permission) but they may not search
actively for articles outwith the warrant or take away articles which might on
717 Macleod v Attorney-General ofNew South Wales [1891] AC 455.
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further examination disclose other offences718. This question arose in a mutual
assistance context in R v Bow Street Magistrates' Court and another ex p
Montgomery and others7I9. In that case, police officers executing a serious fraud
powers search warrant pursuant to a request from the USA seized a solicitor's
entire computer system, which contained material not only about the "target" of
the investigation but about many other clients as well. It was then transmitted,
unsorted, to the requesting authority in the USA. This was one of several grounds
on which the warrant was quashed.
Some consideration was given to the manner of execution ofwarrants and
to the Secretary of State's duties as to the transmission of material in Gross and
others v Southwark Crown Court and others™. In that case, the London home of
the father of a man charged in the USA with deception and false accounting had
been searched following a request from the USA and a direction by the Home
Secretary that a search warrant should be obtained under section 7 of the 1990
Act. Much of the case turned on the detail ofPACE and its associated codes, with
which we are not concerned. However, there were 2 issues of more general
application. The first was the presence and activities of a US law enforcement
official during the search and the second was the practice of the UK Central
Authority as regards the transmission of recovered material to the requesting
State.
The US official was not named on the warrant as being authorised to
accompany the English police officers and it was not until he was inside the house
that any attempt was made to indicate who he was or why he was there. A Home
Office Circular721 offered guidance to the police on the presence of officers from
the requesting State but went no further than permitting their presence as
observers at the application for and execution of the warrant. The Divisional
718 HMAdvocate v Turnbull 1951 JC 96; HMAdvocate v Hepper 1958 JC 39.
719 Unreported, Queen's Bench Divisional Court, 7 April 1998 (copy Judgement on file with
author)
720 Unreported, Queens Bench Division (Crown Office List) (CO/1759/98) 24 July 1998
(transcript available on Lexis Nexis).
721 No 16 of 1997.
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Court said that "if such a person is to be authorised to enter the premises he must
be named on the warrant and if he is not then any entry by him before his status
and identity has been revealed to the occupier, and the latter's permission has been
given, is unlawful and...that unlawfulness taints the entire proceedings of entry".
The unlawfulness was said to be aggravated by the fact that the US official, once
in the house, began to speak in terms of the father being prosecuted (for what is
not clear) and to offer him immunity in return for his co-operation. It might well
be that it was this conduct which predisposed the Court to insist that in future
observers from the requesting State should be identified as such before gaining
admission.
The search warrant having been executed, the Detective Constable who
was dealing with the case told the householder that he would retain the papers for
at least 48 hours after which he would deliver them to the United Kingdom
Central Authority. Effectively, this was giving him time to apply to set aside the
warrant. The Court was told that it is the policy of the Secretary of State to
transmit the documents as early as possible but, at any rate, within five days. The
Court considered that to be reasonable "in the light of the obvious purpose of the
1990 Act". As Brooke LJ put it, the role of the Secretary of State in the statutory
scheme was "that of a conduit pipe", except where he was put on notice of the
possibility of a material irregularity. He was not under any obligation to inspect
the documents himself before sending them on.
Sections 1 and 5
Sections 1 and 5 of the 1990 Act deal with the service of overseas process in the
UK and with the transfer of a UK prisoner to give evidence or assist an
investigation overseas. These sections can be dealt with much more briefly than
could sections 4 and 8, not least because they have not generated any case-law.
Article 7 ECMA provides that "The requested Party shall effect service of
writs and records of judicial verdicts which are transmitted to it for this purpose
by the requesting Party". Paragraph 15 of the Harare Scheme contemplates
assistance by "service of documents relevant to a criminal matter arising in the
207
requesting country". Such assistance is also contemplated by each of the bilateral
MLATs722. Section 1 of the 1990 Act empowers the Secretary of State or the Lord
Advocate (as the case may be) to cause the "process or document" received to be
served, either by post or by police officer.
Section 1 applies where the Secretary of State receives from the requesting
state "a summons or other process requiring a person to appear as defendant or
attend as a witness in criminal proceedings in that country"723 or a document
recording a decision of a court in that country724. Although Article 15(4) ECMA
contemplates that requests for assistance other than the obtaining of evidence may
be sent directly from judicial authority to judicial authority it has been thought
convenient to deal with all requests through the Home Office as central authority.
The actual operation of the section in Scotland is in the hands of the Lord
Advocate.
The documents in contemplation are those which "require" a person to
appear or attend. The word "requiring" is misleading. By section 1(3), service of
such documents imposes no obligation in UK law to comply with such a
requirement. This principle is set out in article 8 ECMA, which prohibits the
imposition of a penalty on a person who fails to answer a summons to appear
unless he returns voluntarily to the requesting state and is there again duly
summoned. According to the Council of Europe Explanatory Report on ECMA,
"the rule laid down is derived from an international custom". Although the nature
of that custom is not elaborated, it may well reflect the perception (especially
amongst States of the civilian tradition) that the service in their territory of a
document which threatened the imposition of a penalty for lack of compliance
would infringe their sovereignty.
From ECMA, the principle found its way into the Harare Scheme725. It also
722 Article 13 of the Treaty with the USA, Article XIV of the Treaty with Canada and Article 10 of





appears in the bilateral Treaty with the USA726 and in that with Thailand727 but not
in the Treaty with Canada.
Section 5 of the 1990 Act provides for the transfer of a UK prisoner to
give evidence or assist in an investigation overseas. Its provisions bear a close
relation to Article 11 ECMA and paragraph 24 of the Harare Scheme. In
particular, such transfer is made conditional upon the consent of the prisoner in
question, a condition which reflects the first of four derogations in Article 11(1)
ECMA. Such a condition was added to the Harare Scheme in 1990728 and may
evidently be traced back to ECMA. The existence of the requirement for the
consent of the prisoner places him in a position equivalent to that of the ordinary
witness who cannot be subjected to a penalty if he chooses not to comply with a
summons to attend served on him in the requested State.
Section 9
Paragraph 27(1) of the Harare Scheme provides that a request made under the
Scheme may seek assistance in securing the making in the requested country of an
order relating to the instrumentalities of crime or the recognition or enforcement
in that country of such an order made in the requesting country. Paragraph 27(2)
explains that the orders in contemplation include restraint and confiscation orders
(though the word "confiscation" is used in a sense which includes what Scots law
refers to as "forfeiture"). And, notwithstanding the fact that its title refers only to
the proceeds from crime, the Laundering Convention, by Article 2(1), requires
States Parties to adopt measures necessary to enable them to "confiscate
instrumentalities". In both instruments, the word "instrumentalities" is intended to
refer to property used in the commission of an offence729.
Section 9 of the 1990 Act authorises the making of Orders in Council for
the enforcement of what the headnote calls "overseas forfeiture orders" but that




729Laundering Convention Article lc; Harare Scheme para 27(2)(a) and (b).
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offences730. For those offences, it was implemented in 1991731. The power thus
created was exercised in the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act
1990 (Enforcement ofOverseas Forfeiture Orders) (Scotland) Order 1999732 ("the
Forfeiture Order"733). The Forfeiture Order came into force on 1 May 1999 and
superseded the 1991 Order. It is difficult to draw any conclusion from the delay
between 1995 and 1998 other than that Scottish Office regarded the matter as
having a low priority. It is understood, from informal conversations with the
Crown Office Fraud Unit, that no request was received during that time which
would have required the regime which the Forfeiture Order creates. That,
however, was fortuitous.
Section 43 of the Proceeds of Crime (Scotland) Act 1995 ("the 1995 Act")
creates an Order-making power in relation to the enforcement of Scottish
confiscation and forfeiture orders in foreign jurisdictions and that power was also
exercised in the Forfeiture Order.
The Forfeiture Order works by applying Parts II, III and IV of the 1995
Act in relation to designated countries, subject to such modifications as are
specified in its third Schedule734 but it requires that external forfeiture orders735
must be registered in the Court of Session before they are capable of being
enforced under the Order736. Such registration requires the Court of Session to be
satisfied that the external forfeiture order is in force and not subject to appeal737. It
730 For England and Wales, the 1990 Act extended the power to offences to which Part VI of the
Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies-that is, to non drug cases. The 1995 Act makes provision for
Scotland equivalent to that made by that Part of the 1988 for England and Wales.
731 Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 (Enforcement ofOverseas Forfeiture
Orders) (Scotland) Order 1991 (SI 1991 No 1468 S 136).
732 SI 1999 No 675 (S46).
733 At the same time, an equivalent Order was made in relation to confiscation. It is discussed
below at 299.
734 Para 4.
735 By para 1, "external forfeiture order" means "an order, including any decree, direction or
judgement, or any part thereof, however described, made by a court in a designated country for
the forfeiture and destruction or the forfeiture and other disposal of anything in respect ofwhich
an offence to which this Order applies has been committed or which was used in connection with
the commission of such an offence".
736 Para 5(1) and (2).
737 Para 5(2)(a).
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must also be satisfied that, where the person against whom the order is made did
not appear at the proceedings which gave rise to it, he received notice of those
proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend them738. Finally, it must be
of the opinion that enforcing the order in Scotland would not be contrary to the
interests of justice739.
Paragraph 3 of the Forfeiture Order deals with the designation of countries
to which the regime which the Order enacts is to apply. They fall into 2 groups.
The first group consists of those countries and territories designated in part I of
Schedule 1 to the Forfeiture Order but they are so designated only in relation to
cases in which the external forfeiture order which it is sought to enforce has been
made in respect of a drug trafficking offence740. The second group consists of
those countries and territories specified in Part II of the same Schedule but they
are so designated only in relation to what the Forfeiture Order calls "any other
offence to which this Order applies"741. This distinction between those countries
and territories which can only receive assistance in relation to drug trafficking
cases and those which can receive assistance in relation to a wider range of cases
reflects the UK's treaty relationships. Part I of Schedule 1 includes those countries
with which the UK has a bilateral drug-specific MLAT and States Parties to the
1998 UN Drugs Convention, whilst Part II includes those countries with which
the UK has a bilateral "all crimes" MLAT and States Parties to the Laundering
Convention. Every country listed in Part II is also listed in Part I but the reverse is
not true.
Paragraphs 6 to 11 of the Forfeiture Order provide for the proof of foreign
orders in relation to the registration process, representation of the Government of
the requesting State, the eventuality that the order is satisfied in the requesting
country and the revocation of earlier orders. They have some interest in their own
738 Para 5(2)(b).
739 Para 5(2)(c).
740 Para 3(l)(a). The expression "drug trafficking offence" is defined by reference to section 49(5)
of the 1995 Act.
741 Para 3 (l)(b).
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right but their nature is essentially technical and much of their content is, strictly,
civil procedure. Lack of space and the need to focus on the relationship between
international law and criminal law prevents their fuller consideration here. We
pass, therefore, to Schedule 3, which modifies those Parts of the 1995 Act which
are applied to the designated countries.
Part II of the 1995 Act provides a comprehensive general forfeiture regime
in respect of prosecutions which take place in Scotland and the central feature of
the scheme is the suspended forfeiture order, which is introduced by section 21. In
order to make sense of the modifications made by the Forfeiture Order, a brief
account of the statutory scheme which applies in domestic cases, and which is
being modified, will be helpful.
By section 21 of the unmodified 1995 Act, a suspended forfeiture order is
available where, in respect of any offence, the accused is convicted (whether in
solemn or summary proceedings) or where in summary proceedings he is
discharged absolutely. The prosecutor can ask for an order under solemn
procedure upon moving for sentence and under summary procedure upon the
conviction of the accused. At that time he must tell the court of the identity of any
person whom he knows or reasonably suspects to have an interest in the property.
Before making the order the court must be "satisfied" (the Act does not say to
what standard) that "property which was at the time of the offence or of the
accused's apprehension in his ownership or possession or under his control-(a) has
been used for the purpose of committing, or facilitating the commission of, any
offence; or (b) was intended to be used for that purpose".
The first effect of the making of a suspended forfeiture order is that the
property is taken into the possession of or placed under the control of the clerk of
court until either the order is recalled or the property is forfeited and disposed of.
The prosecutor must intimate the making of the order immediately in writing to
any person named in the order as someone thought to have an interest in the
property and must notify that person that he may be entitled to apply for the order
to be recalled. If the property includes heritage the prosecutor must cause a
212
certified copy of the order to be recorded in the General Register of Sasines or
Land Register of Scotland. In addition, if the court directs, the prosecutor must
insert notice of the order in the Edinburgh Gazette or other publication.
In most cases, the property is perishable, dangerous, worthless or
intrinsically pernicious (in the sense that its mere possession is unlawful). Where
the prosecutor certifies that such is the case it is, by section 24, forfeited
immediately after the making of the suspended forfeiture order. In other cases,
forfeiture takes effect only after the passage of a period of time. Forfeiture takes
effect in the case of heritable property six months after the copy of the suspended
forfeiture order is registered and in the case of moveable property 60 days after
the making of the suspended forfeiture order. This delay allows an opportunity for
a third party having an interest in the property to vindicate that interest and secure
the recall of the order, as provided for by section 25.
Underlying the introduction of the suspended forfeiture order was the need
to make proper provision for the protection of bona fide third party interests in
property found liable to forfeiture as having been used or intended to be used for
the commission of an offence. That policy objective is retained in the
modification of section 21 of the 1995 Act by the Forfeiture Order742. Most of the
section is omitted, as relating purely to the means by which the suspended
forfeiture order is obtained in a domestic prosecution. However, new subsections
(10) and (11) are substituted. By subsection (10), as soon as may be after an
external forfeiture order has been registered, the Lord Advocate is required to
notify in writing any person named in the order (other than the person in respect
of whom the order has been made) who is the owner of or otherwise has an
interest in, the property to which the external forfeiture order relates743. If the
property in respect of which the order has been made includes heritable property
in Scotland, he is to cause a certified copy of the order to be registered in the
General Register of Sasines or the Land Register for Scotland (as the case may
742 Schedule 3 para 2.
743 Subsection (10)(a).
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be)744. And, if directed to do so by the Court of Session, he must insert a notice in
the Edinburgh Gazette or such other publication as seems to the Court to be
appropriate, specifying the terms of the external forfeiture order745.
These requirements mirror those which are made by subsection (10) of the
unmodified Act for domestic cases. Their purpose is to permit the third party who
claims an interest in property an opportunity to vindicate that interest; and section
25, together with parts of section 24 make particular provision for that third
party's remedy. Section 24 has the principal purpose, however, of giving effect to
the order for forfeiture.
Some of the modifications made to section 24 by the Forfeiture Order are
merely consequential; so, for example, in subsection (1) the phrase "a suspended
forfeiture order" becomes "an external forfeiture order"746. Such consequential
amendments do not require to be considered here. There is, however, one more
substantive modification, and it substitutes a new subsection (3).
In the unmodified Act, subsection (3) provides that, if an application for
recall or variation of a suspended forfeiture order is made, the property is not to be
forfeited until the application is finally disposed of in favour of the prosecutor or
the overall time limit applicable to suspended forfeiture orders expires, whichever
is later. Applications for recall or variation are dealt with by section 25 and here
the Forfeiture Order substitutes a completely new section747 (though one which is
closely related to what it replaces).
By section 25(1) as modified, the High Court shall, on an application
being made to it by a person other than the accused, order that property shall not
be forfeited if either subsection (2) or subsection(3) applies. Subsection (2)
applies where the Court is satisfied by the applicant on the balance of probabilities
that he is the owner of the property or otherwise has an interest in it and it is not
satisfied by the Lord Advocate that the applicant knew or ought to have known
744 Subsection (10)(b).
745 Subsection (10)(c).
746 Schedule 3 para 4(a).
747 Schedule 3 para 5.
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that the property was intended to be used for the commission of the offence and
did not take reasonable steps to prevent that use or, where he acquired his interest
after the offence, knew or ought to have known that it had been so used.
Subsection (3) applies where the Lord Advocate succeeds in satisfying the High
Court of what may broadly be called the bad faith of the applicant as specified in
subsection (2) but it nevertheless appears to the High Court that forfeiture of the
property would be excessive or inappropriate.
It may fairly be said that the Forfeiture Order takes the regime which
applies to domestic cases and makes the minimum of modification so that the
same regime can be applied to international assistance.
Outgoing requests
Section 2 of the 1990 Act makes provision for the service ofUK process overseas.
As it applies to Scotland, it makes it possible for "any document which may
competently be served on an accused person or on any person who may give
evidence in criminal proceedings"748 to be served outside the United Kingdom "in
accordance with arrangements made by the Secretary of State"749. This takes the
maximum possible advantage of paragraph 15 of the Harare Scheme, which
permits service of "documents relevant to a criminal matter". Its relationship with
Article 7 ECMA, which provides that "the requested Party shall effect service of
writs and records of judicial verdicts which are transmitted to it for this purpose
by the requesting Party", is, however, of some interest.
Since the word "writs" is not defined in ECMA one must wonder whether
some of the documents which are served on the accused in the course of Scottish
criminal procedure are really within the contemplation of the Treaty. Section 258
of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 permits a party to criminal
proceedings to serve on the other party a statement of uncontroversial evidence,
failure to challenge which means that the facts set out therein are deemed to be




of expert reports, failure to challenge which means that they are to be treated as
sufficient evidence of the matters with which they deal. The question whether
such documents are within the ambit of Article 7 ECMA may yet come to be of
importance in the courts because of the requirement of section 2(1) that service
outside the UK is to be "in accordance with arrangements made by the Secretary
of State". Although ECMA has not undergone legislative transformation an
appeal to it must be required if it becomes necessary to determine whether a
particular document is indeed within the scope of the arrangements made. This is
not precisely a matter of statutory ambiguity such as to permit an appeal to the
treaty within the meaning of Salomon. It is more a matter of legislation by
reference to the international arrangements; but perhaps the point is too obscure to
be likely to be taken at any early date, especially because it could only arise in the
somewhat unlikely case of an accused person who was outside the UK even after
proceedings had been commenced.
Subsections (3) and (4) are directly influenced by Article 8 ECMA and
paragraph 15(5) of the Harare Scheme, both of which prohibit the imposition of
penalties in the requesting state on a person who does not comply with a
requirement to attend served on him in the requested state. Subsection (3)
provides in terms that process served outside the UK does not give rise to any
obligation of compliance and precludes the imposition of a penalty for non¬
compliance, while subsection (4) qualifies that by preserving the position where
the process in question is subsequently served on the person within the UK.
Supplementary provision is made by Chapter 36 of the Act of Adjournal
(Criminal Procedure Rules) 1996750. Rule 36.3 permits the service of a document
to be proved by a certificate given by or on behalf of the Secretary of State. It is
accordingly possible for the UK Central Authority, having had confirmation from
the relevant foreign authority that the document has been served, to certify that
fact, so avoiding the need to get from a foreign authority an execution of service
in any particular form. Article 7 ECMA and Article 15(4) of the Harare Scheme
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provide for the giving of certificates of service so providing the Secretary of State
with a basis upon which to give certification in terms of section 2.
There are 2 statutory regimes by which a request may be made from
Scotland to a foreign jurisdiction for assistance in obtaining evidence. The older
of the 2 is presently consolidated in section 272 of the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1995. So far as relevant751, subsection (1) provides that: "in any
criminal proceedings in the High Court or the sheriff court the prosecutor or the
defence may, at an appropriate time, apply to a judge of the court in which the
trial is to take place (or, if that is not yet known, to a judge of the High Court) for
"the issue of a letter of request to a court, or tribunal, exercising jurisdiction in a
country or territory outside the United Kingdom...for the examination of a
witness resident in that country or territory". This, and its associated procedure, is
in several ways inadequate and it is not used in practice.
Firstly, the procedure is only available once proceedings have been
commenced. We have seen above the importance of mutual assistance at the
stage of investigation. Secondly, it relates only to the examination of witnesses,
not to the obtaining of documents and the like. Thirdly, by subsection (3), the
request can only be issued if there would be no unfairness to the other party if the
evidence were received in the form of a record of the examination. In Muirhead v
HM Advocate752 it was pointed out that it is likely to be very difficult to satisfy
that test, where the effect will be to deprive parties of the opportunity of cross-
examining witnesses who give evidence of any importance. And, finally, section
272 is supported and supplemented by a hopelessly inappropriate form and
procedural regime in Chapter 23 of the Act of Adjournal (Criminal Procedure
Rules) 1996.
The form is Form 23.1-C. It is drawn from the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Cases 1968. It requires that
750 SI 1996 No 513 (S47).
751 The section deals also with the taking of evidence on commission within the UK, the Channel
Islands or the Isle ofMan.
752 Supra.
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the nature and purpose of the proceedings should be specified, as though in a
criminal case that was not obvious. It makes no provision for the relevant law to
be summarised, notwithstanding the importance of that under most mutual
assistance arrangements753. It requires that information be given about who will
bear the expenses of the procedure, notwithstanding the general practice in mutual
assistance arrangements that costs are to be bome by the requested party754. And it
gives no assurance of reciprocity. The Rules require that the letter of request
should be sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
for onward transmission755, notwithstanding the fact that Article 15 ECMA, for
example, clearly contemplated that ministries ofjustice are to provide the channel
of communication and that in emergencies judicial authorities can transmit
requests directly to one another, through Interpol if they desire and
notwithstanding also the clear requirement of the Harare Scheme for the
designation of a Central Authority through which requests are to be transmitted756.
In the UK, that Authority is at the Home Office.
It is clear that the section 272 procedure is modelled on what was
appropriate for civil procedure. It was never very appropriate and was not used by
the Crown Office after Muirhead. That it should remain in force nearly a decade
after accession to ECMA and the passing of the 1990 Act is, at best, an
anachronism. Until the coming into force of the 1990 Act, the Crown Office was
sending Commissions Rogatoire on the basis of international comity and by the
diplomatic channel. Their form was one which had developed over a number of
years as experience was gained in anticipating the issues which foreign authorities
would need to have addressed.
Section 273 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 makes it
competent to take evidence by live television link from a place outside the UK.
The procedure is derived from that specified in section 272. By section 273(2), the
753 United Nations Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1990 art 5.




prosecutor or the defence may apply to the court for the issue of a letter of request
requesting assistance in facilitating the giving of evidence through a live
television link. Such an application may be granted if the judge is satisfied, inter
alia, that the granting of an application made by the prosecutor is not unfair to the
accused757. This, it will be noted, is slightly different from the provision in section
272 which requires that the issue of the letter should not be unfair to the other
party, whoever seeks it. Section 273 follows the section 272 model in that it
requires the decision to be taken about potential unfairness before the request is
issued. It is therefore subject to the same difficulty of application. One would
have thought that, since the evidence is "live", its fairness could have been left to
the control of the trial judge just as if the witness had been in the witness box of
the court.
Section 3 of the 1990 Act provides a more generally appropriate
framework for the making of requests to foreign jurisdictions for evidence for use
within the UK. So far as applicable to Scotland, by subsection (1) where, on an
application made by the prosecuting authority or (where proceedings have been
commenced) by the accused, it appears to a sheriff or a judge that an offence has
been committed or that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence
has been committed and that proceedings have been instituted or that the offence
is being investigated, he may issue a letter of request, requesting assistance in
obtaining outside the UK such evidence as is specified in the letter for use in the
proceedings or investigation. A letter of request issued by the court under this
power is, by subsection (4), required to be sent to the Secretary of State for
transmission but in cases of urgency subsection (5) permits the sending of the
letter directly to the foreign court. Supplementary provision, of a purely domestic
procedural kind, is made by the 1996 Criminal Procedure Rules. However, a
different form is provided from that which is given for section 272 of the Criminal
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. It is Form 36.4-B and it was drafted (by the
present writer) explicitly for the purpose of implementing ECMA and in light of
757 Section 273(3)(b).
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the experience of the Crown Office in sending commissions rogatoires on the
basis of comity. Its content is very close to what was being sent out before the
1990 Act came into force. It is not derived to any extent from Form 23.1-C.
Naturally, the writer regards Form 36.4-B as superior in every way to
Form 23.1-C. It is difficult for him to analyse Form 36.4-B with appropriate
critical objectivity. It has not, however, given any problems in practice and that
encourages him to believe that his satisfaction with his work might be justified. If
so, the critical difference is this, that Form 36.4-B was drafted on the basis of
practical experience of the operation of mutual assistance and specifically in light
of a treaty (ECMA) which deals with mutual assistance in criminal matters. Form
23.1-C was drafted at a time when such experience was not readily available
(because such work was not centralised within Crown Office in the way it was in
1990) and when the only judicial assistance treaty to which the UK was party
related to civil and commercial law. The draftsman of Form 23.1-C is not to be
criticised for the content of that form, albeit it is inappropriate. Rather, criticism is
made of Scottish Office and the High Court judiciary for leaving in place section
272 and Form 23.1-C respectively even through the 1995 consolidation of
Scottish criminal procedure law.
The procedure set out in section 3(1) and (2) of the 1990 Act and
described above is in practice that which is invoked by the accused. Prosecutors
routinely take advantage of subsection (3), which allows a prosecuting authority
designated for the purpose by an order made by the Secretary of State to issue a
letter of request itself if it is satisfied of the matters specified in subsection (l)(a)
(that is, that an offence has been committed or that there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that an offence has been committed) and that the offence is being
investigated or that the authority has instituted proceedings in respect of it. The
designated prosecuting authorities include the Lord Advocate and any procurator
fiscal758. In practice, all Scottish prosecution requests are routed through (and
758 Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 (Designation of Prosecuting
Authorities) Order 1991 (SI 1991 No 1224).
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drafted by) the Crown Office Fraud and Specialist Services Unit and take the
form desiderated in Form 36.4-B.
Experience in getting assistance by means of outgoing letters of request
varies. The Scottish criminal justice system works on a much shorter timescale
than almost any other, especially where the accused is in custody, and answers to
requests are not always received within the time limits imposed by section 65 of
the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, even where those time limits are
spelled out in the request. Where possible, the precognition of complex cases,
including those with a foreign element, is carried out without actually
commencing proceedings, so that the time limits do not begin to run.
Delays are experienced by English prosecutors too759. One such delay gave
rise to the circumstances considered by the Divisional Court in R v Central
Criminal Court and Another ex parte Hunt and Another160. In that case a letter of
request had been issued and sent to Switzerland in 1992 but not completely
executed. By 1995, 2 of the accused in connection with whom it had been sent
had been convicted but others were fugitives. The Swiss authorities wanted to
know what the attitude of the English court was to the desire of the prosecuting
authorities to secure additional material under the request. The Divisional Court
declined to say, holding that the request was with the Swiss and it was for them to
decide what they were going to do about it.
Section 3 of the 1990 Act does not only regulate the sending of letters of
request. Subsections (7) and (9) also make some provision about the handling of
evidence received in response.
Subsection (7) is the longer of the 2 sections. Its effect is to prohibit the
use of evidence received from a foreign authority other than in connection with
the purpose specified in the letter of request, so meeting common concerns that
what was properly provided in connection with one set of criminal proceedings
759See the comments ofHM Customs and Excise and the Director of the Serious Fraud Office in
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Prosecuting Fraud..., 31 and 36
respectively.
760 The Times, 21 February 1995 (full transcript available on Lexis Nexis).
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might, once in the hands of the authorities of the requesting State, come to be used
for another purpose for which the requested State would not have wished to
provide them. This rule, which is the mutual assistance equivalent of the rule of
specialty in extradition proceedings, is set out explicitly in Article 8 of the UN
Model Treaty.
Subsection (9) is, however, potentially of greater significance. It provides
that "in Scotland, evidence obtained by virtue of a letter of request shall, without
being sworn to by witnesses, be received in evidence in so far as that can be done
without unfairness to either party.
This differs from section 272 of the 1995 Act in that section 272(3)
applies a fairness test before the letter of request can be issued, whereas section
3(9) of the 1990 Act applies that test only after the evidence sought has been
received. The court is therefore in a position to make a much more informed
assessment of the likelihood of unfairness.
It is, however, unclear how section 3(9) is intended to interact with section
259 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
Section 259 codifies the statutory exceptions to the general rule that
hearsay is inadmissible. The section works by making evidence of a statement
made by a person otherwise than while giving oral evidence admissible provided
that the judge is satisfied of certain things761, the first of which is that the person
who made the statement will not give evidence in the proceedings for one of the
reasons specified in section 259(2). The second of those reasons is that the person
who made the statement "is named and otherwise sufficiently identified, but is
outwith the United Kingdom and it is not reasonably practicable to secure his
attendance at the trial or to obtain his evidence in any other competent manner"762.
Clearly, it is not reasonably practicable to secure the attendance at trial of
a person who has been cited in a foreign jurisdiction but who takes advantage of




securing evidence in any other competent manner, one would require to exclude
the possibility of live television link as contemplated by section 273 of the
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. That might be done quite easily because
it is understood that relatively few countries have provisions in place which would
allow them to provide evidence by such a link. It will, therefore, quite often be
possible to lead the evidence of the results of a letter of request under section 259
of the 1995 Act. The possibility which arises, because insufficient steps have been
taken to secure coherence between the 1990 Act and the 1995 Act, is that, even if
the particular criteria set out in section 259 are not satisfied, the court could
permit the evidence to be tendered in terms of section 3(9) of the 1990 Act.
This brings us to the general question of the admissibility of evidence
obtained by letter of request and to what Gane and Mackarel have called "process
laundering"763. What they have in mind is the situation in which there is
irregularity in the requested state in the obtaining of the evidence and the question
of admissibility which faces the court in the requesting state when that evidence is
tendered. They survey the case law of a wide range of common law jurisdictions
and note a trend whereby such irregularities are not given any effect in the
question whether or not to admit the evidence at trial. They argue for a "double
admissibility" test under which the evidence would have to be admissible in both
the requested and the requesting state before it could be tendered.
The only case in which the Scottish courts have come anywhere close to
addressing this issue is Torres v HM Advocate764, in which the High Court of
Justiciary had to consider the approach to be taken by a Scottish criminal court to
evidence obtained by search in Canada. It was argued for the appellant, without
reference to either the MLAT or the Harare Scheme, that the approach which a
Scottish court would adopt in regard to articles recovered by means of an official
763 C Gane and M Mackarel, "The Admissibility of Evidence...". For a further consideration of the
issue by the same authors, see Mark Mackarel and Christopher Gane, "Admitting Irregularly or
Illegally Obtained evidence from Abroad into Criminal Proceedings-A Common Law Approach"
[1997] Grim LR 720.
764 1997 SCCR491.
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search in this country should also apply in the case of articles recovered by means
of such a search abroad. The Crown argued that, out of considerations of comity
and because of the difficulties of proving the content of foreign law, Scottish
courts should not investigate the legality of the actions of foreign authorities.
The facts in Torres were not complex. Bales of cocaine were transported
by a ship, ofwhich Torres was the captain, to a point off the coast of Sutherland.
There they were landed by dinghy and loaded into a van, which was intercepted
on the main road south. Persons in the van were arrested and prosecuted. Some
time later, and in an action which was apparently unconnected with the Scottish
case, the ship was searched and seized in Halifax, Nova Scotia by Canadian
Customs, who arrested Torres. A Nova Scotia JP granted a warrant permitting
officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("RCMP") to search the ship for
articles which included cannabis resin and documents. The search took place and
documents were seized and placed in an RCMP vault. Less than a month later, an
RCMP officer became aware of a request from Scotland for evidence in
connection with the prosecution of the men arrested on the A9. That officer
obtained a warrant which permitted him to go into the vault and recover
navigational charts and shell casings but which did not make reference to the
seizure of other items which might be relevant to proof. Notwithstanding that, a
hand-written note was removed from the vault. A Canadian court subsequently
authorised the transmission to Scotland of a number of items, including the hand¬
written note which in due course was to make a considerable contribution to the
Crown case against Torres (who was extradited from Canada to Scotland).
The argument for Torres on appeal was that there was no evidence that the
removal of the note from the ship to the RCMP vault had been lawful and no
evidence that its removal from the vault pursuant to the Scottish request for
assistance had been lawful. The absence from the warrant to enter the RCMP
vault of reference to anything beyond charts and shell cases meant that the
removal of the note was prima facie irregular. The onus is on the Crown to show
that irregularities should be excused. A departure from the terms of the foreign
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warrant could only be justified by evidence of the foreign law and practice. In the
absence in Torres of such evidence the material recovered by the search should
not have been admitted in evidence.
The Crown invoked the extradition analogy, arguing that in Sinclair v HM
Advocate765 the High Court had declined to enter into the question of the
regularity of proceedings in Portugal which had led to the arrest and
imprisonment there of a person wanted on warrant in Scotland. It was further
argued for the Crown that, even if the Court was prepared to consider what had
happened in Canada, no illegality had been established by the appellant, upon
whom the onus lay, and that even if there had been an irregularity of procedure it
should be excused. The Crown's position, it should be said, was a moderate one,
involving the concession that matters would be different if there had been an
irregularity in which the Canadian and Scottish authorities had colluded.
The High Court noted that a Canadian court had authorised the
transmission of the hand-written note to Scotland. Whilst the Lord Justice-Clerk,
who delivered the opinion, said that in a case which raised a question whether the
appellant had been denied a right of any kind the approach in Sinclair might have
to be reconsidered, that did not arise in Torres. Moreover, it was said that the
removal of the hand-written note from the vault was not irregular, except perhaps
in the most technical sense. Accordingly, this ground of appeal failed.
Torres was, perhaps, unusual in that the Canadian court had specifically
authorised the transmission to Scotland of the item in dispute, and that after it had
been recovered under the purported authority of the warrant. In many legal
systems, including that of Scotland, the court is empowered to grant a search
warrant to assist a foreign investigation but does not review the result of the
search. It seems from what was said in Torres that, where the foreign court has
not reviewed the results of the search, the High Court might be prepared to
consider allegations of irregularity; but Torres does not resolve the question of
onus in relation to such allegations.
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Some assistance may be gained from the rather fuller consideration of the
issues made in light ofArticle 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
1982 by the Canadian Supreme Court in Attorney General ofCanada v Schreiber
andAttorney General ofQuebec766.
Article 8 of the Charter provides that "everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure". The facts of the case were that a letter of
request was sent to Switzerland in connection with a Canadian criminal
investigation. The Swiss government accepted the letter of request and ordered the
seizure of documents and records relating to bank accounts maintained in
Switzerland by the respondent, who was a Canadian citizen and who divided his
time between Canada and Europe. Prior to the issue of the letter of request, no
search warrant or other judicial authorisation had been obtained in Canada. The
decision of the Federal Court which was brought under review was one which
required Canadian domestic standards for the issue of a search warrant to be met
before the Minister of Justice submitted a letter of request seeking search in a
foreign jurisdiction.
In Terry v R (Attorney General ofCanada interveningj767 the appellant had
been arrested in the USA pursuant to a Canadian request for his extradition to face
a charge of murder. At the request of the Canadian police, the US police
interviewed him, giving him a warning about his rights, which satisfied US law
but which did not go as far as would have been required by the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. Nevertheless, the Court held that the evidence of the
criminative statement which he made under interview had been properly admitted,
basing its decision, quite reasonably, on the impossibility of expecting foreign
police officers to apply Canadian law. The same reasoning was applied in R v
Harrer1(A in relation to a statement made by a Canadian accused to US
Immigration officials. In Schreiber, Lamer CJ distinguished Terry and Harrer on
765 (1890) 2 White 481.
766[1998] 1 SCR 841.
767 [1996] 3 LRC 16.
768 [1995] 3 SCR 562.
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the basis that both of those cases concerned actions by foreign authorities who
could not be expected to know and comply with the laws of Canada769. In the
instant case, however, what was at issue was the action of the Canadian
authorities in preparing and sending the letter of request. They, he said, "fall
squarely within the purview of ...the Charter, as an arm of the executive branch,
or the "government of Canada". Moreover, because they are Canadian, there is no
reason to be concerned with comity. They can be expected to have knowledge of
Canadian law, including the Constitution, and it is not unreasonable to require that
they follow it. This is especially true for officials who perform functions in the
name of the Attorney General, who may indeed have additional responsibilities
that flow from the special nature of that office"770. Ifwe were to translate that into
a Scottish context, we would have the unexceptionable proposition that members
of the Procurator Fiscal Service, acting under the authority of the Lord Advocate
are expected to act lawfully in terms of Scots law. That would now include a
requirement to act compatibly with the Convention rights. It is suggested that
there can be no doubt that the sending of a letter of request by or on behalf of the
Lord Advocate is an act of a member of the Scottish Executive for the purposes of
section 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 and will (once it enters force) be a relevant
act for the purposes of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
In the Chief Justice's analysis, the point in Schreiber could be determined
on the basis of the preliminary issue, which was whether the respondent had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his banking records in Switzerland.
Following Hunter v Southam Inc111, the reasonableness of a search had to be
measured by balancing the state's interest in law enforcement against the
individual's interest in privacy. In terms of Article 8 ECHR, one would express
this concept by saying that there is a right to respect for private life and
correspondence772, which cannot lawfully be interfered with by a public authority
769At 852, para 16.
mLoc cit.
771[1984] 2 SCR 145.
772Article 8(1).
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except in accordance with law and where it is necessary for (inter alia) the
prevention of crime or the protection of the rights of others773. Before the Article 8
guarantee is engaged, one must determine whether the records relating to a bank
account held in a foreign state are within the ambit of Article 8(1).
In Schreiber, the Chief Justice took the view that expectations of privacy
must necessarily vary with their context774 and upon the nature of the activity
which brings the individual into contact with the state775. Personal financial
records at a bank are material in relation to which there would ordinarily be a
reasonable expectation of privacy but, following Terry, it was of critical
importance that the records were located in Switzerland and obtained in a manner
consistent with Swiss law776. It might fairly be assumed that a person who decides
to conduct financial affairs and keep records in a foreign state has made an
informed choice. If he is reasonably prudent, he will have taken into account the
state of the prevailing bank secrecy laws in deciding where to conduct his or her
affairs777. "In other words", the Chief Justice said, "a person who has property or
records in a foreign state runs the risk that a search will be carried out in
accordance with the laws of that state"778 and a search carried out by foreign
authorities, in a foreign country, in accordance with foreign law, does not infringe
on a person's reasonable expectation of privacy, as he or she cannot reasonably
expect more privacy than he or she is entitled to under foreign law779. Section 8 of
the Charter was not, therefore, engaged. The Canadian Court would be reluctant
to measure the laws of foreign states against guarantees contained in the Canadian
constitution. If, however, use of the evidence obtained under foreign law affected
the fairness of a trial held in Canada, it could be excluded under a combination of
'"Article 8(2).
774At 854, para 19.
775At 854-5, para 20, following Thomson Newspapers Ltd v Canada (Director ofInvestigation and
Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission) [1990] 1 SCR 425.
776At 856, para 22.
777At 856-7, para 23.
778At 857, para 24.
779At 857, para 25.
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sections 7 and 24 of the Charter780. Section 24 (2) provides that where a court
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any
rights or freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it
is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in
the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is
suggested that the effect of this language is somewhat similar to that used in
section 3(9) of the 1990 Act.
The minority dissent, set out in the judgement of Iacobucci, J, took a
different view on the reasonable expectation point, holding that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to banking information no matter
where the accounts are held, so that an account holder might reasonably expect
that Canadian authorities would not be able to request the assistance of the Swiss
authorities in the matter of obtaining bank records without some prior judicial
authorisation in Canada781. Since Scottish prosecutors have specific statutory
authorisation to send letters of request without judicial intervention782, the
minority reasoning on this point is not applicable to the Scottish situation783.
The majority reached the same result as the Chief Justice but by different
reasoning784. Their judgement was delivered by L'Heureux-Dube, who agreed that
the Charter applied only to the Canadian authorities and not to those of
Switzerland785, focussing the issue by saying that international criminal
investigation necessitates co-operation between states. The fact that the Canadian
780At 857, para 24.
781At 872, para 56.
7821990 Act s3(3).
783The writer finds the Chief Justice's reasoning more attractive in any event because it provides
an objective and predictable basis for determining whether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy. On the minority approach, the expectation of privacy would vary according to the rules
applicable in the requesting state which, depending on the circumstances figured, might well be a
state other than that in which the account was held or that in which the account holder resided.
784The minority approached the issue differently. It noted that section 8 of the Charter provides ex
ante protection for privacy rights rather than merely an ex post validation or condemnation of a
state intrusion on an individual's privacy. To operate effectively, it must operate before search
and seizure is executed. The impact on the individual of a search is the same whether it takes place
in Canada or Switzerland and so, by analogy with the obtaining of a search warrant within
Canada, judicial authorisation should have been obtained before the request was sent.
785At 858, paras 27-8.
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government might play a part in such investigations and that its part might have
implications for individual rights and freedoms did not by itself mean that the
Charter is engaged. Rather, the specific actions undertaken by Canadian officials
had to be assessed to see whether they infringed the Charter; and the only relevant
action in the instant case was the sending of the letter of request786. In a request
from one part of Canada to another for the carrying out of a search, it would be
the search warrant and action taken under it that would be amenable to challenge,
not the making of the request. By analogy, the letter of request itself does not
engage section 8 of the Charter. All of the actions which had an element of state
compulsion were taken in Switzerland by the Swiss authorities787. A line fell to be
drawn between those Canadian actions which did not implicate the Charter and
actions by Swiss authorities which would have implicated the Charter had they
been taken by Canadian authorities; and that was consistent with other decisions
taken by the Court in connection with international investigations and
• 788
prosecutions .
Torres suggests that where a court in the requested state has authorised the
transmission of material the Scottish courts will be slow to look behind that
authorisation. Schreiber too leaves it substantially to the courts of the requested
state to ensure that what is done in that state is done properly. Neither case,
however, addresses the question of what happens where there is, or is alleged to
be, an irregularity in what is done in the foreign state. The US courts have
addressed that question and have shown themselves unwilling to exclude evidence
obtained in questionable ways furth of US territory. In Brulay v United States™9,
for example, it was held that the finding of amphetamine tablets by Mexican
border officials who had searched the appellant's car without a warrant was
admissible. In United States v Verdugo-Urquidez190, a warrant to arrest the
786At 859, para 29.
787At 860, para 31.
788At 862, para 34, citing inter alia Kindler v Canada (Minister ofJustice) [1991] 2 SCR 779.
789 383 F 2d 345 (1967) cert denied 389 US 986 (1986).
790494 US 259(1990).
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respondent in connection with narcotics trafficking and murder791 had been
obtained in the USA and executed by Mexican police officers who delivered him
to a US border post (apparently without any extradition procedure). Thereafter, a
DEA agent arranged with the Mexican police for the search of the respondent's
residences in two Mexican cities. Those searches were carried out by DEA agents
and Mexican officers. They found a tally sheet which was said to relate to the
smuggling of marijuana in to the USA. The US District Court granted the
respondent's motion to suppress that evidence on the basis that the Fourth
Amendment applied and that the DEA agents had failed to justify search without
warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision; but the Supreme Court
reversed it on a construction of the Fourth Amendment which held that "The
People" (to whom the protection against unreasonable searches applies) is a term
of art which does not include aliens resident abroad792. The Court drew a clear
distinction between the due process and fair trial guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments on the one hand and the Fourth Amendment guarantees in relation
to search on the other. The latter guarantees, they held, were intended to protect
the people of the USA against arbitrary action by their own Government rather
than to restrain the actions of that Government against aliens outside the USA.
The closing sentences of the majority opinion bear quotation: "Some who violate
our laws may live outside our borders under a regime quite different from that
which obtains in this country. Situations threatening to important American
interests may arise halfway around the globe, situations which in the view of the
political branches of our Government require an American response with armed
force. If there are to be restrictions on searches and seizures which occur incident
to such American action, they must be imposed by the political branches through
diplomatic understanding, treaty or legislation".
Serious and reprehensible as international drug trafficking and murder
791 The same murder which was at issue in Alvarez-Machain.
792 For criticism of this case, see EB Fisher, "The Road Not Taken: The Extraterritorial
Application of the Fourth Amendment Reconsidered" 34 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law
705 (1996).
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undoubtedly are, it is not obvious that they constitute a situation which requires a
response with armed force in a neighbouring friendly country. Nor was such a
response in issue in Verdugo-Urquidez. Moreover, an MLAT between the USA
and Mexico existed793 but, as a result of delays in the US Senate, was not yet in
force794. That Treaty provided for "the legal execution of requests for searches and
seizures as ordered by the judicial authorities of the requested Party in accordance
with its constitutional and other legal provisions"795. It also included a provision
designed to prevent the arising of any right on the part of any private person to
obtain, suppress or exclude any evidence"796. That provision, together with the
approach to treaties which the Supreme Court was to take in Alvarez-Machain
(viz that consequences do not flow from extraterritorial abduction where the treaty
does not specifically prohibit it), would have combined to prevent the respondent
in Verdugo-Urquidez from relying on what was done by way of treaty in any
event797. The US cases therefore offer a somewhat uncertain guide to the
approach which might be taken in a Scottish court.
In Schreiber, it was contemplated that evidence obtained in a foreign State
might be excluded if it affected the fairness of the trial adversely. A similar
approach is taken in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court798,
Article 69(7) of which limits the Court's power to exclude evidence obtained in
violation of the Statute or of internationally recognised human rights but does
give such power in the situation in which the violation casts substantial doubt on
the reliability of the evidence or that in which the admission of the evidence
would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of the
proceedings. This is language which is very close to that used by section 8 of the
793 Treaty on Co-operation between the United States of America and the United Mexican States
for Mutual Legal Assistance 1987.
794 See EA Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders, 379-384.
795 Article l(4)(c).
796 Article 1(5).
797 By way of contrast, in R v Cook [1996] BCJ No 2615 (QL) the British Columbia Court of
Appeal took the view that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 was designed to
regulate the conduct of Canadian officials and was therefore prepared to exclude evidence
obtained by such officials in a foreign territory in circumstances which breached the Charter.
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Canadian Charter. By Article 70, however, the Court is specifically prohibited
from ruling on the application of the national law of the State in which evidence
was gathered. It will not, therefore, be open to the accused to seek to have
evidence excluded solely on the basis that it was obtained in a way which was
contrary to the law of the State in which that obtaining was done.
It is clear enough in Scots law that irregularities in the obtaining of
evidence may be excused so as to make the evidence admissible799. It is also clear
that ECHR law says nothing directly about the admissibility of evidence800 but
that the rule that irregularities in the obtaining of evidence may be excused does
not of itself contravene the Convention801. The appeal to fairness in section 3(9) of
the 1990 Act seems to leave it open to the trial court to take into account any
matter which seems to be relevant to the question, including what has happened in
the requested State. Torres and cases from other jurisdictions suggest, however,
that courts will be slow to hold that there is unfairness where what has been done
was lawful in the requested State.
Conclusion
It is clear that during the middle 1980s there was a significant change in the UK's
attitude to mutual assistance. As happened in the case of extradition, that change
was prompted by the dissatisfaction expressed by other European governments,
joined in relation to mutual assistance by the USA. Before then, the UK had
scarcely engaged in mutual assistance at all. The procedures for providing mutual
assistance were cumbersome and the forms of assistance which could be provided
distinctly limited. Until 1980 Scots law had no legislative provision under which
requests for assistance could be sent. The provision which was introduced in the
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 was intended by the government to be used
only in very limited circumstances and was so construed by the courts in
Muirhead. On the international plane, the UK had simply declined to take any part
798 UN Doc A/CONF. 183/9.
mLawrie vMuir.
800 Asch vAustria (1993) 15 EHRR597.
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in the negotiation of ECMA. Until the middle 1980s, then, the UK's approach to
mutual assistance fully justified Harding's observation about the UK's attitude
that "as a common law jurisdiction with well-established mechanisms for ensuring
the fairness and effectiveness of criminal proceedings, it was neither right nor
possible to take much cognisance ofother countries' judicial processes"802.
Once the government had decided that international co-operation had
become a matter of necessity, it moved ahead in a way which, on the face of it,
was constructive. The 1990 Act makes assistance available without any
requirement that there should be a treaty in place and the UK engaged quite
vigorously in the negotiation of bilateral MLATs. On closer examination,
however, the focus remained and remains on municipal law as the priority.
Whereas other countries such as Holland and the USA have provision which
permits the taking of evidence according to the procedure of the requesting State,
the UK has sought to apply the model ofmunicipal law. This is especially evident
in relation to the taking of evidence within the UK.
Whilst the UK's obligations under Article 8 ECHR and Article 1 of
Protocol 1 ECHR (apart from any other consideration) would probably make it
necessary to regulate matters such as search of property under a consistent code of
domestic law (so as to secure predictability), such considerations do not arise as
regards the simple taking of oral evidence from witnesses. We have seen that in
at least one case the UK's application of its domestic procedural approach to the
taking of evidence has resulted in the evidence obtained by letter of request being
found to be inadmissible in the requesting State, so defeating the whole point of
the exercise. Pursuing this a little further, we have seen that the UK has, in its
reservation to Article 3 ECMA, insisted on applying its municipal law as to
privilege and non-compellability even though these are matters of the law of
evidence and not primarily of property law. The point of this is not to criticise the
UK's decision to give priority to national law but, rather, to highlight the giving
mChinoy v United Kingdom 15199/89, 4 September 1991 (Commission).
802 Op cit, 235.
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of that priority.
Any process of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters involves co¬
operation between 2 criminal justice systems. It is possible to identify 2 different
attitudes in UK law and practice to foreign criminal justice systems. In some
matters there is continuing suspicion of foreign systems. We have seen that the
UK wished to maintain the double criminality requirement as regards search in
both the Harare Scheme and ECMA; and that, in relation to the Harare Scheme at
least, that reflected anxiety about criminal justice standards in some jurisdictions.
Given the apparently fraudulent nature of the request in Zardari, such anxiety
may be understandable. In other cases, however, policy, legislation and the
practice of the courts demonstrates significant trust in foreign authorities. The UK
is now willing to depart from the dual criminality requirement as regards EU
member States803. Section 4(4) of the 1990 Act requires the Secretary of State and
the Lord Advocate (respectively) to rely on a certificate granted by a foreign
authority as to the satisfaction of the criteria for the nomination of a court to take
evidence on behalf of that foreign authority. And the courts, in Scotland and
elsewhere, have been reluctant to investigate the means by which evidence has
been obtained in a foreign country.
In the 1990 Act, the UK enacted a coherent code for mutual assistance law
which, for the most part, reflects a clear understanding of both the international
and domestic legal contexts. Nevertheless, we begin to see even in that Act a
certain failure of understanding. In England and Wales, the restriction of
assistance by way of search to cases in which proceedings have been commenced
is difficult to square with the Harare Scheme. When one looks at the UK's
reservations to ECMA and some of the Scottish legislation, other failures of
understanding become apparent. The reservation to Article 2 ECMA on non bis in
idem is in terms which are, for no obvious reason, not consistent with either the
UK's position on the same issue in relation to ECE or the domestic law of either
Scotland or England. The Scottish rules on the use of documentary evidence are
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not reflected in what the UK has agreed in its bilateral MLAT with the USA.
Within Scots law itself, section 272 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act
1995 and its associated Form 23.1-C seem to reflect a poor understanding of the
international issues; and the delay until 1 May 1999 in putting in place the
Forfeiture Order seems to indicate a lack of application.
The UK has a history of ignoring mutual assistance issues; now it pursues
them with some vigour. Nevertheless, it has not departed from its general practice
of giving priority to national law; and there are some difficulties in policy and
practice which seem to indicate that there may be an inadequate understanding of
aspects of the law. These conclusions, it is suggested, are consistent with what we
saw in relation to extradition.
803See 170 above.
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5. PROCEEDS OF CRIME
Introduction
In July 1995 the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee commented that
"the most readily obvious internationally organised criminal activity is drug
production and drug trafficking. The size of the drug economy is enormous"804;
but it is, of course, not only in drug trafficking cases that there are significant
proceeds to be made. It has been argued that the huge profits made on drugs are
applied to the corruption of those in positions of authority in the community and
then used to finance other crime including the counterfeiting of designer goods,
fraud and the "piracy" of intellectual property, while the drug consumer turns to
theft and prostitution to finance the addiction805.
The realisation that a proportion of crime is committed in an organised
way in pursuit of profit806 has led Governments to conclude that it is desirable to
attack crime by attacking its financial aspects, both so as to deny criminals the
capital necessary to fund their activities and also because it is regarded as
unacceptable that criminals should benefit from their crimes807. As the House of
Commons Home Affairs Committee put it, "ifmoney laundering can be detected
and the proceeds of crime confiscated, crime becomes less attractive. Effective
policing of financial movements can therefore become a deterrent in itself to
organised crime"808. It is not accepted universally in the literature that such action
804 House ofCommons Home Affairs Committee, Third Report Organised Crime HC 18-1, July
1995 para 19. In 1990 the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities noted
that the turnover of the drug industry exceeds that of the international oil trade (Session 1990-91,
1st Report, Money Laundering (HL Paper 6) 5).
805 WA Tupman, Police Training Requirements in the Face ofNew Types ofCrime, (typescript on
file with author).
806 See, for example, Michael de Feo's remarks in Proceedings ofthe 82ndAnnualMeeting ofthe
American Society ofInternational Law, 1988,450; see also Wilmer Parker III, "Money or liberty?
A dilemma for those who aid money launderers" 44 Alabama Law Review 763 (1993).
807 See for example PH Bucy, "The Fight Against Money Laundering: A New Jurisprudential
Direction" 44 Alabama Law Review 839 (1993); G Polimeni, op cit, 10; and the remarks of the
European Court ofHuman Rights in Raimondo v Italy [1994] 18 EHRR 237, especially at 260.
808 Organised Crime, HC 18-1, para 113.
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is appropriate809 or that it actually works in practice810. Even the Home Office
Working Group on Confiscation has noted that the scheme has not been as
successful in depriving criminals of their assets as originally anticipated811.
However, since that issue does not bear on the relationship between international
law and criminal law, it is not necessary to address it here.
The attack on the financial aspects of crime has two aspects. First,
substantial efforts are directed to identifying the proceeds of crime as the criminal
attempts to launder them through the financial system812 and making that system
an unfriendly environment for the criminal; and secondly, since it would be
unrealistic to think that it would be possible to stop all proceeds from getting into
the system, it is necessary to overcome commercial or legal confidentiality in
order to trace the funds, to provide a restraint mechanism under which the
property of the suspect can be frozen; and to provide a mechanism for
confiscating the proceeds of a suspect who has been convicted of a profit
generating crime.
Whereas in relation to extradition and mutual legal assistance, the
existence of a relationship between international law and criminal law was
inherent in the subject, it is not so in relation to proceeds of crime. It is true that
80% of all laundering schemes in what is probably the most comprehensive
review of detected cases had an international dimension813 and that the Financial
Action Task Force has said that "the stage of drugs cash movements between
809 See the summary of opposition to the policy given by Ethan A Nadelmann, "Unlaundering
Dirty Money Abroad: US Foreign Policy and Financial Secrecy Jurisdictions" 18 Inter American
Law Review 33, 38 (1986). For substantive criticism, see: B Fisse and D Fraser, "Some
Antipodean Scepticisms about Forfeiture, Confiscation of Proceeds ofCrime and Money
Laundering Offences" 44 Alabama Law Review 737 (1993); C Sallon and D Bedingfield, "Drugs,
Money and the Law" [1993] Crim LR 165; Eric L Jensen and Jurg Gerber, "The Civil Forfeiture
ofAssets and the War on Drugs: Expanding Criminal Sanctions While Reducing Due Process
Protections" 42 Crime andDelinquency 421 (1996).
810 See for example M Levi, "Evaluating the TJew Policing': Attacking the Money Trail of
Organized Crime" 30 The Australian andNew Zealand Journal ofCriminology 1, 8 (1997).
811 Third Report, 1998, para 4.2.
812 For accounts ofmoney laundering techniques, see DA Chaiken, "Money Laundering: An
Investigatory Perspective" 2 Criminal Law Forum 467 (1991) and W Gilmore, Dirty Money, 37.
813 ME Beare and S Schneider, Tracing ofIllicit Funds: Money Laundering in Canada, Ministry
of the Solicitor General of Canada, 1990, xxiii.
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countries is crucial in the detection of money laundering"814. The most recent
report on money laundering typologies, published by the Financial Action Task
Force, once again confirms the frequency with which cross border transactions are
a feature ofmoney laundering. Particular reference is made to the use of foreign
legal entities and "Hawala" alternative remittance systems815 There is, however,
no necessity for the proceeds of crime to cross borders if the criminal can launder
his proceeds in some other way. Nadelmann asserted as long ago as 1986 that
"most dirty money, including most drug money, is almost certainly laundered
without ever leaving the United States"816.
During the formative period of UK proceeds of crime law in the middle
third of the 1980s, the UK had not yet begun to engage in a positive way in
mutual legal assistance. That and the fact that money laundering typologies were
less well understood than they are now might go a considerable way towards
explaining the particular way in which UK proceeds of crime law developed. The
early focus was on the proceeds of drug trafficking and confiscation law
developed much more quickly than money laundering law. Mutual assistance
mechanisms developed particularly slowly and, indeed, so far as Scots law is
concerned, although confiscation of drug trafficking proceeds was provided for in
the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987 ("the 1987 Act"), it was only on 1 May
1999, with the coming into force of the Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime
(Designated Countries and Territories) (Scotland) Order 1999817 that it became
possible to co-operate fully in the confiscation of the proceeds of non-drug crime.
Against this background, it should not surprise us that the extent of the
relationship between international law and municipal proceeds of crime law was
at first rather limited and has steadily become deeper and more sophisticated as
the law has developed and expanded to take greater account of the transnational
814 Recommendations, reproduced in Hector L MacQueen (ed), Money Laundering, David Hume
Institute/Edinburgh University Press, 1993, 28.
815 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, 1998-1999 Report on Money Laundering
Typologies, paras 22 and 39
816 Ethan A Nadelmann, "Unlaundering Dirty Money...", 41.
817 SI 1999 No 290 (S16).
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aspects ofmoney laundering.
The relationship between international law and criminal law has, in
relation to proceeds of crime, been developing rather than constant. It is most
easily examined by a broadly chronological account moving between the
international and municipal planes rather than making the more absolute division
which was employed in relation to extradition and mutual assistance.
Before that account is given, there is one point of critical importance to be
made. Proceeds of crime law in both Scotland and England took its fundamental
shape on the basis of domestic, rather than international, considerations818. It will
be shown both that the UK required to alter its law very little in order to meet its
international obligations and also that it has tended to treat the international and
European instruments as opportunities to extend its law in pursuit of existing
policy (sometimes beyond the demands of the international obligation). That
being so, and since the writer has already analysed substantive proceeds of crime
law (both Scots and international) in some detail elsewhere819 it is not appropriate
in this thesis to embark on a lengthy analysis of the substantive international or
domestic law. The content of that law would tell us little about the relationship
between international law and Scottish criminal law. What matters is the way
international law and domestic law relate to one another; and that is not a matter
of textual analysis.
On the other hand, the mutual assistance aspect of proceeds of crime law,
especially as regards Scotland, has not previously been the subject of much
analysis and does have some significance for the relationship with which we are
concerned. Accordingly, the mutual assistance aspect has a somewhat higher
profile in this chapter than it would merit in a straightforward critical analysis of
proceeds of crime law as such, and the substantive content of the money
laundering and confiscation provisions of the treaties and the legislation is treated
in less depth than would have been the case in such an analysis.
818 See 241.
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The early development of the law
Some commentators have claimed to identify the origins of proceeds of crime law
in English forfeiture law dating from feudal times820. It is questionable whether
the link can really be made but not necessary to express any decided view on the
matter here. What can be said with some certainty is that in modern times the
attack on the financial aspects of crime began, in a recognisable form, in the USA
during the 1970s821. Developments on the international plane began with a
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 822.
That arose out of concern about crimes of violence, especially hold-ups and
kidnappings, and was based on the assumption that criminality in Europe had
shown "an impressive increase in organised violent criminality supported by large
financial resources and aimed at raising more and more gain"823. "Hold-ups" and
kidnappings are crimes which are likely to result in cash payments to criminals
and there is the possibility of such payments being made with bank notes whose
serial numbers are known. The Recommendation reflected this by urging the
constitution of reserve stocks of banknotes whose serial numbers could be
disclosed to the authorities in the event of their use in connection with criminal
offences, international information exchange about the circulation of such notes
and machinery whereby banks could refer to lists of banknotes used in connection
with crime. This emphasis on banknote serial numbers did not find a place in later
instruments, essentially because it came to be the case that the predicate offences
819 Alastair N Brown, Proceeds ofCrime: Money Laundering, Confiscation and Forfeiture, W
Green/ Sweet & Maxwell, 1996.
820 For example, Andrew R Mitchell, Susan ME Taylor and Kennedy V Talbot, Mitchell Taylor
and Talbot on Confiscation and the Proceeds ofCrime, 2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, 1;
Jensen and Gerber, op cit; and, to a lesser extent, Shannon T Noya, "Hoisted by their own petard:
adverse inferences in civil forfeiture" 86 Journal ofCriminal Law and Criminology 493, 497
(1996).
821 For a critical analysis of the US approach from an English law perspective, see M Zander,
Confiscation and Forfeiture Law: English andAmerican Comparisons, Police Foundation, July
1989.
822 Recommendation No R(80)10 Adopted by the Committee ofMinisters of the Council of
Europe on 27 June 1980: Measures Against the Transfer and Safekeeping ofFunds ofCriminal
Origin.
823 Explanatory Memorandum para 2
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which drove the development of the law were those such as drug trafficking824 in
which such serial numbers are unlikely to be known. But other themes of the
Recommendation were to recur and these included identity checks on customers
in certain circumstances825, the provision of training for bank cashiers in checking
identity papers and detecting criminal behaviour and the establishment of national
and international co-operation between banks and "the appropriate authorities".
The Recommendation did not, however, have any perceptible effect on UK law.
In particular, the anti-money laundering measures which it desiderated were not to
be reflected in UK law until 1993, when it became necessary to legislate so as to
implement EC law826.
The start of proceeds of crime law (or modern proceeds of crime law at
any rate) in the UK was marked by R v Cuthbertsor*21. That case established that
the forfeiture provision of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971828 was not apt to deal
with the laundered proceeds of drug trafficking, especially where the conviction
was not even for an offence under the 1971 Act829. This decision caused
substantial public concern830 and resulted in the formation, under the auspices of
the Howard League, of the Hodgson Committee with a remit to consider the law
and possible reforms831. That Committee made recommendations for a
confiscation mechanism832 but devoted only three and a half pages833 to
824As recently as 10 February 1999, FATF noted that "Narcotics trafficking appears still to be the
primary single source of criminal proceeds among the majority ofFATF members. The various
types of fraud (fiscal, EU funds, value added tax, insurance, bankruptcy, etc.) are the next major
source of illegal funds, if not, in some jurisdictions, the primary source." (Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering, 1998-1999 Report on Money Laundering Typologies, para 43).
825 The opening of an account, the renting of a safe deposit or the effecting of cash transactions or
bank transfers above a certain magnitude (bearing mind the possibility of structuring linked
transactions as an avoidance device).
826See 273 below.
827 [1980] 3 WLR 89.
828 Section 27.
829 The charge was one of conspiracy.
830 For critical analysis ofR v Cuthbertson, see Alec Samuels, "The Misuse of Rules of Statutory
Interpretation" [1980] Statute Law Review 166.
831 Sir Derek Hodgson (Chairman), The Profits ofCrime and Their Recovery: Report ofa
Committee, Heinemann, 1984.
832 For detailed analysis, see Martin Wasik, "The Hodgson Report on the Profits ofCrime and
Their Recovery" [1984] Crim LR 708.
242
international law. Those pages concentrated on the inadequacy of mutual
assistance arrangements.
At the time the Hodgson Committee reported, the 1980 Council of Europe
Recommendation was the only formal international instrument which bore
significantly on proceeds of crime. It went unnoticed in the Hodgson Report.
There were, however, other important international developments which should
be noticed. Proceeds of crime issues were discussed in the Council of Europe
Pompidou Group in 1983 and 1985834 and the UK, as a member of that Group,
must have been aware of the discussions. Of greater importance, however (and
hardly noticed in the literature) were early developments within the framework of
the UN. Following meetings in 1980835 and 1984836 there was convened in October
1984 the Second Expert Group Meeting on the Forfeiture of the Proceeds of Drug
Crimes. That Group examined national legislation and experience in the field and
made a series of suggestions for inclusion in an international instrument to
address the forfeiture of the proceeds of drug trafficking. There is such significant
overlap between those recommendations and the 1988 UN Drugs Convention as
adopted that it is inconceivable that the Group's Report837 was not an influence on
the Convention. The UK participated in that group. In 1985, the UN Commission
on Narcotic Drugs requested the Secretary-General to seek from member States
comments and proposals on the elements they would like to have incorporated in
what was ultimately to become the 1988 UN Drugs Convention838. In its response
to the Secretary-General's letter839, the UK Government said that it was preparing
833140-143.
834 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation ofthe Proceeds from Crime, para 2.
835 Meeting on Financial Assets and Transactions relating to Illicit Drug Traffic (UN Doc.
E/CN.7/657/Add 2).
836 First Expert Group Meeting on the Forfeiture of the Profits and Proceeds ofDrug Crimes (UN
Doc DNDAVP.1983/23/Rev.l).
837 Report of the Second Expert Group Meeting on the Forfeiture of the Proceeds ofDrug Crimes
(UN Doc MNAR/1984/13).
838 See Preparation ofa draft convention against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances: report ofthe Secretary-General (UN Doc E/CN.7/1987/2, 13 June
1986).
839 UN Doc NAR/CL. 2/1985 (15 March 1985).
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legislation to allow for the assets of drug traffickers to be traced, frozen and seized
and that the measures which it had in mind were "based upon those set out in
chapter V of the Report of the Second Expert Group Meeting on the forfeiture of
the proceeds of drug crimes"840.
This, however, overstated the position. The recommendations of that
Group had international co-operation as their principal focus. The
recommendations which did not address that subject contained nothing which
could not also be found in the Hodgson Report. It seems likely, therefore, that the
recommendations of the Group reinforced those of the Hodgson Report and were
themselves the genesis of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 ("DTOA")
section 26 (which provided for the enforcement of foreign confiscation orders) but
there is no evidence that they exerted any greater influence than that. With this
limited exception, then, it seems legitimate to conclude that the foundations of
UK proceeds of crime law were essentially municipal.
By the time the early draft of what was to become the 1988 UN Drugs
Convention was circulated (sometime after June 1986) ("the 1986 UN draft"),
DTOA was already complete. UK negotiators therefore went to international
discussions with an existing framework of English municipal law. That
framework was sufficiently developed and comprehensive for the Home Office
Minister of State to be able, in due course, to say to the House of Lords that "our
law and working procedures already enable the United Kingdom to apply many-if
not most-of the requirements of the convention"841.
DTOA and the 1987Act
In May 1985 the Home Affairs Committee had recommended that UK law should
be amended to provide for the seizure and forfeiture of assets connected with drug
traffic in accordance with American practice842. The US model was to be rejected
840 Response by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General's letter (n839
above); National Library of Scotland Shelfmark GHD 2/10.
841 HL Debs Vol 513, 12 December 1989, col 1218.
842 Fifth (Interim) Report, Misuse ofHardDrugs, May 1985, HC 399.
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by the Government as incompatible with the British system843 but the
recommendations of the Hodgson Committee and the Home Affairs Committee
resulted in DTOA, which became the foundation and pattern for UK proceeds of
crime law in both its municipal and its international aspects.
DTOA was followed by Part I of the 1987 Act, which has been well
described as "essentially a Scottish adaptation of the Drug Trafficking Offences
Act 1986" 844. Both DTOA and the 1987 Act were concerned exclusively with the
proceeds of drug trafficking. Other predicate offences were not addressed.
It is not necessary to analyse these 2 Acts in detail here. In any event,
much of their content is technical municipal procedure with no international
significance. However, since DTOA in particular provided the framework of
municipal law on the basis of which UK negotiations were subsequently to
proceed at international conferences, the general provisions of DTOA and the
1987 Act should be summarised at this stage. Neither Act is now in force. For
Scotland, the law has been consolidated in the 1995 Act; but its essential features
remain the same.
The confiscation order is the heart of the scheme and its whole point. It is
important to understand its nature. There are two approaches commonly in use in
legal systems for the confiscation of the proceeds of crime. The first of these is
"property confiscation" under which ownership rights in specific property which
is derived directly or indirectly from offences are transferred to the state. Under
the second, which is "value confiscation" there is a requirement to pay a sum of
money based on an assessment of the value of property derived directly or
indirectly from crime845. Both Scots and English law operate value confiscation.
In seeking to achieve confiscation, the first requirement which the law
enforcement authorities have is for a means of investigating the financial aspects
843 See HC Debates, 1986, Vol 90, Cols 278-9.
844Christopher Gane, "Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987", Current Law Statutes Annotated
1987,41-3.
845 See Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure
and Confiscation ofthe Proceeds from Crime, 1990, para 15.
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of crime. Such a means of investigation was provided for by sections 27 and 28 of
DTOA and sections 38 and 39 of the 1987 Act. Under the Scottish provisions the
procurator fiscal could get an order requiring the production of material and, if
need be, a search warrant.
The drafting of DTOA section 27 and section 38 of the 1987 Act, its
Scottish equivalent, also took account of the cross border features of money
laundering. These provisions made it possible "for the purpose of an investigation
into drug trafficking" to obtain an order for the production of material. The
expression "drug trafficking" was defined so as to cover drug trafficking
anywhere in the world846 and the result is to make this investigative tool available
for the assistance of an investigation anywhere. In R v Crown Court at Southwark
ex parte Customs and Excise Commissioners847 the Divisional Court in England
held that there was nothing in the legislation to restrict the making of such orders
to cases being investigated by UK investigators. On the contrary, Watkins LJ said
that one of the purposes of the legislation is to advance the international co¬
operation to which the UK is bound by the UN Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs 1961. The Court held that the judge who had granted the order had
exceeded his powers when he attached a condition preventing Customs and
Excise from communicating the results of the execution of the order to foreign
investigators without special leave of the Court.
Assets having been identified by investigation, the restraint order
mechanism already described briefly could be brought into play to try to prevent
the accused from putting his assets beyond reach of attempts to enforce any
confiscation order which might ultimately be made.
This mechanism, in its Scottish manifestation, interdicts those affected by
it from dealing with their property and allows the Crown to use inhibition and
arrestment to "freeze" property more effectively. The intended effect was
846 DTOA s38(l); 1987 Act s 1(6).
847 [1989] 3 All ER 673.
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described by Otton J. in Re A/848: "The property to which the Restraint Order
applies is no longer to be considered a part of the defendant's estate. He holds
only notional title to such properties. All dealings with such property are to be
held in abeyance until such time as the defendant is acquitted or a Confiscation
Order is made and satisfied".
The English restraint order849 owes much to the Mareva injunction850 and
in particular carries with it the possibility of certain collateral orders based on the
Mareva analogy. These are an order that the defendant must provide an affidavit
as to the existence, location and value of all his assets851 and an order that the
defendant must bring realisable property held overseas back within the
jurisdiction852. In making such orders, the English courts have drawn on the
Mareva jurisprudence and the principles of Equity. The Scottish courts have no
equivalent basis for the making of such orders and neither the 1987 Act nor its
successor, the 1995 Act, provides a statutory basis853. It follows that the
confiscation legislation of the 1980s was drafted first under reference to English
legal categories and then translated imperfectly into Scottish terms with the result
that the Scottish restraint order is a more restricted instrument than its English
model.
If the accused person is convicted it is open to the prosecutor to seek a
confiscation order. Here the Scottish approach diverged from the English model.
848 [1992] 1 All ER 537.
849 For analysis of the English restraint order see David Feldman, "Freezing Defendants' Assets
Before Drugs Trials" [1987] New Law Journal 457.
850 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulk Carriers SA (The Mareva) [1980] 1 All ER
231 CA. For detailed analysis see Steven Gee, Mareva Injunctions andAnton Piller Relief, FT
Law and Tax, 1995, especially chapter 20 ("Criminal Marevas, restraint orders and receivers").
851 First made in Re O [1991] 2 WLR 475, under reference to AJBekhor & Co Ltd v Bilton [1981]
QB 923, a civil Mareva case.
852 On the basis ofDerby & Cov Weldon (No 6) [1990] 3 All ER 263, anotherMareva case.
853 It is, therefore, ironic that the arrangements for the enforcement of Scottish restraint and
confiscation orders in relation to property in England have on at least one case resulted in the
Divisional Court making ancillary orders for the swearing by the accused of an affidavit as to his
whole financial circumstances and as to the particular circumstances relating to the receipt by him
of a particular sum ofmoney and for the deposit by him of over £23,000 in a building society
account known to the Crown Prosecution Service (In the matter ofJohn Wintour Scott Steele
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Whereas under DTOA the convicting court was obliged to consider whether there
was any benefit from crime and, if it found there was, proceed to make a
confiscation order854, under section 1(1) of the 1987 Act it was (and, under the
1995 Act, remains) only the prosecutor's motion that could trigger the making of
such an order. Moreover, and by the same section, the Scottish court was given a
discretion whether or not to make a confiscation order and about the amount of
any such order.
Sections 27 to 32 of the 1987 Act dealt with reciprocal arrangements for
the enforcement of orders made by courts outwith Scotland. The starting point
was DTOA section 26 which permitted the registration in the (English) High
Court of confiscation orders made in countries or territories outside the UK,
designated by Order in Council. Earl Ferrers, Minister of State at the Home
Office, was in due course to say that the "spirit" of the provision "is to strengthen
co-operation between ourselves and other countries with a view to depriving drug
traffickers of ill gotten gains855. The designation process was triggered by the
existence of a treaty relationship. Provision to identical effect, permitting the
registration of such external orders in the Court of Session, was made by section
30 of the 1987 Act. That provision has now been consolidated in sections 40 and
41 of the 1995 Act.
According to Harding, the complexity of these provisions and the absence
at the time they were introduced of any multilateral instrument caused the UK to
conclude that bilateral agreements would be necessary to ensure reciprocity and
the effective operation of the process856. The absence of any multilateral
instrument was, however, remedied quickly by Article 7 of the 1988 UN Drugs
Convention under reference to which most of the UK's bilateral proceeds of crime
MLATs are drafted. The general approach of these sections was to apply the
Robertson, unreported, High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, 16 March 1994, copy of
order on file with author).
854 DTOA si.
855 HL Debs Vol 513 col 1231 (12 December 1989).
856 Alan Harding, op cit, at 239.
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municipal arrangements, so far as practicable, to the enforcement of foreign
orders. This approach has persisted and the current arrangements are discussed
below.
Substantive money laundering law was set out in DTOA section 24, with a
virtually identical provision for Scotland in section 43 of the 1987 Act (now to be
found at section 38 of the (Consolidation) Act. These provisions were rather basic
and certainly did not go nearly so far as UK money laundering law now goes.
The section made it an offence for a person to enter into or be otherwise
concerned in an arrangement whereby the retention or control by or on behalf of
another of that other person's proceeds of drug trafficking was facilitated (whether
by concealment, removal from the jurisdiction, transfer to nominees or otherwise),
or whereby that other person's proceeds of drug trafficking were used to secure
that funds were placed at the other person's disposal, or were used for the other
person's benefit to acquire property by way of investment. Liability to conviction
only arose, however, where the accused knew or suspected that the person he
assisted in this way was a person who carried on or had carried on drug trafficking
or had benefited from drug trafficking. There was a defence and some civil
immunity where the suspicion was disclosed to a constable before the
arrangement was entered into (or, in some circumstances, very shortly thereafter).
This offence was not capable ofbeing committed by a person in relation to
his own personal proceeds of drug trafficking. It was aimed at those who have not
participated in the actual trafficking but who assist in retention. The precondition
for the commission of this offence was that the accused knew or suspected that the
other person was one who carried on, or had carried on, or had derived financial
or other rewards from, drug trafficking. Mitchell, Taylor and Talbot suggest that,
as to the meaning of "knowing", an analogy might be drawn with the law on
possession of stolen property857. They also suggest that "suspicion" must be given
its dictionary meaning and that "an inkling or fleeting thought that the property
might be the proceeds of drug trafficking" would be sufficient. The writer
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disagrees858 but which of us is correct is not the issue here. Since Taylor was head
of the Crown Prosecution Service Central Confiscation Unit and worked closely
with the Home Office on these issues, it seems likely that those authors were
expressing what the UK Government thought the legislation which it had enacted
meant.
The suspicion which was relevant was one that the other person is one
who carried on, or had carried on, or had derived financial or other rewards from,
drug trafficking. The section did not require knowledge or suspicion as to the
provenance of the property or as to the effect of the arrangement. Even an
apparently innocent transaction might in fact turn out to be within the section and
thus found criminal liability if the relevant suspicion as to the person concerned
could be proved859.
The Criminal Justice Act 1988
It was evident that predicate offences other than drug trafficking are capable of
generating significant profits and so a confiscation scheme for crime other than
drug trafficking was provided for English law by Part VI of the Criminal Justice
Act 1988. That scheme followed the pattern of DTOA very closely, the most
significant differences (apart from the wider range of predicate offence) being the
imposition of a threshold of £10,000 benefit from crime before the scheme could
come into effect860 and the absence of any assumptions about the provenance of
income or property861. That scheme did not apply to Scotland, where the question
of the most appropriate course was referred to the Scottish Law Commission. It
was only after the publication of their Report on Confiscation and Forfeiture862 in
1994 that such a scheme was established for Scotland. Some aspects of that are
for consideration below. And for the sake of completeness, Schedules 4 and 7 of
857 Op cit, 186-7.
858 See Alastair Brown, "Money Laundering: A European and UK Perspective" [1997] JIBL 307.
859 Although these remarks are made in the past tense, they all remain true of the current
legislative equivalents.
860 Criminal Justice Act 1988 s71(2)(b)(ii).
861 Both of these features have since changed.
862 Scot Law Com No 147.
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the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. which provide a
confiscation scheme in respect of terrorist funds, should also be mentioned but
need not be analysed863.
The Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline
The late 1980s saw important developments on the international plane. The
beginning of these developments was marked by UN General Assembly
Resolution 39/141 of 14 December 1984. That Resolution, which was prompted
by an initiative by the Government of Venezuela864, requested the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs to give priority to the preparation to what in due course became
the 1988 UN Drugs Convention. In the lead up to that, the International
Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking was held in June 1987 and not
only supported the idea of a Convention but also adopted a Comprehensive
Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control865. That
Outline set out targets "particularising the objective to be attained and the action
to be taken" at both national and international levels866. Target 23 was the
forfeiture of the instruments and proceeds of illicit drug trafficking. Consideration
was to be given to making it possible to seize, freeze and forfeit objects
knowingly used in trafficking and the proceeds thereof, including objects
knowingly acquired with those proceeds867. DTOA combined with section 27 of
863 But see An Official of the Northern Ireland Office, "Tackling Terrorist Finance" in Action
Against Transnational Criminality, Vol II: Papers from the 1992 Oxford Conference on
International and White Collar Crime, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993, p80; Keith Maguire,
"Fraud, extortion and racketeering: The black economy in Northern Ireland" 20 Crime Law and
Social Change 273 (1993); and for more detailed analysis, Alastair N Brown, Proceeds ofCrime...
287-299.
864 William C Gilmore, Dirty Money, 63.
865 See "United Nations International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking: Decisions
of the Conference" 26 ILM 1637 (1987). The ComprehensiveMultidisciplinary Outline is
reproduced at 26 ILM 1638 (1987). The UK Government claimed to have "played an active part"
in the Conference and described the development in terms which suggest that it favoured the
policy approaches set out in the Outline-see Tackling Drug Misuse: a summary ofthe
Government's strategy Home Office, 1988, para 3.11. Gilmore has confirmed the UK's generally
positive and active role in these developments (William C Gilmore, "International Action Against




the 1971 Act already provided such mechanisms for English law and the 1987 Act
was to do so for Scots law. Furthermore, it was said that associations ofbanks and
similar institutions should devise codes of conduct whereby their members would
assist the authorities and that legislation should provide for penalties if the
personnel of such institutions knowingly participated in or facilitated schemes for
concealing information about money laundering868. Finally, investigation of the
income levels of suspects was desiderated869. The assumptions provided for by
DTOA were consistent with this approach and concentration on the income of the
suspect has marked the Scottish approach to confiscation procedures from their
inception870. It should be said, however, that this approach arose in Scottish
practice entirely independently of the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline. It
was suggested by the then Home Advocate Depute871 in an internal Crown Office
document entitled "Confiscation Orders: Preparation of Financial Information"872
which showed no sign of awareness of the existence of the Outline. For that
matter, nothing in the Crown Office files relating to the passing of the 1987 Act
suggests that anyone at Scottish Office or Crown Office concerned in the passing
of the 1987 Act had even heard of the work going on in relation to the Outline. In
short, the relationship between UK law and the Outline was one of consistency,
with the UK supporting the strategy ultimately adopted in that document.
The Basle Statement
December 1988 saw the adoption of two instruments, one informal and one
formal. The (relatively) informal instrument was the Statement on Prevention of
Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering
promulgated by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory
Practices. This important document has informed not only the practice ofbanking
supervisors internationally but also the content of other international instruments.
868 Para 283.
869 Para 284.
™ See HMAdvocate v McLean 1993 SCCR917 and Alastair N Brown, Proceeds ofCrime, 27-28.
871 GW Penrose QC (as he then was).
872 May 1989. Copy on file with author.
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The Statement has no binding force in international law, but is a general statement
of ethical principles which encourages banks' management to put in place
effective anti-laundering procedures. It is therefore a "self regulation" measure
and exactly the kind of thing contemplated by the Comprehensive
Multidisciplinary Outline, though its voluntary character has since been overtaken
by a hardening approach, both internationally and domestically873.
The Statement proceeds on the basis that the first and most important
safeguard against money laundering is the integrity of banks' own managements
and their determination to prevent their institutions being used as a channel for
money laundering. The Statement is intended to reinforce those standards of
conduct. The vulnerability of banks has been pointed out by Beare and Schneider,
who say that "Deposit-taking institutions are the common thread running through
the myriad ofmoney laundering schemes available to criminal enterprises...banks
are used to launder more money in Canada than all other laundering vehicles
combined"874. It remains true in 1999 that such institutions figure largely in the
Financial Action Task Force ("FATF") report on money laundering typologies875,
though the focus is now on e-cash and online banking.
The Statement contains three substantive elements and reflects the themes
of the Council of Europe Recommendation. The first is that for which the
Statement is best known and it is that banks should make "reasonable efforts to
determine the true identity of all customers requesting the institution's services."
This (the so called "know your customer" principle) is elaborated to desiderate
particular care in the identification of the ownership of all accounts and of those
using safe custody facilities, effective procedures for obtaining identification from
new customers and an explicit policy that significant business transactions will
not be conducted with those who fail to provide evidence of their identity.
873The Basle Committee has continued to promote good practice-see Jack A Blum, Michael Levi,
RT Naylor and Phil Williams, Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy andMoney Laundering,
UNDCP Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Newsletter, 1998, 32.
874 Op cit 10.
il5Op cit.
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Next, the Statement urges compliance with law and that banks should not
set out to offer services or provide active assistance in transactions which they
have good reason to suppose are associated with money laundering activities.
Finally, banks are urged to co-operate fully with national law enforcement
authorities to the extent permitted by specific local regulations relating to
customer confidentiality.
The 1988 UN Drugs Convention
At Council of Europe level, the issue of action against the proceeds of crime was
discussed with particular reference to drug trafficking in the Pompidou Group in
1983 and 1985 and in 1987 steps were taken which were to lead to the elaboration
of the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime ("the Council of Europe Laundering
Convention"). In the meantime, however, work had begun at UN level and the
work of the Council of Europe was somewhat eclipsed by what became the 1988
UN Drugs Convention, which was adopted on 19 December 1988 and is of
foundational importance in relation to international co-operation in the area of
drug trafficking. In the European context alone, it exerted a major influence on the
Council of Europe Laundering Convention and on the EC Directive on prevention
of the use of the financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering. On a wider
stage it has formed an essential framework for the work of FATF and, indeed,
implementation and ratification of the treaty was the very first of the
recommendations made by FATF876.
The preamble makes plain the intention of those who drafted the
Convention. The Conference was "desiring to conclude a comprehensive,
effective and operational convention that is directed specifically against illicit
traffic and that considers the various aspects of the problem as a whole, in
particular those aspects not envisaged in the existing treaties in the field of
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances". In large measure, the objective of
876 Reproduced in Hector L MacQueen (ed) Money Laundering, 21.
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comprehensiveness was achieved. In Gilmore's words, as well as requiring the
criminalisation of drugs money laundering, the 1988 UN Drugs Convention
"makes major advances in relation to mutual legal assistance and confiscation and
eliminates bank secrecy as a barrier to these important forms of international co¬
operation. Even in the more traditional field of extradition some progress was
recorded. In the normally contentious area ofjurisdiction obligations are imposed
and, perhaps more significantly, new opportunities presented to state parties in
terms of the ordering of their mutual relations. Furthermore, this treaty promotes
innovative law enforcement techniques such as controlled delivery and facilitates
action in circumstances which, as with the interdiction of foreign flag vessels on
the high seas, have previously given rise to difficulties and inefficiencies"877. Not
only that but there was an unusually rapid series of ratifications of the treaty so
that it received the ratifications required to bring it into force in near record time.
Now only a small minority of states are not parties878.
The proceeds of crime provisions of the Convention occur primarily in
Articles 3 and 5 and have been said to have "established a new direction in
multinational co-operation in the field of crime prevention and control"879. Article
3 demands the criminalisation of certain forms of conduct, including money
laundering, whilst Article 5 requires the adoption of measures which make
confiscation possible. Aspects of these provisions are now to be analysed in light
of existing Scots law but in general it may be said that it was only in their money
laundering aspect that they required legislative action from the UK. That action
took place in the 1990 Act.
Both confiscation and money laundering featured in the 1986 UN draft.
Comparison of that draft and the recommendations of the Second Expert Group
877 W Gilmore, Combatting International Drugs Trafficking: The 1988 UnitedNations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Commonwealth
Secretariat, 1991,42.
878 See Gilmore, Dirty Money, 63-64.
879 Edward G Lee, Legal Adviser to the Department ofExternal Affairs, Canada, in Proceedings of
the 82nd AnnualMeeting ofthe American Society ofInternational Law, 1988,447. Since Mr Lee's
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suggests that those recommendations must have informed the draft-there are many
similarities. It is, on this basis, legitimate to point out that the Expert Group's
examination of trends in national legislation provided the basis of those
recommendations; and that the recommendations of the Hodgson Report as
regards confiscation, restraint orders and the reversal of the onus ofproof as to the
provenance of assets were before the Group880. These were themes which were
eventually to find their way into the 1988 UN Drugs Convention. Since those
themes also occurred in the legislation of other states it cannot be said that the
recommendations were in any sense based exclusively on English law; but having
regard to the fact that the Report had some influence on DTOA the references to
the Hodgson Report in the Expert Group Report indicates that there can
sometimes be cross fertilisation during the developmental stages of both treaties
and Acts of Parliament.
As might be expected, the drafting developed between that first draft and
the final text of the Convention. We know that the UK participated in the ongoing
discussions881 but, because the reports of the pre-Vienna meetings882 are highly
compressed and do not distinguish the contributions of individual delegations, we
cannot know what the UK's particular negotiating position at those meetings was.
Although the position changes for the Vienna Conference itself because the
summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committees
of the Whole are published883 and report the interventions made not merely by
national delegations but also by individual members of those delegations, the draft
which was discussed at the Vienna Conference was already in a form which was
very close to the Convention as ultimately adopted. Examination of the 1986 UN
remarks do not carry any disclaimer it seems likely that he was expressing an official Canadian
Government view.
880 Op cit paras 24-27.
881 See Reports ofthe open-ended intergovernmental expert group meeting on the preparation ofa
draft convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs andpsychotropic substances (UN Doc
E/CN.7/1988/2, 23 October 1987 and 8 February 1988).
882 Ibid.
883 United Nations Conferencefor the Adoption ofa Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Official Records, Volume II (UN Doc E/CONF.82/16/Add. 1.
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draft and comparison with DTOA suggests that the UK did not, in the preparatory
work, have to confront any proposal which would have required fundamental
change in municipal law. However, in the absence of detailed records of the
preparatory meetings and until the UK Government's own records reach the
public domain it is not possible to express the UK position with any greater
certainty.
The money laundering provisions are contained in Article 2 of the 1988
UN draft and the confiscation provisions are in Article 3884. As regards money
laundering, the draft required all parties to "adopt such measures as may be
necessary to establish as offences under its criminal law, when completed
intentionally (a)...(iii) concealment, disguise or conversion of the nature, source,
disposition, movement or ownership of property, knowing that such property is
derived from illicit traffic; (b) subject to its constitutional limitations, legal system
and domestic law (i) acquisition, possession or use of property knowing that such
property is derived from illicit traffic...". As regards confiscation the draft
required that confiscation should apply to proceeds of drug trafficking but also to
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, materials and equipment and other
instrumentalities of the crime. The confiscation of drugs, materials, equipment
and other instrumentalities is, in Scots law, dealt with as forfeiture and is beyond
the scope of this thesis885. The draft also demanded the provision ofmutual legal
assistance in relation to the proceeds of crime and this aspect is addressed
below886.
So far as concerned the confiscation of the proceeds of drug trafficking,
the draft contemplated that proceeds derived from offences established in
accordance with article 2 paragraph 1 of the draft should be liable to confiscation.
Article 2 paragraph 1 (which was to become Article 3(1) of the ultimate
884 UnitedNations Conferencefor the Adoption ofa Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Official Records, Volume I (UN Doc E/CONF.82/16) 77-8.
The Article numbers changed in the Convention as adopted.
885 But see Proceeds ofCrime etc.. 238-249.
886 See 299.
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Convention) has been said to be "the cornerstone of the Convention...designed to
focus on the fundamental law enforcement measures necessary to combat the dual
problems of international drug trafficking and money laundering...an all-inclusive
list of illicit drug trafficking offences"887.
Article 2 went on to require parties to "adopt such measures as may be
necessary to enable [them] to identify, trace, freeze or seize proceeds...for the
purpose of the eventual confiscation" and to empower courts to order that bank,
financial and commercial records should be made available. It was also
contemplated that if the proceeds of crime had been intermingled with property
acquired from legitimate sources that property should be liable to confiscation up
to the value of the criminal proceeds and that property into which the proceeds of
crime had been transformed should be liable to the measures desiderated in the
Convention in lieu of the original proceeds themselves. Moreover parties were to
consider the reversal of the onus ofproof as regards the legitimacy of proceeds or
other property liable to confiscation.
The essential features of DTOA are summarised above. On the basis of
that summary and the foregoing summary of the proceeds of crime provisions of
the 1988 UN draft it may be said that UK law was already largely consistent with
what was being discussed. Although it was to prove necessary to extend the UK's
money laundering legislation so as to bring it fully into compliance with the
Convention, there was no material conflict of policies between existing UK law
and either the 1988 UN draft or the Convention itself. It was perhaps for this
reason that the UK's negotiating profile in relation to both money laundering and
confiscation was quite low.
Only one intervention by the UK is of any real significance for the present
work. It related to the subjection to constitutional limitations, legal system and
domestic law of the requirement to criminalise acquisition, possession or use of
property knowing that such property is derived from illicit traffic. The formula
887 Report ofthe United States Delegation to the UnitedNations Conferencefor the adoption ofa
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, reproduced in
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was derived from Article 36 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961888.
In the Convention as adopted, it became a reference to the "constitutional
principles [of each State Party] and the basic concepts of its legal system"889. The
requirements qualified by this chapeau constitute what the US delegation
described as "the permissive category of offenses that the Parties are obligated to
establish as offenses under their domestic law"890.
We are told by the US delegation that the chapeau was adopted for a
number of reasons891. In particular, there was concern that those criminal justice
systems which do not allow prosecutors the kind of discretion to be found in the
common law and Scottish systems892 would otherwise be obliged to create
offences which would strike at innocent conduct as well as guilty. Without an
effective prosecutor's discretion there would be no means of avoiding the
prosecution of innocents. The second reason for the chapeau was the variation
from system to system in the treatment of the offence of conspiracy and the third
was concern at the potential interaction of the matters dealt with in Article 3
paragraph (l)(c) with the fundamental concepts of certain legal systems, such as
the First Amendment to the US Constitution. Sproule and St Denis point out893
that similar concerns were felt by many delegations.
The chapeau had been the subject of some discussion in the course of the
preparatory work. There was a view that the inclusion of such a chapeau would
"have the undesirable effect of weakening one of the basic articles of the draft
convention; the undertaking by States to punish the illicit traffic should be
WC Gilmore, International Efforts to CombatMoney Laundering, Grotius, 1992, 100-101.
888 WC Gilmore, Combatting InternationalDrugs Trafficking..., 7.
889 Article 3, paragraph (l)(c).
890 Report ofthe United States Delegation to the UnitedNations Conferencefor the Adoption ofa
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, reproduced in
WC Gilmore, International Efforts to CombatMoney Laundering, Grotius, 1992, 98, 103).
891 Loc cit.
892 For detailed but dated accounts ofprosecutorial discretion in Scotland, see AV Sheehan,
Criminal Procedure in Scotland and France, HMSO, 1975, 136; and Susan R Moody and
Jacqueline Tombs, Prosecution in the Public Interest, Scottish Academic Press, 1982, chapters 3
and 4. For a more up-to-date, and official version, see Crown Office andProcurator Fiscal
Service Annual Report 1992/93, HMSO, 1993, 15.
893 D Sproule and P St Denis, op cit.
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mandatory and Parties to the Convention should be ready to adjust their national
legislation to the requirements of its provisions"894. Others argued, however, that
"certain States might find it difficult under their constitutional and legal systems
to apply fully and effectively some of the far reaching provisions of the article and
that some form of limitation clause was consequently necessary"895.
When the issue arose at the Conference to Adopt, the UK said that "it
would be unfortunate to eliminate the safeguard clause altogether, since it would
be inappropriate to impose on States obligations incompatible with their legal
system, with the result that a number of countries would be unable to accept the
convention at all. Consideration should rather be given to what changes in
domestic law might be required"896.
Two things may be said about this. First, since the UK in fact legislated
without apparent difficulty on the basis of these provisions897, the UK intervention
was presumably not for the purpose of preserving its own position. Rather, the
concern the UK showed about the possibility of some States not being able to
become Parties to the Convention at all is consistent with the point made in the
context of the extradition provisions of the Convention.898 The UK's approach
seems to have been driven by a desire to achieve the widest possible measure of
agreement and participation in the Convention.
Secondly, however, and notwithstanding what has just been said, the UK's
approach does seem to have been one which assumed a priority for municipal law.
The UK did not align itself with those who, in the preparatory meetings, had
maintained that states with a problem would just have to change their municipal
law. The consequence which the UK foresaw if the chapeau was not included was
not enforced change in municipal law but rather an absence of participation in the
894 Report ofthe open-ended intergovernmental expert group... 23 October 1987, para 48.
895 Ibid, para 49.
896 UnitedNations Conferencefor the Adoption ofa Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Official Records, Volume II (UN Doc E/CONF.82/16/Add. 1)
55.
897 See 261 below.
898 See 103 above.
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Convention. It could, of course, be said of this that, since no State can be
compelled to give its assent to a treaty and there is no question of the 1988 UN
Drugs Convention having been a codification of customary norms (much less of
peremptory norms), the UK's concerns about an absence of participation simply
reflected the fact that any multilateral treaty represents the lowest common
denominator of what states can agree and the more demanding the treaty the
greater the political will that is required to secure participation. Nevertheless, the
record of discussion in the preparatory phase demonstrates that some states
expected that a hard line in the Convention would lead, not to refusals to
participate but to changes in municipal law, even of a quite fundamental kind
(since the reference they wished to remove was to constitutional principles). The
fact that the UK did not take such a view and that the UK was concerned that
municipal law might for some states constitute a barrier to participation may be
seen as weak evidence of the UK's assumption that municipal law takes priority;
but it would be dreadfully easy to push this too far. The intervention was only two
sentences long and its greatest significance lies in its consistency with what as
been noted in other contexts.
Because even the earliest drafts of the 1988 UN Drugs Convention were
substantially compatible with DTOA, the possibility that municipal law might
constrain what the UK was prepared to accept in a treaty, in the way section 4(2)
of the 1989 Act does in an extradition context, did not arise. UK municipal law
may be said to have influenced the content of the 1988 Convention to the extent
that the UK was anxious to secure the widest possible coverage and supported
wording which tended towards that result; but (especially because nobody was
arguing for a particularly restrictive approach) this is municipal law influence at
its weakest.
Article 7 of the Convention is a mutual legal assistance treaty-within-a-
treaty. It runs to 20 paragraphs but is not especially innovative as mutual
assistance arrangements go. As is common in such arrangements, the Parties are
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obliged to afford one another "the widest measure of mutual legal assistance"899
and this applies as early as the investigative stage. The assistance required is to
extend to search and seizure900 and it is specifically provided that mutual
assistance cannot be refused on the ground of bank secrecy. This should be seen
against the background of Article 5(4), which obliges Parties in whose territories
proceeds, property or instrumentalities are situated to render assistance by was of
tracing, freezing and confiscation.
Article 7(20) contemplates "the possibility of concluding bilateral or
multilateral agreements or arrangements that would serve the purpose of, give
practical effect to, or enhance the provisions of' the Article. In 1994, the UK
developed a model for such agreements and has concluded a considerable number.
The model is considered below901. Meanwhile, Commonwealth Law Ministers,
meeting in 1990, revised the Harare Scheme so as to make provision for tracing,
seizing and confiscating the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime902. The
amendments to the Harare Scheme simply "provide a framework for co-operation
between Commonwealth Governments in tracing and seizing the proceeds and
instrumentalities of crime"903 and offer only the most basic provisions. The effect
is that many Commonwealth members, including the UK, are subject as regards
drug trafficking to the obligations accepted under Article 7 of the UN Drugs
Convention but, as regards other types of predicate offence, are Party to the less
formal, non obligatory arrangements under the Scheme.
The 1990 Act
We have dealt with Part I of the 1990 Act as regards mutual legal assistance.
Section 14 of the Act extended UK money laundering law so as to create the
offence of concealing or transferring the proceeds of drug trafficking, which was





903Commentary by Professor David McClean.
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UN Convention. According to the Notes on Clauses904, the intention of the clause
was "to meet the terms of Article 3 of the Vienna Convention905". The Speaking
Note is not otherwise available and, because it sets out exactly what the UK was
intending to do, it bears quotation in full. The Minister was offered text which
said that the clause:
"1... seeks to fill the gap between our existing money laundering offence
under section 24 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1986 and the rather wider
offence set out in Article 3 of the Convention.
2. The position is this. Section 24 created an offence ofbeing concerned in
an arrangement whereby a drug trafficker is assisted to retain the benefit of
drug trafficking. The key to the offence is that the defendant knew or
suspected that the person whose property he was dealing with was a drug
trafficker. Section 24 also requires that the arrangement must be for the
benefit of the drug trafficker whose proceeds are the subject of the
arrangement.
3. The Convention offences, on the other hand, turn on the nature or
source of the property itself. They cover the situation where anybody-
including the drug trafficker himself06-deal with proceeds in such a way as
to avoid prosecution or the making, or enforcement of, a confiscation
order against any person.
4. Accordingly, subsections (1) and (2) of the new clause give effect to
Article 3(b)(1) and (ii) of the Convention by creating new offences of
concealment, disguise, conversion or transfer of proceeds for the purpose
of avoiding prosecution or confiscation. Similarly subsections (3) and (5)
give effect to the Convention by creating an offence of acquiring property
904 Copy on file with author.
905 That is, the 1988 UN Drugs Convention.
906 Not all states interpret the Convention as requiring the criminalisation ofmoney laundering
carried out by the person who commits the predicate offence. Article 6(2)(b) of the Council of
Europe Convention on the Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from
Crime is drafted on the assumption that the 1988 Convention does not require such
criminalisation.
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knowing or having reasonable grounds to suspect that it is the proceeds of
drug trafficking".
There are 2 things to be said about this. The first is that what the
Government did not make clear at the time is that in two respects section 14 went
further than the Convention required. The first of these related to the mens rea of
the offence. The Convention only required that those with knowledge of the
criminal provenance of the property in question should be made liable to
conviction. Section 14(2) of the 1990 Act subjects to criminal liability a person
who knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect that provenance. Although it is
true to say that Article 3(3) of the Convention provides that knowledge may be
inferred from "objective factual circumstances", section 14(2) goes further than
that. Having reasonable grounds to suspect something falls short of actual
knowledge, and whilst both Scots law and English law are accustomed to
inferring knowledge from circumstances907, neither treats reasonable grounds for
suspicion as the same as actual knowledge (or the reference to reasonable grounds
for suspicion in section 14(2) would have been unnecessary). It would be true to
say that liability where there are reasonable grounds for suspicion is consistent
with Article 6(3) of the Laundering Convention, which contemplates criminal
liability where the offender "ought to have assumed that the property was
proceeds"; but the Laundering Convention was not completed until several
months after the 1990 Act received Royal Assent. It might be that those who
made the policy for the 1990 Act knew that the Laundering Convention was to
include such a provision and anticipated it. This, however, is speculative; nothing
was said on the subject at the time.
It is, then, true to say that section 14 was heavily influenced by the 1988
UN Drugs Convention; but it is also true to say that the UK went beyond the
requirements of the Convention. That bespeaks a situation in which the
Convention was more an opportunity than an obligation. Indeed, Article 24 of the
Convention seems to contemplate just such a possibility when it provides that a
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Party may adopt more strict or severe measures than those provided for by the
Convention.
The second thing to say about the speaking note provided for the Minister
is that the Scottish offence equivalent to DTOA section 24 was not mentioned. It
must, of course, be tedious for Home Office officials always to have to give
Scottish equivalents but it would, nevertheless, make understanding the changes
effected in Scots law by UK legislation slightly easier if that was done. The fact
that it is not done simply underlines the fact that the tandem desiderated by the
Renton Committee is not yet being ridden by the Westminster Parliament.
The section creates offences with several variations. Certain elements are
common to all the variations and they are also to be found in other money
laundering offences. The first element is that there is property which is, or in
whole or in part directly or indirectly represents, a person's proceeds of drug
trafficking. "Property" is not as such defined and we must fall back on the
ordinary meaning of the concept, informed by the intention of the legislation
which is to strike at that which has value. Some assistance may be gained from
Article l(q) of the Convention, which defines "property" as "assets of every kind,
whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible,
and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets".
The property concerned must be or represent the "proceeds of drug
trafficking", an expression which requires to be understood in the light ofwhat is
now section 49 of the Proceeds of Crime (Scotland) Act 1995, which makes it
clear that the expression is not restricted to UK drug trafficking, much less to
trafficking in a particular jurisdiction within the UK908. Finally, there must be an
intention to avoid one (or more) of three things, namely prosecution for a drug
trafficking offence, the making of a confiscation order or the enforcement of such
an order.
Section 14(l)(a) may be thought of as dealing with the situation in which
907 Alison i, 330; R v Hall (Edward) [1985] Crim LR 337.
908Section 49(2).
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the relevant property is retained by the trafficker in its existing place and state,
subject to the taking of steps-concealment or disguise-to make it appear other than
it is. Section 14( 1 )(b) may be thought of as dealing with the situation in which
more active steps-conversion, transfer or removal from the jurisdiction-are taken
to launder the asset(s). These concepts are subject to a degree of overlap and it
will not always be easy, or necessary, to determine, for example, where
concealment ends and disguise begins. The intention seems to be that the
provision will be capable of application to any dealing with property in which the
prosecutor has been able to prove the purpose set out in the section. In particular,
section 14(4) provides that "references to concealing or disguising any property
include references to concealing or disguising its nature, source, location,
disposition, movement or ownership or any rights with respect to it." This is
derived directly from Article 3(l)(b)(ii) of the 1988 UN Drugs Convention.
The Council ofEurope Laundering Convention
The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime was opened for signature on 8
November 1990, the draft being prepared over a series of meetings between 1987
and 1990. The 1988 UN Drugs Convention was, therefore, adopted during the
period of discussion of the Laundering Convention. It played an important role in
the eventual form of the Laundering Convention and a conscious effort was made
to ensure that the definitions in particular were in harmony909. This was, no doubt,
rendered easier by the fact that some at least of the delegates at the committee of
Governmental experts who met under the authority of the European Committee on
Crime Problems ("CDPC") also participated in the negotiations which produced
the 1988 UN Drugs Convention910. The important difference between the
Laundering Convention and the 1988 UN Drugs Convention is that the
909 See the comments of the Secretary to the Expert Group which prepared the Laundering
Convention: HG Nilsson, "The Council ofEurope Laundering Convention: A Recent Example of
a Developing International Criminal Law" 2 Criminal Law Forum 426 (1991).
910 Mr G Polimeni of Italy chaired both the Committees of the Whole at Vienna and the Council of
Europe Select Committee.
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Laundering Convention is not restricted to drug trafficking offences. It was
considered that the "predicate offences" upon which the operation of the
Laundering Convention is based should include drug trafficking, terrorist
offences, organised crime, violent crimes, offences involving the sexual
exploitation of children and young persons, extortion, kidnapping, environmental
offences, economic fraud, insider trading and other serious offences.
Unfortunately, from the point of view of the present work, it is not
possible to attribute the particular contributions made by individual national
delegations to the development of the Laundering Convention. That is a matter of
deliberate policy on the part of the Council of Europe, which proceeds on the
basis that "European Conventions are elaborated by committees of Governmental
experts... [T]hey...follow, in their proceedings, the general customs of diplomacy,
including that of deliberating behind closed doors. Moreover, committee
members, although appointed by Governments, are not delegates but independent
experts who sit on the committee in their personal capacity: they are not bound by
instructions from their capitals and cannot engage their Governments'
responsibility. This status enhances their personal independence and enables them
to agree to European solutions on the basis of an objective assessment of the legal
problems involved. They do not, as delegates would, only voice their
Governments' policy thinking"911. The records of the discussions during the
preparation of the Convention are, therefore, not available.
Chapter II of the Convention is concerned with "measures to be taken at
national level". These include confiscation912 and the criminalising of money
laundering913, both of which are straightforward enough. As the Explanatory
Report makes clear914, the provisions of Chapter II are substantially influenced by
the 1988 UN Drugs Convention, though they represent some slight widening of
the types of conduct covered and a very substantial widening of the categories of





predicate offence; Article 1 defines "proceeds" as "any economic advantage from
criminal offences", without restriction, and "predicate offence" as "any criminal
offence as a result of which proceeds were generated". The application of the
remainder of the Convention follows from that. The general detail of these
provisions is, with two important exceptions, of limited significance for us
because the UK was able, on 28 September 1992, to deposit its instrument of
ratification without having been required to legislate at all.
The first exception relates to Article 6, which required the criminalisation
of money laundering, Although the UK had, in the 1990 Act, extended its
legislation so as to cover drugs money laundering as described in the 1988 UN
Drugs Convention, it had not, in 1992, yet legislated to make the laundering of the
proceeds of all crimes an offence. That was to be done in the Criminal Justice Act
1993.
The other exception relates to Article 2, which requires parties to "adopt
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate
instrumentalities and proceeds or property the value ofwhich corresponds to such
proceeds". Since Scotland did not have an all-crimes confiscation regime (unlike
England and Wales which had such a regime in the Criminal Justice Act 1988) it
was not possible for the UK to comply in Scotland with Article 2 except as
regards drug trafficking. That was not permitted to stand in the way of ratification,
however, and a reservation was made so that Article 2 should apply only to
offences which constituted drug trafficking as defined in Scottish legislation. It
was April 1, 1996 with the coming into force of the 1995 Act before Scots law
was put in a position to comply fully with the requirement to confiscate on the
basis of all kinds of predicate offences and only on 1 May 1999 that it was
possible to do so on behalfof other countries915.
Chapter III of the Convention deals with international co-operation. Here,
the Council of Europe experts had the opportunity to draw upon not only the 1988
UN Drugs Convention but also ECMA. Indeed, the Explanatory Report tells us
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that it was intended that "to the extent that the scope of application of the present
Convention and the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters converge, parties should, if no reasons to the contrary exist, endeavour to
use the latter convention"916. Since, as we have seen, the UK does not require a
treaty basis for most sorts of mutual assistance, the treaty under which requests
are made is largely immaterial. However, Articles 11 to 17 which deal with
assistance by way of "provisional measures" and by way of confiscation go rather
beyond what is contemplated by ECMA. The "provisional measures"
contemplated by the Laundering Convention include "freezing or seizing, to
prevent any dealing in, transfer or disposal ofproperty which, at a later stage, may
be the subject of a request for confiscation or which might be such as to satisfy the
request"917. These are the matters dealt with in UK law by restraint orders and,
whilst the facility for search or seizure contemplated by Article 5 ECMA might in
some cases be apt to meet the obligation, in many cases something more is
required. It should be recalled that ordinary domestic powers of search were not
considered to be adequate at the time DTOA and the 1987 Act were enacted and
that section 8 of the 1990 Act, which makes search and seizure in Scotland
available as a means ofmutual assistance, only provides the sheriff with power to
grant warrant equivalent to that which he can grant at common law in a municipal
case. Critically, however, Article 13(1) of the Laundering Convention provides
that the procedures for obtaining and enforcing confiscation are to be governed by
the law of the requested party. Until the 1995 Act came into force, that meant that
confiscation of the proceeds ofnon drug crime918 was not available in Scotland.
Article 39 of the Laundering Convention contemplates the making of
bilateral agreements on the matters dealt with in the Convention for purposes of
supplementing or strengthening its provisions or facilitating the application of the
915See 299 below.
916Para 36. The context is assistance in identifying and tracing property but the meaning seems




principles embodied in it. The UK has developed a model bilateral agreement919 to
serve this purpose, which is of interest because it at once indicates the matters as
to which the UK wishes particular procedures to be followed and also where the
UK wishes to ensure that the Convention takes effect as widely as possible. The
desire for width of application is evident from 2 references to property being
available for provisional measures or confiscation irrespective of its relationship
to the offence or offences for which the order may be imposed920. The matters as
regards which the UK wishes particular procedures to be followed are traceable to
the needs of municipal law and include the provision of certified copy
documents921 (so making proof in a UK court of what has happened in a foreign
jurisdiction much easier) and evidence of the commencement or intended
commencement of proceedings922 (so making it possible to satisfy section 29(2)
and (3) of the 1995 Act as regards the granting of restraint orders).
The EC Directive on prevention of the use of the financial system for
the purpose ofmoney laundering
The Directive was adopted by the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers on
10 June 1991. It occupies a pivotal position in the development of UK money
laundering law and is therefore of considerable significance for this part of the
thesis. The Directive was based on the 1988 UN Drugs Convention, the Basle
Statement of Principles, recommendations of FATF and the Laundering
Convention; and it provided the occasion for the substantial expansion of UK
money laundering law effected by part of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 and by
the Money Laundering Regulations 1993923.
Excursis: the First Pillar and criminal law
The UK has tended to emphasise the relationship between criminal law and
national sovereignty rather more than most member states and to take the view
that the EC has no competence in criminal law matters. This was spelled out in
"'Reproduced in Gilmore, Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Business Regulatory Matters, 260.




the context of the consideration by the House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Communities of the Proposal for a Money Laundering Directive924. As
the Committee summarised the position, "the Treasury in their Explanatory
Memorandum stated that as presently drafted Articles 2, 5(1) and 6 of the
Directive 'relate to the field of criminal law and therefore are outside Community
competence'. As described more precisely in oral evidence, the United Kingdom
Government's objection is that the Community cannot require the imposition of
measures or penalties of a specifically criminal character. It may require the
imposition at national level of sanctions or penalties of sufficient gravity to deter
certain conduct, but it is for the national authorities to exercise their judgement as
to whether these sanctions should be of a civil, administrative or criminal
character"925. This position was implicitly based on the truism that Community
law has no criminal law element as such. At the time of the establishment of the
Communities there was no desire to cover criminal law and that was left within
the sovereign jurisdiction of the Member States926. The Select Committee was not,
however, persuaded by the Government point of view. It pointed out that nothing
in the treaties excludes national criminal law from the ambit of Community law
and laid emphasis on the argument made by Advocate General Lenz in Cowan v
Tresor Publique927 that "for the assessment of a legal rule from the point of view
ofCommunity law what is important is not the area of law in which it is found but
its substantive content". In other words, it is not the civil, administrative or
criminal law character of the procedure selected which matters but whether the
substantive matters dealt with are within the scope of Community law. In a
memorandum submitted to the Select Committee, Smith and others pointed out
923 SI 1993 No 1933.
924 Session 1990-91; 1st Report (HL Paper 6).
925 Op cit, 15.
926 Hanna G Sevenster, "Criminal Law and EC Law" (1992) 29 CMLR 29; Julian JE Schutte, "The
European Market of 1993: A Test for a Regional Model of Supranational Criminal Justice or of
Inter-Regional Co-operation", in Principles and Proceduresfor a New Transnational Criminal
Law (ed Albin Eser and Otto Lagodny), Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International
Criminal Law, 1992, 387; Fleur Keyser-Rignaldi, "European Integration with regard to the
Confiscation of the Proceeds ofCrime" (1992) European Law Review 499, 502.
271
that obligations to change criminal law had been imposed on member States by a
range of Community law obligations. They gave examples and concluded that "it
is not per se outside the competence of the Community to engage in the
harmonisation or co-ordination of issues of criminal law for purposes which come
within the wider objective of the Treaties"928. By way of example, we may cite
Criminal Proceedings against Calfa929, in which the ECJ held that a sentence of a
Greek criminal court, pursuant to national legislation, excluding an Italian
national from Greece for life following his conviction of drug trafficking was
precluded by those provisions of the EC Treaty and a Directive930 which deal with
the freedom for recipients of services (in this case, tourism) to go to another
member state to receive them.
The UK Government did not support its position with a legally reasoned
argument and it is suggested that it is a position which owed more to politics than
to legal analysis. As Sevenster has said, "both the Treaties and secondary
Community law are sources of obligations on Member States in the sphere of
criminal law. An analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the EC...shows
that the sovereignty involved-at least if taken in an absolute sense-has become an
illusion931. The corollary of this, and of the House of Lords Select Committee's
analysis, is that some aspects of criminal law are within the scope of Community
competence and hence within the First Pillar arrangements. The general position,
however, is as stated by Cullen: "Criminal law remains within the jurisdiction of
the Member States. It is not immune to indirect influence by norms of Community
law but the Community lacks any general competence to create substantive
927 Case 186/87, [1989] ECR 195.
928 Memorandum by Raymond Smith, David Freestone and Patrick Birkinshaw, reproduced in
Select Committee Report, Written Evidence, 30.
929 Case C-348/96; Times LawReport, January 21" 1999.
930 Council Directive 64/221/EEC of February 25 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures
concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of
public policy, public security or public health.
931 Op cit, 29.
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offences or to prescribe criminal penalties"932.
Baker has criticised as outdated the perspective that the economic origins
of the EC mean that its influence upon criminal justice matters has been
"specialised, of marginal interest, and as serving a regulatory rather than a 'truly
criminal' purpose"933. Consideration of the effect of the Money Laundering
Directive below will demonstrate that, in that case at least, the influence of EC
law has gone well beyond the merely regulatory. It will also demonstrate,
however, that the Directive was originally explained as having an essentially
regulatory purpose. Examination of the examples given in the literature of EC
influence on criminal law suggests that, so far, most influence has indeed been in
areas with a regulatory flavour934. This, it is suggested, reflects the areas with
which EC law has in practice been concerned rather than any issue of underlying
principle.
It is already the case that when a Member State in fact uses the criminal
law to fulfil an obligation which it has in Community law, EC law will be relevant
in the criminal court. In the case of tachograph equipment, for example, the UK
legislation935 refers to and adopts the Regulation936 in such a way that the charge
which the accused faces refers explicitly to EC law937 and the Court might well
refer to the case law of the ECJ in coming to a decision938. In such cases, and in
other cases where EC law is in fact relevant, Article 177 EC provides for the
referring of questions of EC law to the ECJ for decision (though in R v Carrierm
the English Court of Appeal refused to make a reference, even though the parties
were agreed that it should be made, on the ground that the two years' delay which
932 Peter Cullen, "Fraud against the Community Budget: a common concern" ECTJ 3/2 [1999] 61,
68.
933 Estella Baker, "Taking European Criminal Law Seriously" [1998] Crim LR 361, 363.
934 See the examples given in Janet Dine, "European Community Criminal Law?" [1993] Crim LR
246.
935 The Transport Act 1968 s97(l).
936 Council Regulation 3821/85 (EEC).
937 See the charge reproduced in Reith v Skinner 1996 SCCR 506.
938 In Reith v Skinner, the High Court referred to Pierre Goupil, ECJ 21 March 1996, Case C-
39/95 and to Mrozek v Jager, ECJ 21 March 1996, Case C-335/94.
939 [1994] 1 CMLR457.
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this would induce would do substantial harm to the fairness of the trial and in
Westwater v Thomson940 the High Court refused to make a reference on the ground
that the answer to the point at issue was so obvious that a reference was
unnecessary). For Scots criminal law, the mechanism is provided by Chapter 31
of the Act of Adjournal (Criminal Procedure Rules) 1996. Such references from
Scotland have not been very frequent and have not related to anything which
could be said to be in the mainstream of criminal law. Renton and Brown cites
only 2 examples of the procedure941, both of which relate to fisheries regulation.
Nevertheless, the possibility is there and provides a means by which the ECJ can
influence Scots criminal law in a direct way.
To this we should add reference to sections 29 and 57 of the Scotland Act
1998. Section 29(2)(d) provides that legislation of the Scottish Parliament will be
outside the Parliament's competence, and hence not law, if it conflicts with
Community law. Section 57 (2) provides that a member of the Scottish Executive
has no power to do any act which is incompatible with Community law. We shall
not analyse these provisions beyond noting that they place Community law in the
same situation as the (ECHR derived) Convention rights under the Scotland
Act942. How far they affect Scottish criminal law in the future will depend on how
far Community competence extends into the criminal law sphere and also on how
alive Scottish practitioners come to be to Community law issues.
The UK approach to the Directive
In attempting to determine the UK contribution and attitude to the Directive as it
finally stood, we can derive considerable assistance from the Money Laundering
Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities943.
The Committee had before it the Draft Directive944 and decided to examine three
questions in particular. These were, first, whether the Directive is a necessary
940 1992 SCCR 624.
941 Paras 37-03; Wither v Cowie, Wither v Wood 1990 SCCR 741; Walkinshaw vMarshall 1991
SCCR 397.




addition to other international instruments, secondly whether the Community had
the competence to promulgate the Directive and, thirdly, whether the proposed
duties of supervision and informing were too wide945.
In the course of considering these questions the Committee took evidence
from Treasury and Home Office officials and the Minutes of Evidence are
annexed to the Report946. The officials concerned were both closely involved in
the development ofUK proceeds of crime policy and it seems safe to proceed on
the basis that the answers they gave, together with the memoranda submitted by
Treasury, represent an accurate statement of the UK perception of
developments947.
The Commission Proposal for the Directive was accompanied by an
Explanatory Memorandum, reproduced at Appendix 3 to the Select Committee
Report. It was explained there that, whilst money laundering "must mainly be
combatted by penal means...and in the framework of international co-operation
among law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities...a penal approach
should not be the only strategy to combat money laundering since, as credit and
financial institutions are frequently used to carry out these kinds of activities, the
soundness and stability of the particular institutions involved as well as the
prestige of the financial system as a whole could be seriously jeopardised". It was
asserted on this basis that "the Community, which is responsible for adopting the
necessary measures to ensure the soundness and stability of the European
financial system, cannot be indifferent to the involvement of credit and financial
institutions in money laundering". Concern was expressed about the possibility
that the market would be distorted if EC Member States proceeded at different
speeds which would have had the effect that the costs associated with compliance
would have affected the financial industry unevenly across Europe.
945 Report, para 4.
946 References to the evidence are given here in the form: Minutes [].
947 The principal Explanatory Memorandum submitted by Treasury was signed by the Economic
Secretary to the Treasury.
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The UK supported "the broad thrust of the EC proposal"948. It was noted949
that the substance of the draft Directive followed closely the Recommendations of
FATF and it was asserted950 that "the Government attaches high priority to the war
against drugs and money laundering. Internationally, the UK has played a leading
role in taking measures against money laundering". Nevertheless, the Treasury
Memorandum put down the marker that "it is arguable that provisions in Article 2,
5(1) and (6) of the Directive relate to the field of criminal law and therefore are
outside Community competence"951.
The proposition that an absence of Community competence followed
necessarily from the fact that a matter related to criminal law was demolished, at
least to the satisfaction of the Select Committee, in a memorandum submitted by
3 scholars from Hull University952 and their argument is summarised above953. It is
clear that the UK was at odds with the Commission on the point. Supplementary
evidence given by Treasury, describing events at the Council of Finance Ministers
on 8 October 1990, explained954 that the UK "along with most other Member
States" considered that provisions related to the field of criminal law were outside
Community competence. The UK had therefore "with the support of a large
majority of other Member States" suggested that the approach adopted in the
Insider Dealing Directive955 should be followed. That approach was to impose on
member States a series of obligations to "prohibit" certain conduct956, whereas
Article 2 of the draft Money Laundering Directive would have required Member
States to ensure that money laundering was "treated as a criminal offence".
The UK's suggestion was put into effect and Article 2 was amended so that
it merely requires the prohibition ofmoney laundering. This was supplemented by







955 Council Directive 89/592 EEC (OJ L334/30).
956 The word "prohibit" had been used even in the draft of that Directive-see [1987] 2 CMLR 765.
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a Statement in which the Member States, recalling their signatures to the 1988 UN
Drugs Convention and the Laundering Convention and conscious of the
derivation from those instruments of the Directive definition ofmoney laundering,
undertook to "take all necessary steps by 31 December 1992 at the latest to enact
criminal legislation enabling them to comply with their obligations under those
instruments"957. The date selected was that by which compliance with the
Directive was required to be achieved.
As this Statement anticipated, the UK did in fact use criminal law to
implement the Directive. It was the requirement to do so to which the UK
objected, rather than the proposition that money laundering should be an offence.
Mr A Harding of the Home Office made the position clear to the Select
Committee: "We are very concerned at the implication for Community
competence of purported Community law that would require the creation of
criminal offences and also, as the draft Directive would do, would go into the area
of the enforcement of criminal law. Those have seemed to us very much matters
for Member States to handle, those matters that go very directly to issues of
sovereignty, and the United Kingdom would indeed be very concerned if such a
precedent were set"958.
The issue, then, had nothing to do with money laundering. The argument
was about the limits of Community competence generally and money laundering
merely provided the context. Since the UK adopts a dualist position as regards
international law, refusal to participate in a treaty has no legal consequences. A
Directive is binding959 and failure to implement a Directive renders Member
States open to proceedings in the European Court of Justice under Article 169 EC.
Voting procedure as regards the Directive was by qualified majority960 which is
957 Statement by Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European
Communities Meeting within the Council Concerning the Council Directive of 10 June 1991 (OJ
L166/83).
958 Minutes 13.
959 Article 189 EC.
960 Minutes 10.
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true of Directives over a wide range of subjects961. The Luxembourg
Compromise962, under which there may be said to be a "quasi-veto", applies only
where there is a vital national interest at issue and such interests tend to be defined
narrowly963. It is in any event little used. If the UK is not assiduous in resisting the
assertion of a Community competence to make requirements in the criminal law
field there is at least a theoretical risk that a Directive might at some stage impose
on the UK, against its wishes, obligations derived from international agreements
in which the UK had declined to participate. Of course, if the House of Lords
Select Committee was correct in its view that "there is nothing in the EEC Treaty
or in other Community Treaties which excludes national criminal law from the
ambit of national community law"964, that theoretical risk already exists.
The other issue which should be noted here is that of the scope of the
Directive as regards predicate offences. The Proposal argued for its application to
all serious crime965 but the Directive as adopted is restricted to drugs offences.
This restriction was said by Treasury to have been suggested by the UK to
minimise the complications arising from difficulties in agreeing a harmonised
definition of serious crime966. This can probably be taken at face value, since the
UK was to sign the Laundering Convention in November 1990 and plainly had no
objection to expanding the concept of the predicate offence well beyond drug
trafficking. It is of some interest, however, that the UK did not suggest dealing
with the problem of defining "serious" crime by simply applying the Directive to
"any criminal offence as a result of which proceeds were generated", following
the model of Article 1 of the Laundering Convention. It is possible that the
mindset ofUK negotiators may have been limited by the restriction in English law
of confiscation of the proceeds of non drug crime to cases prosecuted on
961 David AO Edwards and Robert C Lane, European Community Law: An Introduction, 2nd
edition, Butterworths, 1995, 27.
962 Bulletin of the European Economic Community, No 3, 1966, 9-10.





indictment (with some limited exceptions) and with a threshold of £10,000
proceeds before the procedure applied.
It should now be said that, according to a Commission press release967, the
recommendation of the Second Commission Report to the European Parliament
and the Council on the implementation of the Money Laundering Directive968 that
the need to keep the Directive up-to-date "argues strongly in favour of a widening
of the range of predicate offences covered"969 has been accepted and that a new
Directive is in preparation to achieve such widening. The Commission has,
however, expressed concern that this will once again raise the issue ofprohibition
as opposed to criminalisation970.
As adopted, the Directive required Member States to prohibit money
laundering and also to (i) impose a duty on credit and financial institutions, their
directors and employees to report suspected money laundering to the enforcement
authorities and at the authorities' request furnish them with all necessary
information (Article 6); (ii) impose duties as regards the handling of suspicious
transactions (Article 7); (iii) prevent institutions, their directors and their
employees from disclosing to the customer concerned or to any third party that
information has been passed by them to the enforcement authorities (Article 8);
and (iv) provide immunity for disclosures in good faith of information to the
enforcement authorities (Article 9). All of these were first implemented by
primary legislation in the Criminal Justice Act 1993.
Other requirements of the Directive were capable ofbeing implemented by
secondary legislation made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act
1972 and this was done with the Money Laundering Regulations 1993. The detail
of these Regulations is considered below. The relevant requirements were to
impose duties as to (i) the identification of customers (Article 3); (ii) the
966 Minutes 11.





maintenance of records of identification and transactions (Article 4); (iii) the
examination with special attention of any transaction particularly likely to be
related to money laundering (Article 5); and (iv) the establishment and
maintenance of adequate procedures of internal control and communication and
staff training (Article 11).
The 1993 legislation
Following the adoption of the Directive, the UK Government set about
overhauling UK money laundering law. In May 1992, as part of that exercise, the
Treasury issued a consultation paper entitled Implementation of the EC Money
Laundering Directive ("the 1992 consultation paper") in which there was stated
the Government's assessment of how far UK law already satisfied the
requirements of the Directive and what would require to be done to satisfy those
requirements fully.
The position as the Government saw it was that UK law and practice was
"to a considerable extent already in line with the provisions of the Money
Laundering Directive" and that implementation would "essentially entail an
elaboration and extension of existing law" rather than more fundamental
change971. From this starting point, the consultation paper went on to examine
each of the UK's money laundering offences in light of the Directive and to
identify the changes which would be required.
The assessment was that the duty to report suspected money laundering
and furnish information972, the requirements of the Directive as regards handling
suspicious transactions973, the prevention of disclosure that information has been
passed to the enforcement authorities974, the immunity for disclosures in good
faith to the authorities975 and the duty on supervisory bodies to report976 would







require to be implemented by primary legislation. Customer identification977,
record keeping978, examination of transactions particularly likely to be related to
money laundering979 and internal control and communication and staff training980
were all judged suitable for secondary legislation981.
It was considered that in most respects DTOA section 24, its (unspecified)
Scottish equivalent and section 14 of the 1990 Act satisfied Article 2 of the
Directive. However, it was noted that the definition of money laundering in
Article 1 of the Directive went beyond DTOA section 24 in that it extends to
simple acquisition of or possession or use of the proceeds of trafficking, albeit
with knowledge. It was therefore considered necessary to expand the existing
money laundering offences to provide that a person who acquires, possesses or
uses the proceeds of drug trafficking in the knowledge that they are proceeds
commits an offence982.
This was done in section 17 of the 1993 Act, which, for Scotland, inserted
a new section 42A in the 1987 Act983 (now consolidated in section 37 of the
(Consolidation) Act). Subsection (1) provided that "A person is guilty of an
offence if, knowing that any property is, or in whole or in part directly or
indirectly represents, another person's proceeds of drug trafficking, he acquires or
uses that property or has possession of it. Article 2 of the Directive simply
requires Member States to "ensure that money laundering as defined in this
Directive is prohibited" and the definition in Article 1 includes "the acquisition,
possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property
was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such
activity".





981 1992 consultation paper paras 8 and 9.
982 1992 consultation paper para 15.
983 Section 16 inserted a new section 26A, in identical terms, into DTOA.
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1993 Act was hung, the legislation in fact went beyond what the Directive
requires. The Directive only requires the prohibition of the acts described,
whereas the legislation criminalises it. More subtly, and perhaps more important
for the present purpose, the Directive only requires the prohibition of acquisition,
possession or use of property if its criminal provenance is known at the time it is
received. Section 17 however, was apt to deal with the case of a person who
discovers that property which he already possesses has such a provenance and
continues to possess it without availing himself of subsection (5)(b) which makes
an exception in the case of a person who makes a disclosure to the authorities of
his suspicion that the property is tainted as soon as it is reasonable for him to do
so. In Scots law at least there is a clear parallel with the law of reset, under which
"the person accused may originally have got the goods honestly, but if he
afterwards finds that he got them from a thief, the moment he knows this he is
guilty of reset, unless he takes steps at once by informing the police to show that
he has no guilty intention with regard to the goods"984. This discrepancy may be
traced to the 1992 consultation paper, where words very similar to those now
appearing in the legislation are used985. It may be that the Treasury officials who
drafted that consultation thought that they were paraphrasing the Directive
accurately. The Home Office was the lead department for the 1993 Act and might
ormight not have noticed the point.
The Consultation Paper noted986 that Article 6 of the Directive required
member States to ensure that financial institutions, their directors and employees
reported on their own initiative facts and circumstances which might be an
indication of money laundering, whilst Article 7 require that institutions should
refrain from carrying out transactions until they have informed the authorities. It
further noted987 that section 24 of DTOA, and its Scottish and Northern Irish
equivalents, fell short of the requirements of Articles 6 and 7 in that they did not
984 Gold v Nielson (1907) 5 Adam 423 per Lord Justice-Clerk (MacDonald) at 431.




require the making of reports (they only provided a defence where a report was
made) and did not apply to employees who became aware of (but were not
themselves involved in) money laundering activity. It was therefore considered
that there would have to be an offence whereby any person who, acting in the
course of any trade, business or profession, knows or suspects that another person
is engaged in money laundering, shall be guilty of a offence unless he discloses
any matter on which that knowledge or suspicion is based to a constable as soon
as practicable988. Such an offence was created by section 19 of the 1993 Act,
which inserted a new section 43A into the 1987 Act989.
Once again, what the UK enacted went beyond what the Directive
required. Articles 6 and 12 of the Directive limit the obligation to "credit and
financial institutions and their directors and employees" and other professions and
categories of undertaking "which engage in activities which are particularly likely
to be used for money laundering purposes" but the offence created by the UK
legislation, for both Scotland and England, applies to any person who acquires, in
the course of his "trade, profession, business or employment" information
founding a knowledge or suspicion that a person is engaged in drug money
laundering.
Article 8 of the Directive deals with "tipping off' and provides simply that
credit and financial institutions and their directors and employees shall not
disclose to the customer concerned nor to other third persons that information has
been transmitted to the authorities in accordance with Articles 6 and 7 or that a
money laundering investigation is being carried out. The tipping off offence
provided for by DTOA section 31 depended on an application having been made
for a production order (under DTOA s27) or a search warrant (under DTOA s28)
and it was considered that this required to be widened990. It was noted, however,
that the tipping off offence under section 42 of the 1987 Act was not made to
988 Consultation Paper, para 19.
989 For full analysis, see Alastair N Brown, Proceeds ofCrime..., 159. Section 18 inserted a new
section 26B, in identical terms, into DTOA.
990 Consultation Paper para 22.
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depend on such an application and that, accordingly, Scots law did not require to
be amended. Nevertheless, section 19 of the 1993 Act inserted a new section 43B
into the 1987 Act in terms which were the direct equivalent of the new provision
introduced for English law by section 18991 (inserting a new section 26C into
DTOA). The new Scottish provision sat alongside section 42 of the 1987 Act and
in due course both were consolidated in the (Consolidation) Act, section 42
becoming section 36 of the (Consolidation) Act and section 43B becoming section
40 of that Act992.
Section 43B went rather beyond what was required by the Directive (as
did DTOA section 26C). It followed what had been done in relation to the
obligation to report suspicions in that it applied to everyone, rather than merely
the institutions and limited class of persons referred to in the Directive.
Furthermore, whereas the Directive merely sought to prohibit the disclosure to the
customer or third parties that information had been transmitted to the authorities
or that a money laundering investigation is being carried out, the section 43B
offences (there were three of them) applied to the disclosure of anything likely to
prejudice the investigation. All three offences also apply even where no
investigation has yet commenced, provided that an investigation is in
contemplation and the first of the offences applies even where there has been no
disclosure but an investigation is contemplated.
In a Scots law context, this has to be seen in combination with section 42
of the 1987 Act (now section 36 of the (Consolidation) Act), subsection (1) of
which already provided that "a person who, knowing or suspecting that an
investigation into drug trafficking is taking place, does anything which is likely to
prejudice the investigation is guilty of an offence". This is wider than the
Directive in that it applies to everyone and not the limited class of persons
identified in the Directive; it relates to investigations into drug trafficking, an
991 There is a minor difference as regards the position ofCustoms Officers as recipients of
disclosures (see Alastair N Brown, Proceeds ofCrime... 162) but that need not concern us here.
992 For detailed analysis of section 36 of the (Consolidation) Act see Alastair N Brown, Proceeds
ofCrime... 151; for such analysis of section 40 of that Act, see ibid 161.
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expression which includes money laundering but is very much wider than that993;
and it applies not merely to disclosing that information had been given to the
authorities or that an investigation is being carried out but to the doing of anything
at all which is likely to prejudice the investigation.
In short, although the 1990 Act and the 1993 Act were ostensibly intended
to implement the 1988 UN Drugs Convention and certain aspects of the Directive,
respectively, every money laundering offence created by these two Acts was in
some way wider than the obligation under international or EC law would have
required. The international and supra-national instruments certainly provided the
opportunity for legislation and indeed made some legislation necessary; but it
would be entirely incorrect to assume that the UK confined itself to the minimum
so required. It looks very much more as though the UK saw the Directive in
particular as a golden opportunity to introduce far reaching legislation.
There is a further respect in which the UK plainly used the Directive as an
opportunity to extend the law. Sections 29 to 32 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993
made insertions in the 1988 Act creating money laundering offences as regards
non-drug predicate offences. Except in two respects, these put the law as regards
the laundering of such proceeds onto exactly the same footing as the law relating
to the laundering of drug trafficking proceeds. The exceptions were that no
offence of failing to report suspicion was created as regards non-drug predicate
offences and that the tipping off offence (which became section 93D of the 1988
Act) had no equivalent to the very wide ambit of section 42 of the 1987 Act. With
these exceptions, however, these provisions used the very wording of their drug
trafficking equivalents, the only changes being those necessitated by the need to
refer to "criminal conduct" rather than "drug trafficking". The Directive applied
only to drug trafficking and did not, therefore, oblige the UK to apply any of its
requirements to the laundering of the proceeds of non-drug predicate offences.
The writer has analysed the meaning and effect of the Money Laundering
993 Proceeds ofCrime (Scotland) Act 1995 s49(2).
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Regulations elsewhere994 and repetition here is unnecessary. In large measure they
do indeed implement the Directive and the differences between the Regulations
and the Directive are substantially matters of drafting style. It is, however, worth
devoting a few paragraphs to the scope of the application of the Regulations
because the approach which was taken provides a further example of the UK
going beyond the minimum necessary for implementation.
Articles 3, 4, 10 and 11 of the Directive all make requirements in relation
to "credit and financial institutions". In this they pick up the justification for the
Directive asserted in its preamble, which is that "when credit and financial
institutions are used to launder proceeds...the soundness and stability of the
institution concerned and confidence in the financial system as a whole could be
seriously jeopardised". "Credit institution" is defined in Article 1 of the Directive
by reference to the first Banking Co-ordination Directive995. "Financial institution"
is defined by reference to the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive996 and the
first Life Directive997.
Had the UK sought to achieve only the minimum implementation required
by the Directive the scope of the Regulations could have been defined by
reference to the Directive definitions of "credit institution" and "financial
institution". As the Treasury Consultation makes clear, however, the UK was
going well beyond that minimum.
Article 12 of the Directive requires member States to "ensure that the
provisions of this Directive are extended in whole or in part to professions and to
categories of undertakings, other than the credit and financial institutions referred
to in Article 1, which engage in activities which are particularly likely to be used
for money laundering purposes". Article 15 permits Member States to "adopt or
retain in force stricter provisions in the field covered by the Directive to prevent
money laundering". The Consultation identified as factors of importance in





determining whether a profession or undertaking was likely to be used for money
laundering purposes, first, the nature of the activities engaged in, secondly, the
extent to which client money is handled and, thirdly, the role of the profession in
acting as an intermediary in the "formal" financial sector. On the basis of these
facts it was thought that accountants, auctioneers, casinos, commodity and
commodity futures brokers and dealers, solicitors, licensed conveyancers and
authorised practitioners all posed a particular risk998. That assessment has since
received some confirmation in the FATF-VII Report on Money Laundering
Typologies999, which noted "an increase in the number of solicitors, attorneys,
accountants, financial advisors, notaries and other fiduciaries whose services are
employed to assist in the disposal of criminal profits"1000. A similar trend was
noted in the 1998 Typologies Report1001.
The Regulations proceed under reference neither to credit and financial
institutions nor even to such institutions supplemented by a list of other
professions and categories of undertaking. Instead, the scope of application of the
Regulations is determined according to the nature of the business transacted. The
focus is on the activity rather than on the person (natural or juridical) carrying out
that activity. The Regulations apply to "relevant financial business" which is
defined by reference to a list of types of business activity1002. Out of 9 rather
broadly stated types of activity on that list, all but one1003 of the first 7 are defined
under reference to UK legislation1004. The UK legislation referred to by the fifth of
these seven is subordinate legislation which itself implemented a Directive1005.
Only the eighth and ninth types of business listed are defined under direct
998 Para 40.
999 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Annual Report 1996-1997, Annex 3.
1000 Ibid para 20.
1001 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: Money Laundering Typologies 1998, para
43.
1002 Reg 4.
io°3 jjje busjness 0f the National Savings Bank.
,004 Reg 4(1), (3) and (4).
1005 The Second Banking Co-ordination Directive.
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reference to EC instruments1006.
This approach, taken when there was no reason in principle not to refer
directly to relevant EC legislation, indicates a preference for working as far as
possible within a municipal law frame of reference. It is also clear once again that
the UK was using its obligations under a non-municipal instrument as an
opportunity to apply control as widely as possible.
The 1994 model bilateral agreement
In 1994 the UK developed a Model Agreement Concerning Restraint and
Confiscation of the Proceeds and Instruments of Crime1007. The model is
expressed to be without prejudice to obligations between the parties arising from
other treaties1008 of which the 1988 UN Drugs Convention and the Laundering
Convention are the most obvious examples. Like the Model Agreement to
supplement the Laundering Convention, much of the 1994 Model seeks to ensure
that a request made to the UK contains the information necessary to give it
practical effect. So, for example, Article 9, which deals with restraint requires that
a request should include information about the commencement or intended
commencement of proceedings. The 2 models are different, however, in that in
the 1994 Model it has been thought necessary to set out information about the
content of requests to a level of detail which is not necessary in the Model to
supplement the Laundering Convention. There is no special significance in this; it
simply reflects the fact that the Laundering Convention itself provides most of the
detail necessary on these matters.
The Scottish Law Commission Report and the 1995 Act
The Proceeds of Crime (Scotland) Act 1995 consolidated the 1987 Act and the
proceeds of crime provisions of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1995. The
latter Act was a pre-consolidation measure which was only in force on one day1009,
1006 The Second Banking Co-ordination Directive and the First Life Directive.




after which it was replaced by the Proceeds of Crime (Scotland) Act (which we
shall continue to call "the 1995 Act"). The exercise gave effect to the Scottish
Law Commission Report on Confiscation and Forfeiture1010 ("the SLC Report").
The background to the Report was a reference from the Secretary of State
for Scotland under the Law Commissions Act 1965, requiring the Scottish Law
Commission ("the SLC") to consider the adequacy of the law on the forfeiture of
the instrumentalities and proceeds of "criminal activity in general" and "whether
further provision should be made to enable courts in Scotland to order forfeiture
of the proceeds of criminal activity generally and property derived from such
proceeds"1011. That reference was made in October 1987 and matters proceeded
very slowly. A Discussion Paper was issued in 19891012 but it was 1994 before the
SLC reported. In the intervening years, of course, proceeds of crime law had
developed significantly. Of particular significance was the fact that the
Laundering Convention had been concluded and ratified by the UK.
The SLC, in completing its Report, was aware of the international
dimension to proceeds of crime law and of the need to take account of the
obligations which the Laundering Convention "imposes" on its Parties1013. In its
introductory pages the Report noted that criminal law policy must include an
international element and that domestic legislators could no longer treat crime
merely as a national phenomenon. It referred to both the 1988 UN Drugs
Convention and the Laundering Convention1014. The UK's reservation on ratifying
the latter, restricting its application in Scotland to drug trafficking offences was
noted1015. The SLC observed in particular that Article 2 paragraph 1 of the
Laundering Convention required each Party to "adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate instrumentalities and
proceeds or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds" and took
1010 Scot Law Com No 147, 1994.
1011 SLC Report para 1.1.
1012 Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 82, Forfeiture and Confiscation, 1989.
1013 SLC Report para 1.2.
1014 SLC Report para 2.8.
1015 SLC Report para 2.10.
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note of the Convention definitions of "proceeds", "property" and
"confiscation"1016. The international context, and the Laundering Convention in
particular, was very much in the Commission's mind in the formulation of its
recommendations1017 and it may therefore be said that the SLC Report's ultimate
fruit, the Proceeds of Crime (Scotland) Act 1995, is influenced by conventional
international law even though that influence is not immediately apparent from the
text. It is clear that any approach which would have been acceptable within a
purely municipal frame of reference would nevertheless have been rejected by the
SLC if it had been incompatible with the Laundering Convention.
Examination of the Report discloses that the international law influence
went rather further than merely establishing a framework within which the
legislation was required to fit. In some aspects it made a positive contribution to
the course recommended by the SLC. Addressing the fundamental question of
when confiscation should be competent, the SLC noted Gilmore's remark that the
Laundering Convention "contains an implicit invitation for such legislation to be
as broad in scope as possible"1018 and on that ground justified a significantly wider
scope for confiscation in Scotland than existed in England and Wales under the
1988 Act. In defining the key concepts of "benefit" from crime and "property", the
SLC proceeded under explicit reference to the definitions in the Laundering
Convention1019. The inclusion of a restraint order mechanism was justified not
primarily under reference to the precedents in DTOA and the 1987 Act (though
these were mentioned) but by the requirements of Article 3 of the Laundering
Convention. Protocol 1 ECHR and the decision of the Human Rights Court in
Raimondo v Italy were considered along with Article 5 of the Laundering
1016 SLC Report para 2.9.
1017 In the interests of complete accuracy it is recorded here that the writer was seconded part time
to the SLC to assist with its work on confiscation and that the SLC was not aware of the
international dimension until the writer drew it to the attention of the responsible Commissioner,
Sheriff ED MacPhail QC. It must be emphasised that he was immediately receptive and that,
having been referred to the basic texts, he went on to research the matter himself. The particular
references to international law in the Report are attributable to him and not to the writer.
1018 SLC Report para 3.2, citing WC Gilmore, International Efforts to CombatMoney Laundering,
xv.
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Convention and its associated Explanatory Report in the formulation of proposals
for the protection of third party interests in property liable to be realised to satisfy
a confiscation order1020. Similar references characterise the SLC's consideration of
the forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime1021. A chapter is devoted to
international co-operation and it proceeds within the framework of the
requirements ofArticles 7 and 11 of the Laundering Convention1022.
What the SLC effectively did was to check the existing confiscation law as
regards drug trafficking against the requirements of the Laundering Convention
and ECHR and to formulate recommendations for a confiscation regime applying
to other types of predicate offence under conscious reference to the requirements
of those two instruments. The Report included a draft Bill, which was enacted
with no alteration of any significance for our present purpose. The law is now
very much in the form which the SLC recommended. It may therefore be said that
confiscation law in Scotland has been deliberately put into a form in which it is
consistent with the relevant international instruments and that this has involved
some departure from the English law model.
It would be wrong to make too much of this. For one thing, such an
approach was essential if the reservation which severely limited the effect of the
Laundering Convention as regards Scotland was to be withdrawn. For another, it
was the SLC and not the Government which made such a point of securing
compliance with the Convention1023. And, finally, the steps necessary to comply
with the Convention were relatively minor and certainly did not involve any
major policy changes. Even without the Laundering Convention, Scottish
confiscation law would have looked very much as it does now. The references to
international law tended to confirm and support the approach to which the SLC
was in any event inclined and to provide a useful peg upon which to hang
1019 SLC Report para 4.3.
1020 SLC Report para 10.1.
1021 SLC Report paras 11.1, 12.6, 12.20, 16.2.
1022 SLC Report paras 18.1-18.19.
1023 It should be recorded, however, that the Scottish Office official with responsibility for
proceeds of crime issues was anxious to be able to have the declaration withdrawn.
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recommendations rather than to demand an approach which the SLC would not
otherwise have chosen. In a wider UK framework, that, as we have seen, is
exactly what happened as regards money laundering law and the EC Directive.
The writer has analysed the content of the 1995 Act in great detail in the
Current Law Statutes Annotated series and it is not necessary to repeat that
analysis here. The effect was very much to apply the scheme of the 1987 Act to
all types ofpredicate offence.
What does require some consideration, however, is why it should be that
there have been very few prosecutions for money laundering and why confiscation
orders should have accounted for only very small amounts of money by
comparison with the large estimates of the value of the drugs trade internationally.
The Second Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council
on the implementation of the Money Laundering Directive notes that "It does
not appear that large amounts are being confiscated and there are indications,
from certain Member States, that much of the money seized or frozen
ultimately has to be returned or released"1024. The Home Office Working Group
on Confiscation has noted that "Whilst the United Kingdom's criminal
confiscation scheme has had some effect in depriving criminals of their assets, it
has not been as successful as originally anticipated...[the amount confiscated]
represents only a tiny proportion of the sums by which criminals are benefiting
from crime"1025.
The Fraud and Specialist Services Unit at Crown Office no longer
maintains a record of confiscation orders made and has never maintained a record
of money laundering prosecutions. Such orders and prosecutions are not
separately identified for Scotland; indeed, the Home Office publication Drug
Seizure and Offender Statistics, United Kingdom, 1997, although it addresses the
whole of the UK in most of its statistics, restricts information about confiscation
1024XV/1116/97-rev.2, 21.
1025Home Office Working Group on Confiscation, Third Report, Criminal Assets, November 1998,
paras 4.2 and 4.2.
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orders to England and Wales alone1026 Confiscation orders are not mentioned at
all in the Scottish Office publication Costs, Sentencing Profiles and the Scottish
Criminal Justice System, 1997mi. Some limited statistics are given for




1993/4 "In excess of£260,000"
1994/5 "In excess of£50,000"
1995/6 "In excess of£260,000"
1996/7 "In excess of "£455,000"
1997/8 In excess of£390,000"
By way of comparison, the English figures were as follows1029:












Separate figures for non-drug confiscations in Scotland are not published
or collated but it is understood that between April 1998 and April 1999 5 such
cases were dealt with and confiscation orders made to a total of £279,4421030. For
England and Wales, the Home Office Working Group on Confiscation has said
that "between April 1989 and December 1996, £14.9 million was ordered to be
1026 John Martin Corkery, Drug Seizure and Offender Statistics, United Kingdom, 1997, Home
Office Statistical Bulletin, Issue 8/99, 29 April 1999, para 68.
1027 Published 30 March 1999.
1028 Numbers of cases are not given except for 1994/5 when there were 2 orders, 1995/6 when
there were 9, 1996/7 when there were 6 and 1998/9 when there were 10.
1029 John Martin Corkery, op cit, 31.
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confiscated from criminals convicted of offences to which Part VI of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988 applies. Appeals resulted in downward variations totalling
£630,000 while approximately £1.5 million was written off following the serving
of default sentences. This left a revised total of approximately £12.7 million
available for confiscation of which £4.5 million was remitted to the Consolidated
Fund indicating a recovery rate of approximately 37%"1031. A little later, the
Working Group noted that "the number of convicted drug traffickers liable to a
confiscation order rose from about 3,000 in each of the years 1987 to 1991 to over
7,000 in 1996. The number of confiscation orders actually made first exceeded
1,000 in 1991, rising to a little over 1,500 in 1996. In the same period, the total
amount ordered to be confiscated rose from just over £1 million in 1987 to over
£10 million in 1996. Between 1987 and 1996 only 157 drug trafficking
confiscation orders for £100,000 or more were made against a background of over
45,000 convictions for supply of drugs. It may be inferred from the statistics that
large numbers of persons are convicted who have insufficient assets to justify a
confiscation order being made, whilst relatively few confiscation orders are being
made against major criminals with substantial assets. Furthermore, whilst the
amounts ordered by the courts to be confiscated have risen, those actually realised
have remained consistently low at about £5 million per annum in relation to the
proceeds of drug trafficking, and less where the proceeds of all other serious
crimes are concerned"1032.
Levi has examined this issue from a criminology perspective, including
comparative material from non-UK jurisdictions1033. Some of his conclusions are
rather subjective, involving comment on the lack of organisational incentive for
law enforcement officers and prosecutors to invest effort in confiscation work and
on a perceived lack of expertise on the part of counsel and judges. He may be
1030 Conversation with Ms C Duncan, Fraud and Specialist Services Unit, Crown Office, 8th June
1999.
m'Op cit para 2.4.
m2Op cit paras 4.2-4.3.
1033 Michael Levi, "Taking the Profit Out ofCrime: The UK Experience" 5 European Journal of
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 228, 237 (1997).
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right but assessing the accuracy and significance of propositions such as these is
difficult. Two other explanations which he offers do, however, clearly hold water.
The first of these is that "relatively few 'Mr Bigs' have been convicted in the
courts" and so few of the most major figures in the drugs business (in whose
hands one might expect the biggest profits to be concentrated) have suffered
confiscation. This accords well with evidence given by the Crown Office to the
Scottish Affairs Committee in 1993, when it was said that "the hidden profits of
drug trafficking in Scotland in relation to the identified accused persons is
considerably lower than in England and Wales...the pattern to date in Scotland in
importation cases has tended to be the persons who are arrested are perhaps lowly
seamen or paid couriers rather than the people behind the organisation"1034.
The second of Levi's points is that persistent offenders at a medium or low
level tend to have "spend as they go" lifestyles with low savings ratios, so that
there is little available for confiscation. It is certainly the case that Crown Office
scrutiny of the financial position of offenders with a view to confiscation
proceedings tends to discover that the benefit which they can be shown to have
derived from crime is higher (sometimes significantly higher) than their realisable
property. In HM Advocate v McLean1035, for example, in which the Opinion of
Lord Sutherland sets out the financial position of the offender in detail, the benefit
from crime was £146,064 but the value of the realisable property was only
£98,966.
As regards the prosecution of money laundering offences, the European
Commission has explained, so far as the UK is concerned, that "between 1993
and 1996 there were 25 convictions for money laundering, of which 13 [were]
in 1996. Although only 1 prosecution for money laundering resulted from a
suspicious transaction report there were over 200 known prosecutions for other
offences in 1996 as a result of reports passed on to police or investigative
1034 Scottish Affairs Committee, First Report, Session 1993-94, Drug Abuse in Scotland, HC Paper




In Kerr v HM Advocate1037 Lord Hunter said1038 that section 4(3)(b) of the
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 "was purposely enacted in the widest terms and was
intended to cover a great variety of activities both at the centre and also on the
fringes of dealing in controlled drugs. It would, for example, in appropriate
circumstances include the activities offinanciers, couriers, and other go-betweens,
lookouts, advertisers, agents and many links in the chain of distribution". Earlier
in his Opinion, he doubted whether the offence could be regarded simply as a
form of statutory concert. Lord Hunter's analysis was approved by the Lord
Justice-Clerk (Ross) in Kyle v HM Advocate1039. For English law, R v Blake and
O'Connor1040 confirms that the offence may be committed by a person who is at
some distance from the making of an offer to supply, provided that there is some
identifiable participation in the process1041. With these cases, we should read
Nelson vHMAdvocate1042, in which it was held (subject to the requirement for fair
notice) that the Crown could lead evidence of a crime not charged where that
crime was relevant to the proof of the crime which was charged.
When we examine the content of the several money laundering offences in
light of these authorities, it becomes clear that section 4(3)(b) of the 1971 Act is
in fact apt to cover much ofwhat is dealt with in the money laundering legislation
(other than the Regulations).
Section 14(1) of the 1990 Act strikes at the drug trafficker who, in order to
avoid prosecution or confiscation, conceals or disguises property representing the
proceeds of drug trafficking. The property concerned need not itselfbe entirely, or
even substantially, the proceeds of drug trafficking; nor does it require to be the
actual proceeds. It is enough if part of the property concerned represents those
m6Op cit Annex 9.
1037 1986 SCCR 81
1038 At 87.
1039 1988 SLT 601,603.
1040 (1979) 68 Cr App R 1, CA.
1041 RvFarr [1982] Crim LR 745 CA; cfRv Hughes (1985) 81 Cr App R 344 CA per Gore LJ.
i04T994 SCCR 192
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proceeds even indirectly1043. This offence is plainly ancillary to the drug
trafficking itself. In order to prove it, the Crown would require to prove that the
accused had proceeds of drug trafficking. The evidence to prove that, combined
with evidence of the kind of dealings with money which would be within the
ambit of section 14(1), would be likely to be apt to prove the predicate offence.
There is little point in a prosecutor trying to prove money laundering when he can
prove drug trafficking. Similarly, the person who knows that property is in whole
or in part the proceeds of drug trafficking and has dealings with it so as to bring
himself within section 14(2) is very likely also to bring himself within section
4(3)(b) of the 1971 Act as explained in Kerr. Subject to a possible exception in
the case of the single-transaction drug trafficking case, in which the crime is
complete before anything is done with the property, the evidence of the dealings
with property is evidence which might well be apt to prove involvement in
continuing drug trafficking itself. Indeed, in R v McMaster1044 it was held that the
offence (now consolidated for England and Wales as section 50(1) of the Drug
Trafficking Act 1994) is apt to cover the conversion of sterling to Dutch guilders
in order to buy drugs (and not merely to hide the proceeds). The scope left to
section 14(2) alone is thus reduced to the situation in which the person who deals
with property only has reasonable grounds to suspect the provenance of the
property.
Section 37 of the (Consolidation) Act makes a person guilty of an offence
if, knowing that any property is, or in whole or in part directly or indirectly
represents another person's proceeds of drug trafficking, he acquires or uses that
property or has possession of it1045. Again leaving aside the case where drug
trafficking has ceased before the accused becomes involved with the property, the
person who acts in a way which is liable to be struck at by section 37 is also liable
l043For more detailed analysis, see Alastair N Brown, Proceeds ofCrime: Money
Laundering... 144.
10441998 TLR659.
1045For more detailed analysis, see Alastair N Brown, Proceeds ofCrime: Money
Laundering... 154.
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to be convicted under section 4(3)(b) of the 1971 Act.
Similarly, section 38 of the (Consolidation) Act makes a person is guilty
of an offence if, knowing or suspecting that another person is involved in drug
trafficking, he is concerned in an arrangement whereby the retention or control of
the proceeds of drug trafficking is facilitated. This offence is not capable of being
committed by a person in relation to his own proceeds of drug trafficking, though
it is possible to figure a case in which one member of a trafficking group assists
another member to retain that other member's proceeds and thus commits this
offence. In general, however, the offence is aimed at those who have not
participated in the actual trafficking but who assist in retention. The precondition
is that the accused knows or suspects that the other person is one who carries on,
or has carried on, or has derived financial or other rewards from, drug trafficking.
It is to be noted that the knowledge or suspicion relates to activities, not to the
particular funds1046. Again, in the case of the person who can be proved to have
known the provenance of the property, proof that a person assisted in the retention
of the proceeds of the crime is very likely to bring that person equally within
section 4(3)(b) of the 1971 Act. Prosecutors will usually prefer to proceed for the
well-understood section 4(3)(b) offence, which is, after all, the primary offence.
Money laundering offences are, by definition, derivative. Once again, the money
laundering offence is likely to be the charge of choice only in the case of the
accused who can only be proved to have suspected the provenance of the
property.
The first explanation for the infrequency with which money laundering is
prosecuted, therefore, is that there is a good chance that many money laundering
offences are simply subsumed within charges under section 4(3)(b) of the 1971
Act. Indeed, they may be subsumed in other charges as well. In R v Bennmi,
evidence of money laundering was part of the proof of conspiracy to evade the
prohibition on the importation of class A drugs. To put it another way, UK law
1046For more detailed analysis, see Alastair N Brown, Proceeds ofCrime: Money
Laundering... 156.
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was already, as a result of existing law, and in particular the 1971 Act, in a
position to penalise money laundering and hence consistent with much of what
was required by the 1988 UN Drugs Convention, the Laundering Convention and
the Directive.
Secondly, it might well be that the inffequency with which money
laundering is prosecuted is a further reflection of the factors which have caused
the confiscation figures to be lower than might have been expected. If McFadyen
was right to suggest that few of the promoters of drug trafficking are caught in
Scotland and if Levi is right to explain the low figures in terms of the hedonistic
lifestyle of criminals, it would follow that the proceeds of much drug trafficking
in Scotland would be running at a sufficiently low level not to require laundering
and that those making such proceeds are less concerned with laundering them than
with spending them on consumable goods. This does not make the legislation
unnecessary. It is well recognised that laundering activity moves away from
jurisdictions with strong anti-money laundering legislation towards jurisdictions
with a weaker legislative framework1048 and the having of the legislation in place
must have some deterrent effect.
Finally, it should be noted, that in order to prove all of the offences
discussed above, the Crown has to prove that the property concerned is or
represents the proceeds of drug trafficking in particular, rather than of crime in
general. In the confiscation context, the link between proceeds and drug
trafficking is made using the statutory assumptions. As Lord Sutherland put it in
McLean, "the general approach taken by the Crown is set out in Schedule 1. The
first section calculates the increase in net assets for each year. The second section
calculates total withdrawals from building society and bank accounts with an
adjustment for payments which have already been taken into account by reason of
increasing assets or reducing liabilities. The sum of net increase in assets and
withdrawals constitutes known expenditure. From this is deducted for each year
1047 Unreported, Court ofAppeal, 10 December 1998 (transcript on file with author).
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the total known income. The balance constitutes expenditure which cannot be
explained by known legitimate transactions and, using the assumption contained
in section 3(2) [of the 1987 Act], is deemed to be the proceeds of drug
trafficking"1049. No such assumptions are available in relation to the money
laundering offences and the fact that the property was the proceeds of drug
trafficking in particular would require full proof to the criminal standard. That is a
task which would not be easy to accomplish, especially where active steps had
been taken to conceal the existence or provenance of the property.
Somewhat similar points may be made about non-drug money laundering.
Section 93C of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 ("the 1988 Act") creates non drug
laundering offences equivalent to those in section 14 of the 1990 Act. Sections
93A and 93 B of the 1988 Act create offences of assisting another to retain the
benefit of criminal conduct and of acquisition, possession or use of the proceeds
of criminal conduct, equivalent to sections 38 and 37 of the (Consolidation) Act
respectively. In the case of a continuing, organised, criminal scheme, the evidence
which would be necessary to prove these offences would (especially because the
Crown would require to prove the predicate offence to prove the money
laundering) be very likely to be sufficient to convict the accused of the predicate
offence on the basis of accession. Lord Patrick's explanation of accession in HM
Advocate v Lappen and Others'050 (a robbery case) seems to make the point clear:
"if a number ofmen form a common plan whereby some are to commit the actual
seizure of the property, and some according to the plan are to keep watch, and
some according to the plan are to help to carry away the loot, and some according
to the plan are to help to dispose of the loot, then, although the actual robbery
may only have been committed by one or two of them, everyone is guilty of the
robbery..."1051.
1048 See, for example, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Annual Report 1996-
1997, para 18.
1049Emphasis added.
1050 1956 SLT 109, 110.
1051 Emphasis added.
300
The 1999 (Designated Countries and Territories) Order
The Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime (Designated Countries and Territories)
(Scotland) Order 19991052 was made under the powers given by sections 40 and 43
of the 1995 Act. Section 40 provides for the enforcement of orders made outside
the UK while section 43 provides for the taking of action in designated foreign
countries. Put another way, section 40 deals with the giving of mutual legal
assistance in connection with the confiscation of the proceeds of crime while
section 43 deals with the obtaining of such assistance.
Section 40 provides that Order in Council may "direct in relation to a
country or territory outside the United Kingdom designated by the Order that,
subject to such modifications as may be specified", Part I of the 1995 Act (which
deals with confiscation) and Part III of the Act (which deals with restraint orders)
"shall apply in relation to external confiscation orders and to proceedings which
have been or are to be instituted in the designated country and may result in an
external confiscation order being made there"1053. "External confiscation order" is
defined so as to mean "an order made by a court in a designated country for the
purpose of recovering payments or other rewards or property or other economic
advantage" received in connection with offences corresponding to those to which
Part I of the Act applies-that is, those non-drug crimes for which confiscation is
available in Scottish cases-or received in connection with drug trafficking1054.
The UK ratified the Laundering Convention on 28 September 1992 with
the reservation that, as regards Scotland, confiscation was only available in drug
trafficking cases. Article 7(2) of that Convention provides that "each Party shall
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to enable it to
comply, under the conditions provided for in this chapter, with requests...(a) for
confiscation of specific items of property representing proceeds or
instrumentalities, as well as for confiscation of proceeds consisting in a




1995 Act came into force on 1 April 1996. It took until 1 May 1999 and the
coming into force of the Order in Council for Scots law to be put in a position to
meet the obligations which the UK had accepted under the Laundering
Convention. It is understood that no request was received in the interim for
assistance in the confiscation in Scotland of the proceeds of non-drug crime. This
was probably fortuitous; or it may be that other States, aware of the reservation,
simply did not ask It is undeniable, however, that Scottish Office (the Department
responsible for obtaining the Order in Council) plainly did not accord any
significant priority to putting in place a means of meeting the international
obligations which had been accepted in relation to proceeds of crime. It is easy to
criticise the Home Office for ignoring Scots law in its international criminal
justice policy; but if the Scottish Office does not pursue international criminal law
issues with greater vigour than it demonstrated in relation to this Order in Council
it is understandable that Home Office should concentrate its attentions elsewhere.
The 1998 Confiscation Order follows the same pattern as the Forfeiture
Order. It operates by applying a modified version of parts I and III of the 1995
Act to orders made by courts in designated countries "for the purpose of
recovering payments or other rewards or property or other economic advantage
received in connection with offences corresponding with or similar to offences to
which part I of the Act applies or drug trafficking"1055.
The Order was made under powers granted by section 40 of the 1995 Act.
It supersedes an Order made under the 1987 Act and its subsequent amendments
to reflect the designation of new countries1056 but restricted, as the 1987 Act was
itself, to drug trafficking cases.
Schedule 3 to the 1998 Order rewrites the 1998 Act as necessary to apply
it to "external confiscation orders", an expression defined in the Act under
1054 Section 40(2).
'""Explanatory Note.
1056 Confiscation of the Proceeds ofDrug Trafficking (Designated Countries and Territories)
(Scotland) Order 1991 (SI 1991 No 1467 as amended by SI 1992 No 1733, 1993 No 1806 and
1993 No 3156).
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reference to offences "corresponding with or similar to" offences to which part I
of the 1995 Act applies or drug trafficking1057.
Part I of the Act applies, by section 1(2), to offences prosecuted on
indictment and to those offences prosecuted summarily, for which the available
penalty exceeds the usual summary maxima. For restraint order purposes, it was
held in Carnegie vMcKechniel0ss that section 1(2) is "unhappily worded" and that
it was plain from a wider reading of the Act that Parliament intended that restraint
orders might be pronounced immediately following the institution of proceedings
against an individual, which might well occur at a time before there is any
indictment. The Court adopted what it called a "strained" construction in order to
give effect to this intention. Since the Order proceeds on the basis that assistance
will be available when proceedings have been instituted in a designated
country1059, it may be that Carnegie v McKechnie is a timely decision, avoiding
unlooked for complications about what in a given foreign state is equivalent to
indicting in Scotland.
Article 18(4) of the Laundering Convention permits States parties to
refuse co-operation if "under the law of the requested Party confiscation is not
provided for in respect of the type of offence to which the request relates". This,
the Explanatory Report tells us1060 "is meant to cover cases where confiscation is
not at all provided for in respect of a certain offence by the requested Party". The
breadth of application of Part I of the 1995 Act seems likely to be such that Scots
law will rarely have to refuse co-operation on this ground. Moreover, in re JLxm
Judge J held that the equivalent English Order was operative notwithstanding the
fact that the proceedings in the foreign country were civil proceedings in rem.
There seems to be no reason why a similar decision should not be reached if the
point arose in Scotland.
10571995 Act s40(2).
10581999 GWD 7-319; fall transcript on file with author.
l059Schedule 3 para 14.
l060Para 70.
1061 The Times, 4 May 1994.
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The detailed modifications made by the Order are technical and
consequential to the need to make restraint and confiscation available to assist
requesting States. They do not require analysis here.
The States which are designated for mutual assistance fall into 2 groups.
The first group consists of those States which are Party to the 1988 UN Drugs
Convention. They are designated only in relation to drug trafficking1062. The
second group is designated in relation to all types of predicate offence1063. It
consists of a mixture of Commonwealth countries able to co-operate under the
Harare Scheme as amended, Parties to the Laundering Convention and the 3
countries (Canada, Thailand and the USA) with which the UK has the general
MLATs discussed above1064.
Confiscation and Human Rights
ECtHR has been required to consider confiscation and forfeiture regimes in a
number of cases and EComHR has recently dealt with another case in which the
application of one of the ECtHR cases has been discussed and refined. These
cases will be described shortly. In general, however, it is worth noting Reid's
remark that "draconian powers for the seizure of goods in the customs or criminal
context which pursue lawful and legitimate purposes have proved acceptable [to
ECtHR], subject to minimum requirements of procedural safeguards"1065. She
cites Handyside v United Kingdom1066, in which ECtHR held that States have an
extremely wide margin of appreciation in relation to the necessity for interference
with property rights in pursuit of the general interest (though she does point out
that Handyside represented "an extreme approach" which has been mitigated by
later cases1067).
It is also worth noting that the SLC Report took some account of ECHR in
l062Article 3 and Schedule I Part I.
l063Article 3 and Schedule I Part II.
1064Page 177.
1065 Karen Reid, A Practitioner's Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights, 1998, 218.
1066 (1979-80) 1 EHRR737.
1067 Ibid, n23.
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relation to the protection of third-party interests in property liable to forfeiture or
confiscation1068. It noted briefly that Article 1 of the First Protocol, which protects
the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, provides specifically that its
protection of that right is not to impair in any way the right of a State to enforce
such laws as it deems necessary, inter alia, to secure the payment of penalties. As
we have noted, however, the SLC Report proceeded explicitly under reference to
the Laundering Convention and, as a result, the 1995 Act is also consistent with
the Laundering Convention. It is well recognised that ECtHR reasons not only in
the light ofECHR itself but also in the light of general international law1069 and in
the light of the developing work of the Council of Europe1070. It is therefore
possible to proceed on the basis that, to the extent that the provisions of the 1995
Act reflect accurately the Laundering Convention and other multilateral treaties
with wide participation, they would not be held to breach ECHR.
Raimondo v Italy1071 was the first case in which the Court considered
confiscation other than under special Customs powers. In it, the applicant was
prosecuted, and ultimately acquitted, on charges relating to his alleged
membership of a mafia-type organisation. In connection with the prosecution, the
Italian District Court had, on 13 May 1985, ordered "preventive seizure" of 10
plots of land, 6 buildings and 6 vehicles. On 16 October 1985, it ordered the
confiscation of some of those assets on the ground that it had not been proved that
they had been lawfully acquired. Following his acquittal on 30 January 1986, the
Italian Court of Appeal on 4 July 1986 ordered the return of the confiscated
1068SLC Report para 10.1.
1069 See in particular JG Merrills, The development of international law by the European Court of
Human Rights, 2°d edition, 1993, chapter 19.
1070 In Burghartz v Switzerland (1994) 18 EHRR 101, which concerned the right ofmarried
persons to choose the name by which they would be known, part of the Court's reasoning in
support of its conclusion that Article 8 had been breached was the fact that "the advancement of
the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the Member States of the Council ofEurope".
Precisely the same consideration had been invoked by the Court in Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v UnitedKingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 471, an immigration case in which the point at
issue was the disadvantageous position in which the husbands of female immigrants were placed
compared with the wives ofmale immigrants.
1071 Supra.
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property. There was, however, delay of over 4 years in the return of some of the
property.
The applicant complained, inter alia, that the confiscation had breached
Article 1 of Protocol 1 in itself and in that the property had not been adequately
supervised and had suffered damage. ECtHR held that the seizure ordered on 13
May was "clearly a provisional measure intended to ensure that property which
appears to be the fruit of unlawful activities carried out to the detriment of the
community can subsequently be confiscated if necessary. The measure as such
was therefore justified by the general interest and, in view of the extremely
dangerous economic power of an 'organisation' like the Mafia, it cannot be said
that taking it at this stage of the proceedings was disproportionate to the aim
pursued...the confiscation...pursued an aim that was in the general interest, namely
it sought to ensure that the use of the property in question did not procure for the
applicant, or the criminal organisation to which he was suspected of belonging,
advantages to the detriment of the community...The Court is fully aware of the
difficulties encountered by the Italian State in the fight against the Mafia. As a
result of its unlawful activities, in particular drug trafficking, and its international
connections, this 'organisation' has an enormous turnover that is subsequently
invested, inter alia, in the real property sector. Confiscation, which is designed to
block these movements of suspect capital, is an effective and necessary weapon in
the combat against this cancer. It therefore appears proportionate to the aim
pursued...the preventive effect of confiscation justifies its immediate application
notwithstanding any appeal". With regard to the confiscation, the state did not
overstep its margin of appreciation. As to damage, that is an inevitable
consequence of any seizure or confiscation. It was not clear that the damage
sustained exceeded that which was inevitable. However, the Court found it hard to
see why there had been such a long delay in returning property to the applicant.
That delay was neither provided for by law nor necessary and in that respect there
was a breach ofArticle 1 of Protocol 1.
This approach would tend to confirm that ECtHR would not regard a
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Scottish Restraint Order as being in any way in breach of ECHR, not least
because there is a facility in such orders for the appointment of an administrator to
property which requires active management to preserve its value. This would
place the owner of property affected by a Scottish Restraint Order in a rather
better position than was Mr Raimondo. Moreover, and at the most general level, it
seems possible to derive two broad propositions from the Raimondo case. The
first is that in cases where serious organised crime is alleged, confiscation
arrangements and interim measures designed to facilitate such arrangements, will
not breach ECHR even where there is damage to the property concerned and the
accused is ultimately acquitted. The second is that the robust attitude which the
Court takes to action against serious crime does not extend to overlooking
maladministration.
In Welch v United Kingdom1072, the applicant had been arrested and
charged in November 1986 in relation to drug trafficking offences. In January
1987 DTOA came into force, making it possible for the first time for English
courts to impose confiscation orders. In February and May 1987 the applicant was
charged with further drug trafficking offences. In August 1988 he was convicted
of five counts. He was imprisoned and a confiscation order was imposed in the
sum of £66,914 (subsequently reduced on appeal to £59,914). He complained
under Article 7 that the imposition of a confiscation order constituted a retroactive
criminal penalty.
The Government argued that the true purposes of a confiscation order were
two-fold: firstly, to deprive a person of the profits which he had received from
drug trafficking and secondly, to remove the value of the proceeds from future use
in the drugs trade. On this basis, the Government argued, confiscation was not a
penalty.
ECtHR held, however, that the concept of a penalty in Article 7 is an
autonomous Convention concept. The wording of Article 7(1) indicates that the
starting point for the assessment of the existence of a penalty is whether the
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measure is imposed following conviction for a criminal offence. Other factors that
may be taken into account are the nature and purpose of the measure in question,
its characterisation under national law, the procedures involved in the making and
implementation of the measure and its severity.
Before a confiscation order can be made in English law, the accused must
have been convicted of a drug trafficking offence. This link is not diminished by
the fact that, due to the operation of the statutory presumptions concerning the
extent to which the accused has benefited from drug trafficking, the court order
may affect proceeds which are not directly related to the facts underlying the
criminal conviction. The 1986 Act was introduced to overcome the inadequacy of
existing powers of forfeiture. Although the provisions were designed to ensure
that proceeds were not available for use in future drug trafficking and that crime
does not pay, the legislation also pursues the aim of punishing the offender. The
aims of prevention and reparation are consistent with a punitive purpose and may
be seen as constituent elements of the very notion ofpunishment.
The Court considered that several aspects of the making of an order under
the 1986 Act were in keeping with the idea of a penalty even though they were
essential to the preventive scheme inherent in the 1986 Act. These included the
sweeping statutory assumptions that all property passing through the offender's
hands during a six-year period is the fruit of drug trafficking unless he can prove
otherwise, the fact that the confiscation order is directed to proceeds and not
restricted to actual enrichment or profit, the discretion of the trial judge in fixing
the order to take account of the degree of culpability of the accused and the
possibility of imprisonment in default of payment. These elements, considered
together, provide a strong indication of inter alia a regime ofpunishment.
Looking behind appearances at the reality of the situation, whatever the
characterisation of the measure of confiscation, ECtHR said that the fact remained
that the applicant faced more far reaching detriment as a result of the order than
that to which he was exposed at the time of the commission of the offences of
1072 (1995) 20 EHRR247.
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which he was convicted. There was therefore a breach of Article 7; but the Court
stressed that its conclusion related only to the retrospective application of the
legislation and did not call into question in any respect the powers of confiscation
conferred on the courts as a weapon in the fight against "the scourge of drug
trafficking". It should be added that the fact that confiscation is a penalty does not
necessarily mean that a confiscation hearing is the determination of a criminal
charge so as to bring Article 6 into play. It is possible that it is the determination
of a question of civil right-though that is undecided-but it is suggested that the
detailed arrangements for confiscation hearings, which include the giving to the
accused of substantial notice of the Crown case, would satisfy Article 6 in any
event.
In Taylor v United KingdomI073, EComHR considered the effect of Welch.
In 1986 the applicant had pleaded guilty to drug trafficking between January 1974
and September 1979. He was imprisoned and fined £234,750. In January 1987
DTOA came into force. In November 1994 the applicant was convicted of drug
trafficking between February 1990 and April 1993. He was imprisoned and a
confiscation order was made for an amount in excess of £15 million in relation to
proceeds from drug trafficking between 1974 and 1979 and between 1990 and
1993. He contended that the confiscation order breached Article 7 to the extent
that it related to proceeds from drug trafficking between 1974 and 1979. His
appeal was unsuccessful because the Court of Appeal held that at the time he
committed the offence between 1990 and 1993 (which had triggered the
Confiscation order) he was aware of the possibility of a confiscation order
because DTOA had come into force.
EComHR took a slightly different approach. They followed Welch in
holding that confiscation is a penalty for the purposes of Article 7 ECHR but
noted that the application of confiscation to proceeds relating to the earlier
offences was based on the fact that the applicant had "benefited" from drug
trafficking at that time rather than upon his conviction of it. It was not his earlier
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conviction upon which the Crown Court had relied in making that part of the
order which related to proceeds before DTOA came into force but rather his
admission that he had derived benefit. The confiscation order was therefore not a
penalty for the period between 1974 and 1979 but only for the period between
1990 and 1993.
Whilst Welch and Taylor are of assistance in understanding the nature of
UK confiscation orders in terms ofECHR, they would on their facts apply only to
a very limited range of cases. They will only be directly relevant where, in a drugs
case, proceeds obtained before the 1987 Act came into force are in issue. In other
kinds of crime, it would be proceeds obtained before the 1995 Act came into force
on 1 April 1996 to which these cases would have relevance. Every significant
aspect of the 1995 Act regime may be related to the Laundering Convention and,
in drugs cases, to the 1988 UN Drugs Convention. In particular, both of those
Conventions require that banking confidentiality (which might otherwise be an
issue) is not to be allowed to impede investigations1074. In Elton v United
Kingdom1075 it was argued for the applicant that the making of a confiscation order
against him (by an English Court, under DTOA) breached Article 6(2) ECHR in
that it was based on an assumption rather than on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
We leave aside the fact that this proposition depended in part on the fallacy that
ECHR prescribes any particular standard of proof. EComHR noted ECtHR's
remark in Welch that "it does not call into question in any respect the powers of
confiscation conferred on the courts as a weapon in the fight against the scourge
of drug trafficking"1076 and went on to deal with the matter on the basis of the
ordinary ECHR jurisprudence about presumptions1077, in terms of which the
critical question is the rebuttability of the presumption in question. The
application was held to be manifestly ill-founded, and hence inadmissible, on the
1073Application No 31209/96; [1998] EHRLR 90.
1074 Laundering Convention Art 4; 1988 Convention Art 5(3).
1075 Application No 32344/96, 11 September 1997.
1076 Court, para 36.
1077 Especially Salabiaku v France (1993) 13 EHRR 379 and Pham Hoang v France (1996) 16
EHRR 53.
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basis that the assumptions do not apply if they are shown to be incorrect.
It was suggested above that one consequence of Soering is that the
acceptance and manner of discharge of international extradition arrangements
would be affected significantly by ECHR. Elton provides some reason to think
that this proposition should be widened so as to apply to any international
obligation.
Article 5(7) of the 1988 UN Drugs Convention provides explicitly that
"each party may consider ensuring that the onus of proof be reversed regarding
the lawful origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable to confiscation"1078.
The UK is party to that Convention (as is every other Western European
country1079). It is possible, given the approach taken by EComHR in Elton, that
Article 5(7) of the 1988 Convention must be read subject to the qualification that
reversal of the onus of proofmust not be taken so far that it becomes irrebutable.
Great care must be taken not to overstate this point, however. First, the 1988
Convention provision is permissive and so States which are party to both ECHR
and that Convention are not faced with conflicting obligations. And secondly, of
course, EComHR did not actually consider the interaction of Article 6(2) ECHR
and Article 5(7) of the 1988 Convention provision. Nevertheless, it is suggested,
in light of the fact that in Soering ECtHR did not regard the UK's extradition
obligation as a sufficient justification for action which would breach Article 3
ECHR, it would be correct to approach Article 5(7) of the 1988 UN Convention
on the basis that it would not offer protection to a State Party to ECHR which
made the reversal of onus irrebutable.
Conclusion
By contrast with extradition and mutual legal assistance, there is no necessary
international element to proceeds of crime law; though in practice the frequency
with which money laundering has a transnational dimension justifies the interest
1078 Art 5(7).
1079 Second Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the
implementation of the Money Laundering Directive, COM (1998) 401 final, Annex 3.
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taken in the subject by the international community. That practical
transnationality is and always has been reflected in the definition of "drug
trafficking". That being so, the delay in putting the confiscation Order in Council
in place is disturbing.
Although there has been very substantial activity on the international plane
in relation to proceeds of crime, it is suggested that it is established that the
influence which the international instruments have had on UK or Scots law is
limited. The development of proceeds of crime law in Scotland until the 1995 Act
was clearly driven by domestic considerations. In the work which led to the 1995
Act, the Scottish Law Commission proceeded deliberately under reference to the
international instruments but its conclusions on the basis of the international
instruments did not lead it to any recommendations which varied significantly
from the existing structure of the law. Indeed this pattern continues. The Home
Office Working Group on Confiscation, in its Third Report1080, has recommended
that forfeiture of criminal proceeds should be available by civil process. No
international instrument requires that to be done.
In terms of the relationship between international law and criminal law,
then, proceeds of crime law can only tell us a limited amount. We can say that the
UK has been prepared to participate with some enthusiasm in international
initiatives which fit well with its national law and policy. Indeed, we can also say
that the UK has on a number of occasions seen in international or European
instruments an opportunity to extend its law and has done so beyond what is




This thesis has examined selected (but illustrative) aspects of the law in which
there arises a relationship between international law and criminal law. The first
and most obvious conclusion that may be drawn about the relationship between
international law and the criminal law of Scotland is that it is not merely
substantially unexplored. It is also underdeveloped. It would have been
impossible to write the municipal law parts of this thesis under exclusive
reference to Scottish material, even if it had been desirable to do so. More
significantly, it has been impossible to write those parts of the thesis under
primary reference to Scottish material. It would be too easy to blame this on the
pervasive anglocentricity ofUK international criminal justice policy and practice.
Although that is undoubtedly a factor, it is by no means the only one. The simple
truth is that (with a few individual exceptions) no section of the legal community
which might have been expected to contribute to the relationship between
international law and Scottish criminal law has so far done very much at all to
develop that relationship. Some have, from time to time, done quite a lot to
discourage it.
In Kaurxm and Moore10*2, the judiciary closed the door on reference to
ECHR and also, because those cases treated of the use of unincorporated treaties
in general and simply applied that law to reference to ECHR, on reference to all
other unincorporated treaties. Until T, Petitioner™*2, the Scottish judiciary showed
itself to be much less receptive to international law points in criminal cases than
was the English judiciary. In Muirhead1084 the Crown, having failed to persuade
the sheriff in Lesacher1085, was successful in obtaining from the High Court a
highly restrictive approach to section 32 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act








reflected the attitude of the government of the day which, in enacting the
provision, had made it clear that it anticipated that it would be used only in
relation to relatively formal matters1087. Scottish criminal justice policy has, of
course, been a matter for the Scottish Office and it could not be said that that
Department has been quick to pursue international criminal justice issues. The
delay until May 1999 in getting the Confiscation Order into place1088 is only one
illustration of that. More generally, one wonders whether the pervasive
anglocentricity ofUK international criminal law policy has been either inevitable
or wholly the fault of the Home Office.
Scottish solicitors and advocates have shown little inclination to take
international (or even European) law based points in criminal cases and those they
have taken have sometimes been sadly misconceived1089. The right of individual
petition under ECHR has been available since 1966 but the legal profession in
Scotland has been rather slow to make use of it1090. This has been at least as true of
criminal law practitioners as of the profession in general. It may be recalled that,
notwithstanding the considerable relevance of ECHR to criminal law, T,
Petitioner, in which the law was finally changed so as to permit reference to
ECHR, was a civil case before the Inner House of the Court of Session.
Nor have most Scottish academics been especially industrious in pursuing
the Scots law aspect of international criminal law. Some high quality work has
been published but it has been infrequent and has focussed on a limited range of
issues.
In the result, although some of the particular rules of Scots law differ from
those of English law (for example, as to the availability of search and seizure in
pursuance of a foreign investigation in connection with which proceedings have
not been commenced1091) it cannot be said that Scots law has developed a
1087 Ibid.
1088 See 299.
1089 See, for example, Jardine v Crowe 1999 SCCR 52.
1090 See Jim Murdoch, "The Human Rights Dimension" (1999) 44 JLSS 20.
1091 See 201.
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relationship with international law which is materially different in principle from
that between international law and English law. Indeed, one consequence of T,
Petitioner was to elide a difference between the respective relationships of Scots
and English law with international law. One may speculate that the advent of the
Scottish Parliament with legislative competence over criminal law and procedure
might open the possibility of divergence but, since the key areas of foreign affairs,
money laundering, proceeds of crime so far as it relates to drug trafficking and
extradition are all reserved matters1092 one should, perhaps, not hold one's breath.
It is entirely possible that the Scottish Executive, lacking any locus in foreign
policy, will give little attention to international criminal justice policy and that
Whitehall, lacking any responsibility for the development of Scottish criminal
law, will marginalise it even more than at present in international negotiations.
The handling of the UK position during the negotiation of the projected UN
Convention on Transnational Organised Crime might be illuminating.
Some Scottish representation in European Union affairs seems to be in
contemplation1093 and, since Europe has provided the context within which
significant parts of the development of UK international criminal justice policy
have taken place, it might be that there will be some departure from the practice
whereby the relationship between Scots law and international law is conducted by
proxy; but that remains to be seen. For the time being, one requires to understand
the relationship between international law and Scots law in very similar terms to
the relationship between international law and English law-except that the
implementation of international law in Scotland is rendered more difficult than it
need by the common habit of negotiating treaties with an exclusively English law
frame of reference and legislating in primarily English legal categories1094. The
uncertain grasp which policy makers seem to have of aspects of both national and
1092 Scotland Act 1998 Schedule 5 Part I para 7 and Part II para 3 sections A5, B1 and B11.
1093 It is understood that a protocol for dealing with the Scottish position in European affairs is
under discussion between the Scottish Executive and Whitehall.
1094 See P Robinson, "Treaty Negotiation, Drafting, Ratification and Accession by CARICOM
States", especially at 3-4, on the desirability of having present at negotiations a lawyer conversant
with the domestic legal context in which the treaty will have to operate.
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international law does not assist.
Just as it would be too easy to blame the underdevelopment of the
relationship between international law and Scots criminal law on anglocentricity,
so it would be too easy to characterise the relative lack of engagement of Scottish
actors in international criminal law matters as a manifestation of parochialism or
unreflective separatism. It is suggested that the shortage of material on
international criminal law from a Scots law perspective in fact reflects the
approach taken by successive UK governments to international criminal justice
policy more generally. Until the middle 1980s, although the UK did participate in
multilateral criminal law treaties, it saw no particular need to co-operate in
international criminal justice matters1095. Although the dualistic approach to the
general relationship between international law and municipal law was developed
by the courts, it is clear enough from comments made by the UK government in
international fora that it was content with that position1096. There was a barrier
between international law and municipal criminal law and successive
governments left it in place. Even now, notwithstanding the fact that in the middle
1980s the UK decided that international co-operation had become a matter of
necessity1097 and began to pursue active involvement in international criminal law,
it remains true that municipal criminal law has priority.
That priority follows from the fact that (with the exception of peremptory
norms, which do not concern us) the content of international law is very largely
within the control of states1098 and the rule, developed by the courts, that the
sovereign power of the Queen in Parliament extends to breaking treaties1099.
As to control over the content of international law, it is clear that
customary norms are not opposable to a state which has consistently objected to
1095 See 36.
1096 See 18, n37.
1097 See 76-77.




them1100. It is also clear (as a matter of the definition of a treaty as an agreement,
apart from any other consideration) that no State can be obliged to participate in a
treaty. Control over the content of criminal law is typically regarded by states as a
matter of sovereignty and tends, therefore, to be guarded jealously1101. No state
regards itself as being under any obligation to accept any criminal law rule
developed by the international community. On the contrary, states may be
expected to show significant resistance to anything which they perceive as
external interference in their criminal law. The UK's attitude to the requirement in
the Proposal for the Money Laundering Directive that money laundering should
be criminalised is illustrative of this. Notwithstanding the fact that such
criminalisation was a policy to which the UK was firmly committed, it will be
recalled that Mr A Harding of the Home Office, giving evidence to the House of
Lords Select Committee on the European Communities on the subject, invoked
the concept of sovereignty and said that the UK would be "very concerned" if
such a precedent was set1102. The UK's determination to control the content of its
international criminal law obligations is, of course, further illustrated by section
4(2) of the 1989 Act, which requires that international extradition arrangements
should conform to the statute.
By accepting an international obligation with which existing domestic
criminal law is inconsistent, a state commits itself to changing that criminal law.
Its willingness to accept such obligations must therefore (and obviously) depend
in large measure on its willingness to change its criminal law. The critical
question will always be how anxious a state is, as a matter of policy, to achieve
the objective of the treaty in question. We have noted above the attitude which the
UK took to the negotiation of the extradition provisions of the 1988 UN Drugs
Convention. Notwithstanding the fact that those provisions did not precisely
reflect the UK's traditional approach to extradition, the UK's desire to attack
1100 Brownlie, op cit, 10.
1101 See Christine Van den Wyngaert, "Foreword" in Christine Van den Wyngaert (and others)
(eds) Criminal Procedure Systems in the European Community, Butterworths, 1993, i.
1102 See 276.
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transnational drug trafficking was strong and may be seen as contributing to the
UK's supportive attitude to the draft of the Convention. Still more telling,
perhaps, was the UK's decision to abandon the prima facie case requirement, to
which it had been heavily attached. It is clear that this step was taken because the
UK attached an even higher priority to its wider aim of attacking international
crime.
The major overhaul of UK extradition and mutual assistance legislation
between 1988 and 1990 may be explained in a similar way. It had become clear
that the uncompromising anglocentricity of the UK's extradition law and practice
was a "stumbling block" to the UK's wider policy objective of attacking
transnational crime1103. An absence of mechanisms for the provision of mutual
assistance by the UK was causing "serious problems" for UK prosecution
authorities who were trying to secure assistance from other jurisdictions. Under
these imperatives, the law was changed. Although the UK wished to preserve so
far as possible what it regarded as its own legal traditions (as the 1982 Working
Party on Extradition said in terms), its priority was the attack on transnational
crime.
That priority is not, however, absolute. The European Union Convention
on the Establishment of a European Police Office1104 ("The Europol Convention")
is the only Third Pillar convention which has entered into force. Under it, there is
no role for the European Court of Justice. Germany and the Benelux countries
thought it reasonable to have the activities of Europol subject to ECJ scrutiny but
although the UK was heavily committed to the attack on transnational crime it
considered that policing and criminal justice are for Member States alone and not
for the EC institutions. Feelings ran so strongly on the ECJ issue that it looked at
times as though it might derail the whole Europol project. In the event, the
problem was dealt with in a protocol, which enabled Member States to accept the
jurisdiction of the ECJ to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the
1103 See 76.
1,04 OJ 95/C 316/2.
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Europol Convention1105. All of the Member States except the UK have now done
so. As regards the UK alone, therefore, the Europol Convention has entered into
force without any role for the ECJ.
The critical issue in all cases will be the balance of priority between the
UK policies which are affected. In the case of Europol, it is evident that the UK
took the view that national sovereignty as it applied to policing and the risk which
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ECJ is perceived as posing to that sovereignty
outweighs its undoubted commitment to attacking transnational crime.
The future is uncertain; but it does seem probable that it will be the UK's
involvement in Europe which will be the single most important influence on the
relationship between international law and Scottish criminal law. We have noted
the UK's preference for the Third Pillar of the EU over the First1106 and also the
public international law character of the Third Pillar1107. In the context of fraud on
the EC budget (a transnational crime which costs upwards of £5.5 billion per
year1108) the UK Government has placed great stress on completion and
ratification of Third Pillar instruments1109. One of the things which is clear from
the foregoing study is that European complaints about the UK's isolationist
approach played a significant part in the change in the UK's attitude during the
mid to late 1980s. It is also clear that Council of Europe and EU instruments have
played a large part in the development of current UK international criminal justice
policy. But there are limits. The Home Office continues to stress the importance
of national sovereignty1110 and there is no reason at present to suppose that the
Government is considering changing that position. That being so, municipal law
seems likely to retain its priority.
That priority is, of course, much modified from the isolationist attitude
1105 OJ 96/C 299/2.
1106 See 92.
"07See 88.
1108House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Prosecuting Fraud..., 7.
xmIbid, 98.
moHouse of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Prosecuting Fraud..., 99,
para 297, evidence of Kate Hoey, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office.
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which characterised UK international criminal justice policy (if one can call it a
policy) until the middle 1980s. Extradition and mutual assistance law have been
substantially recast and the UK has made it clear that it intends to engage actively
in international criminal justice matters in the future. The Government's agenda
for the immediate future was made clear to the House of Lords Select Committee
on the European Communities in a Home Office memorandum as recently as 24
March 19991111. The Government proposes the development of the concept of the
mutual recognition of court decisions, which "might in due course lead to fast-
track extradition (similar to backing of warrants); abolition of dual criminality
restrictions on extradition and MLA requests; and the ability for member states to
freeze suspect assets and certain types of evidence more quickly to prevent their
being dispersed". The paper submitted by the UK to the K4 Committee in March
1999 notes that public opinion is not always ready to accept that the procedures of
other member States are equivalent to their own and that governments will have to
inform and educate public opinion1112. The clear implication is that the UK
Government does accept that it is possible to have confidence in the criminal
justice systems of other EU countries. We have come a long way from the attitude
described by Harding1113.
The position at which we have arrived is this: the relationship between
international law and Scots criminal law is underdeveloped. Whilst there is a
Scots law dimension to the relationship between international law and criminal
law in the UK, the principles have been developed primarily in the context of
English law. In general, priority lies with municipal law but the UK has shown
itself willing to change municipal law and even to depart from principles which
English law has long cherished where the international obligation which is under
consideration for acceptance pursues a policy objective to which the UK
government at the time attaches particular priority. This, it should be said,
contradicts the tendency which the UK has shown in the past to assume that its
1111 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Prosecuting Fraud..., 98.
1112 Para 14.
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traditional approach to matters such as criminal jurisdiction and the prima facie
case requirement reflects fundamental legal principle; though the UK has not been
so accommodating as (for example) Holland, which has embraced mutual
assistance sufficiently thoroughly to legislate for evidence to be taken according
to the procedures of the requesting State1114 and international human rights
sufficiently thoroughly to legislate for the refusal of extradition ifprocedure in the
requesting State is contrary to ECHR1115.
In United States v Jamieson it was said that ministers dealing with
extradition must consider comity, reciprocity, treaty obligations and national
security interests1116. Much the same is true of international criminal law as a
whole. Although one may identify dualism and the consequent need for the
legislative transformation of treaties as fundamental to the relationship between
international law and municipal criminal law, not even these principles are
immutable. The relationship between international law and criminal law in the
UK, including the criminal law of Scotland, is not, in the final analysis, a matter
of legal principle. It is, rather, a matter of the working out in the law of political
priorities. One may identify and describe trends in the relationship but the
conclusion must be a positivist one. There are no immutable principles. The
relationship between international law and the criminal law of Scotland is entirely
a matter of Governmental choice as expressed in treaties and legislation; no more
and no less.
1113 See 150 above.
11,4 See 164.
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